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Abstract 
The energy retrofit of homes is one of the most important and challenging issues for the 
decarbonisation of the global economy - having wider benefits for social welfare, 
economic development, energy security and public health. This thesis examines how new 
‘business models’ and ‘finance mechanisms’, can promote a comprehensive ‘whole-
house’ approach to retrofit - involving integrated energy efficiency measures to the 
building fabric, low carbon heat measures such as heat pumps, and electricity micro-
generation such as solar photovoltaics (PV). In addition, it shows how policymakers can 
support these new business models and finance mechanisms through innovation 
intermediaries. To deliver these aims, this research involved thirty-eight semi-structured 
interviews, combined with information from documentary sources and is split into four 
original articles, with a primary focus on the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
Article 1 shows how new business models can be a powerful tool for overcoming the 
challenges of whole-house retrofit. The article describes and compares five business 
model archetypes - ranging from the traditional, to highly innovative business models. 
These innovative models are characterised by: an emphasis on home improvement, 
aesthetics and comfort; industrialised processes and integrated supply chains; a holistic 
customer offering and single point of sale; long term energy-saving performance 
guarantees and integral project finance. Although the traditional model is suitable for the 
implementation of single energy-saving measures, it is argued business model innovation 
will be required to meet the UK’s ambitious climate change targets. 
 
Article 2 explores the challenges of financing this retrofit activity at scale. First, it develops 
a novel typology of finance mechanisms for residential retrofit - highlighting their key 
design features. The article then explores how these features influence the success of 
these mechanisms in different contexts. Three outcomes are shown to be especially 
important: a low cost of capital for retrofit finance; funding for non-energy measures 
such as general improvement works; and reduced complexity through a simple customer 
journey. Most importantly, the article outlines how finance alone is unlikely to be a driver 
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of demand and should be viewed as a necessary enabler, of much broader retrofit 
strategy. 
 
Article 3 outlines how the adoption of ‘systemic innovations’, such as whole-house 
retrofit, may necessitate business model innovation. Through a case study of the 
innovative ‘Energiesprong’ retrofit business model it highlights the central role of an 
intermediary in this business model innovation. The article shows how Dutch 
policymakers sought to promote business model innovation through creation of this 
‘market development team’: developing a novel framework combining the components 
of business models with the functions of intermediaries. The article further argues that 
policymakers might promote business model innovation through intermediaries in other 
sectors. 
 
Article 4 outlines how recent policy initiatives in the UK, have failed to address four 
interrelated challenges that constrain demand for retrofits: 1) uncertain benefits and 
quality; 2) complexity, disruption and timing; 3) up-front capital cost and split incentives 
and 4) information, engagement and trust. Overcoming these challenges, will require a 
comprehensive and wide-reaching policy strategy - involving ambitious targets and 
regulations, and the creation and support of new finance mechanisms, business models 
and dedicated intermediary actors to support policy implementation. 
 
This thesis therefore demonstrates how a focus on business models and financing 
provides an effective means of integrating the social and behavioural, organisational 
management and economic and financial challenges of retrofit. Thus, providing a 
coherent picture of how these problems fit together, as well as making a conceptual 
contribution.  It further illustrates how policymakers can act to support business model 
innovation, through innovation intermediaries, and thus overcome many of the 
challenges facing the diffusion of whole-house retrofit.  
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“We shape our buildings; thereafter they shape us” - Winston Churchill 
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Preface 
This PhD thesis is the product of three years of research undertaken at the Science Policy 
Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. The thesis is the primary 
contribution towards the award of a Doctor of Philosophy in Science and Technology 
Policy at SPRU. This research was funded by the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) through a grant to the Centre on Innovation and Energy 
Demand (CIED), Ref. EP/K011790/1. 
 
The CIED sits at the forefront of research on the transition to a sustainable economy, 
focussing on how different forms of innovation can transform how energy is used, to 
achieve substantial reductions in energy demand. As a PhD researcher within the CIED, 
the author was privileged to be part of an interdisciplinary community researching energy 
demand issues. This provided an invaluable experience which led to the collaboration on 
a number of projects across the centre, also facilitating collaboration on the four articles 
that make up this thesis by papers. Whilst Article 1 is solo authored, Articles 2 and 3 were 
co-authored by the thesis supervisors with Article 4 co-authored by several other CIED 
members. Alongside the work presented here, the author also contributed to several 
other papers, public consultations and policy briefs as well as attending multiple 
academic and industry events as a representative of SPRU and the CIED. 
 
In producing this synthesis, a number of terms have been standardised across the four 
articles - to improve clarity and consistency. Therefore, the articles within this text vary 
slightly from their published counterparts in the following ways. Spellings are 
standardised to UK English throughout. The connecting chapters adopt the term whole-
house retrofit which is preferred to ‘comprehensive retrofit’ from earlier published 
versions. The use of ‘domestic’ has been standardised to ‘residential’ throughout. The 
use of greenhouse gases has been standardised to carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) 
throughout. The published version of Article 1 abbreviates business models to ‘BMs’, 
however in this document this abbreviation is removed. All other abbreviations are 
spelled out in each Article and in the Abbreviations section. In addition, a consolidated 
table of interviews is provided in Appendix A, which includes unique interview codes. 
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These codes have therefore been added to interview quotes across Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
These Articles are provided in its published form in Appendix D. References are formatted 
in the style of SPRU’s home journal, Research Policy.  
 
Upon receiving examiners corrections, Article 3 has been modified from its published 
form to provide a re-organised Section 4.5, a new Section 4.6 and new text forming 
Section 4.6.2. Therefore, this section now differs from the published version in the SPRU 
Working Paper Series (SWPS) and Appendix C. Further, Article 4 has been modified from 
its published form to include footnotes with interview quotations as requested by 
examiners corrections. 
 
Given that this is a papers style thesis, there is inevitably some repetition in the 
introductions to the four articles, as well as the literature reviewed. The aim of the 
connecting chapters (1, 6 and 7) is therefore to synthesise the findings across the articles 
such that they can be read as a ‘stand-alone’ contribution.  
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Key terms and concepts 
Concept Definition 
Business 
model 
A description of the nature of value delivered to customers, how 
organisations and networks create that value and the means of capturing 
revenues from these activities. 
Customer 
journey  
Defined as the sequence of events that customers experience in order to 
learn about, purchase and interact with products and services (Norton et 
al., 2013). 
Distributed 
Energy 
Electricity generating plant that is connected to a distribution network, 
rather than the transmission network: including Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) plants, wind farms, hydroelectric power, or solar 
photovoltaics. 
Finance 
mechanism  
The provision of capital through a combination of equity and/or debt that 
is repaid to the lender. 
Net-zero 
energy 
Where annual total household energy consumptions equals annual 
production of energy on-site through renewables (Energiesprong, 
2014). 
Regulated 
energy 
 
Building energy consumption resulting from fixed building services and 
fittings, including space heating and cooling, hot water, ventilation and 
lighting (BRE, 2014a). 
Retrofit Involves the introduction of new materials, equipment and hardware 
into an existing building with the aim of reducing the energy 
consumption of that building (Baeli, 2013). 
Sustainable 
energy 
The provision of energy such that it meets the needs of the present, 
without compromising the ability of future, generations to meet their 
own needs - having two key components: renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. 
Systemic 
innovations 
Systemic innovations require complementary changes in supporting 
technologies, technical skills, user competences, organisational practices 
and regulation (Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). 
Whole-
house 
retrofit 
Whole-house energy efficiency retrofit involves combining 
improvements to optimise the performance of the building as a whole. 
Whilst this may still be implemented in stages, it differs from the current 
mainstream approach in that it promotes the interaction of multiple 
measures to be considered (e.g. fabric, ventilation, heating, lighting and 
microgeneration) at the earliest stages (Lewis and Smith, 2013). 
Zero 
carbon 
Zero carbon assumes a SAP rating of 100+, assuming that unregulated 
emissions are mitigated through onsite renewables or the low carbon 
content of grid electricity – thus cannot include fossil fuel heating 
sources such as gas boilers.  
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Abbreviations 
BEIS - Business Energy and Industrial Strategy  
bn- Billion 
CBRP - CO2 Building Rehabilitation Programme 
CCC – Committee on Climate Change 
CEWO - Clean Energy Works Oregon  
CO2e – Carbon Dioxide Equivalents  
DfE - Department for Education  
DH - Department of Health  
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions  
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ECO – Energy Companies Obligation 
EE – Energy Efficiency  
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ESCO – Energy Service Company 
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NIC - National Infrastructure Commission  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Overview of the thesis  
This thesis examines how new business models and finance mechanisms can reduce the 
energy consumption of residential buildings by promoting ‘whole-house retrofits’, and 
how public policy can support these outcomes. Although the insights are relevant to an 
international audience, the thesis focuses primarily upon the UK - considered to be an 
interesting case, due to the age of its housing stock and the perceived failure of recent 
retrofit policies. 
 
The energy retrofit of homes presents one of the biggest challenges to decarbonising the 
global economy. In the UK, homes constitute around a fifth of total1 greenhouse gas 
emissions – hereafter referred to as carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) (CCC, 2016). The 
UK’s carbon reduction targets for homes imply a 24% reduction in direct2 CO2e from 1990 
levels by 2030, with near-zero emissions needed by 2050 (CCC, 2018). Such retrofits are 
frequently cost-effective and can have important ancillary benefits for social welfare, 
economic development, energy security and public health (Washan et al., 2014). While 
the UK has made considerable progress in decarbonising electricity generation emissions, 
reductions from buildings have plateaued since 2012, and actually increased on a 
temperature-adjusted basis in 2016 and 2017 (CCC, 2018).  
 
These emissions remain high due to an old and inefficient building stock - in which the 
majority of future energy and carbon savings must be found (CCC, 2018). The current 
housing stock will remain a major energy consumer in most advanced economies in 2050 
(IPCC, 2014); where in the UK 80-85% of current homes will likely still be standing (Fylan 
et al., 2016). Significant progress has previously been made in the UK, through relatively 
cost-effective, single measures such as loft and cavity wall insulation. Although much of 
this ‘low hanging fruit’ has now been exploited (Rosenow and Galvin, 2013), there 
remains an annual potential to insulate 545,000 lofts by 2022 and 200,000 cavity walls 
by 2030 (CCC, 2018, p.94). Notwithstanding this potential, meeting internationally agreed 
                                                        
1 This includes both direct emissions from fuels used for heating and hot water as well as indirect emissions from 
lighting and appliances 
2 Direct emissions exclude emissions from the generation of electricity supplied through the grid  
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emissions targets under the 2015 Paris agreement will require deeper emission 
reductions to a wider range of homes. This will necessitate a ‘whole-house’ approach to 
retrofit; including multiple energy efficiency improvements to the building fabric, low 
carbon heat measures such as heat pumps, and electricity microgeneration such as solar 
photovoltaics (PV).  
 
This thesis aims to bring a fresh perspective to the retrofit challenge by investigating the 
potential contribution of new business models and financing mechanisms. Whilst a 
number of studies have explored how new business models can facilitate sustainability 
(Boons et al., 2013), there have been very few studies of business models for residential 
retrofit (Mlecnik et al., 2018). Similarly, while there is recognition of the importance of 
finance in the energy transition (Hall et al., 2015), there has been limited attention to 
financing residential retrofit, or indeed financing energy efficiency in general (Diaz-Rainey 
et al., 2017). Through a primarily qualitative approach involving thirty-eight semi-
structured interviews and extensive documentary analysis, this thesis aims to provide 
practical insights into how the challenge of whole-house retrofits may be overcome, 
alongside theoretical contributions to the literatures on business models, finance and 
systemic innovation.  
 
Previous studies have investigated the technical (Mcelroy and Rosenow, 2018), social and 
behavioural, (Walker et al., 2014), organisational (Mlecnik et al., 2012), and economic 
and financial (Bird and Hernández, 2012) challenges of retrofit, but this literature remains 
fragmented. By adopting a business model perspective, this thesis aims to synthesise and 
extend these perspectives and provide a coherent picture of how these different 
elements might fit together, to deliver successful retrofits on a large scale. The thesis also 
suggests how public policy can support business model and financial innovation, notably 
through encouraging ‘innovation intermediaries’. Broadening Kivimaa et al’s., (2018) 
definition, innovation intermediaries are defined as: 
 
“Actors, networks and platforms that positively influence innovation processes by 
linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources” 
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The thesis also provides a theoretical contribution. First, it develops a business model 
framework which draws together literature on the components of business models 
(Boons et al., 2013; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) with the literature on organisational 
forms and governance (Eriksson, 2008; Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Second, it outlines how the different features of finance mechanisms affect the cost of 
capital and consumer appeal. Third, it suggests how public policy can promote business 
model innovation, combining ideas from the literature on systemic innovation (Midgley 
and Lindhult, 2015), business model innovation (Massa and Tucci, 2013) and innovation 
intermediaries (Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008).  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the research 
aims and questions, while Section 1.3 summarises the thesis structure. Section 1.4 
describes the UK context for building energy use and climate change targets and indicates 
the contribution that whole-house retrofits can make to those targets. Section 1.5 
reviews the literature on residential retrofit and shows how various challenges both 
reduce the demand for whole-house approaches and obstruct their delivery. It also 
summarises the concepts from the literature on business models and financing which are 
employed throughout the thesis. Section 1.6 summarises the methodology for the four 
original articles, while Section 1.7 summarises their content and results. 
 
1.2. Research aims and research questions  
Recent research has highlighted the potential role that innovative business models and 
financing may play in overcoming the challenges for sustainable innovation (Boons and 
Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). However, few studies have 
applied these concepts to the context of residential retrofit, with even fewer exploring 
their policy implications.  
 
A limited number of studies have explored the role of new business models for retrofit 
(Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018; Moschetti and Brattebø, 2016), but these 
fail to reflect the diversity of business models or explain why different models are more 
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or less successful. Similarly, while a few studies discuss the importance of finance in the 
transition to sustainable energy systems (Blyth et al., 2015; Hall et al., 2016, 2015) there 
has been limited attention to the challenge of financing residential retrofit (Gouldson et 
al., 2015). Again, the existing literature fails to reflect the diversity of approaches to 
retrofit financing or explain their relative success. Further, there remains little or no 
literature on how public policy may encourage innovation in both business models and 
financing for retrofit, or indeed in wider contexts.  
 
This thesis aims to fill these gaps in the literature by: first, demonstrating how the 
business model concept can provide fresh insights into the challenges of residential 
retrofit; second, by improving understanding of how different forms of finance can 
overcome these challenges; and third, by highlighting the role of policy in supporting new 
business models and financing mechanisms.  
 
The thesis addresses the following overarching research question: 
 
How can new business models and financing mechanisms encourage a greater uptake of 
whole-house retrofits and what are their policy implications? 
 
This research is published in three academic journal articles and one book chapter. The 
author is the sole author of Article 1 and the first author of Articles 2-4. Articles 1-3 
involve primary research and will be published in peer-reviewed journals. Article 4 is a 
synthesis of Articles 1-3 and are published in an edited book that was subject to internal 
peer review. The articles address the following subsidiary research questions in turn: 
 
Article 1 
1. How and why can new business models encourage the uptake of whole-house 
retrofit? 
Article 2 
2. How and why can new finance mechanisms encourage the uptake of whole-house 
retrofit? 
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Article 3 
3. How can public policy encourage new business models for whole-house retrofit 
through intermediaries? 
Article 4 
4. How can the uptake of whole-house retrofit in the UK be accelerated by public 
policy?  
 20 
1.3. Thesis structure  
This thesis is structured as follows: 
 
1. Introduction (This chapter) provides: the research aims, questions and structure; 
an overview of the empirical context; a review of the academic literature on 
residential retrofit, business models and finance mechanisms; a summary of the 
concepts employed; a description of the methodological approach; and finally, a 
summary of the four articles and their contribution to addressing the research 
questions.  
 
2. Article 1 develops a business model framework and then identifies five business 
model ‘archetypes’ for residential retrofit. Through a cross-sectional research 
design, it compares these business models and identifies the features that make 
them more or less successful in promoting whole-house retrofit. 
 
3. Article 2 identifies the key design features of finance mechanisms and constructs 
a typology of six finance mechanisms operating in the retrofit sector. Through a 
cross-sectional research design, it shows how these design features contribute to 
three key outcomes that are critical to the success of finance mechanisms in this 
sector.  
 
4. Article 3 provides an in-depth case study of an innovative business model for 
residential retrofit and contrasts this with the incumbent business model. The 
article highlights the critical role of an ‘innovation intermediary’, created by 
policymakers, which facilitated this innovation and discusses the wider 
implications for public policy. 
 
5. Article 4 identifies four key challenges that undermine demand and delivery of 
whole-house retrofits. This synthesises insights from the three previous articles 
and argues that a combination of the solutions advocated by each could 
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overcome these challenges. The article concludes with some concrete policy 
recommendations for the UK.  
 
6. Discussion – this section reflects on the overall findings of the thesis. It discusses 
the methodological approach, theoretical insights, empirical findings and policy 
implications and the main contributions to knowledge. 
 
7. Conclusion – this section answers the research questions, reflects upon the 
strengths and weaknesses of the research and suggests potential avenues for 
future research. 
 
The following section outlines the UK empirical context for energy and climate change, 
the progress to date in reducing energy use in residential buildings and the role of 
residential retrofit - highlighting the lack of recent progress.  
  
 22 
1.4. Empirical context: energy use in residential buildings 
1.4.1. Climate change and the UK energy system 
Recognising the threat of global climate change, many of the world’s economies have 
agreed to reduce CO2e emissions; to keep global average temperature increases below 
2°C as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement. In its landmark Climate Change Act of 2008, the 
UK had previously committed to reduce its emissions of CO2e by 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050 (HM Government, 2008). This Act created an independent Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC) to oversee a series of five-year carbon budgets, to track progress 
towards the 2050 target. The UK is currently on track to outperform its second (2013-
2017) and third (2018-2022) carbon budgets and has thus far (2017) reduced emissions 
by 43% compared to 1990 levels (CCC, 2018).  
 
Much of the progress to date can be attributed to public policy, with approximately 75% 
of the savings since 2012 the result of decarbonising electricity generation. The UK’s 
power generation mix in 2016 comprised 52% low carbon sources, including nuclear, 
wind, biomass and solar; with emissions from electricity generation falling by 59% 
between 2008 and 2017 (CCC, 2018). UK industry has seen emissions reductions of 
~3%/year over the period 2009-2016 and a halving of emissions since 1990 - although 
partly a consequence of de-industrialisation and offshoring. Emissions from waste have 
also decreased by 70% since 1990 (CCC, 2018). 
 
Other sectors of the UK economy have seen much slower progress. Some, such as 
agriculture, play a relatively small role, whilst emissions from transport constitute around 
27% of UK total CO2e emissions (CCC, 2018). However, a key sector where progress has 
stalled since 2012 is emissions from buildings. These trends are shown in  
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Changes in UK emissions by sector since 1990 and 2012. Source: (CCC, 2018) 
 
1.4.2. The role of buildings and homes  
CO2e emissions from buildings are primarily a result of direct emissions from space and 
water heating, and indirect emissions from electricity consumption - a result of lighting, 
appliance use, ventilation and cooling. Taken together these emissions constitute 
approximately 30% of the UK’s CO2e emissions (CCC, 2018) and around 53% of its final 
energy consumption (Palmer et al., 2017). Adjusting for annual temperature changes, 
emissions from buildings actually increased by 1% in both 2016 and 2017 in the UK (CCC, 
2018). 
 
Homes are the most significant component of this energy consumption and CO2e 
emissions. Direct emissions from space and water heating in homes account for 14% of 
the UK’s CO2e emissions with a further 6% arising indirectly from electricity consumption 
(CCC, 2018). Until recently these indirect emissions were much higher, reflecting the 
higher carbon content of grid electricity (Kelly et al., 2012). Energy consumption from the 
residential sector has risen by 12% since 1970, owing to population and income growth 
alongside demographic changes. This is despite significant improvements in the energy 
efficiency of buildings and appliances (BEIS, 2017).  
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The UK Government’s standard assessment procedure (SAP) is a methodology to 
calculate the energy performance of homes (BRE, 2014b). SAP is rated from 0 to 1003 and 
informs the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) system, with ratings from A-G - with an 
EPC A being an exemplary dwelling (SAP rating of 91+). Homes in the UK have seen a 
significant improvement in their average SAP rating, increasing from 18 in 1970 to 63 in 
2016 (BEIS, 2017) as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Average UK SAP rating 1970-2016. Adapted from: BEIS (2017) 
 
Much of this improvement has been offset by the increased consumption of energy 
services such as heating and lighting, both in relative (per household) and absolute terms 
(BEIS, 2017). The widespread diffusion of central heating systems, rapid increases in 
appliance ownership and a proliferation of lighting use, have led to a take-back of many 
of these savings through increased electricity consumption and ‘comfort taking’ in 
homes. It is estimated that these direct ‘rebound effects’ amount to a significant portion 
of potential savings; although are thought to be no more than 30% in OECD countries 
(Sorrell et al., 2009). Despite this, energy efficiency savings from homes have mitigated a 
46% increase in the number of households, an increase of 5.6oC in average internal 
temperatures and the rapid growth in appliance ownership – meaning per-household 
energy consumption has only increased by 7% in 45 years (Rosenow et al., 2018). These 
trends are summarised in Figure 3. 
                                                        
3 It is possible to achieve a score of over 100 for a ‘zero carbon’ home based on zero emissions. UK SAP is based on 
emissions from regulated energy sources; from fixed heating, cooling, lighting and ventilation systems, and therefore 
does not consider un-regulated emissions from appliances (BRE, 2014b) 
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Figure 3 Factors impacting on residential energy consumption. Source: (BEIS, 2017) 
 
1.4.3. Energy retrofit – what is it? 
Energy retrofit or ‘retrofit' for short is a term that is used throughout this thesis. Retrofit, 
as used here, involves the introduction of new materials, equipment and hardware into 
an existing building with the aim of reducing the energy consumption of that building 
(Baeli, 2013). Energy consumption in homes can also be reduced through the use of 
efficient appliances (Rosenow et al., 2018), behavioural changes (Risholt and Berker, 
2013) and a shift towards less energy consuming social practices (Shove and Walker, 
2014). However, this thesis is concerned with modifications to homes in terms of what 
UK SAP defines as regulated energy - that from fixed heating, cooling, lighting and 
ventilation systems (BRE, 2014b), and does not discuss these other issues in any detail. 
Energy efficient appliances and social and behavioural changes are in any case likely to 
be complementary to retrofit measures (Shove, 2017). 
 
The retrofit of residential buildings involves three key types of measure: energy efficiency 
improvements to the building fabric; new heating systems and controls such as new 
boilers, thermostats, or heat pumps; and electricity microgeneration systems such as 
solar photovoltaics and battery storage. Retrofit as an area of empirical study, therefore 
encompasses other topics, such as energy efficiency, low carbon heat and distributed 
energy. Whilst these areas have traditionally been approached in isolation, only an 
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integrated approach which addresses them together is likely to be effective (Brown et al., 
2018).  
Figure 4 shows some of the main retrofit measures which can be installed in homes.  
 
Figure 4 Key retrofit measures. Source: (DECC, 2012) 
 
1.4.4. The benefits of retrofit  
Meeting internationally agreed emissions reduction targets will necessitate significant 
progress in the retrofit of homes. Retrofit of residential buildings can significantly reduce 
CO2e emissions (CCC, 2016), but can also contribute to reducing fuel poverty (Sovacool, 
2015), improving occupant health and wellbeing (Willand et al., 2015) and increasing 
employment and economic growth (Washan et al., 2014).  
 
In the CCC’s central scenario, where building fabric measures and low carbon heat are 
deployed cost-effectively; direct emissions from all buildings are reduced to 32% below 
their 1990 levels in 2030 (CCC, 2018, p. 94). Despite historical progress, there remains an 
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un-tapped ‘cost-effective’4 potential5 of around one-quarter of the energy currently used 
in UK homes; an average saving of £270 per household per year (Rosenow et al., 2018). 
Rosenow et al., (2018) estimate that there is technical potential to reduce residential 
energy consumption by approximately one half5 (Rosenow et al., 2018), with further 
savings in CO2e emissions available from renewable microgeneration such as rooftop PV 
panels (Reid and Wynn, 2015). Even more ambitious savings may be achievable with the 
net-zero-energy retrofits6 now being delivered in the UK and the Netherlands 
(Energiesprong, 2017). Indeed, it is expected that all homes will need to be net-zero-
carbon by 2050 (CCC, 2018). 
 
One in ten UK households are in fuel poverty7 (Sovacool, 2015); a product of income 
inequality, the poor condition of the UK housing stock, and rising energy prices in recent 
years (Rosenow et al., 2013b). Many households in fuel poverty are forced to choose 
between heating and other essential expenditures such as travel, clothing or even food 
(Fylan et al., 2016). This often leads to under-heating in winter, creating serious health 
problems particularly for young children and the elderly (Willand et al., 2015). It is 
estimated that of the 31,100 excess winter deaths in England and Wales in 2012/13, 30-
50% were due to cold indoor temperatures (Washan et al., 2014). Improved winter 
warmth and lowered relative humidity have proven benefits for cardiovascular, 
respiratory, and mental health (Willand et al., 2015). Indeed for every £1 spent on 
retrofitting fuel poor homes an estimated £0.42 is saved in UK National Health Service 
spending (UKGBC, 2017). 
 
Rosenow et al., (2018) develop a ‘cost-effective’ scenario for improvements in the energy 
efficiency of UK housing that includes all measures deployable to 20358. The scenario 
uses a discount rate of 3.5% and places a monetary value on emission reductions, 
                                                        
4The CCC define the cost-effective path as “comprising measures that cost less than the projected carbon price across 
their lifetimes … together with measures that may cost more than the projected carbon price, but are necessary in 
order to manage costs and risks of meeting the 2050 target” (2013, p. 27). 
5 These figures include efficient appliances 
6 A definition of net-zero energy is provided in the glossary of terms 
7 The definition of fuel poverty in the UK, is where fuel costs that are above average (the national median level), and 
these fuel costs leave a residual income that is below the UK’s official poverty line (DECC, 2013b) 
8 Estimated to be cost-effective according to criteria used by the UK government to appraise public 
policies (BEIS, 2018). 
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improvements in occupant comfort and improvements in air quality, in addition to the 
savings in energy costs. The scenario requires approximately £85.2bn of investment but 
would deliver discounted benefits of £92.7bn, giving a net present value (NPV) of £7.5bn 
(Rosenow et al., 2018). If allowance is also made for the additional benefits to human 
health, economic activity and the efficiency of the electricity system, the NPV could be as 
high as £47bn (Rosenow et al., 2018). Studies of the macroeconomic impacts 
complement this microeconomic evidence for the benefits of energy efficiency. For 
example, Washan et al.,(2014) estimate that raising every home in the UK to EPC level C 
or above would increase UK GDP by 0.6% by 2030 and deliver up to 108,000 jobs annually 
between 2020-2030.  
 
Taken together these benefits provide a strong rationale for policy action. 
 
1.4.5. Policies to promote retrofit and the UK policy gap  
Retrofit has historically played a significant role in reducing the UK’s energy use and CO2e 
emissions. Total UK household energy use decreased by 19% between 2002 and 2016 on 
a temperature corrected basis. This is despite increases of 12% in the number of 
households and 10% in UK population over that period (BEIS, 2017). Per-household 
energy consumption fell by 37% between 1970 and 2015, with 29% of this occurring since 
2004 as shown in Figure 3 (BEIS, 2017). Public policies to promote retrofit have been 
responsible for the bulk of these reductions in per-household energy consumption (BEIS, 
2017; CCC, 2017; Odyssee, 2017; Thurlwell et al., 2011).  
 
Since 1994, ‘supplier obligations’ have imposed energy and carbon saving targets on UK 
electricity and gas suppliers - allowing them to recover the costs through a levy on 
household energy bills. The first supplier obligation was the Energy Efficiency Standards 
of Performance (EESoP) running between 1994-1998, with successors, EESoP 2 and 
EESoP 3 running from 1998-2000 and 2000-2002 (Rosenow, 2012). These were replaced 
by the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) 1 and 2 from 2002-2008, with a gradual 
ramping up of ambition, and the inclusion of a broader range of eligible measures and 
fuel types over this period (Rosenow, 2012). The most significant supplier obligation in 
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the UK to date - the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) – ran from 2008-2012. 
Although the programme was designed to save CO2 emissions, it is expected to deliver 
500TWh of lifetime energy savings - mostly from loft and cavity wall insulation - around 
eighty times the ambition of the original EESoP (Rosenow, 2012) (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 Changes to UK supplier obligation policy target. Source: (Rosenow, 2012) 
 
Alongside the market based supplier obligations, dedicated grant programmes funded 
through general taxation have historically supported low-income households in ‘fuel 
poverty’ (Dowson et al., 2012). The most significant of these - ‘Warm Front’ ran from 
2000-2013, with 2.3 million fuel poor homes receiving free insulation measures and 
boiler upgrades (Sovacool, 2015). Also important was the progressive tightening of EU 
standards on the energy efficiency of electrical appliances and the requirement for 
condensing boilers within the UK Building Regulations (Thurlwell et al., 2011). 
 
However, there was a change in approach after 2013, contributing to a major reduction 
in investment in energy efficiency (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). Previous supplier 
obligations primarily supported low-cost, single measures across all homes. The Energy 
Companies Obligation (ECO) introduced in 2013, was much smaller in scale and ambition 
than previous supplier obligations, and was reoriented to: first, focus upon low-income 
groups rather than so-called ‘able to pay’ households; and second, include more complex 
and invasive measures such as solid wall insulation (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). It has since 
been argued that the ECO is a poorly targeted means of addressing fuel poverty, having 
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a regressive impact on wider fuel bills (Rosenow et al., 2013b) as well as lacking the social 
welfare focus of the Warm Front scheme (Sovacool, 2015). Equally, others have 
questioned the suitability of a supplier obligation based only on carbon savings for more 
complex and invasive measures (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). 
 
Parallel to ECO, the Green Deal was introduced in 2013 and was intended to trigger 
substantial private investment in multiple measures in ‘able to pay’ households. Unlike 
the supplier obligations, the Green Deal was a voluntary program based on a private 
sector finance mechanism, repaid on energy bills. While up to 2 million retrofits a year 
were anticipated under the Green Deal (DECC, 2014), an average of less than 6,000 were 
realised (DECC, 2015a). It has been argued this failure was due to its high interest rates, 
complex application process, and narrow funding criteria (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016, 
2014). In 2015 the Green Deal was effectively terminated and funding provided through 
ECO has since been significantly reduced (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016) – partly due to 
concerns over the costs on energy bills (Kern et al., 2017). As a result, the rate of uptake 
of residential insulation measures has collapsed since 2012 (CCC, 2016), as shown in 
Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 Recent trends in uptake of key insulation measures in UK (CCC, 2018) 
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Alongside these funding, obligation and standards policies, a range of intermediary 
organisations have facilitated the uptake of energy efficiency and retrofit measures in the 
UK. In 1993, the UK government created the Energy Saving Trust (EST), to promote 
energy efficiency in the UK’s homes. In 2000, the EST contributed to the establishment 
of Energy Efficiency Partnership for Homes, and has been the key source of household 
advice, support and implementation to complement government energy efficient policies 
(Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018a). The EST’s core government funding was cut in 2010, 
resulting in a significant curtailment of its activities (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018a). 
The Building Research Establishment (BRE) is the UK’s industry facing centre of excellence 
for buildings, developing standards and public policy on retrofit. Alongside the 
privatisation of the BRE in 1997, these cuts have weakened advocacy for the industry, 
providing less support for households, which are increasingly reliant on a diffuse network 
of charities and third sector intermediaries – lacking the policy influence of previous 
statutory bodies (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018a). 
 
The UK now has insufficient policies and capacity in place to deliver on its medium and 
long-term targets to reduce carbon emissions from buildings. Figure 7 shows a large gap 
between the CCC cost-effective scenario for all buildings and the projected emission 
trends. Achieving the cost-effective savings from the building sector is therefore based 
on policies that are at risk, policies that lack a basis beyond aspirational targets, or lack 
any policy commitment whatsoever. Others have argued that the CCC cost-effective 
scenario is itself overly conservative (Platt and Rosenow, 2014).  
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Figure 7 Risks around the delivery of buildings sector policies to meet the CCC cost-
effective path (CCC, 2018) 
 
The UK’s 2017 Clean Growth Strategy outlines an aspirational target for all homes to 
reach EPC band C by 2035 and all fuel poor homes by 2030 (HM Government, 2017). The 
government has also recently introduced minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) 
for the private rented sector. However, as shown in Figure 7 the current mix of policies is 
insufficient to deliver the near-term targets, and recent failures and cutbacks have 
highlighted the weaknesses of the current policy approach. The sheer scale of the task 
will now likely necessitate multiple measures to be installed at once, in a move towards 
‘whole-house retrofits’ (Lewis and Smith, 2013).  
 
1.4.6. The need for a comprehensive whole-house approach  
Thus far, significant savings in the UK and European Union have mostly been achieved 
through single, incremental measures such as fluorescent light bulbs, loft insulation and 
efficient boilers (Rosenow et al., 2016). Whilst these measures have been implemented 
through existing supply chains, requiring limited changes in consumer and industry 
practices; it is increasingly recognised that with many of the ‘low hanging fruit’ now 
exploited, this approach will be insufficient to meeting the UK’s emissions targets (Lewis 
and Smith, 2013).  
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Of particular importance to meeting the UK’s climate change targets will be deeper9, 
measures such as solid wall insulation (SWI) and low carbon heating systems such as heat 
pumps (CCC, 2018). These measures require complementary consideration of draft 
proofing, moisture, ventilation as well as the suitability of existing heat emitters and 
controls (Bonfield, 2016). Research has shown that the single measures approach, 
incentivised by government policies such as ECO has in many cases led to damaging 
unintended consequences (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012; Hansford, 2015; Milsom, 2016; 
STBA, 2012).  
 
This piecemeal approach is problematised by cases where SWI is installed without 
consideration of moisture and ventilation implications (Milsom, 2016), or heat pumps are 
installed without appropriate assessment of existing pipework or heat emitters (Snape et 
al., 2015). Thus, a lack of attention to detail, insufficient consideration of building physics, 
cold bridges and airtightness, and poor heating system design (Gupta and Chandiwala, 
2010; STBA, 2012), can create issues of mould growth, poor air quality and condensation 
(Hansford, 2015), low seasonal efficiencies, limited temperature control, excessive noise 
and heat pump breakdowns (Snape et al., 2015).  
 
This has led to calls for a ‘whole-house’ approach to retrofit, particularly where measures 
such as SWI and heat pumps are involved (STBA, 2016). A report from the Energy 
Efficiency Partnership for Buildings provides the following definition: 
“Whole-house energy efficiency retrofit involves combining improvements to 
optimise the performance of the building as a whole. Whilst this may still be 
implemented in stages, it differs from the current mainstream approach in that it 
promotes the interaction of multiple measures to be considered (e.g. fabric, 
ventilation, heating, lighting and microgeneration) at the earliest stages.” (Lewis 
and Smith, 2013) 
Thus, in a whole-house retrofit the building is treated as a system rather than as individual 
elements or measures. For example, a whole-house approach would: complement SWI 
with improved ventilation and moisture protection and elimination of cold bridging; 
                                                        
9 Occasionally referred to as deep retrofit such as Gupta and Gregg, (2016), however ‘whole-house’ is considered to 
better reflect the need for a holistic approach across multiple, related measures rather than a reflection of the depth 
of carbon savings  
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install new heat emitters and circuitry for a heat pump; consider PV panels when 
scaffolding is erected and integrate other non-energy repair works, such as roofing 
improvements alongside the retrofit. Each of these measures may interact and thus they 
would be considered holistically rather than in isolation.  
 
Consequently, a whole-house approach involves the effective integration of multiple 
measures and consideration of their sometimes complex interaction; whether installed 
at once or over time (Fawcett, 2014). This strategy is likely to mitigate unintended 
consequences and achieve deeper reductions in emissions (Milsom, 2016).  
 
These features call into question the suitability of supplier obligations for achieving 
whole-house retrofits. This is due to their narrow focus on costs of carbon saved 
(£/tCO2e) from individual measures, rather than how multiple measures interact in a 
specific building (STBA, 2012). The adoption of whole-house retrofit may instead require 
changes in financing, supply chains and household practices (Wilson et al., 2015), 
requiring complementary policy and institutional changes to be fully and effectively 
realised (Brown et al., 2018). These multiple changes thus necessitate a systemic 
approach across multiple domains to enable the whole-house retrofit of millions of 
homes in a limited timeframe (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012; Mlecnik, 2013). The required 
retrofit rate - amounting to ‘1.4 homes a minute until 2050’ (BBC, 2017) - also emphasises 
the limitations of a strategy based on incremental installation of single measures, 
requiring multiple visits to a single home (Fawcett, 2014).  
 
A successful retrofit strategy would therefore necessitate a significant uptake in both the 
rate and quality of residential retrofits, to meet its climate change targets as well as 
delivering on wider social policy and economic development goals. This would include 
meeting the UK’s climate change committee’s central scenario advocating a reduction in 
direct CO2e emissions of at least 16% between 2017 and 2030 from the UK’s buildings 
(CCC, 2018). And exploiting the remaining cost-effective potential of at least 25% energy 
savings from the UK’s homes, or 140 TWh per year, with further savings from electricity 
microgeneration (Rosenow et al., 2018). This level of retrofit will require an estimated 
£85.2bn of investment (Rosenow et al., 2017a), while necessitating improvement in the 
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quality of delivery and performance through a whole-house approach, to realise its wider 
benefits (Lewis and Smith, 2013). 
 
Understanding how these challenges can be overcome is the primary focus of this thesis. 
Article 1 focusses on the delivery and quality of retrofit measures, whilst Article 2 
elucidates the investment challenge. Article 3 emphasises the conditions required for the 
scale up of a retrofit strategy, whilst Article 4 draws together these findings into policy 
recommendations.   
1.5. Literature review  
This section first reviews the academic literature on the challenges for residential retrofit, 
particularly whole-house approaches. It then reviews the literature on business models 
and finance for sustainable innovation and briefly discusses how new approaches to both 
might promote the uptake of whole-house retrofit. This section synthesises the literature 
reviewed within the four articles and therefore repeats some of the arguments.  
 
1.5.1. Literature on challenges for residential retrofit  
The ‘energy efficiency gap' - characterised as the limited uptake of apparently cost-
effective energy efficiency measures (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), remains the focus of much 
research (Kangas et al., 2018; Pelenur and Cruickshank, 2012; Rezessy and Bertoldi, 
2010). Energy retrofit and its challenges are studied across many fields from architecture 
and engineering (Lowe, 2007), finance and economics (Hyland et al., 2013), sociology and 
psychology (Walker et al., 2014) energy policy (Rosenow, 2012) and innovation studies 
(Mlecnik, 2013). Understanding the challenges of promoting retrofit and how these 
challenges fit together, therefore, requires an interdisciplinary perspective, summarised 
in this section.   
 
Much literature on energy efficiency adopts ‘barriers’ to uptake as the theoretical basis 
for understanding the energy efficiency gap (Kangas et al., 2018; Sorrell, 2007; Sorrell et 
al., 2004). However, the focus on ‘barriers’ characterises retrofit decision-making in 
terms of rational economic choices - downplaying social and contextual factors (Shove 
and Walker, 2014; Walker et al., 2014). This also assumes that there is a pre-existing 
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demand for retrofit once these barriers are removed (Wilson et al., 2015). This barriers 
framing has come to dominate the design of policy initiatives which also tend to 
emphasise the economic benefits of retrofit whilst ignoring others (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2016). This framing is excessively narrow. A broader review of the literature highlights 
four interrelated challenges which are discussed below, including economic barriers, 
technical and skills issues, and wider social and cultural factors (Fylan et al., 2016)  
 
First, many studies highlight a persistent lack of information, engagement and trust. A 
survey by Marchand et al., (2015) shows knowledge of the options and benefits of retrofit 
is widely lacking among UK households. Balcombe et al., (2014) also show that while 
many of the technologies and tools to retrofit existing buildings are known, their uptake 
is not widespread - due to a lack of household interest. Public engagement and marketing 
schemes have tried to generate demand, but tend to be top-down (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2016), short-term, and focused upon specific subsidy schemes (Marchand et al., 2015). 
The complexity of policies, such as the UK’s Green Deal, has also deterred household 
engagement with retrofit (Marchand et al., 2015). Owen et al., (2014) show how the 
conservatism of tradespeople towards retrofit solutions influences households decisions 
on technology choices and subsequent use. Thus, a lack of appropriate advice, concerns 
over post retrofit performance and the quality of workmanship have undermined trust 
with the wider public. 
 
A second issue is the uncertain benefits and quality of retrofit improvements. Multiple 
studies show a ‘performance gap’ between modelled energy savings and actual energy 
performance outcomes (Gupta et al., 2015; Gupta and Gregg, 2016; Mcelroy and 
Rosenow, 2018; Webber et al., 2015). Studies cite several reasons for this, including a 
widespread lack of technical skills (Kangas et al., 2018), the complex design and 
engineering challenges of retrofit (Gupta and Gregg, 2016), and weaknesses in building 
performance evaluation methodologies such as the UK's SAP (Kelly et al., 2012). Wilson 
et al., (2015) and Walker et al., (2014) further emphasise how retrofit may be perceived 
to alter a buildings’ existing features, affecting households’ practices (washing, heating 
habits) and emotional attachments (aesthetics, familiarity) – creating resistance to 
change (Shove and Walker, 2014). Gram-Hanssen (2014) argue that the focus on barriers 
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has tended to side-line these more human dimensions. Thus, whilst government retrofit 
programs have emphasised the financial benefits of retrofit, households may value other 
factors above financial savings (Fawcett and Killip, 2014).  
 
A third issue is the complexity, disruption and timing of retrofit projects. Davies and 
Oreszczyn (2012) outline the challenges of managing the multiple and overlapping 
activities carried out by several contractors and consultants in a retrofit project. Snape et 
al., (2015) also emphasise the significant disruption or the ‘hassle factor’ of major works 
as a deterrent to uptake. Whilst many households undertake extensive renovation work 
during wider home improvements, the timing of these decisions is rarely integrated with 
retrofit interventions (Maby and Owen, 2015; Wilson et al., 2015). Therefore, whole-
house retrofit - if adopted, is typically done in a staged and piecemeal manner (Fawcett, 
2014). 
 
Fourthly, financial issues remain important. The high up-front capital cost, split incentives 
and long payback periods are important economic barriers to undertaking retrofit 
projects (Sorrell et al., 2004). Gouldson et al., (2015) emphasise whilst retrofits result in 
long-term energy savings, whole-house retrofits typically require long periods before the 
capital cost can be recovered in energy savings. Studies also show a lack of access to up-
front capital as a key reason for not undertaking retrofits (Pettifor et al., 2015). ‘Split 
incentives’ occur where the benefits of an investment in terms of energy cost savings are 
not realised by the investor, such as when moving house or in a landlord-tenant situation 
(Sorrell et al., 2004). Bird and Hernández (2012) emphasise the pervasiveness of split 
incentives for low-income tenants and argue for a range of financing solutions to 
overcome them. Gouldson et al., (2015) further emphasise how the economics of long-
term financing is extremely sensitive to interest rates, particularly if energy savings must 
exceed repayments (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Further, in a study of different financing 
mechanisms, Leventis et al., (2017) describe how the majority only fund energy measures 
- despite the need for funding of wider enabling measures and general repairs. 
 
These challenges help to explain much of the low household demand for retrofits, and 
the limited success of recent policies to promote retrofit - particularly whole-house 
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approaches. This thesis therefore investigates how new business models, finance 
mechanism and supporting policy approaches may overcome these challenges. 
 
1.5.2. Literature on business models 
The concept of the ‘business model’ is increasingly adopted as a means of classifying 
different businesses, a theoretical lens for academic research, and as a practical tool for 
entrepreneurs and managers (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). As Teece (2010) argues, 
an effective business model is often more important than the relatively generic products 
and services an organisation provides. The business model is also critical for the diffusion 
of technological innovations (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013; Teece, 2010). Drawing on 
Hellström et al., (2015) and Teece (2010) a business model is defined here as10: 
 
A description of the nature of value delivered to customers, how organisations 
and networks create that value and the means of capturing revenues from these 
activities. 
 
The business model concept first became prevalent in the field of business and 
management during the late 1990s - a product of the profusion of new business models 
accompanying the emergence of the internet (Zott et al., 2011). Since then it has grown 
in significance in the field of technology and innovation studies (Lambert and Davidson, 
2013), and more recently in the study of transitions to a sustainable economy (Wells, 
2013). 
 
Ritter and Lettl (2018) identify four perspectives on business models. In their most 
abstract form business models describe the underlying logic of an organisation, such as 
delivering sustainable buildings or low-cost air travel (Ritter and Lettl, 2018). In a less 
abstract form, business models are characterised by generic archetypes – involving 
idealised models such as the Gillette’s ‘razor and blade’ (Teece, 2010) or Rolls Royce’s 
‘power-by-the-hour’ business model for aircraft engines (Teece, 2018).  
 
                                                        
10 A more detailed definition of the business model components is provided in Articles 1 and 3. 
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A more detailed perspective, which facilitates comparison between different business 
models, identifies the generic components common to all business models. Perhaps the 
most well-known is Osterwalder & Pignuer’s (2010) framework which identifies nine 
components, simplified by Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013, p. 10) into four: 
1. Value proposition: what value is embedded in the product/ service offered by the 
firm; 
2. Supply chain: how are upstream relationships with suppliers structured and 
managed; 
3. Customer interface: how are downstream relationships with customers 
structured and managed; and 
4. Financial model: costs and benefits from 1), 2) and 3) and their distribution across 
business model stakeholders. 
 
A final perspective provides a detailed description of the actors and networks involved in 
a business model (Amit and Zott, 2001). This view captures the networked and 
interdependent activities involved in the delivery of products and services - potentially 
across multiple organisations (Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and Amit, 2010). This shifts the 
focus from single firms towards the wider networks which deliver the value proposition. 
This perspective is therefore characterised here as business model governance -  ranging 
from highly networked to hierarchical modes of governance (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). 
 
Each of these perspectives has value depending on the area of interest and research 
questions deployed. This thesis draws on all four perspectives to answer the research 
questions. However, a drawback of these perspectives is their relatively static picture of 
business models (Foss and Saebi, 2018). Hence, it is useful to also consider the literature 
on business model innovation.  
 
1.5.3. Business model innovation  
The innovation studies literature has traditionally employed technological artefacts as 
the primary unit of analysis. However, there is growing attention to the role of business 
model innovation, particularly in the case of radical, path-breaking or systemic 
innovations (Chesbrough, 2010; Massa and Tucci, 2013; Teece, 2018). Massa and Tucci 
(2013) describe how business model innovation provides two important opportunities. 
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First, it allows organisations to reconfigure their existing business models towards more 
efficient or profitable practices (Zott and Amit, 2009). Second, it enables the adoption 
and diffusion of new innovations, which may currently have no route to market or be 
incompatible with existing business models (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013). The 
importance of business model innovation is emphasised by Teece (2010, p. 183): 
 
“technological innovation does not guarantee business success - new product 
development efforts should be coupled with a business model defining their ’go to 
market’ and ’capturing value’ strategies” 
 
Therefore, new business models have often been the critical means of commercialising 
now ubiquitous innovations; including the electric light bulb (Johnson and Suskewicz, 
2009), smart phones (Mazzucato, 2015) and e-commerce (Teece, 2010). Further, the 
combination of a radical innovation with a new business model has revolutionised the 
business model of entire sectors in recent years; including taxis (Teece, 2018), printing 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), and the music industry (Johnson, 2008). 
Consequently, business model innovation may also be crucial for transforming energy 
systems. 
 
Business model innovation commonly involves new value propositions, such as a shift 
from product-based offerings like selling heating fuel, towards service-based offerings 
based on thermal comfort (Kindström and Ottosson, 2016). Business model innovation 
may also involve: supply chain innovations, such as process automation, integration and 
just-in-time logistics (Mlecnik, 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2012); new types of customer 
interface - utilising new forms of acquisition and engagement through information 
technologies and the internet (Shomali and Pinkse, 2016; Teece, 2018); or novel financial 
models like long-term leasing - such as Rolls-Royce’s ‘power-by-the-hour’ engine servicing 
model (Teece, 2018). Further, new approaches to business model governance may see 
firms ‘out-source’ or ‘in-house’ various components of their business model through 
mechanisms such as franchising (Hellström et al., 2015). Therefore, business model 
innovation is both enabled by technological innovation and also facilitates such 
innovation - explaining why general-purpose technologies such as the internet have had 
such a profound impact on organisational change (Osterwalder, 2004).  
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However, organisations face a range of internal (organisational) and external (socio-
economic) barriers to business model innovation (Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008). These 
barriers may be structural, such as unfavourable regulations (Hannon et al., 2013) or 
cultural – relating to the ‘dominant logic’ within an firm or industry (Chesbrough, 2010). 
Organisations may therefore lack the complementary knowledge, capabilities or assets 
to innovate their existing business models or capture value from new business models 
(Teece, 2018, 2010, 1986). Firms are thus likely to under invest in business model 
innovation, due to market failures that also characterise technological innovation (Jaffe 
et al., 2005; Zott and Amit, 2010) 
 
Bolton and Hannon (2016) argue that these barriers and benefits may provide a rationale 
for policy intervention – such as in the case of whole-house retrofit. However, few studies 
have explored how policymakers could promote business model innovation, despite an 
increasing focus on business models as a means of achieving sustainability policy 
objectives (OECD, 2015a).  
 
1.5.4. Business models for sustainability  
Most studies on business model innovation originate from the business and management 
literature (Massa and Tucci, 2013), although the concept is increasingly used to study the 
transition to a sustainable economy (Boons et al., 2013). The growing literature on 
business models for sustainability encompasses a range of empirical topics including 
energy and transport systems, industrial processes and waste, ecosystem management 
and social justice (Bocken et al., 2014).  
 
Many authors therefore expect new business models to play an important role in creating 
a sustainable economy. Stubbs and Cocklin (2008) describe how incumbent business 
models, preoccupied with profitability and shareholder value, may be incompatible with 
long-term sustainability and planetary boundaries. Consequently, Bocken et al., (2014) 
identify a typology of eight archetypes of business models for sustainability which 
incorporate the ‘triple bottom line’ of economic, environmental and social sustainability. 
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Other authors emphasise the role of business model innovation in sustainable 
technological change (Massa and Tucci, 2013). For example, Richter (2012) argues that 
the incumbent energy utility business model is largely incompatible with distributed 
renewable energy systems11. While the traditional business model can capture value 
from large scale renewable systems – such as offshore wind farms – distributed energy 
systems such as rooftop solar require a more fundamental shift towards ‘customer-side’ 
business models. Thus,  requiring new revenue streams from energy services rather than 
units of power (Richter, 2013a, 2012). Budde Christensen et al., (2012) further describe 
how the adoption of electric vehicles may involve business models based on mobility 
services rather than ownership (Budde Christensen et al., 2012; Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 
2008). Similarly, Roome and Louche (2016) argue that ‘circular economy’ business 
models will increasingly need to replace resource-intensive ‘open loop’ business models 
in many industries. 
 
One area that has received particular attention is energy service business models 
(Duplessis et al., 2012; Hannon et al., 2015; Kindström and Ottosson, 2016; Labanca et 
al., 2014; Okkonen and Suhonen, 2010). These involve value propositions based on the 
energy service itself (heat, hot water, mobility) rather than the sale of energy 
commodities (gas, electricity, petroleum) (Steinberger et al., 2009). Consequently, these 
models create incentives to improve resource efficiency in the delivery of services such 
as mobility, thermal comfort, lighting and sanitation (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Roelich et al., 
2015; Sorrell, 2007). Various studies have explored the potential for energy service 
business models in industry and non-residential buildings (Hannon and Bolton, 2015; 
Kindström and Ottosson, 2016; Okkonen and Suhonen, 2010), with examples of 
residential energy service business models also emerging (Irrek et al., 2013; Labanca et 
al., 2014).  
 
However, there are few studies of business models for residential retrofit. Gauthier and 
Gilomen (2016) compare retrofit business models in two French case studies, but focus 
upon individual subcontractors rather than the overall business model. Several studies 
                                                        
11 These involve smaller scale decentralised energy generation technologies, such as solar PV, small-scale wind, 
biomass or combined heat and power 
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identify the benefits of integrated retrofit business models, where multiple measures and 
finance are provided by one organisation (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik, 2013; Mlecnik 
et al., 2018). Others highlight the potential of energy performance contracts in the 
residential sector (Winther and Gurigard, 2017), but do not present any operating 
examples. Hitherto, few studies contrast these innovative approaches with incumbent 
business models (Moschetti and Brattebø, 2016) and none explain why certain retrofit 
models are more or less successful. Moreover, no studies have investigated how 
policymakers can promote business model innovation in a retrofit or wider context.  
 
This review of the business model literature therefore highlights two important gaps. 
First, there are no studies that compare the range of business models for residential 
retrofit or explain the reasons for their success or failure. Second, there are no studies 
that investigate how policymakers can promote innovative business models. Addressing 
these gaps would provide a valuable contribution to the literature. 
 
1.5.5. Finance, the energy system and residential retrofit 
There is increasing recognition of the importance of new forms of finance in the energy 
transition. Whilst the majority of UK sustainable energy investment (including residential 
retrofit) has come from the balance sheets of large energy suppliers, sufficient 
investment to meet the UK’s carbon targets (estimated to be between £130-330bn by 
2030) will likely require third-party capital (Blyth et al., 2015). The incumbent business 
model of the large energy suppliers is also poorly suited to funding retrofit - characterised 
by small-scale investments such as heat pumps and PV panels with complex revenue 
streams (Richter, 2013b, 2013a, 2012). This business model also lacks incentives to fund 
energy efficiency as is currently reliant on increasing sales of energy (Knoeri et al., 2016). 
Hall et al., (2015) therefore argue that ‘institutional and structural constraints, 
behavioural routines, and fundamental uncertainties’ contribute to a ‘finance gap’ for 
sustainable energy (Hall et al., 2016; Masini and Menichetti, 2013, 2012). This is especially 
prevalent for small investments like retrofit where transaction costs can also be 
significant (Arnold and Yildiz, 2015). 
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Recent studies have emphasised the role of state investment banks in filling this 
investment gap (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018), whilst 
others have highlighted the importance of a local banking sector for funding smaller scale 
distributed energy systems – presently lacking in the UK (Hall et al., 2016). However, few 
studies have explored the challenges of financing energy efficiency retrofit (Gouldson et 
al., 2015) – with the mainstream finance journals largely ignoring energy issues 
altogether (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2017). 
 
Investment in energy efficiency retrofit also faces particular barriers which are especially 
challenging for whole-house approaches. Often households lack access to capital, owing 
to limited savings or the unavailability of conventional financing solutions, such as 
secured and unsecured loans (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010). Further, most conventional 
forms of financing do not address the problem of split incentives (Bird and Hernández, 
2012). The lower rates of return associated with deeper measures such as SWI are also 
especially sensitive to the cost of capital or the interest rates on loans (Gouldson et al., 
2015). However, whilst these barriers have long been understood (Sorrell et al., 2004) 
the literature offers few insights into how these barriers might be overcome (Bird and 
Hernández, 2012; Gouldson et al., 2015).  
 
A recent body of non-academic literature has highlighted the role of a range of finance 
mechanisms in overcoming these issues of access to capital, split incentives and long 
payback periods (EEFIG, 2015; Kim et al., 2012; Sweatman, 2013, 2012). A finance 
mechanism is considered distinct from targeted subsidies funded through taxation, 
energy supplier obligations (Leventis et al., 2017) or fiscal incentives such as variable 
property taxes (Rosenow et al., 2014). Instead, a finance mechanism is defined as: 
 
The provision of capital through a combination of equity and/or debt that is repaid 
to the lender. 
 
However, studies on retrofit finance mechanisms, together with their relationship to 
business models, are lacking from the academic literature. Whilst the majority of studies 
have focussed on government or supplier-funded grants (Rosenow et al., 2013b; 
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Rosenow and Galvin, 2013; Sovacool, 2015), most future investment will involve 
repayable financing for the ‘able-to-pay’ segment (Blyth et al., 2015; Rosenow et al., 
2013b). Some authors have studied both the UK’s failed Green Deal (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2016) and Germany’s successful KfW finance mechanisms (Rosenow, 2013), although 
provide limited insight to features that influenced their success and failure. New business 
models, such as those based on energy performance contracts (Winther and Gurigard, 
2017), may also provide a means of delivering retrofit investment (Foxon et al., 2015); 
although these studies do not foreground the financial component of these models. 
Other work has highlighted how new finance mechanisms might overcome the split 
incentives barrier (Bird and Hernández, 2012; Gouldson et al., 2015). But taken together, 
this literature provides an incomplete picture of the range of financing mechanisms or a 
common conceptual basis for comparing them. 
 
Consequently, research which identifies the features of alternative finance mechanisms, 
explains why different mechanisms are more or less successful, and explores the 
relationship between finance mechanisms and business models - would seem a timely 
addition to the academic literature.  
 
1.6. Methodological approach 
This section describes the methodological approach taken across the four articles. This 
begins with the scope of the research, clarifying the units of analysis, the concepts 
included, the assumptions employed and the choice of cases. Subsequently the key 
conceptual ideas used in the thesis are introduced. This is followed by the research design 
- describing the overall strategy to address the research questions. Subsequently, the 
methods of data collection are explained, and their strengths and weaknesses identified. 
Finally, the methods of data analysis are presented.  
 
1.6.1. Research scope 
This research concerns how new business models and finance mechanisms can help 
accelerate the uptake of whole-house retrofits, and how policymakers can promote these 
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new approaches. Therefore, the units of analysis are 1) business models for residential 
retrofit 2) finance mechanisms and 3) policy approaches to promote these.  
 
The thesis is focussed on residential retrofit and does not consider the retrofit of 
industrial, public or commercial buildings. However, many of the business models and 
finance mechanisms operate in various guises in all three sectors. Although the focus is 
residential buildings, this includes all forms; from single family homes to multi-family 
apartment blocks; and all tenure types, from social housing, privately rented to owner-
occupied homes. Section 6 discusses the challenges presented by these different forms 
and tenure types, and the suitability of different models and mechanisms for each. The 
primary focus is the UK, but Articles 1 & 3 include examples from France, Latvia, Belgium 
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, while Article 2 includes examples from the 
USA.  
 
The UK presents an interesting case for several reasons. Whilst having strong climate 
change legislation in the form of the Climate Change Act (HM Government, 2008), and 
having achieved considerable progress with electricity decarbonisation; the UK has one 
of the oldest and least energy efficient housing stocks in Europe (Fylan et al., 2016). 
Despite previous success installing single measures through its supplier obligation 
policies, two recent policies designed to promote deeper retrofits and multiple measures 
(the Green Deal and ECO) have delivered significantly less than anticipated (Rosenow and 
Eyre, 2016). The UK also has highly heterogeneous mix of buildings and tenure types 
(Gram-Hanssen, 2014). These factors create a challenging environment for retrofit policy, 
thus, the UK could provide important lessons for other national contexts. 
 
1.6.2. Conceptual framework, archetypes and typologies  
Building on the literature review, this thesis develops and applies several conceptual 
frameworks, archetypes and typologies to the context of whole-house retrofit.  
 
A conceptual framework provides a means of making conceptual distinctions and 
organising ideas. It “explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be 
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studied—the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among 
them”(Miles et al., 1994, p. 18). Articles 1-3 each develop a conceptual framework, with 
their relationship to each other, discussed in Section 6.1. 
 
Article 1 develops a conceptual framework to describe the five generic components 
common to all business models. This builds on Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013) four key 
components of a business model, namely: the value proposition; supply chain; customer 
interface; and financial model and is supplemented with the governance component as 
described by Zott and Amit (2010). In Article 3, this framework is augmented with three 
key intermediation activities of facilitating, configuring and brokering (Stewart and 
Hyysalo, 2008).  
 
For Article 2 on finance mechanisms, no equivalent conceptual framework could be 
identified from the literature. Therefore, the scoping research involved a grounded 
approach to theory development (Glaser and Strauss, 2017). Grounded theory is 
developed inductively during data collection such that it is ‘grounded’ in the evidence - 
entering the field with only a limited understanding of the important variables or how 
they relate to each other (Maxwell, 2012). Whilst some features of finance mechanisms 
could be determined from the literature and the researcher’s prior knowledge, it was 
only through this inductive process that an appropriate conceptual framework could be 
developed. This framework identifies seven generic features namely: the source of 
capital; the financial instrument(s); the project performance requirements; the point of 
sale; the nature of the security and underwriting; repayment channel and the customer 
journey. These frameworks are used to explain why different business models and 
finance mechanisms are more or less successful, and how business model innovation can 
be supported. 
 
The term archetype is used here to represent idealised examples of phenomena such as 
business models or finance mechanisms. Archetypes are intended to reduce the diversity 
of reality to a number of ‘ideal types’ - which can be differentiated by their key 
components. Article 1 develops five archetypes of business models, of which two are 
compared in Article 3. Similarly, Article 2 develops six archetypes of finance mechanisms. 
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A typology is a means of classifying a number of ideal types, usually to depict the diversity 
of examples within a given field of study: thus, a typology may be comprised from a 
number of archetypes. Article 1, therefore, identifies a typology of the key business 
model archetypes across the retrofit industry, whilst Article 2 identifies a typology of the 
main retrofit finance mechanisms currently in operation. Figure 8 shows how these three 
concepts link together.  
 
Figure 8 The relationship between conceptual frameworks, archetypes and typologies 
 
1.6.3. Research design 
The research design describes the overall plan for how the research questions are to be 
addressed. It provides “the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of 
data” (De Vaus, 2002). In this thesis, each article addresses each research question in 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
ARCHETYPES
TYPOLOGY
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turn, generating cumulative insights for the subsequent stage of analysis. Thus, the 
research design was iterative, with research questions, conceptual framework, 
methodological approach, research methods and analysis revised reflexively throughout 
the project (Maxwell, 2012).  
 
First, to identify the business models and financing mechanisms currently in operation 
and second to explain their relative success, data for Articles 1 and 2 was collected and 
analysed in two phases. Article 1 initially involved scoping research to investigate the 
diversity of business models within the UK and wider EU - developing archetypes guided 
by the business model conceptual framework. This led to the development of a typology 
of five business model archetypes considered to represent the diversity of models.  
 
A complementary framework is developed in Article 2 to identify the generic features of 
finance mechanisms. This was developed through a grounded approach (described in 
Section 1.6.2 (Glaser and Strauss, 2017)). Subsequently, this led to the identification of a 
typology of six archetypes of finance mechanism; representing the diversity of 
approaches within the EU, although this time broadening the focus to include the USA. 
 
Both papers then employed a cross-sectional study, to determine how the components 
of the business models and finance mechanisms impacted their success in different 
contexts. Cross-sectional research designs involve collecting data at one point in time, 
segregating the sample into a number of groups or types and analysing the extent to 
which variation in the outcome is linked to variation in these groups or types (De Vaus, 
2002). These research designs usually involve the use or creation of a typology as in 
Articles 1 and 2. 
 
Article 3 builds on Article 1 to explain why some archetypes are more successful than 
others. It compares two archetypes: one considered to be common practice, the other a 
highly novel and innovative business model – maximising the contrast between these 
cases. Whilst the research for Article 1 provided sufficient insight into the structure, 
operation and success of the common business model, an in-depth case study of the 
innovative model was deemed necessary. This was appropriate given the unique nature 
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of this case and its potential to be an exemplar for the wider retrofit sector (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Case study research also affords a greater depth of insight than a cross-sectional 
research design (Yin, 1994). Article 3 also draws upon insights from a project on Low 
Energy Housing Innovation Intermediaries (LEHII) undertaken by the primary PhD 
supervisor - providing background and context to the study (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 
2018; Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018). 
 
The research for these three articles was qualitative throughout - considered appropriate 
given the need to develop an in-depth understanding of the operation of the business 
models and finance mechanisms, and to answer ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions regarding their 
relative success (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 1994). Qualitative research is also inherently 
flexible, allowing the research design, lines of enquiry and methodological approach to 
be developed iteratively (Maxwell, 2012). The primary data was supplemented by 
extensive analysis of secondary literature. This helped develop the researcher’s 
understanding of the phenomena, as well as adding validity by triangulating data from 
the interviews. More detail on the approach to data collection is provided in each article. 
 
Article 4 was developed for an edited book and aimed to synthesise the insights from 
Articles 1-3 and provide some policy recommendations for the UK. This involved 
supplementing the previous work with a review of the academic and grey literature on 
policy approaches for promoting residential retrofit. A summary of the research design 
and methods for the four articles is provided in Figure 9. 
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1.6.4. Data collection 
Primary data collection involved a total of thirty-eight semi-structured interviews - 
including a mix of face to face and video conference interviews. This was supplemented 
by secondary analysis of a wide range of documents, described in each article. The 
interviews were conducted in three phases, each focussed on a research sub-question 
and each informing a separate article. Interviews in Articles 1 & 2 were subdivided into: 
a scoping phase to help develop the respective frameworks, archetypes and typologies; 
followed by a detailed investigation of the range of business models and finance 
mechanisms. Article 3 built upon the comparative investigation in Article 1 with an in-
depth case study of an individual business model. A summary of the data collection 
process is provided in Table 1. More detail on the interviewees, including organisation 
and role, can be found in Appendices A and B. 
 
Table 1 Summary of primary data collection 
Article Research question Primary data: semi-structured 
interviews*  
Date of 
collection 
1 How and why can new 
business models 
encourage the uptake of 
whole-house retrofit? 
8 scoping interviews with experts in 
residential retrofit and 10 with 
practitioners (18 in total) 
November 
2016 –
March 
2017 
2 How and why can new 
finance mechanisms 
encourage the uptake of 
whole-house retrofit? 
6 scoping interviews with experts in 
energy efficiency finance and 8 
interviews with finance 
practitioners (14 in total) 4 
interviews were re-used from 
Article 1 
April – 
September 
2017 
3 How can public policy 
encourage new business 
models for whole-house 
retrofit through 
intermediaries? 
 
6 case study interviews (one reused 
from Article 1)  
 
Interview data from Articles 1 & 2 
was also reused   
November 
2016 – 
June 2018 
4 How can the uptake of 
whole-house retrofit in the 
UK be accelerated by 
public policy? 
Re-use of interview data from 
Articles 1, 2 & 3 
N/A 
*Each interview lasted approximately 1 hour 
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Semi-structured interviews combine planned questions with a more flexible and 
conversational approach (Kvale, 2008). This allowed the pursuit of unexpected lines of 
enquiry which produced unanticipated findings or contradicted initial assumptions (Grix, 
2010). This approach was considered appropriate for the mix of inductive and deductive 
objectives of this project. Each interviewee was provided with a consent form and 
information sheet that allowed them to specify their anonymity and level of disclosure 
for the interview. Interviews were recorded using a smartphone and converted to mp3 
files. Early interviews were transcribed by the author, but in the latter stages, an online 
transcription service was used. Interview transcripts are available on request, subject to 
confidentiality agreements.  
 
1.6.5. Data analysis 
Each interview transcript was coded using the NVivo 11 & 12™ software. This allowed 
common themes to be identified, along with areas for further investigation. Interviews 
were coded within a master file to allow coding links to be made across the data sets. 
This was especially beneficial for Article 3 which drew heavily on the insights from Article 
1. The coding was structured to mirror the conceptual frameworks adopted in each 
article, thus guiding the data analysis. The coding structure (Figure 10) was divided into 
thematic nodes and case nodes. Whilst case nodes (red) describe discrete categories of 
information such as people, places or archetypes in a typology; thematic nodes (black) 
are more subjective and tend to contain more explanatory information such as drivers or 
barriers. The use of NVivo allowed a simple coding structure to be adopted with more 
precise relationships determined through the ‘Query’ function. This allows for the 
identification of overlapping coding and provides quick access to relationships in the data. 
For example, ‘Good quotes’ surrounding the ‘Barriers’ to a certain business model like 
the ‘Energiesprong model'. This function also allowed searches for words or phrases of 
interest. Figure 10 summarises the NVivo coding structure across the three sets of 
interview data. 
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Figure 10 Coding structure across the interview data 
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1.7. Article summary 
The following summarises the four articles and shows how they answer each of the 
research questions.  
 
1. Business models for residential retrofit in the UK: a critical assessment of five key 
archetypes. 
Article 1 shows how new business models can be a powerful means of overcoming the 
challenges of retrofit in residential buildings. The paper synthesises the contemporary 
literature on business models, combining the four components of a business model 
identified by Boons et al., (2013) with the additional concept of business model 
governance described by Zott and Amit, (2010). The paper then identifies five business 
model archetypes for residential retrofit, ranging from the traditional approach to 
innovative energy service contracts which are now being trialled in the EU.  
 
By applying this framework, the paper identifies the core components of a business 
model that allow it to be both effective in delivering whole-house retrofits and appealing 
to consumers. These include: increasingly industrialised processes and integrated supply 
chains; a holistic customer offering and single point of contact; long-term energy saving 
performance contracts; and integral project finance. It is argued that whilst the 
traditional business model is suitable for the implementation of single or piecemeal 
retrofit measures, more innovative business models that embody each of these features 
will be required to meet the UK’s ambitious climate change targets. 
 
2. Worth the risk? An evaluation of alternative finance mechanisms for residential 
retrofit. 
Article 2 explores the challenges of financing this retrofit activity at scale. A literature 
review revealed that few studies investigate the features of alternative financing 
mechanisms. Therefore, the paper develops a conceptual framework to highlight the 
generic features of different finance mechanisms and to aid their comparison. These 
features include: the source of capital; the financial instrument(s); the project 
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performance requirements; the point of sale; the nature of the security and underwriting; 
repayment channel; and the customer journey. 
 
The paper then explores how these features influence the success of the finance 
mechanisms in different contexts. It shows that: first, a low cost of capital is critical for 
the economic viability of deeper, whole-house retrofits; second, the inclusion of non-
energy measures such as general improvement works can enable broader sources of 
value that are more highly prized by households; and third, mechanisms that reduce 
complexity by simplifying the customer journey are likely to achieve much higher levels 
of uptake.  
 
The paper also argues that finance alone is unlikely to be a driver of demand and instead 
should be viewed as an enabler once demand is in place. This has important implications 
for the design of public policies to promote retrofit, which have too often foregrounded 
the financial barriers and benefits of retrofit and neglected wider considerations.   
 
3. How intermediaries promote business model innovation: the case of 
‘Energiesprong’ whole-house retrofits in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands. 
Article 3 takes a more conceptual approach, arguing that systemic innovations - requiring 
complementary changes in supporting technologies, technical skills, user competences, 
organisational practices and regulation - may require new business models before they 
are widely adopted. The paper argues that whole-house retrofit is an archetypal example 
of a systemic innovation. 
 
By comparing the incumbent ‘atomised market model’ with an in-depth case study of 
innovative the Dutch ‘Energiesprong’ retrofit initiative, the paper demonstrates the 
potential of business model innovation in this sector. The innovative business model is 
seen as a driver of consumer appeal but also technical and process innovation and a 
means of achieving economies of scale and cost reduction for whole-house retrofit. 
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By developing a novel framework, the paper also demonstrates the central role of an 
innovation intermediary in this business model innovation. It highlights how Dutch 
policymakers were able to promote business model innovation by funding and supporting 
this intermediary; providing lessons for how policymakers can foster business model and 
systemic innovation, which may be transferable to other sectors. 
 
4. Overcoming the systemic challenges of retrofitting residential buildings in the 
United Kingdom, a Herculean task?  
Article 4 is a chapter for a book on innovation and energy demand. It argues that the UK’s 
historical retrofit policies have failed to address four systemic challenges that constrain 
uptake for whole-house retrofits, namely: lack of information, engagement and trust; the 
uncertain benefits and quality of retrofit work; the complexity, disruption and timing of 
the project; and high capital costs and split incentives that act as a financial barrier.  
 
The chapter focuses on solutions to these challenges, drawing upon insights from the 
three previous articles in terms of the business model, financing and intermediaries. It 
argues that a more comprehensive policy approach will be needed to overcome these 
challenges and provides some specific recommendations. 
 
Table 2 summarises the contribution of the main author to each of the articles.  
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Table 2 Main authors’ contribution to the articles 
Article title  Main author contribution  Co-author/supervisor contribution 
Article title: Business models for residential retrofit in the UK: 
a critical assessment of five key archetypes. 
Authors: Donal Brown 
Journal: Energy Efficiency (2018) 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9629-5  
Publication status: Published  
Sole author  Supervisors advised on empirical data collection and 
provided proofreading and general feedback 
Article title: Worth the risk? An evaluation of alternative 
finance mechanisms for residential retrofit.  
Authors: Donal Brown, Steven Sorrell, Paula Kivimaa 
Journal: Energy Policy (2019) 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.12.033 
Publication status: Published 
Designed the study, 
undertook  
literature review, developed 
framework,  
undertook all 14 interviews 
and data analysis, wrote 
discussion and conclusions  
Sorrell provided guidance on the literature and 
theoretical approach and undertook edits of the 
manuscript, for sense and readability. 
Kivimaa provided advice and comments on research 
design, interview structure, and undertook edits of 
the manuscript, for sense and readability. 
Article title: How intermediaries promote business model 
innovation: the case of ‘Energiesprong’ whole-house 
retrofits in UK and the Netherlands. 
Authors: Donal Brown, Paula Kivimaa, Steven Sorrell  
Journal: SPRU Working Paper Series (SWPS)  
Publication status: Published 
Designed the study, 
undertook  
literature review, developed 
framework,  
undertook all 6 interviews 
and data analysis, wrote 
discussion and conclusions  
Kivimaa provided guidance on the literature and 
theoretical approach and undertook edits of the 
manuscript, including developing the literature 
review, framework and discussion as well as for sense 
and readability. 
Sorrell undertook edits of the manuscript, for sense 
and readability. 
Article title: Overcoming the systemic challenges of retrofitting 
residential buildings in the United Kingdom, A herculean task? 
Authors: Donal Brown, Paula Kivimaa, Jan Rosenow, Mari 
Martiskainen  
Book: Jenkins, K and Hopkins, D. (2018) (Eds.) Transitions in 
Energy Efficiency and Demand: The emergence, diffusion and 
impact of low-carbon innovation. London, UK: Routledge 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351127264  
Publication status: Published  
Designed the study, 
undertook  
literature review, developed 
framework, wrote 
discussion and conclusions  
 
Kivimaa provided the bulk of the text on 
intermediaries including developing the literature and 
theoretical approach and undertook edits of the 
manuscript for sense and readability. 
Rosenow provided the bulk of the text for subsection 
on UK policy on residential retrofit including reviewing 
the literature Martiskainen provided edits to the 
intermediaries section and undertook edits of the 
manuscript for sense and readability. 
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2. Article 1: Business models for residential retrofit in the UK: a critical assessment of five 
key archetypes  
(Pre-print, published in Energy Efficiency) 
 
Abstract 
The whole-house retrofit of residential buildings has significant potential to reduce carbon 
emissions and provide additional heath and economic benefits. However, in countries such as 
the UK much of this potential is yet to be realised. This paper shows how the concept of 
‘business models’ can be a powerful tool for understanding the challenge of improving energy 
performance and reducing carbon emissions in residential buildings. Through a review of 
contemporary literature and eighteen semi-structured interviews; the paper describes and 
compares five distinct business model archetypes: the atomised market model; market 
intermediation model; one-stop-shop; energy services agreement and managed energy services 
agreement. These models range from the traditional approach to highly innovative energy 
service contracts. The paper further illustrates how the UK and EU market for retrofitting 
residential buildings is beginning to trial the more innovative business models. These emerging 
business models are characterised by increasingly industrialised processes and integrated 
supply chains, a holistic customer offering and single point of sale, long-term energy saving 
performance contracts (ESPC) and integral project finance. It is argued that whilst the 
traditional business model is suitable for the implementation of single or piecemeal energy-
saving measures, business model innovation will be required to meet the UK’s ambitious 
climate change targets. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) has an ambitious target to reduce greenhouse gas (CO2e) emissions 
by 80% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels (Treasury, 2008). To this end, the UK government has 
set legally binding, five-year carbon budgets that include targets for reducing emissions in all 
sectors of the UK economy (CCC, 2013). In 2016, buildings were responsible for over a third of 
the UK’s CO2e emissions, with 22% from the residential sector alone (CCC, 2016). Improving 
the energy efficiency of residential buildings can also improve occupant’s health (Willand et 
al., 2015) and reduce fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015). In the UK, the energy performance of 
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residential buildings is measured using the ‘Standard Assessment Procedure’ (SAP)12, where a 
SAP score of 100 equates to an exemplary dwelling. In 2012, the average SAP for UK homes 
was 59, compared to only 45 in 1996 (DECC, 2015b).  
 
Progress in improving the energy performance of residential buildings has stalled since 2012 
(CCC, 2016). The UK still has one of the oldest and least energy efficient housing stocks in 
Europe, and two thirds of the existing buildings are likely to exist in 2050 (Fylan et al., 2016). 
Older, solid walled properties constitute around 27% of the UK stock, and have a large energy 
saving potential (Element Energy, 2013), yet only around 4% have had solid wall insulation 
(SWI) installed (CCC, 2016). The UK also has a high proportion (67%) of owner occupied 
housing, with 19% in social housing and 14% in private rented sectors (CCC, 2016). The 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015a) estimates there is cost effective13 potential to 
reduce direct emissions14 from all buildings by 32% to 2030, with further savings available from 
the implementation of onsite microgeneration - with the need to achieve near-zero emissions 
from the sector by 2050 (CCC, 2016). A 2013 policy initiative to improve energy efficiency in 
this sector (the ‘Green Deal’) proved to be a high-profile failure, achieving only 15,000 
installations (mostly new boilers) rather than the two million a year that were envisaged 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Since the remaining policies for energy efficiency in housing are 
relatively limited in ambition and scope, the carbon targets for this sector may not be achieved 
(Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). 
 
Emissions from UK residential buildings largely derive from gas use for space and water 
heating, and electricity use for lighting and appliances. Alongside efficient appliances and 
behaviour changes, the majority of these emissions can be reduced by the retrofit of three 
types of measure (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014): improving the building fabric of properties; 
adopting low-carbon heat technologies such as heat pumps; and building-integrated electricity 
                                                        
12 SAP quantifies a dwelling’s performance in terms of: energy use per unit floor area, a fuel-cost-based energy efficiency 
rating (the SAP Rating) and emissions of CO2 (the Environmental Impact Rating) (GOV.UK, 2017). 
13 The CCC define the cost-effective path as comprising measures that cost less than the projected carbon price across their 
lifetimes together with measures that may cost more than the projected carbon price, but are necessary in order to manage 
costs and risks of meeting the 2050 target (CCC, 2013). 
14 Those that result from heating, ventilation and cooling systems as well as and hot water. This term excludes emissions 
from electricity consumption  
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microgeneration, such as solar PV (CCC, 2013). The CCC projections for 2030 include 2 million 
SWI and 2.5 million heat pump installations. This represents a 7-fold increase in properties with 
SWI and a massive upscaling in low carbon heat (CCC, 2016).  
 
The improper installation of deeper single measures such as SWI have, however, the potential 
to cause damaging unintended consequences15 (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). A whole-house 
residential retrofit; where the entire building is treated as a system rather than as individual 
elements or measures, is likely to mitigate such issues and achieve greater reductions in 
emissions (Hansford, 2015). Such an approach typically involves multiple measures and 
strategies for insulation, draught proofing, ventilation and heating systems, and may also 
include microgeneration (Milsom, 2016). Consequently, if the UK is to meet its ambitious 
climate change targets, whole-house residential retrofit; involving multiple co-ordinated 
measures will need to become the norm (Lewis and Smith, 2013).  
 
This paper argues that despite significant policy action in this area, a major reason for the slow 
progress is the limitations of the traditional business model through which energy efficiency 
measures are delivered. This model is characterised by a piecemeal offering; with a fragmented 
supply chain, a focus on single (rather than multiple, complementary) measures, and no 
guarantees on performance. Yet, research that identifies how alternative business models 
might be more effective in delivering whole-house retrofit, is largely absent from the literature. 
 
This study addresses this gap. First, it uses the business model concept to better understand 
the challenge of residential retrofit; second, it identifies the range of business models currently 
used for delivering residential retrofit in the UK and the EU; and third, it evaluates how and 
why the characteristics of these business models influence their potential in delivering whole-
house retrofits.  
 
The study addresses the following research questions: 
1. What insights does the business models concept offer for the challenge of residential 
retrofit? 
                                                        
15 Such as mould growth, poor air quality and interstitial condensation; due to poor detailing, and in-sufficient consideration 
of building physics, airtightness and ventilation (Milsom, 2016) 
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2. What business models are currently used for residential retrofit and how do they 
differ? 
3. How and why do the characteristics of these alternative business models influence their 
potential for delivering whole-house residential retrofit? 
 
Through a review of the academic literature on both business models and residential retrofit, 
together with semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the residential retrofit 
industry, this paper explores how more innovative business models could enable greater 
uptake of whole-house retrofit. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarises the 
theoretical literature on business models and the empirical literature on residential retrofit 
and outlines the value of using the former to understand the latter. Section 2.4 outlines the 
research methodology, while Section 2.5 describes five key business model archetypes for 
residential retrofit. Section 2.6 summarises the empirical results and highlights the implications 
for the successful delivery of whole-house residential retrofit. Section 2.7 places these findings 
in the context of the wider literature on business models and residential retrofit. Section 2.8 
concludes and provides some suggestions for further research. 
 
2.2. Literature on business models, energy services and residential retrofit 
2.2.1. Literature on business models 
Throughout history, the development of new business models has been instrumental in the 
diffusion of innovations, such as commercial aviation, modern customer electronics and the 
internet (Teece, 2010). Meeting the sustainability challenges of the 21st century, is likely to 
require a major transition in many sectors of the economy. This transition requires the 
development and rapid diffusion of multiple low carbon innovations throughout the housing 
sector. Thus, innovations such as distributed energy16 and whole-house residential retrofit may 
require novel business models before they are viable on a large scale; due to their 
incompatibility with existing industry practices (Hall and Roelich, 2016; Winther and Gurigard, 
2017). Consequently, various scholars have identified how such systemic innovations may have 
specific characteristics that are more suitable to certain novel business models (Hall and 
                                                        
16 Defined as electricity generation feeding into the local distribution network (operating from 132kV down to 230V), as 
opposed to the regional or national transmission grid (which operates from 400kV and 275kV).  
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Roelich, 2016; Richter, 2012; Steinberger et al., 2009). In addition, new business models for 
energy services may also enable a whole-house approach to improving the energy performance 
of buildings (Kangas et al., 2018).  
 
The business model is therefore increasingly adopted as a lens for evaluating firm strategies to 
address sustainability challenges (Boons et al., 2013). Yet, whilst a few key studies provide 
points of reference for characterising business models, the term remains contested; both in 
terms of the organisational components that are described (Osterwalder et al., 2005) and the 
system boundaries of individual firms or networks of firms (DaSilva and Trkman, 2014; Upward 
and Jones, 2015; Zott et al., 2011). Perhaps the most commonly used definition is from 
Osterwalder & Pignuer (2010) who identify four basic components; the value proposition, the 
supply chain, the customer interface and the financial model (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). 
This characterisation provides a ‘meta-model’ of features that are generic to all business 
models, and can thus be applied in multiple contexts (Osterwalder et al., 2005). Business 
models therefore incorporate the nature of the value delivered to customers; the activities 
involved in delivering that value; and the means of capturing revenue from these activities 
(Boons et al., 2013). 
 
However, the study of the business model of individual firms overlooks the interdependent 
and networked nature of the delivery of good and services (Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and 
Amit, 2010). Business models thus involve a range of activities that may span the boundaries 
of multiple organisations (Zott and Amit, 2010). This highlights the need for what has been 
termed a systems perspective on business models (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). This perspective 
emphasises the governance of business models, both in terms of the role of different actors 
and the chosen mode of governance; for example, from highly integrated to highly outsourced 
approaches (Amit and Zott, 2001). 
 
2.2.2. Business models, energy services and residential retrofit 
Several studies use the business model concept to describe how organisations provide energy 
services (Duplessis et al., 2012; Hannon et al., 2015; Kindström and Ottosson, 2016; Labanca 
et al., 2014; Okkonen and Suhonen, 2010). Energy service business models move beyond the 
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prevailing value proposition based on the sale of energy commodities (gas, electricity, fuel oil); 
towards an alternative value proposition based on the energy service itself (warmth, light, hot 
water) (Steinberger et al., 2009). This creates incentives for suppliers to reduce energy demand 
in order to minimise the energy cost of supplying the service (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Sorrell, 
2007). Where these contracts include guaranteed reductions in energy consumption or costs 
for the client, they are termed Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC), with the relevant 
supplier being termed an Energy Service Company (ESCO) (Kindström and Ottosson, 2016). The 
market for ESPCs is largely confined to industry and non-residential buildings (Hannon and 
Bolton, 2015; Kindström and Ottosson, 2016; Okkonen and Suhonen, 2010), since the 
transaction costs in the residential market are relatively high (Sorrell, 2007). However, Bleyl-
Androschin and Schinnerl (2007) propose a number of models for ESPC’s that could promote 
building envelope refurbishment. Indeed, several residential examples of ESPC’s are now 
emerging across the EU (Irrek et al., 2013; Labanca et al., 2014). 
 
Relatively few academic studies investigate business models for residential retrofit. Recent UK 
case studies focus on new models for distributed energy (Foxon et al., 2015; Hall and Roelich, 
2016; Hannon and Bolton, 2015), but do not assess the specific challenges posed by residential 
retrofit. Gauthier and Gilomen (2016) compare two French case studies of residential retrofit 
business models, but focus on individual firms within the project, rather than the overall 
retrofit process. Mahapatra et al., (2013) evaluate the opportunities and barriers of one-stop-
shop business models in Scandinavia for residential retrofit; where multiple services and 
finance are provided by one organisation. Winther & Gurigard (2017) explore a failed attempt 
to implement ESPC contracts in a Norwegian case study, whilst Moschetti and Brattebø (2016) 
map out possible alternative business models for residential buildings, yet provide limited 
empirical examples.  
 
Cost effective energy efficiency measures face several barriers to their implementation (Sorrell 
et al., 2004). These barriers can be grouped into four categories: financial; social & behavioural; 
supplier competence; and performance risk (Fylan et al., 2016). The five components of the 
business model outlined in Section 2.1 correspond to each of these inter-related barriers. 
Studies identify problems with a value proposition focused on estimated, rather than 
guaranteed energy performance (Pettifor et al., 2015), and final energy services, such as 
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temperature and comfort (Roelich et al., 2015). Further barriers to uptake are identified as; a 
customer interface that is ineffective in engaging consumers (Owen et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 
2015); poorly developed supply chains and retrofit performance gaps (where modelled savings 
are not realised) (Gupta and Chandiwala, 2010; Kelly et al., 2012; Snape et al., 2015); and a lack 
of appeal in the financial model (Marchand et al., 2015). Other studies have identified the 
importance of intermediary actors in the governance of retrofit (Bleyl et al., 2013; Kivimaa and 
Martiskainen, 2018b), and as a means of reducing transaction costs for ESCO business models 
(Nolden et al., 2016). Thus, the five components of business models provide a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the solutions to these barriers. 
 
2.3. Business model framework for residential retrofit 
The following section describes how a business model framework can improve understanding 
of the challenges in delivering residential retrofit. This framework combines the four 
components of business models outlined by Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013) with the 
additional component of business model governance as described by Amit and Zott (2001; 
2010). The components of a business model are therefore the value proposition, supply chain, 
customer interface, financial model and business model governance. 
 
2.3.1. Value proposition  
The value proposition refers to the value or utility from goods and services that an organisation 
provides to the customer (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Engelken et al., 2016). New 
business models do not necessarily provide a novel value proposition (Lopez et al., 2014), 
although a shift towards ESPCs may also create stronger incentives for energy efficiency 
improvements (Steinberger et al., 2009). Thus, the value proposition may constitute simply the 
implementation of energy-saving retrofit measures or a move towards some form of ESPC. 
Suppliers may also emphasise other sources of value for customers; such as improvements in 
aesthetics, comfort, health and wellbeing rather than energy cost savings alone (Knoeri et al., 
2016). ESPC’s may also enable more comprehensive residential retrofit projects (Kangas et al., 
2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017).  
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2.3.2. Supply chain 
The supply chain is the upstream relationships between an organisation and its suppliers 
(Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This comprises the logistical and technical elements that 
enable delivery of the value proposition (Osterwalder, 2004). In the context of residential 
retrofit, the supply chain includes the design and delivery of the retrofit; encompassing both 
the installation and the operational phases, potentially across multiple suppliers and 
consultants. Both integration of the supply chain and improvements in project management 
may enable more comprehensive residential retrofits (Mahapatra et al., 2013), increased 
material efficiency and quality control (Lopez et al., 2014) and industrialisation/automation of 
manufacturing processes and logistics; such as the use of offsite manufacture techniques 
(Energiesprong, 2014).  
 
2.3.3. Customer interface 
The customer interface covers all downstream, customer-related interactions (Boons and 
Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This includes the relationship the customer has with the supplier 
organisations in terms of marketing, sales and distribution channels and the ongoing 
relationship with the product or service (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). In a retrofit context, 
the customer may include homeowners, landlords or social housing providers. Where 
customers separately source retrofit measures, finance and energy audits; they may encounter 
multiple interfaces and points of sale.  
 
2.3.4. Financial model 
The financial model constitutes the combination of an organisation’s capital and operational 
expenditures with its means of revenue generation from business activities (Osterwalder et al., 
2005). Typically, the financial objective in energy retrofits is to recover the capital costs of the 
measures from the saving in energy bills, or from the revenues from onsite electricity 
generation. A range of financing mechanisms have thus been developed to overcome the initial 
capital cost; where the objective is typically to ensure that repayments are equal to or lower 
than the energy cost savings. A suitable finance mechanism is often the catalyst for a viable 
retrofit project, with the associated cost of capital being critical to the economic viability of 
many measures (Gouldson et al., 2015). 
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2.3.5. Business model governance  
Business model governance involves both the control and management of the individual 
components (Zott and Amit, 2010) and the organisational form of the business model (Amit 
and Zott, 2001). As such, business models may involve a constellation of firms that interact to 
provide a service or product (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013), leading to interdependencies 
between various actors in the delivery of the value proposition (Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Consequently, the range of governance approaches lie along a continuum, with integrated, 
hierarchical firms at one end, and arm's-length, market-based, contractual relationships at the 
other (Treib et al., 2007). Where a hierarchical approach is adopted, the business model 
components are internal to a single organisation, whereas in a market-based approach, 
multiple organisations are likely to be involved. More common is a hybrid of these, with most 
business models employing varying degrees of market-based, hierarchical and trust-based 
governance; the latter involving recurrent relationships with trusted partners (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Eriksson, 2008).  
 
In residential retrofit, managers, intermediaries and government actors may each play 
important roles in governance (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). Governance (or lack of), becomes 
a particularly important consideration in highly networked arrangements where intermediaries 
(Bleyl et al., 2013; Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b), such as community (Seyfang et al., 2013), 
municipal actors (Webb et al., 2016) work alongside private firms. In particular, innovative 
business models, may require these system builders to foster trust and co-ordinate the actions 
of multiple stakeholders (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). 
 
2.4. Methods  
This study began with a comprehensive review of the academic and grey literature on retrofit 
business models. The literature review identified a number of texts and reports17 that 
described the range of approaches to retrofit that are currently employed in the UK and EU 
                                                        
17 These texts were identified from Google, Google Scholar and Scopus using several search terms. Search terms included; 
retrofit business model, retrofit financial model, energy efficiency business model, retrofit intermediary, residential energy 
service contracts, community retrofit, co-operative retrofit, local authority retrofit, retrofit one stop shop, energy services 
agreement, residential energy performance contract, managed energy service agreement  
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(De Groote et al., 2016; Edrich et al., 2010; EST, 2011; Jankel, 2013; Kats et al., 2011; Kim et al., 
2012; Koh et al., 2013; Mahapatra et al., 2013; Milin and Bullier, 2011; Straub, 2016; Sweatman 
and Managan, 2010; The Rockefeller Foundation and DB Climate Change Advisors, 2012). Five 
key archetypes of retrofit business models were subsequently identified, summarised in Table 
3 and described in detail in Section 2.5. All these models currently exist in the EU, but some 
are much more widespread than others. The criteria for their differentiation were the five key 
business model components outlined in Section 2.3. 
 
The literature review was followed by scoping interviews with eight prominent experts in the 
residential retrofit field (see ‘Expert scoping’ in Table A1 in Appendix A). The aim was to test 
the validity and representativeness of five archetypes and gain an overview of current practice 
in the UK and wider EU residential retrofit market. The selection of interviewees involved 
identification of the key organisations involved in the residential energy efficiency sector, 
including, academic, technical, advocacy and policy actors. Snowballing techniques were then 
used to develop contacts and source further interviewees (Kvale, 2008). 
 
Building on the insights from the expert interviews, the business model framework was refined, 
and an interview protocol developed for practitioners from each of the business model 
archetypes, with the aim of including at least two representatives of each archetype (see 
‘Practitioners’ in Table A1 in Appendix A). The sample was initially drawn from the UK but was 
expanded to include other EU Member States; including France, Latvia, and the Netherlands, 
to obtain representatives of the more innovative and less common archetypes. The interview 
questions were designed to develop a detailed understanding of the structure and operation 
of the business models and how this influenced their success in delivering residential retrofit. 
Both sets of interviews were supplemented by documentary analysis of publicly available 
reports, where available.  
 
Each interview was recorded, transcribed, and coded using the NVivo 11™ software. This 
enabled detailed analysis of the responses, allowing common themes to be identified along 
with areas for further investigation. These methods were considered appropriate, given the 
need to develop a qualitative understanding of the role and importance of the different 
variables within in the business model framework; as well to test the validity of the archetypes 
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through discussion with expert stakeholders (Kvale, 2008). The use of several case studies for 
each archetype allowed identification of their commonalities and to control for more 
idiosyncratic elements. It is recognised this method provides less granular detail than could be 
obtained from in-depth case studies and provides a less representative sample than could be 
obtained from a large survey. However, the chosen method is suitable for addressing the 
research questions given resource constraints. 
 
2.5. Retrofit business models: five key archetypes 
The following sections describe each of the five retrofit archetypes in turn. Each section 
provides examples of the archetype, identifies its distinguishing features and assesses how 
these characteristics influence the potential for delivering retrofits of residential buildings; 
particularly for whole-house approaches.  
 
2.5.1. ‘Atomised’ market model 
The atomised market model continues to be the primary model delivering residential retrofit 
in the UK. Through an offering based on estimated energy cost and carbon savings, this model 
involves individual retrofit measures and technologies installed by separate contractors. 
Customers source the individual measures, energy audits and finance separately, with the 
result that multiple customer interfaces, or points of contact are required for a whole-house 
retrofit. The offer of energy savings is based on modelled impacts of measures, and no 
guarantees are provided. Therefore, any finance package is based on estimated rather than 
guaranteed cost savings. The details of the model are illustrated in Figure 11.  
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Whilst a highly fragmented and market-based business model is the norm for many industries, 
interviewees agreed that this ‘siloed’ approach does not work well for whole-house residential 
retrofit. 
 
“[Supply chain integration] is extremely poor; there has been a focus on single measures 
for the last 20/25 years. It is going to be hard to make the shift to a more comprehensive 
approach. Single measures have their place, but you want to have mechanisms to do 
more comprehensive residential retrofit.” (Academic - energy efficiency policy-I#1) 
 
This focus on single measures stems directly from the atomised and uncoordinated nature of 
the dominant model; 
 
“what we’ve got in the UK is where the customer has to be this project manager…That’s 
complex, it might work; for ringing somebody up when you boiler breaks down…[but] 
it’s not the route for a….ramping up [of] energy efficiency measures” (Energy Saving 
Trust- I#3) 
 
Such an approach has typified the delivery of the energy efficiency measures required and 
subsidised by UK policy; such as the supplier obligations and Green Deal, as well as the low 
carbon heat measures subsidised by the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), and microgeneration 
 
Customer 
Energy Auditor  
Installer Type 1 Installer Type 2 
Finance provider  
 Supply chain actor  
Retrofit measures 
Customer interface 
Finance 
repayments 
Up-front payments 
Figure 11 The ‘Atomised’ market model 
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Feed in Tariff (FIT). Thus, this approach has resulted in very few whole-house retrofits – instead 
tending to deliver a succession of piecemeal interventions at different times, linked to an ever-
evolving policy landscape. 
 
“We have tended to focus in the UK on subsid:…installers, who do one thing; you can 
get a grant for doing x measures, get some carbon credits from the energy 
company…and that’s it. They don’t care about how it performs; they don’t care about 
how it actually impacts on the end user; they just go in and install one measure.” (Policy 
Advisor – UKGBC- I#2) 
 
This model has not helped develop an effective supply chain for residential retrofit; particularly 
for SWI, which requires a more whole-house approach involving additional measures such as 
ventilation and draught-proofing. 
 
“I’ve been around probably now over 3000 houses that have had external wall insulation 
and I haven't seen any done right, and that is a fairly damning indictment of the 
industry…You have got industry-standard details which introduce cold bridging. There 
is no assessment of ventilation it is almost inevitable it's going to go wrong.” (Director 
– BRE- I#4) 
 
2.5.2. Market intermediation model 
The market intermediation model, shown in Figure 12 is also a relatively common delivery 
model for residential retrofit in the UK and the EU. This model usually involves the 
implementation of government subsidy schemes, focused on single measures, and uses 
estimates of the associated energy cost and carbon savings from a basic energy audit. 
However, a key difference is the role of an intermediary organisation, who co-ordinate the 
supply chain and provide the customer interface through marketing activities and project 
management; thus, simplifying the customer journey. These schemes typically involve Local 
Authorities (LA) or NGOs who offer information, consultancy and procurement guidance to the 
client and may also offer a range of specialist services and financing assistance. If the 
intermediary is trusted by potential customers, their involvement can lower transaction costs, 
facilitate project implementation and help raise awareness of retrofit opportunities in the 
residential sector, building upon existing trusted relationships at the area or community level.  
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UK examples of this model include; the RE:NEW scheme implemented by the Greater London 
Authority (GLA); the Birmingham Energy Savers (BES) scheme, involving a partnership between 
Birmingham City Council and Carillion18 and the Nottingham Energy Partnership (NEP) an NGO 
initiative in Nottingham. These schemes commonly utilise relationships with local housing 
providers and LAs. The RE:NEW scheme has focussed on the social housing sector and has 
facilitated the retrofit of over 127,000 London homes, saving around 46k tonnes of carbon 
dioxide a year (GLA, 2017). The NEP scheme focuses on the privately owned and rented sector, 
with an emphasis on households in fuel poverty. Both these schemes owe their success to the 
trusted relationships between households and their housing provider, or council; “working 
with the LA, it’s that trusted brand” (Retrofit Intermediary- I#11).  
 
By contrast the large-scale BES scheme was a major failure. This is in part attributed to the use 
of a multinational private sector partner for the marketing and delivery of measures to 
households, rather than using the councils branding and a local SME supply chain (Watson, 
2014); “There [was] a lot of installers who don’t deserve trust, I wouldn’t touch them with a 
bargepole” (Sustainability Consultant – BES- I#12).  
 
                                                        
18 A large international construction firm, headquartered in the UK 
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Figure 12 Market intermediary model 
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RE:NEW have supported additional carbon savings above and beyond what would have 
otherwise occurred in the delivery of government and business-as-usual planned programs. 
“The majority of organisations fed back [It’s been] faster, deeper and with less risk involved” 
(Manager- RE:NEW – GLA- I#10). 
 
However, these programs have done little to alter the underlying model of the industry and 
encourage the development of whole-house retrofit with an integrated supply chain; “[in the 
end] it reverted to the piecemeal offer that we’ve identified is the problem” (Sustainability 
Consultant – BES - I#12). The reliance on national subsidy schemes, where “changes in policy 
mean that [the] model is ever changing'' (Retrofit Intermediary- I#11), also means that there is 
very little retrofit activity once these schemes have ended. This stop-start nature of funding is 
a key factor in the lack of a well-developed supply chain for whole-house retrofit in the UK. 
This may be changing, with schemes such as RE:NEW looking to support more novel value 
propositions and longer-term finance models (e.g. the Energiesprong approach discussed 
below). It was argued that, whilst future retrofit policy programs should recognise the 
importance of long-term industry led solutions, “there is always going to be a role for 
intermediaries” (Academic - energy efficiency policy- I#1) even where integrated business 
models are adopted. 
 
2.5.3. One-stop-shop 
The one-stop-shop business model (Figure 13) involves an integrated supply chain and 
customer interface that provides a single point of contact for the customer. The supplier offers 
a ‘holistic’ design and build including a comprehensive package of services, a more extensive 
modelling and design phase, the production of a comprehensive residential retrofit plan and 
the implementation of multiple complementary measures. Delivery of these is coordinated 
through either a single company or a well-integrated network of subcontractors. As shown in 
Figure 13, some business models also include finance as part of the offer, while several operate 
as co-operatives. The co-operative approach typically involves both suppliers and households 
as co-op members, who receive dividends on their equity investment in retrofit projects.  
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Although more established in Scandinavia (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Straub, 2016), the UK 
examples of this business model include the Retrofitworks project that utilises an online portal 
and co-operative approach to link suppliers to customers looking for retrofit, and home 
auditing services through its sister company Parity Projects. The Brighton and Hove Energy 
Services Co-op (BHESCo) also uses a co-operative approach and a low-cost financing offer 
based on issuing shares to the local community. A key emphasis in the business model is a 
focus on the needs of the client and a simplification of the customer journey. Segel AS - a 
consultancy providing specialist guidance on the implementation of one-stop-shops in 
continental Europe and Scandinavia, outline; 
 
“The value proposition……is a holistic retrofitting and single point of contact, easiness 
in the project, and project management...many of them also include help for the client 
in the application for grants...and confidence that the solutions chosen are right for 
[them]” (Segel AS - Business Consultant -I#14) 
 
This approach typically facilitates whole-house retrofits and may be applied in conjunction with 
other forms of renovation. In several of the Scandinavian examples, local SMEs collaborate 
with a larger company such as Bravida19 or national hardware chains a means of generating 
customers. In the case of Retrofitworks, the online portal is a key part of the customer interface 
                                                        
19 Bravida is an installation and service company with about 9000 employees at more than 160 locations in Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland.  
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where members of the co-operative can advertise works and have bids placed by the supply 
chain who are also co-operative members. Key to the success of these business models is the 
role of specialist retrofit co-ordinators or project managers; 
 
“a person who understands what every element of the good retrofit looks like; isn't an 
expert in all of them but knows when they look dodgy or when an expert is needed to 
be brought in on certain things. So is about the genuine coordination…so I am a massive 
advocate of that and its built-in within…Retrofitworks.” (Retrofitworks/Parity Projects -
I#13) 
 
Whilst not all these examples offer financing, BHESCo combine their retrofit offering with a 
community share issue to provide a financing package to its customers. 
 
‘’It’s based on this virtuous circle, you become a member of the co-op,…you invest…,you 
get a 5% return on investment. We invest your money into…energy efficiency, the 
customer pays from the savings in their energy bill’’ (BHESCo -I#15) 
 
At present the model is based on a hire purchase agreement20 or what may be termed a capital 
lease, with the assumption that if the person moves they will see uplift in its value that will 
enable the lease to be paid off. However, offering competitive financing remains a challenge 
with considerable risk. 
 
“Our…cost of capital is 5%, but we may have to consider whether we can offer that in 
the future… its very tricky and very difficult [to offer competitive finance]” (BHESCo -
I#15) 
 
2.5.4. Energy Services Agreement (ESA) 
The ESA involves a form of ESPC, where building occupants are provided with an energy 
performance guarantee for specific energy services, usually over a period of 15 years or more. 
Instead of paying for units of heating fuel, occupants are guaranteed a level of performance 
such as a specified internal temperature (i.e. 21°C) and a certain volume of hot water at a 
specified temperature. Such an approach is synonymous with the ESCO model in that measures 
and the subsequent guarantee are provided by an ESCO, who are engaged as part of a long-
                                                        
20 Under an hire purchase agreement, the debtor hire the goods and then pay an agreed amount by instalments. While still 
making payments, the debtor isn’t allowed to sell or dispose of the goods without the lender’s permission. 
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term contract; with contractual penalties for under-performance. However, this model (Figure 
13) differs from the more common examples in the public and municipal sectors (where the 
debt for the retrofit measures is taken on by the building occupants or tenant)21 as measures 
are financed directly by the ESCO, or upstream through a third party financier (The Rockefeller 
Foundation and DB Climate Change Advisors, 2012). These projects typically consist of an 
integrated offering; covering a whole-house retrofit of building fabric and heating measures, 
by a well-coordinated supply chain with design, build and operate phases under one contract. 
A whole-house retrofit is a likely pre-condition to offering a temperature guarantee, thus 
ensuring modelled savings are realised and energy consumption is controlled.  
 
 
The review did not identify any examples of ESA contracts for residential retrofit in the UK, but 
examples exist in France and Latvia. The French state-owned railway company SNCF also 
manages a significant number of social housing properties under its subsidiary; ICF Habitat. ICF 
have undertaken several schemes based on an ESA model, focused on medium-to-high-density 
multifamily buildings. The Energies POSIT’IF is an ESA model for privately owned or rented 
multifamily buildings in greater Paris. In addition, RENESCO is a social enterprise involved in 
                                                        
21 After significant desk based and interview research, the author could not find any examples of this business model in the 
UK or EU residential retrofit sector- thus it is excluded from the paper. 
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the retrofit of dilapidated multifamily buildings in former Soviet-era housing in Eastern Europe, 
particularly Latvia. The Latvian example is notable for its value proposition involving a focus on 
structural improvement as a selling point. 
 
'We are not just conserving energy, our main task is conserving the building, we are 
protecting the building from the elements…about 15% of our total investment has 
nothing to do with energy efficiency'' (RENESCO -I#17). 
 
The risk of offering the ESPC is mitigated through a well-integrated business model “This was 
possible because of one entity taking a decision and co-ordinating the investments [and works]” 
(RENESCO-I#17). Such an approach means a single point of contact and recourse for the client: 
“the main advantage of the [ESPC contract] is that we have only one firm to talk to” (ICF 
Habitat-I#16). The successful co-ordination of the model therefore relies heavily on the design 
of effective contracts; “we as a buyer have to make them talk together, so we have to design a 
process”’ (ICF Habitat -I#16). 
 
An important component of the ESA model is the “bridge of finance and technology” 
(RENESCO-I#17). Under the ICF Habitat model the capital is supplied by the housing provider, 
with the financial agreement upstream from the tenant. Whilst a large semi-public actor such 
as ICF can borrow at a relatively low cost of capital, RENESCO must source funds in private 
capital markets. RENESCO have chosen to use ‘on balance sheet’ finance, meaning the debt 
obligation is tied to the firm rather than the building owner. Based on their current cost of 
capital “the renovation can be paid by the energy efficiency alone in 15 years” (RENESCO-I#17). 
However, the economics of their offering are very sensitive to the financing terms, and the size 
of their portfolio. Therefore, RENESCO “hope to sell off the cash-flows of the first 15 buildings” 
(I#17) under a forfeiting scheme they are developing in collaboration with the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This means that RENESCO can shift successful 
projects off their balance sheet, and sell them on to investors in secondary markets, improving 
their borrowing conditions. 
 
“So, we get our equity back, we have our capital back, we can pay back the loan, we 
hopefully make a little bit of a profit” (RENESCO-I#17). 
  
 
78 
 
2.5.5. Managed Energy Services Agreement (MESA) 
The MESA model (Figure 15) is like the ESA approach in that the ESCO provides guarantees for 
the energy performance of plant and building fabric measures, installed during a retrofit (Kim 
et al., 2012). However, in the MESA model the contracting organisation also takes on 
responsibility for the payment of the energy bill in an energy supply contract (ESC) upstream 
of the customer; to provide total energy management. This requires additional capability in 
energy supply and procurement. This also introduces a potential role for renewable electricity, 
storage and demand side management as part of the MESA. This level of integration also 
incentivises an integrated supply chain and represents a holistic energy services offering to the 
customer.  
 
 
Whilst the MESA is more common in the commercial or public sector, the Dutch government 
has funded a large-scale trial of this approach in the social housing sector; known as the 
Energiesprong or ‘energy leap’ initiative (Energiesprong 2014). The scheme has thus far 
delivered approximately 1800 whole-house residential retrofits in the Netherlands; largely 
focusing on single family semi-detached or terraced units. At the time of writing the first UK 
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trial is about to commence in Nottingham (Energiesprong, 2017). This is the only known 
example of a MESA in the EU residential sector. 
 
Energiesprong do not deliver the measures or the guarantee but instead their market 
development team acts as an intermediary between the client and contractor, providing 
technical assistance in implementation. Customers are offered a whole-house residential 
retrofit, based upon net-zero energy consumption. Typically, an Energiesprong retrofit involves 
the delivery of off-site manufactured, insulated facades, integrated with renewable heat 
systems and PV panels as well as lighting and controls. The contractor offers a 30-year energy 
performance guarantee for net-zero annual energy consumption, amortised over the calendar 
year. This is based on a guaranteed internal temperature of 21°C in living spaces, and a set 
allowance of hot water and electricity consumption; akin to a mobile phone contract with 
usage limits. A whole-house retrofit, with electricity microgeneration is a likely pre-condition 
to offering a net-zero energy guarantee, ensuring modelled savings are realised and heat and 
electricity consumption are controlled. 
 
“The main premise of Energiesprong is an outcome-based procurement approach, 
specifying what it needs to do for the next 30 years; a long list of energy related 
measures; comfort, health and quality elements. So therefore, our approach is entirely 
technology agnostic” (Energiesprong UK-I#18) 
 
Again, the value proposition emphasises the health, comfort and aesthetic benefits; ahead of 
energy cost savings. 
 
“The quality of the design- the ‘kerbside appeal’ of the refurbished property…It is a 
complete envelope, so it gives an opportunity to redesign the property and uplift the 
value, not because of the energy efficiency economics, but the design improvements of 
the property” (Energiesprong UK-I#18) 
 
The aim is to create demand through a desirable customer offering; 
“it was new, it was exciting, and everybody looked at it. You had owner occupiers 
knocking on the door and saying, “Can I buy one of those?” So, it is really being able to 
see, to display the product, which is a brand new refurbished house” (Energiesprong UK-
I#18) 
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The Energiesprong, model requires significant process innovation, in the form of developing 
entire insulated facades using offsite manufacture techniques, to enable an installation time 
of less than one week. This process of mass production and industrialisation is key to enabling 
ESPCs for single family dwellings. Such an industrialised approach also drives down costs for 
SWI, which would otherwise be prohibitively expensive. 
 
“So therefore, it is a challenge given to industry…because there is no technical 
specification, but an outcome-based specification it is more [like] a product design 
approach in industry; akin to automotive and other sectors.” (Energiesprong UK-I#18) 
 
The Energiesprong MESA has thus far been applied in the social housing sector, and “the 
financing model therefore is a combination...of maintenance, major repair works. And the 
additional revenue stream for thirty years from the energy plan that comes with the property.” 
(Energiesprong UK-I#18). However, at present the net-zero energy retrofit is too expensive to 
enable a payback within the 30-year contact. “The [current] market price for a 3-bed terraced 
property of 80 m2 we would be looking at £70k. As a starting point, maybe a trajectory to £40k, 
£35k [is needed]”(I#18). The Energiesprong UK team are hoping to build up a large order-book 
that would enable industrialisation of the supply chain and economies of scale. Currently the 
model is reliant on several sources of grant funding including the EU Interreg scheme. 
However, for long term economic viability, a cost of capital at <2% is also likely to be required.  
 
2.6. Summary of findings 
A summary of the five archetypes and how they differ in terms of the business model 
components is provided in Table 3. The results of the empirical study have provided insights 
into the characteristics of successful retrofit business models, including some generalisable 
findings that draw lessons from all five archetypes, summarised in Table 4. 
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Table 3 Business model archetypes and business model components 
 ‘Atomised’ market 
model 
Market intermediation 
model 
One-stop-shop  Energy services agreement 
(ESA) 
Managed energy services 
agreement (MESA) 
Value proposition 
The bundle of 
products and 
services that create 
value for a specific 
customer segment 
Single measures  
 
Emphasis on energy 
cost savings 
 
Savings are estimated 
rather than guaranteed 
As for ‘atomised’ 
market model 
Multiple measures or 
whole-house 
residential retrofit 
common 
 
Emphasis on energy 
cost savings  
 
Savings are estimated 
rather than 
guaranteed 
 
Additional emphasis 
on home 
improvement and 
comfort 
 
Multiple measures or 
whole-house residential 
retrofit required 
 
Emphasis on energy 
services of temperature 
and hot water volume  
 
Energy savings 
performance contract 
(ESPC) including 
performance guarantee 
for heat and hot water  
 
Additional emphasis on 
home improvement and 
comfort 
As for ESA but with: 
 
Additional energy services of 
lighting and appliances, (ESPC) 
including performance 
guarantee for electricity 
consumption 
 
Energy supply contract (ESC) 
(gas, electricity) 
 
 
Customer interface 
How are 
downstream 
relationships with 
customers 
structured and 
managed 
Largely left to the 
market to promote and 
engage customers, with 
responsibility for the 
marketing and 
engagement for the 
different components 
(i.e. measures, finance) 
of the retrofit typically 
separated 
One point of contact 
for the promotion, 
marketing and sales 
typically provided by 
an intermediary whom 
has no direct 
involvement in the 
retrofit itself   
 
Additional interface 
for finance 
One point of contact 
for the promotion, 
marketing and sales 
of the full package 
necessary to achieve 
the retrofit, typically 
provided by the host 
company offering the 
retrofit package as a 
one-stop-shop  
As for one-stop-shop 
 
As for one-stop-shop and ESA 
but with: 
 
Potential for customer 
engagement through 
traditional energy supply 
retail channels  
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 ‘Atomised’ market 
model 
Market intermediation 
model 
One-stop-shop  Energy services agreement 
(ESA) 
Managed energy services 
agreement (MESA) 
Supply chain  
How are upstream 
relationships with 
suppliers 
structured and 
managed 
Largely ‘siloed’ 
relationship with 
traditional separated 
trades installing the 
retrofit measures in 
sequence with limited 
co-ordination  
Greater co-ordination 
of overall installation, 
through quality 
assurance vetting and 
scheduling by the 
intermediary  
Highly integrated 
package of measures, 
provided in house or 
through trusted 
subcontractors, 
greater scope for 
whole-house 
solutions  
 
Supply chain may 
require legal and 
finance skillsets 
As for one-stop-shop but 
with: 
Additional contractor 
requirement for 
performance guarantee 
reducing likelihood of 
performance gap  
 
Supply chain requires legal 
and finance skillsets 
As for ESA but with: 
 
Additional supply chain for 
energy supply required, can 
be through fully licensed 
supplier model or through a 
white label scheme 
 
 
Financial Model  
How the retrofit is 
funded, by whom 
and how this is 
repaid to the 
lender 
Finance is arranged via 
third party with little 
involvement in the 
retrofit process 
As for ‘atomised’ 
market model 
Finance may be 
provided and 
arranged by the 
retrofit provider, 
even where this is 
part of an upstream 
scheme 
Lender developer / 
investor firms seeking to 
use ESPC/ESA structure to 
fund retrofits 
 
Lender captures energy 
savings and charges back 
to property owner based 
on historic consumption 
As for ESA but: 
 
Supplier assumes 
responsibility for payment of 
energy bill  
Governance 
Are the 
components of the 
business model 
provided by a single 
organisation, or a 
network, how is 
this co-ordinated 
and by whom 
Highly networked 
arrangement of 
suppliers with little co-
ordination between the 
various elements – this 
is largely left to the 
customer to manage  
A network of separate 
suppliers, although the 
intermediary provides 
some co-ordination.  
 
Customer typically left 
to arrange finance and 
may engage in 
multiple contracts 
The elements of the 
business model are 
delivered by a single 
organisation, who 
take responsibility for 
project delivery. 
Finance packages 
may also be offered 
by the supplier 
As for one-stop-shop but 
finance is included 
upstream within the ESPC 
As for ESA but also integrated 
energy procurement 
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Table 4 Main findings and application of business model framework 
Business model 
component 
Key findings  
Value proposition: 
what value is 
embedded in the 
product/ service 
offered by the firm 
• Value proposition should place less on emphasis on carbon and 
energy cost savings. Focus instead on comfort, health benefits, 
aesthetics, building longevity and uplift in value 
• Energy performance guarantees can be more attractive to 
customers and can help reduce performance gaps, although they 
add risk and cost for contractors 
Supply chain: how 
are upstream 
relationships with 
suppliers, structured 
and managed 
• Integrated supply chains can improve quality and reduce 
unintended consequences, but the required holistic skillset is lacking 
in the UK due to highly ‘siloed’ disciplines 
• The role of a retrofit coordinator may therefore be an essential 
component for the successful delivery of whole-house residential 
retrofit 
Customer interface: 
how are downstream 
relationships with 
customers, 
structured and 
managed 
• A single and trusted point of contact is very important, particularly 
for single family schemes 
• Co-operative and community-based approaches offer a key means 
of customer engagement for retrofit 
• Integrated supply chain or one-stop-shops can help but general lack 
of awareness of retrofit and customer engagement at all levels 
Financial model: the 
nature of operational 
expenditures, and 
the means of 
revenue generation 
from the business 
activities  
• Low cost of capital is essential for the viability of long-term whole-
house approaches due to the low rates of return  
• Energy performance guarantees can reduce perceived risk for 
investors, and thereby lower cost of capital 
• An integrated financing package provided with the retrofit is also 
likely to encourage customer demand 
Governance: co-
ordinating the 
business model may 
involve a multi actor 
network; spanning 
multiple 
organisations.  
• Successful retrofits involve the coordination of the various elements 
of the business model; this helps both suppliers and customers 
• Networked approaches such as the ‘atomised’ market model are 
only suitable for single measures. Whole-house retrofit is better 
delivered through integrated business models; where the supply 
chain, customer interface and financial model are brought together 
as a co-ordinated offering  
• The role of intermediary organisations i.e. municipalities or co-
operatives likely to be crucial; particularly for novel business models  
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2.7. Discussion 
The preceding sections have identified five business models for the delivery of residential retrofit 
and evaluated the potential of these models based on recent cases in the UK and EU. Previous 
studies discuss the emergence of one-stop-shop business models for single family homes 
(Mahapatra et al., 2013), and the potential of ESCO models in this sector (Moschetti and Brattebø, 
2016; Winther and Gurigard, 2017), but have provided few empirical examples. This study builds 
on this work through identifying the Energy service agreement (ESA) and Managed energy service 
agreement (MESA) models involving residential ESPCs, along with the market intermediation 
model. These are contrasted with the incumbent ‘atomised’ market model that typifies most 
residential retrofits in the UK, and EU. The study thus contributes to the literature on residential 
retrofit by identifying and evaluating the broader range of business models in this area.  
 
The findings in Table 4 support the argument that ESPC‘s have a significant potential for energy 
saving in residential buildings (Steinberger et al., 2009). In addition, the study demonstrates the 
importance of an emphasis on comfort, health and wellbeing and the improved condition of the 
property as per the value proposition (Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Sunikka-Blank and Galvin, 
2016). Supply chain integration (where multiple measures and design services are provided by a 
single organisation) is shown as critical for the delivery of whole-house residential retrofit; 
particularly for single family houses. This supports previous literature on one-stop-shop retrofit 
business models (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2012). Through this more integrated 
approach, performance gaps (Dowson et al., 2012) and negative unintended consequences; such 
as mould and poor air quality can also be minimised (Hansford, 2015). In turn this can strengthen 
the reputation of the industry and further simplify the customer journey. This contrasts with the 
highly fragmented and ‘siloed’ supply chains that have characterised most residential retrofit 
delivery to date. 
 
The inclusion of financing options as part of the retrofit package may also be a critical driver. Whilst 
many UK suppliers are unable to provide financing, the more integrated businesses models; such 
as BHESCo and the ESA and MESA models include long term finance packages to cover the up-
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front cost of measures. However, the associated cost of capital is critical in determining the 
economic viability of whole-house residential retrofit measures such as SWI (Gouldson et al., 
2015). Indeed, the Energiesprong model is currently reliant on several forms of grant funding for 
its economic viability. While the existence of an ESPC is likely to reduce the perceived risk for 
investors, several other factors will also be important (Donovan and Corbishley, 2016).  
 
Low customer demand is perhaps the biggest challenge for the upscaling of whole-house retrofit. 
A lack of visibility and knowledge of retrofit measures can be a key barrier (Marchand et al., 2015), 
as well as the hassle for the occupants (Snape et al., 2015). Indeed, retrofit interventions may also 
affect current practices in the home (such as heating behaviour), the inherent qualities of the 
property, and other competing needs and desires (Gram-Hanssen, 2014; Wilson et al., 2015). 
Retrofit measures are not typically differentiated from other renovation decisions (Wilson et al., 
2015). Thus other renovations (such as bathroom replacement) may present opportunities for 
retrofit at certain points in a properties’ life cycle (Achtnicht and Madlener, 2014). Occupants may 
also balance potential economic benefits of retrofits against building heritage and aesthetic 
concerns (Sunikka-Blank and Galvin, 2016). 
 
This study shows that a business model with a simplified customer interface, with one point of 
contact for the retrofit process, reduces this complexity and may address barriers to uptake 
(Mahapatra et al., 2013). Examples, such as the Energiesprong scheme, utilise industrialised 
processes to reduce retrofit timescales and the visual upgrade of external facades, and could drive 
increased demand through ‘kerbside appeal’. The role of intermediaries, or facilitators may be 
particularly important in promoting the uptake of novel business models (Bleyl et al., 2013); 
involving coordinated marketing efforts, capacity and trust building with energy agencies, supply 
chains, LAs, and the media (Long et al., 2015; Stieb et al., 2013). 
 
If the business model is characterised as the network through which the product or service is 
delivered, the governance of this network becomes critical. This builds on other work that 
identifies the role of network governance in delivering energy service business models (Hellström 
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et al., 2015). The findings suggest that integrated business models are likely to be most suitable 
for whole-house residential retrofit, where the individual components of the business model are 
co-ordinated by a single actor to provide a simple and holistic offering to the customer.  
 
At present these innovative business models are relatively rare, with the ESA and MESA models 
largely being trialled in multifamily buildings and social housing. With the UK’s large share of 
private rented, owner occupier and single family housing (Element Energy, 2013), a significant 
challenge remains to scale up these models to impact the wider residential market. In the MESA 
example in this study, the ESPC is included into the rental agreement. In the owner occupier sector, 
this would supplant the energy supply contract, and would therefore require alterations to UK 
legislation surrounding the energy switching rights of consumers (Ofgem, 2016). The Dutch 
Energiesprong policy aimed to address the retrofit challenge and produce business model 
innovation (Energiesprong, 2017). This included a range of regulatory changes, public funding 
commitments and the establishment of a ‘market development team’, to promote a radical shift 
in industry practice (Energiesprong, 2017). Highlighting that a mix of policy solutions may be 
required to overcome the multifaceted challenges of whole-house residential retrofit and 
promote business model innovation. 
 
This paper described the breadth of business models adopted for residential retrofit, including 
novel and innovative examples, using desk-based research and qualitative interviews. While this 
approach enabled a detailed understanding of each archetype, the smaller number of participants 
involved means the results are harder to generalise than quantitative results. The pre-testing of 
the framework with ‘experts’ was intended to prevent key approaches and elements being missed, 
although it is acknowledged this could introduce selection bias in the choice of interviewees. 
Equally, the use of in-depth case studies would have provided greater depth of understanding for 
specific approaches, at the expense of breadth. However, acknowledging these weaknesses, the 
approach adopted provides a balance between these factors, and is deemed appropriate for the 
research aims. 
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2.8. Conclusions  
This paper has demonstrated how business models can be a useful framework for understanding 
the challenges posed by residential retrofit. The paper has identified five archetypes that are 
currently being used for residential retrofit within the EU, compared them in terms of their value 
proposition, supply chain, customer interface and financial model, and overall business model 
governance and showed how differences in these elements can help explain their relative 
potential in delivering whole-house retrofit.  
 
The paper has shown how more innovative business models could expand the market for whole-
house residential retrofits in the UK. Elements of a successful business model include: 
 
• a value proposition focussed primarily upon aesthetics, comfort, health and wellbeing and 
includes guaranteed rather than estimated energy performance savings; 
• an integrated and industrialised supply chain providing a whole-house approach; 
• a simplified customer interface with a single expert point of contact;  
• a financial model that includes a low-cost financing mechanism integral to the offering and; 
• co-ordinated governance of these four components through an integrated business model  
 
This is in stark contrast to the highly ‘atomised’, market-oriented approach adopted as the primary 
UK delivery model to date.  
 
Two issues in particular, merit further research. First, the nature of the finance mechanism 
remains a key challenge, so further research should aim to identify how alternative mechanisms 
could enable long-term finance with a low cost of capital. Second, future work should identify the 
challenges of business model innovation in the sector, the barriers to such innovation and how 
both industry and policymakers can respond to these challenges.  
 
There are multiple gains from whole-house residential retrofit, including health and economic 
benefits that go beyond energy and carbon savings. This paper has shown how viewing this 
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challenge through the lens of business models, can provide valuable new insights. What is clear is 
that the incumbent approach is not delivering the scale of change needed; which necessitates the 
rapid growth in comprehensive whole-house retrofit in a short period. Meeting ambitious carbon 
targets requires a sea change in the industry and the diffusion of innovative business models, such 
as those outlined in this paper. Achieving this will require new ways of thinking in both industry 
and policy. 
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3. Article 2: Worth the risk? An evaluation of alternative finance mechanisms for residential 
retrofit.  
(Pre-print published in Energy Policy) 
 
Abstract  
Improving energy efficiency, de-carbonising heating and cooling, and increasing renewable 
microgeneration in existing residential buildings, is crucial for meeting social and climate policy 
objectives. This paper explores the challenges of financing this ‘retrofit’ activity. First, it develops 
a typology of finance mechanisms for residential retrofit highlighting their key design features, 
including: the source of capital; the financial instrument(s); the project performance requirements; 
the point of sale; the nature of the security and underwriting the repayment channel and customer 
journey. Combining information from interviews and documentary sources, the paper explores 
how these design features influence the success of the finance mechanisms in different contexts. 
First, it is shown that a low cost of capital for retrofit finance is critical to the economic viability of 
whole-house retrofits. Second, by funding non-energy measures such as general improvement 
works, finance mechanisms can enable broader sources of value that are more highly prized by 
households. Thirdly, mechanisms that reduce complexity by simplifying the customer journey are 
likely to achieve much higher levels of uptake. Most importantly we discuss how finance alone is 
unlikely to be a driver of demand for whole-house retrofit, and so instead should be viewed as a 
necessary component of a much broader retrofit strategy. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
CO2 emissions from energy used in residential buildings result from space and water heating, and 
electricity used for cooling, lighting and appliances. These emissions constitute a significant 
proportion of total emissions in advanced economies (IPCC, 2014). Aside from more efficient 
appliances and behavioural changes, emissions from the existing building stock can be reduced by 
the retrofit of three main types of measure: improving the energy efficiency (EE) of the building 
fabric; adopting low carbon heating, ventilation and cooling technologies (HVAC); and building 
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integrated electricity microgeneration, such as solar photovoltaics (PV) (CCC, 2013). Thus, in this 
paper ‘retrofit’ finance potentially includes funding for all three types of intervention. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have set ambitious goals for the retrofit of 
buildings (50% energy reduction from 2050 baseline scenario (IPCC, 2014)), to keep global 
temperature rises below 2°C as part of the 2015 Paris agreement. Since 1970 emissions from all 
buildings have more than doubled and in 2010 constituted around 19% of global carbon emissions 
(IPCC, 2014). Many retrofit measures deliver net cost savings or are cost effective22, when 
compared to other climate mitigation measures (CCC, 2018; IEA, 2017). However, delivering these 
ambitious targets, will necessitate increasingly comprehensive ‘whole-house’ retrofits,  involving 
multiple integrated building fabric, HVAC, and microgeneration measures (Brown, 2018).  
 
Delivering the 2°C scenario will require an estimated $31Tn of investment in buildings globally 
over the next four decades (IEA, 2013). A significant proportion of historical energy efficiency 
measures has involved self-financing by firms and households (IEA, 2017; Webber et al., 2015). 
However, an important source of EE investment in recent years in both Europe and North America 
(12% of total) has come from market based instruments such as supplier obligation policies, paid 
for by a levy on electricity and gas bills (IEA, 2017). These policies have typically delivered single 
home retrofit measures (Rosenow, 2012).  
 
Achieving sufficient ‘whole-house’ retrofits  through supplier obligations alone could lead to 
significant increases in household energy bills (Kern et al., 2017), thus having a negative impact on 
low income households who do not undertake retrofit measures (Rosenow et al., 2013b). Whilst 
‘fuel poverty’23 objectives could be better achieved through general taxation (Rosenow et al., 
                                                        
22 The UK’s Committee on Climate Change define the cost-effective path as comprising measures that cost less than the 
projected carbon price across their lifetimes together with measures that may cost more than the projected carbon price, but are 
necessary in order to manage costs and risks of meeting the 2050 target (CCC, 2013) 
23 The definition of fuel poverty in the UK, is where fuel costs that are above average (the national median level), and these fuel 
costs leave a residual income that is below the UK’s official poverty line (DECC, 2013b) 
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2013b), there is a need for effective, repayable finance mechanisms for the ‘able-to-pay’ segments 
(Freehling and Stickles, 2016).  
 
In this paper, finance mechanisms are considered distinct from targeted subsidies, supplier 
obligations (IEA, 2017), or fiscal incentive schemes such as property tax breaks (Rosenow et al., 
2014). A finance mechanism is thus defined as the provision of capital for retrofit measures 
through equity and/or debt that is repaid to the lender (Leventis et al., 2017). A range of retrofit 
finance mechanisms have been developed, in the European Union (EU) and USA. The features of 
and reasons for success of these alternative approaches are the main focus of this study.  
 
A comprehensive study of finance mechanisms for domestic retrofit is largely absent from the 
academic literature - with most studies published being non-academic, having limited 
consideration for the specific issues of residential buildings, or involving a different unit of analysis, 
such as supplier obligations (Rosenow, 2012). Further, an empirical investigation of factors that 
contribute to household appeal and the cost of capital is presently lacking. The role of different 
types of financing and their impact on projects remains somewhat of a ‘black box’ in the energy 
studies field more generally. This paper aims to open up the features of alternative finance 
mechanisms, and to understand the extent to which they can promote the uptake of whole-house 
retrofit -drawing on selected examples in Europe and North America.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background to the context of residential 
retrofit and reviews the literature on retrofit finance. Section 3.3 introduces the conceptual 
framework for the features of finance mechanisms along with the cost of capital. Section 3.4 
outlines the methodology. Section 3.5 introduces a new typology of retrofit finance mechanisms, 
while Section 3.6 describes how these mechanisms differ according to the framework. Section 3.7 
discusses the findings. Section 3.8 concludes and provides recommendations for policy and 
research. A glossary of key financial terminology used in the paper is provided in Table B1 in the 
Appendix. 
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3.2. Background on finance, energy efficiency and residential retrofit 
Residential retrofit produces a range of environmental, social and economic benefits, making it an 
important area for academic and policy research (Kerr et al., 2017). Energy savings from residential 
retrofit and a shift away from fossil fuel-based heating and cooling have the potential to 
significantly mitigate anthropogenic climate change. The IPCC (2014) estimate that, through 
improved EE, energy use from buildings could be stabilised by mid-century, compared to a current 
baseline where this is set to double. Thus, the EU has set a target of 27% improvement in EE by 
2030 (EC, 2014) and the revised Directive for the Energy Performance of Buildings has set a near 
zero-energy aspiration for the existing building stock (EC, 2018). Residential retrofits have also 
been shown to improve occupant health and wellbeing (Curl et al., 2015; Willand et al., 2015), 
reduce fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015) and lead to job creation and economic growth (EEFIG, 2015; 
Washan et al., 2014). Retrofit may also produce private benefits to households, including 
increased property value (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Fuerst et al., 2015), significant savings in energy 
bills and improved thermal comfort (Aravena et al., 2016; Gillingham et al., 2009). However, much 
of this potential remains unexploited.  
 
The lack of investment in seemingly cost effective EE measures, is commonly termed the ‘energy 
efficiency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Firms, public sector actors and households are seen to 
underinvest in EE, due to multiple ‘barriers’ that constrain uptake (Kangas et al., 2018; Sorrell et 
al., 2004) . Although many factors that contribute to a low demand for EE are likely to be outside 
of what financing alone can achieve (Wilson et al., 2015), tailored financing solutions can make an 
important contribution to the uptake of retrofit measures (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010), 
particularly in the residential sector (Freehling and Stickles, 2016). 
 
Historically, a large proportion of global investment in residential retrofit has involved either self-
financing or energy supplier obligations (IEA, 2017). However, meeting the 2°C target will likely 
require third-party sources of finance (EEFIG, 2015), particularly as energy suppliers see their 
 93 
 
93 
market capitalisation shrink and attempt to de-leverage24 their balance sheets due to declining 
revenues and market share (Blyth et al., 2015; Bolton and Foxon, 2015). Incumbent energy 
suppliers also lack incentives to fund EE investments, as their current business model relies on 
increasing throughput sales of energy (Knoeri et al., 2016). Existing financial institutions, such as 
banks and institutional investors, also remain reticent towards such investment due to an 
unfamiliarity with the technologies, regulatory risk, short investment horizons, high transaction 
costs and a lack of suitable finance mechanisms (Bolton and Foxon, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; Stone, 
2014).  
 
The United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘Green Deal’ policy provides an interesting case of an innovative 
finance mechanism, intended to deliver approximately 2 million retrofit installations per year and 
leverage billions of pounds of investment. The scheme was based on private sector lending to 
households, paid back through a levy on energy bills–known as ‘On-bill repayment’ (OBR). 
However, the scheme only achieved a fraction of its target, and resulted in a significant loss to UK 
taxpayers before its premature scrappage in 2015 (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).  
 
A range of more successful retrofit finance mechanisms, however, provide some important lessons 
(EEFIG, 2015). Examples include the USA’s Property Assisted Clean Energy finance (PACE) 
programmes (Kim et al., 2012); low cost loans delivered by the German KfW state bank (Schröder 
et al., 2011); other forms of On-bill-financing and repayment (On-bill) (Zimring et al., 2014a); green 
mortgages (Ecology Building Society, 2017); and state-backed guarantee funds (Borgeson et al., 
2013). In addition, energy service agreements (ESA), where finance for measures is procured 
upstream by an Energy Service Company (ESCo) as part of an energy saving performance contract 
have been used in multi-family housing and commercial buildings (Labanca et al., 2014).  
 
Yet, academic studies on alternative approaches to EE finance are largely absent from the energy 
and climate journals, with leading finance journals largely silent on energy issues in general (Diaz-
                                                        
24 Leverage involves the use of borrowed money: typically, the use of various forms of debt. Firms or projects may be considered 
over leveraged when their balance sheets excessive levels of debt compared to equity. 
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Rainey et al., 2017). The literature on ‘green finance’ has tended to focus on high level flows of 
energy finance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018), or the challenges of funding large renewable 
energy projects (Blyth et al., 2015). Hall et al. (2016) also highlight the challenges of financing 
distributed energy systems, where differing national institutional contexts influence the financial 
solutions available.  
 
A handful studies have discussed the potential of alterative retrofit finance mechanisms, including 
potential revolving retrofit funds (Gouldson et al., 2015), the UK’s Green Deal (Marchand et al., 
2015; Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), and the successful German KfW programme (Rosenow et al., 
2013a). Others have explored how energy performance contracts could finance residential retrofit 
(Winther and Gurigard, 2017) but have not foregrounded the financial component of such models. 
Bergman and Foxon (Bergman and Foxon, 2017) discussed the challenges for reorienting finance 
towards EE in the UK and argue for a re-framing of EE as infrastructure financing. Previous work 
has also discussed the potential of novel financing solutions for overcoming the spilt incentive 
barrier (Bird and Hernández, 2012). But taken together, these studies provide only limited insights 
into what the features of a successful finance mechanism might be. This paper seeks to address 
this gap in the literature.  
 
3.3. Features of a finance mechanism and the cost of capital 
Access to capital and split incentives are a significant barrier to residential retrofit. Often 
household savings or conventional financing solutions, such as secured and unsecured loans may 
be unavailable, or unsuitable (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010). Many also face split incentives - where 
the benefits of an investment do not fully accrue to the investor (Bird and Hernández, 2012). The 
classic example is the pervasive ‘landlord tenant dilemma’, where energy savings accrue to the 
tenant, with the landlord making the investment. Homeowners may also face split incentives if 
they move out before their initial investment has been recovered and if the value of that 
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investment cannot be capitalised in the sale price. Thus, many conventional forms of financing25 
do not address split incentives (Bird and Hernández, 2012). In response, a range of retrofit finance 
mechanisms have been developed to overcome these barriers (EEFIG, 2015). Figure 16 
summarises the conceptual framework of key design features of finance mechanisms, which are 
described in detail in Table 5. 
                                                        
25 Conventional forms of financing such as home equity, credit cards, bank loans or conventional mortgages are excluded from 
this study. Whilst these approaches may be used to fund retrofit measures they are considered distinct from mechanisms 
designed to fund energy efficiency specifically - as the latter are designed to utilise the savings generated from the retrofit 
measures and in many cases to overcome specific barriers such as split incentives.  
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3.3.1. The features of a finance mechanism 
 
FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENT 
Sources of capital: 
• Banks 
• Institutional 
investors 
• Firms 
• Citizens 
• Government 
POINT OF SALE 
Types of financial 
Instrument: 
• Debt 
• Equity 
• Hybrid 
Securitizations and bonds 
can allow access to 
secondary markets  
The point of sale for finance might include: 
• Offered with the installation  
• Through customer’s retail bank 
• As part of an energy service 
agreement 
• Via other third party 
Possible repayment channels 
include:  
• Loan repayments  
• Energy bills 
• Property taxes 
• Mortgage repayments 
• Energy service payments  
• Dividends 
Options for security & 
underwriting: 
• Unsecured 
• Energy bills 
• Second lien (to 
mortgage) 
• Tax regime 
• Property (mortgage) 
1.1.1.  
Project performance 
requirements: 
• Estimated performance 
• Maximum repayment to 
saving ratio (bill 
neutrality) 
• Guaranteed in 
performance contract 
• Accreditation schemes  
Figure 16 Process diagram of an EE finance mechanism 
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Table 5 The key design features of finance mechanisms 
Feature  Description 
Source of 
capital 
• Investment in EE may come from single or multiple sources. Banks, 
institutional investors, firms, governments or even citizens may provide 
financing.  
• Debt is typically provided by banks and institutional investors, whilst other 
non-financial corporations may also provide loans (Buchner et al., 2015b). 
• Equity providers tend to be different (although there is often overlap) and 
can include project developers, ESCOs, co-operatives, private 
investors/citizens and venture capital funds (Buchner et al., 2015a).  
• Public bodies may provide all of the capital, or provide credit 
enhancements26 including: junior27 (high risk) debt with private finance 
providers providing the senior (low risk) debt (EEFIG, 2015); interest rate 
reductions (Gouldson et al., 2015); or credit guarantee funds – all with the 
aim of reducing risk, the cost of capital and leveraging private funding 
(Zimring, 2014a). 
Financial 
instrument 
• Finance may take the form of debt or equity, or a combination of the two.28  
• Debt finance typically consists of loans provided by financial institutions or 
equipment providers in the form of leases (Sorrell, 2005). Debt may be 
issued directly to the homeowner or upstream to energy suppliers, ESCOs or 
to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)29 (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010).  
• Securitisation30 involves aggregating loans into tradeable ‘securities’, thus 
drawing in sources of capital who would normally only invest in larger 
projects (OECD, 2015b). Small scale loans to households can be aggregated 
and securitised and sold into secondary markets31, often in the form of bonds 
(Borgeson et al., 2013).  
• Equity takes the form of part ownership or share issues. Stakeholder models 
such as cooperatives adopt largely equity based approaches (Walker, 2008), 
                                                        
26 Credit enhancements are a set of approaches usually offered by public actors, which reduce lender or investor risk by 
providing some form of protection or guarantee in the event of default, bankruptcy or delinquency.  
27 Junior Debt is a loan or security that ranks below other loans or securities with regard to claims on assets or earnings. Junior 
debt is also known as a ‘Subordinated debt’ or subordinated loan. In the case of borrower default, creditors who own 
subordinated debt won't be paid out until after senior debtholders are paid in full. 
28 Many retrofit programmes may be partly based on grants or other public subsides, however the focus of this study is to 
analyse the dynamics of the finance mechanisms, rather than the influence of grants or subsidy instruments on the underlying 
economic viability of retrofit measures. 
29 A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a company with a specific and often short-term purpose, with a structure and legal status 
that allows the SPV to fail or go bankrupt without bringing down the wider organisations involved the transaction. They are 
designed isolate risk and allow organisations to finance projects ‘off balance sheet’. 
30 Securitization is a form of financial engineering where groups of illiquid assets are bundled together, often by aggregating 
multiple smaller securities, and transforming them into a tradable security in secondary markets.  
31 A secondary market allows for securities (such as loans) to be resold, often in aggregation and are thus second hand. 
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although in commercial finance equity tends to be costlier32 than debt 
(Tapia, 2012), despite its theoretical equivalence (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). The majority of domestic retrofit schemes are debt-financed, 
although ESCOs may use their own equity to finance projects, as part of 
energy performance contracts (Leventis et al., 2017). 
Project 
performance 
• The post intervention performance of EE retrofits is of critical importance to 
both financiers and building occupants. Evaluating the potential of a retrofit 
is likely to require an energy model and audit and ideally data on past energy 
consumption (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010).  
• Financiers may place a range of requirements on project performance. This 
may include requirements that measures are ‘cash-flow positive’ meaning 
that finance repayments are less than or equal to energy bill savings – often 
referred to as energy bill neutrality (Borgeson et al., 2013).  
• Savings-backed arrangements such as energy performance contracts include 
requirements for actual energy performance outcomes, such as kWh 
savings, guaranteed cost reductions or even guaranteed temperatures 
(Sorrell, 2005).  
• Financiers may also require projects to be standardised to best practice 
guidelines (Investor Confidence Project, 2015) or be accredited to industry 
quality standards (Bonfield, 2016). Alternatively, funders may place less 
strict requirements on energy performance outcomes, or enable wider non-
energy measures to be funded (Borgeson et al., 2013). 
Point of sale • The point of sale is the interface through which the customer accesses 
finance. The nature of this interface has important implications for the 
customer journey33 (Norton et al., 2013) for a retrofit project.  
• In many cases, finance has a separate point of sale from the contractor 
providing the retrofit measures. This may include the use of the customer’s 
existing bank (Schröder et al., 2011), a special mortgage product (Ecology 
Building Society, 2017) or an additional third party provider. In other cases 
the retrofit provider may offer an integrated finance package as part of the 
retrofit, or as part of an energy performance contract (Borgeson et al., 2013).  
• Previous studies have shown that the uptake of retrofit schemes is strongly 
influenced by how information is presented (Hoicka et al., 2014; Long et al., 
2015); the nature of the financial rewards (upfront payments or long term 
savings) (Collins et al., 2018); and the channels through which the scheme is 
promoted (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2011).  
                                                        
32 Debt is senior to equity, so in a bankruptcy, the debt holders get paid before the equity holders. Therefore, equity providers 
(shareholders) require dividends that tend to reflect these higher risks with higher associated rewards and are often linked to 
project profitability. 
33 The customer journey is defined as the sequence of events that customers experience in order to learn about, purchase and 
interact with products and services (Norton et al., 2013). 
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Security and 
Underwriting 
• Mortgages are secured by the financial institution’s ability to repossess the 
home should a customer default on their loan (Borgeson et al., 2013). Other 
forms of security include property taxes or energy bills, meaning the threat 
of court proceedings or disconnection can be applied (Zimring, 2014b).  
• The underwriting process is how financiers determine the underlying credit-
worthiness of the asset or borrower. Underwriting may be focussed upon 
the asset to which finance is secured (i.e. the historic repayments of property 
taxes or energy bills), or upon the borrower through metrics such as personal 
credit ratings (Leventis et al., 2017). Publicly funded programmes may place 
less emphasis on security and underwriting, particularly if they are targeting 
low-income households (EEFIG, 2015). 
Repayment 
channel 
• The repayment channel is how funds are repaid to the creditor or 
shareholders. A range of repayment channels exist for EE projects and are 
an important area for new policy and legal frameworks (EEFIG, 2015).  
• Repayments can be made through conventional personal or corporate loan 
repayments, through energy bills, service charges, collected via property 
taxes or through rent or mortgage repayments.  
• Equity returns are then distributed through dividends, although these may 
be contingent on the performance of the asset or company (EEFIG, 2015). 
Further, equity release models may only require payment once the property 
is sold (Scottish Government, 2017). Where repayments are linked to the 
underlying asset such as with property taxes or energy bills, this can enable 
transferability of the retrofit finance from one occupant to the next, thereby 
addressing split incentive problems (Borgeson et al., 2013).  
Customer 
Journey 
• The customer journey is defined as the sequence of events that customers 
experience to learn about, purchase and interact with products and services 
(Norton et al., 2013). Although individual elements of a finance mechanism 
influence the customer journey, the concept summarizes the household’s 
experience of how these elements are integrated.  
• Complex or lengthy customer journeys have been shown to negatively 
impact the uptake of residential retrofit finance (O’Keeffe et al., 2016). 
Specific issues include poor integration with the timing of wider renovations 
(Fawcett, 2014), complex applications and limited information (Marchand et 
al., 2015), low trust in the provider (Risholt and Berker, 2013), and a lack of 
co-ordination with the supply chain (Brown, 2018). 
 
3.3.2. The cost of capital 
The cost of capital is of critical importance for determining the economics of capital-intensive 
investments, such as retrofit (Donovan and Corbishley, 2016). The cost of capital consists of the 
weighted average cost of debt (e.g. the interest rates attached to a bank loan) and equity (e.g. the 
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returns required by shareholders). Due to the effects of compound interest, the cost of capital has 
increasing significance for long term, capital-intensive investments (Donovan and Corbishley, 
2016).  
 
Figure 17 provides a simple illustration. Assuming a fixed repayment of £100/month and a loan 
maturity of 20 years, the figure shows the total amount that can be borrowed at 0%, 5% and 10% 
interest rates respectively. Whilst a household could borrow £24,000 (the principal) at 0%, this 
reduces to £14,954.65 at 5%, and only £10,216.27 at 10% - where at 10% the total interest is 
higher than the principal. Consequently, assuming fixed payments and loan term, the cost of 
capital limits the amount that can be borrowed and in turn the extent of the retrofit measures 
funded.  
Previous studies show that the interest rates on loans can limit the appeal of retrofit finance 
mechanisms such as the UK’s Green Deal (Marchand et al., 2015; Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), whilst 
low interest rates were an important success factor in Germany’s KfW scheme (Rosenow et al., 
2013a; Schröder et al., 2011). This high cost of capital is also likely to significantly limit the feasible 
range of retrofit measures that can be funded (UKGBC, 2014). However, Borgesson (2014) 
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Figure 17 The impact of the interest rate on borrowing potential, assuming a fixed repayment and term 
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question the extent to which the cost of capital is a barrier, emphasising how high interest credit 
card financing for retrofit remains prevalent in the USA. 
 
3.4. Methods  
This study takes a qualitative approach, involving analysis of interviews and secondary data, 
including a comprehensive review of the ‘grey literature’ on EE finance. Whilst there are few 
academic studies on the topic, numerous policy briefs, publicly commissioned studies and 
consultancy reports exist from a range of public, private and third sector sources. This review 
identified several texts with recurring descriptions of the key approaches to retrofit finance in both 
domestic and commercial buildings (EEFIG, 2015; EST, 2011; Investor Confidence Project, 2015; 
Kats et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Sweatman, 2012; Sweatman and Managan, 2010; The 
Rockefeller Foundation and DB Climate Change Advisors, 2012; Zimring, 2014b). Examination of 
this literature led to the development of a typology of six archetypes of finance mechanisms used 
to fund residential retrofit in the EU and USA. For simplicity, some archetypes, such as public 
guarantee funds and state bank loans were aggregated under a single heading, whilst others, such 
as leasing, were excluded due to limited examples being available in the residential sector. This 
typology is summarised in Table 6 and described in detail in Section 3.5. 
 
Subsequently, eighteen semi structured interviews were carried out, split into two phases: ‘expert 
scoping’ and ‘practitioner’ interviews. During Spring/Summer 2017, eight prominent experts 
(Appendix Table A1) in the EE finance community were interviewed. Several interviewees were 
authors in the key texts described above, notably the European Commission funded Energy 
Efficiency Finance Group report (EEFIG, 2015), whilst others were selected through personal 
contacts and snowballing techniques (Yin, 1994). The aim was to understand the key drivers and 
barriers for residential EE financing; which design features of a finance mechanism are most 
important; and why certain approaches are more effective. Information was also sought on how 
the policy and institutional context shapes the preference for and viability of different approaches.  
 
Building on the insights from the expert interviews, a protocol was developed to interview 
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practitioners pertaining to each of the six finance mechanisms in the proposed typology. The aim 
was to include at least two representatives of each type, with the sample drawn from the EU and 
the USA. Many of the mechanisms under study, such as PACE, have only been adopted in certain 
USA states, notably California. Understanding both the mechanism’s features and the policy and 
institutional context in which they operate is therefore important. Questions were designed to 
probe each of the design features of finance mechanisms (described in Section 3.3), and the 
drivers and barriers to the adoption of those mechanisms, including broader contextual factors. 
During Summer/Autumn 2017, ten semi-structured practitioner interviews (Appendix Table A1) 
were conducted.  
 
Interviews were coded using the NVivo 11™ software, allowing common themes to be identified 
along with areas for further investigation. This qualitative approach was considered appropriate, 
given the need to develop a rich understanding of the role and importance of different features 
of finance mechanisms, and their broader contextual setting (Yin, 1994). The pre-testing of the 
framework with ‘experts’ was intended to prevent key approaches and elements being missed, 
although it is acknowledged this could introduce bias in the selection of interviewees. 
 
3.5. Typology of retrofit finance mechanisms  
Building on the review of grey literature, a number of distinct finance mechanisms can be 
identified. These approaches are distinguished by variations in the key features identified in 
Section 3.3. The range of approaches to financing residential retrofit was discussed during the 
expert scoping interviews, leading to the development of a typology of six archetypes of finance 
mechanism, namely, public loan/credit enhancement, On-bill finance and repayment, property 
assessed clean energy financing, green mortgages, energy service agreement financing, and 
community financing. The typology is described in this section and summarised in Table 6. The 
following types are drawn from prominent contemporary examples and their nomenclature 
reflects common terminology within the industry. The typology is ordered from the more 
widespread publicly funded approaches, to the more niche community financing. Some overlap 
exists between the different archetypes, with the possibility that hybrid forms may emerge.
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Table 6 The key features of six archetypes of finance mechanism for residential retrofit  
 FEATURE OF FINANCE MECHANISM 
TYPE OF 
FINANCE 
MECHANISM  
EXAMPLE 
SCHEMES 
SOURCE OF 
CAPITAL 
FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENT 
PROJECT 
PERFORMANCE 
POINT OF SALE SECURITY AND 
UNDERWRITING 
 
REPAYMENT 
CHANNEL 
PUBLIC LOAN/ 
CREDIT 
ENHANCEMENT 
HES and HEEPS 
equity loan 
(Scotland) 
Government 
spending Debt 
Minimum CO2 
saving 
 
Third party finance 
provider 
No security - basic 
credit check 
Unsecured Loan/ 
equity release 
KfW CBRP 
(Germany) Public Bank Debt (bonds) Retail bank 
No security - basic 
credit check Unsecured Loan 
JESSICA-> LEEF 
(EU-> London, UK) 
Hybrid – EIB, LEEF 
& Private lender Debt Housing provider Varies 
Revolving phase 
then full 
repayment  
ON BILL 
FINANCING/ ON 
BILL REPAYMENT  
UK (OBR) Green 
Deal 
Third party private 
Sector 
Debt Bill neutrality 
(Golden rule) 
Third party finance 
provider 
Energy meter & 
bill history Energy Bills USA & Canada 
(OBF) schemes 
Energy Utility & 
public/ credit 
enhancements 
Debt (some 
securitised 
examples) 
Often Bill 
neutrality Energy utility 
PROPERTY 
ASSESSED CLEAN 
ENERGY (PACE) 
RE:NEW Financial 
(US) 
Municipal bond -> 
private capital 
Debt (bonds) 
None - approved 
contractor 
schemes 
Contractor 
Lien on property & 
tax bill-based 
underwriting 
Property taxes 
GREEN 
MORTGAGE 
EMF Green 
mortgage project 
(EU) 
Covered Bond 
market 
Mortgage (equity 
& debt) 
EPC improvement Mortgage provider 
Detailed credit 
check 
Mortgage 
payments 
Ecology Building 
society (UK) Member deposits Equity 
ENERGY 
SERVICES 
AGREEMENT 
RENESCO 
(Latvia) 
ESCO -> Public 
Bank 
Debt & Equity 
Energy 
Performance 
Guarantee 
Contractor 
Based on ESCO 
Energy 
performance 
contract 
SEA 
(Italy) 
ESCO -> 
Institutional 
investor 
Based on ESCO & 
bill payment 
history 
COMMUNITY 
FINANCING  
BHESCo (Brighton, 
UK) 
Member share 
issue Equity None Contractor Credit check 
Hire Purchase 
agreement-> 
dividends 
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3.5.1. Public loan/ credit enhancement 
Public retrofit finance mechanisms typically involve low cost loans provided by governments, 
but may also include a range of credit enhancements to be blended with private capital (EEFIG, 
2015). The most prominent example is Germany’s CO2 Building Rehabilitation Programme 
(CBRP). Germany’s state bank, the KfW, provides loans to households arranged through 
commercial banks. Funds are raised on capital markets34, and offered at very low rates of 
interest (>2%) (Rosenow et al., 2013a). The bank is able to offer these low rates primarily due 
to its AAA rating; a product of its public status, with additional state funding to further subsidise 
interest rates (Schröder et al., 2011). In 2007, the CBRP issued €5bn in loans, and the 
programme is estimated to have reduced carbon emissions from the existing building stock by 
24% between 1990 and 2006, with an average of a 59% reduction per property in 2006 
(Schröder et al., 2011). 
 
Less well-known schemes are the Home Energy Scotland (HES) loan and Home Energy 
Efficiency Programme for Scotland (HEEPS) equity loans, funded by the Scottish government. 
Both programmes offer 0%35 interest loans. The HEEPS equity loan is repaid upon the sale of 
the property. However, it is more common for public funded programmes, such as the HES and 
KfW loans, to be unsecured and linked to the individual rather than the property (Zimring et 
al., 2014a). Both the CBRP and the HEEPS equity loan schemes allow funding for wider 
renovation measures (Schröder et al., 2011), with the HEEPS equity loan allowing 45% of the 
maximum £40,000 to be spent on non-efficiency measures (EST, 2017).  
 
Credit enhancements blend public money with private capital in a single fund. For example, 
the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) programme, 
administered by the European Investment Bank, mobilises grants from European structural 
funds36 (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010). Such mechanisms typically involve the low cost public 
                                                        
34 Generally, these markets involve the trading of longer-term debt and equity instruments, typically with a maturity of a 
year or more.  
35 A small administration fee and inflation index linking is applied 
36 The European Structural Funds are a set of financial tools designed to address inequalities in income, wealth and 
economic opportunities within the Member states of the European Union. 
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capital occupying the junior (high risk) tranche37 of a fund, which is then blended with private 
sources (Zimring, 2014b). This reduces risk for the private providers, with the public money 
absorbing the first losses should customers default. A prominent example is the London & 
Mayors EE Funds (LEEF & MEEF) (LEEF, 2012). Such schemes aim to leverage high ratios of 
private to public capital for EE investments with LEEF and MEEF raising £100m (50:50 
private/public ratio) and £1bn respectively (70:30 private/public ratio) (Amber Infrastructure -
I#25). Other examples may include loan loss reserve funds and guarantees38 or direct interest 
rate subsidies (Zimring, 2014a). 
 
3.5.2. On-bill finance and repayment (On-bill) 
On-bill mechanisms involve the repayment of loans via the energy bill (electricity, gas or dual-
fuel). The investment is typically secured by the right to disconnect supply, if left unpaid 
(Zimring et al., 2014a). These approaches are divided into two types, with different sources of 
capital. On-bill financing (OBF) involves energy bill-payer or public funds, whilst On-bill 
repayment (OBR) refers to the use of third party, private capital (Zimring, 2014b). In the USA, 
UK and Canada over 20 On-bill programmes have provided over $1.05Bn of financing to 
households for EE improvements, delivering $76m in 2014 alone (Zimring et al., 2014a). 
 
The UK’s Green Deal is probably the most well-known example of OBR and included 
requirements for energy bill neutrality as part of its ‘Golden rule’, meaning savings had to be 
equal to or greater than loan repayments. The Green Deal also precluded non-energy 
measures from financing (7-11% interest rate). The scheme had very limited uptake. Of the 
614,383 assessments undertaken, only 15,138 households adopted a Green Deal plan by 
October 2015 (DECC, 2015a), far less than the millions of installations that were hoped for 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). However, in many cases these assessments may have led to self-
financing (Webber et al., 2015).  
                                                        
37 Tranches are different portions of debt within the capital structure of a fund or project finance structure that are designed 
to divide risk or group different characteristics such as rewards, maturity and size in ways that are marketable to various 
classes of investor. This typically includes equity components, junior and senior debt but may also include mezzanine and 
other hybrid forms of finance.  
38 A loan loss reserve or guarantee sets aside a limited pool of funds from which financial institutions can recover a portion 
of their losses in the event of borrower defaults. Several examples exist in the US including the Michigan Saves single family 
loan loss reserve scheme (Zimring, 2014a) 
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A range of other On-bill programmes in North America have been more successful. Manitoba 
Hydro’s public OBF scheme has funded almost $300m in efficiency improvements in single-
family residences since 2001, although 95 percent of the loans have funded single-measure 
window, door or furnace replacements (Zimring et al., 2014a). Some smaller scale 
programmes, such as Clean Energy Works Oregon (CEWO) OBR private finance, have funded 
whole-house retrofits with loans of up-to $30,000 (Zimring et al., 2014b). Several of these 
programmes offer reduced interest rates (0-5%) through public funds and credit 
enhancements, and have very low rates of default (0-3%) (Zimring et al., 2014a). 
 
3.5.3. Property assessed clean energy (PACE) 
PACE was developed in 2007 and allows municipalities in the USA to fund home and 
commercial retrofit using land-secured special improvement districts (Kim et al., 2012). These 
are debt instruments linked to a specific geographical area and secured by land or property. 
Traditionally they are a means of funding municipal infrastructure investments, through an 
additional charge on the property tax bill, common in the USA. The assessment districts were 
devised by Benjamin Franklin in the 17th century as a means to fund improvements that meet 
a ‘valid public purpose’. (Energy Pro-I#23). Originally in PACE, local governments funded 
retrofit measures and attached a tax lien39 (a form of security that allows claims on tax 
payments) to properties that benefit from the improvement works. Most PACE funding now 
comes from the private sector, although still uses the bond issuance and tax collection powers 
of municipal or local governments (Kim et al., 2012). The PACE financing is secured as a senior 
lien on the property and is re-payed along with other municipal charges and assessments, on 
the property tax bill - which provides investors with robust repayment security40 (DOE, 2016). 
 
                                                        
39 A lien is a legal right granted by the owner of property to a creditor to claim rights to or seize an asset that is the subject 
of the lien. The lien guarantees the underlying obligation to repay the creditor, such as claims against residential property 
for repayment of a loan. 
40 “Subject to the structure of a state’s PACE statute…the PACE obligation may result in a property tax lien on the property. If 
applicable…the failure to pay property taxes, including PACE assessments, could trigger foreclosure and property loss even if 
the property owner is current on other mortgage lien(s)” (DOE, 2016) 
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Most residential PACE projects have been concentrated in California, with private providers 
such as RENEW Financial securitising PACE debt for re-sale to capital markets (RENEW 
Financial-I#30). Residential PACE financing has risen dramatically in recent years, facilitating 
more than $4 billion in clean energy investments (Leventis et al., 2017), with RENEW Financial 
achieving an average 28-27% reduction in home energy use on their projects (RENEW 
Financial). There is currently no national or state requirement for energy bill neutrality within 
PACE schemes.  
  
3.5.4. Green mortgages 
Mortgage or home equity financing provides the mainstay of extension and renovation funding 
to existing homes, usually through a mortgage-extension or re-mortgage. Loans are secured to 
the property and typically have a duration of 25 years or more. However, some mortgage 
providers offer a range of Green or EE mortgage products designed to provide lending 
specifically for retrofit. 
 
Mortgage underwriting is based on the applicant’s ability to repay. Whilst a significant 
proportion of outgoings relate to energy costs, current underwriting methods use arbitrary 
techniques to determine these costs. Initiatives including the UK LENDERS (2017) and EU 
EeMAP (2017) projects are seeking to promote actual energy usage data in these underwriting 
calculations. Thus, lenders may provide increased lending for more efficient properties at 
reduced interest rates–as the higher disposable income reduces the risk of default (EeMAp, 
2017). The LENDERS project estimates that monthly savings equivalent to two Energy 
Performance Certificate (EPC)41 bands, could equate to around £4,000 in additional mortgage 
finance (LENDERS, 2017). Eventually this may create a modest ‘green premium’, increasing 
property values for the most efficient properties (EeMAp, 2017), also providing additional 
borrowing for retrofit measures. 
 
Whilst mainstream European mortgage lenders are yet to offer EE mortgage products, some 
                                                        
41 EPCs are a measure of a buildings energy efficiency and running costs, based on a standardised assessment procedure. 
Most EU member states employ some form of EPC and they are typically rated from A to G, with A being an exemplary 
dwelling.  
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specialist lenders such as the UK’s Ecology Building Society offer both additional lending for 
retrofit projects and also interest rate discounts of 0.25% for each EPC improvement level 
(Ecology Building Society, 2017). In the USA, the Fannie Mae mortgage company’s Green 
financing for multi-family buildings reached $3.6 billion in 2016, involving preferential interest 
rates and additional borrowing for energy and water efficiency property improvements 
(Leventis et al., 2017). The UK government is now looking to promote ‘innovative green 
mortgage products’ as part of its Clean Growth Plan (HM Government, 2017). 
 
 
3.5.5. Energy Service Agreement (ESA) financing 
Energy service agreements (ESAs) are a form of financing to fund energy performance 
contracts. In a traditional energy performance contract42, the ESCO implements a retrofit and 
provides an energy performance guarantee and a commitment to maintain the assets under 
the contract for a given period. Energy performance contracts have been most common in the 
public sector, where public actors can access cheap capital and, thus, ESCOs typically provide 
engineering services without any financial component (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Recently 
energy performance contract and ESCO models have been growing in the small commercial 
and residential sectors (Labanca et al., 2014). Under an ESA, a finance provider will arrange 
financing directly with the ESCO or SPV (typically 7-10% interest), with the end user or 
household paying for measured performance improvements - usually derived from a baseline 
of past consumption (Kim et al., 2012). This effectively shifts the financing upstream from the 
household to provide an integrated offer of finance and measures through an energy service 
charge. In some models the ESCO will initially use its own funds and then sell on the cash flows 
or ‘receivables’ of proven projects to a third-party financier in a process known as ‘factoring’43 
(EEFIG, 2015). In a pure ESA, the third-party financier will fund projects from the beginning, 
usually via an SPV, where projects are aggregated and sold into secondary markets to 
institutional investors (SUSI Partners, 2017). 
                                                        
42 In an energy performance contract without a financing package from the ESCO, the client will need to find other forms of 
capital to fund the retrofit. Therefore, this model is not considered a standalone finance mechanism and is not included in 
the study. 
43 Invoice Factoring involves the sale of project accounts and revenues (receivables) to a third party at a discount. This allows 
the issuing company to shift these projects with corresponding debt and future cash flows off their balance sheet - enabling 
them to deleverage and take on additional projects  
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Although in 2014, over $150m of USA ESCO revenues were generated through projects in 
public housing, most this was funded using working capital from the housing provider rather 
than an ESA structure. However, since 2011 PosiGen have offered an ESA for residential solar 
and EE and completed 8,400 projects in the USA (Leventis et al., 2017). The model has also 
been gaining traction in Europe in the multi-family sector. RENESCO provide an ESA for the 
deep retrofit and renovation of dilapidated eastern European housing, while Servizi Energia 
Ambiente (SEA) offers ESAs and energy performance contracts to the Italian multi-family 
market. RENESCO have invested over €4m in 15 Soviet-era blocks and are developing a 
factoring fund with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (RENESCO 
2015). SEA are currently negotiating to refinance several projects, with financing partners (SUSI 
Partners, 2017). Several large investment funds are now beginning to become involved in the 
ESA market, including the UK’s Green Investment Group (2017). 
 
3.5.6. Community Financing  
Community financing mechanisms use equity capital from multiple individuals, each providing 
a small component of funding for a project. Often this involves groups organised around a local 
geographical area, adopting ‘co-operative type’ legal structures. Typically the number of shares 
(and votes) an individual can hold is limited (Yildiz, 2014). Projects are funded through a share 
issue. However, often these shares cannot be easily sold on, requiring long term commitment 
from project investors, who may value wider community benefits (Yildiz, 2014). 
 
Community finance mechanisms are common for renewable energy, where in Germany, over 
500 energy co-operatives with 80,000+ members have invested up to €800 million in solar PV 
(EEFIG, 2015). Yet, there are a growing number of examples of this being used to fund 
residential EE projects. The Brighton and Hove Energy Services Co-op (BHESCo) in the UK use 
a co-operative approach and a low-cost financing offer (5%) to fund retrofits, based on issuing 
shares to the local community with an annual return of 5% (BHESCo-I#15). A number of 
examples also exist in Germany (EEFIG, 2015). 
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3.6. Key features of retrofit finance mechanisms  
The following section outlines the key findings from both sets of stakeholder interviews in 
relation to the features of these finance mechanisms as outlined in Section 3.3. The discussion 
draws upon insights from each of the archetypes of finance mechanisms described in the 
previous section, with the aim of identifying some more generalizable findings. A summary of 
relevant interview quotes for each feature of is provided in Table B2 in the Appendix. 
 
3.6.1. Source of capital 
Two interviewees felt that government should be the primary source of capital for residential 
retrofit. It was argued that the multiple social and environmental benefits of retrofits are 
‘public goods’, justifying state financing. Equally, government bodies typically have the lowest 
cost of borrowing and are able to offer the longest term, lowest interest loans to the widest 
range of customers. It was emphasised that governments already absorbed significant risk in 
other areas, providing credit guarantees and low-cost loans for a range of sectors from 
infrastructure to first time house purchases. 
 
However, most interviewees (eleven out of eighteen) considered that the required investment 
(~$1.3 trillion to 2035 in the EU (EEFIG, 2015)) could not be met from public sources alone. 
Indeed, whilst many small publicly funded programmes utilised day-to-day government 
spending, (such as the HES and HEEPS loans in Scotland), scaling this up could be a challenge. 
Therefore, many stressed the need to bring in low-cost institutional capital44. The only scheme 
to have achieved this at significant scale has been PACE in California, with ESA models being 
better developed in the commercial sector. Crucial to accessing these sources of capital is 
project standardisation and the use of aggregation or securitisation techniques discussed in 
the following sections.  
 
Aside from PACE, leveraging significant private capital for residential retrofit has involved 
public co-financing and credit enhancement approaches. Programmes such as LEEF/MEEF and 
                                                        
44 Institutional investors are a class of investor who trade in securities of sufficient scale and quantity that they qualify for 
preferential treatment and lower commissions. Typical institutional investors include pension funds and life insurance 
companies. 
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some On-bill schemes in the USA use public money to reduce risk for private investors. Through 
provision of the ‘at risk’ or junior tranche of a fund or project finance structure, these 
approaches are able to leverage significant sums of private capital and achieve high ratios of 
private to public investment. 
 
Germany’s CBRP programme is able to overcome the constraints on day-to-day public 
spending through the use of the borrowing powers of the KfW state bank. Thus, the 
programme is able to access large amounts of low-cost funding via the capital markets. 
However, five interviewees described how this approach owes a lot to the specific institutional 
context in Germany and similar approaches would require significant institutional change in 
countries such as the USA or UK, where no equivalent banks exist. 
 
3.6.2. Financial instruments & secondary markets 
Most of those interviewed agreed that the long term, low yield nature of retrofit investments 
lends itself to debt financing. However, BHESCo co-operative (I#15) emphasised that 
community equity finance mechanisms could also play an important role in empowering 
citizens to engage in retrofit at a local level. Community shareholders may also accept lower 
returns in exchange for local community and environmental benefits. 
 
EnergyPro (I#23) in particular emphasised that accessing institutional investor capital is likely 
to require aggregated financial instruments, such as bonds enabling small loans to be pooled 
and traded in capital markets. Unlike central governments, state banks such as KfW are less 
constrained by national fiscal policy and deficit reduction as they are able to issue bonds 
directly into capital markets (Schröder et al., 2011). Equally EE mortgages can utilise the well-
established ‘covered bonds’45 markets, which are used for trading mortgage securities 
(European Mortgage Federation-I#32). Private sector PACE programmes in the USA, have 
successfully aggregated multiple retrofit loans through securitisation and sold them as PACE 
bonds into the asset-backed securities market (RENEW Financial-I#30).  
                                                        
45 Covered bonds are backed both by the issuer -usually a bank and the portfolio of projects -typically mortgages. Unlike 
asset backed securities they remain on the balance sheet of the issuer and are thus considered very secure. 
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Achieving sufficient scale was described by six respondents as the key challenge in accessing 
these secondary markets. Most institutional investors require minimum investments of at least 
£2m. Several examples of the ESA/energy performance contract approach have successfully 
sold on project receivables, often by aggregating several projects once the revenue streams or 
cash flows had been proven. Therefore, ESA models are an attractive means of bringing in 
institutional investors, although these models have so far only been used for the non-
residential and multi-family markets. To appeal to institutional investors, achieving 
standardised projects, that can be aggregated and securitised was identified a key challenge 
by both Energy Pro (I#23) and the European Mortgage Federation (I#32). Ensuring and 
demonstrating project quality is therefore important for reassuring both investors and 
households, mitigating the issues associated with the securitisations of sub-prime mortgages 
during the 2008 financial crisis.  
3.6.3. Project performance  
Long-term performance contracts as part of ESA financing structures provide a clear revenue 
stream that can appeal to investors in a similar way to power purchase agreements for 
renewable generation. Whilst it was recognised that energy performance guarantees could 
also be a key driver for households, Joule Assets Europe (I#29) emphasised, this alone would 
not be sufficient to reassure private investors. Therefore, standardised procurement and 
quality assurance frameworks, such as the Investor Confidence Project (2015) for commercial 
buildings, were seen as important for attracting finance into residential retrofit.  
 
However, requirements for energy bill neutrality such as the Green Deal’s ‘Golden Rule’ was 
criticised by several interviewees. Such requirements prevent non-energy measures from 
being funded and obstruct deeper retrofits, particularly at high interest rates (Figure 17). For 
example, measures such as solid wall insulation could not be funded under the Green Deal. 
Restricting the focus to carbon and energy savings was also seen as a major constraint on 
household demand. Since customers value funding for general renovation work and aesthetic 
improvements, restricting funding to efficiency measures alone limits the appeal of the finance 
package. Mechanisms, such as the CBRP and the HEEPS equity loan and PACE to a lesser extent, 
allow for wider renovation measures to be funded. These schemes also do not impose strict 
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requirements for energy bill neutrality. However, it was noted that this needs to be balanced 
against affordability concerns for repayments significantly above current energy bills. 
 
3.6.4. Point of sale 
The point of sale for finance, and the ease and availability of procuring financing alongside the 
retrofit was viewed as critical by all interviewees. The analogy of the purchase of a car or mobile 
phone was used by several interviewees. In these mature sectors, suppliers provide a financing 
package as part of their offer to customers, whereas many retrofit programmes, require a 
separate interface, involving a long and complex application process. This is also usually 
separated from the process of actually procuring the retrofit measures. 
 
The complexity of schemes such as the Green Deal, with a separate point of sale, is considered 
to be a major barrier. The success of PACE is partly attributed to the fact that approved 
contractors can offer financing through the scheme at the point of sale of the retrofit. This 
means that customers are able to procure the retrofit measures and financing on the same 
day and from the same person. This simplicity can dramatically increase uptake, although it 
requires a streamlined underwriting and approval process from the PACE loan provider, usually 
initially over the telephone. However, challenges remain with contractors’ lack of literacy in 
financing, and financiers’ lack of literacy in energy efficiency. Equally, Energy Programmes 
Consortium (USA) (I#5) emphasised that whilst USA contractors are able to promote certain 
financing packages, UK contractors must be accredited with the Financial Conduct Authority 
before they can provide such advice. Similar arrangements exist in other EU countries. These 
findings highlight the importance of the presentation of the finance offering to prospective 
households, the levels of trust in the finance provider and quality of information provided.  
 
3.6.5. Security and underwriting 
Different mechanisms require different forms of security and underwriting processes, whilst 
most public mechanisms are unsecured. Although there are some examples of private 
unsecured lending, this typically involves a high cost of capital for what is perceived as a high-
risk loan without collateral. Both PACE and On-bill approaches involve novel forms of security, 
tied to the property tax regime and energy bills respectively. Theoretically this leads to 
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streamlined underwriting and draws in people with lower credit ratings - as the debt is secured 
to the underlying asset, rather than the individual. However, this is not always the case, with 
one interviewee (I#31) describing how it could take up to 60 days to get a Green Deal loan. 
Rapid underwriting and unconventional security can also raise concerns about the 
appropriateness of offering finance to vulnerable households who would otherwise not qualify 
for credit. EE mortgage models also require the inclusion of EPCs as part of the underwriting, 
although is unlikely to add a significant burden on already extensive mortgage eligibility 
assessments. 
 
Thus, private sector funded mechanisms are likely to require a robust form of security or 
collateral in order to provide lending at lower interest rates (<10%). Publicly funded 
approaches offer greater flexibility on both underwriting and repayment terms so could 
therefore provide a good option for those in rented accommodation, on low incomes, with a 
poor credit history, or some combination thereof. 
 
3.6.6. Repayment channel 
The use of an existing repayment channel was viewed as a key benefit of the PACE, On-bill and 
mortgage-based approaches. Thus, adopting an existing bill that customers are unable to 
partially pay or refuse to pay the retrofit component of. 
 
Both PACE and On-bill approaches are theoretically transferable to the new occupier of a 
property, addressing the split incentive issue - although currently PACE finance is only available 
to homeowners. Equally, mortgage or equity-release approaches such as HEEPS in Scotland, 
see the remaining debt resolved once the property is sold, through the equity share. Therefore, 
finance for measures that add value to the property strengthens the case for using mortgage-
based financing. However, case studies from the USA have shown that the debt from PACE and 
On-bill schemes is transferred to the new occupant only about 50% of the time, thus requiring 
the outstanding payment on sale (Leventis et al., 2017). Further, both Energy Pro (I#23) and 
PACE Nation (I#31) highlighted how the PACE approach would be particularly challenging for 
the UK given its different system of property taxation and municipal finance.  
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3.7.  Discussion 
This paper introduced a typology of six financing mechanisms currently adopted for residential 
retrofit across the EU and USA. Developing a novel framework, the paper has further identified 
six key features of these mechanisms and shown how these contribute to the success or failure 
of the mechanism. The following section discusses the findings in the context of the literature 
on residential retrofit and EE finance. It is shown how the six features influence three outcomes 
that are critical for the successful uptake of residential retrofit: cost of capital, source of value 
and customer journey. The paper then discusses how the institutional and policy context of 
different states is likely to shape the viability of these approaches and the policy solutions 
required.  
 
3.7.1. Cost of capital 
The stakeholder interviews explored the significance of the cost of capital for the financing of 
residential retrofit projects, particular for more expensive, ‘whole-house’ approaches. The 
impact of the interest rate on household appeal has previously been highlighted by several 
studies on retrofit finance (Marchand et al., 2015; Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Typically, deeper 
retrofits require capital expenditure of at least £15-20,000 (BEIS, 2017) and have payback 
periods of 20 years or more. Thus, in combination with requirements for energy bill neutrality, 
higher interest rates may prevent deeper (but ultimately necessary) measures like solid wall 
insulation from being financed. Although those with sufficient access to capital, or other forms 
of household borrowing may continue to self-finance retrofits (Webber et al., 2015), a lack of 
access to low cost finance remains a key barrier the uptake of residential retrofit. These higher 
costs may be offset by private benefits such as higher house prices (Brounen and Kok, 2011). 
However, the findings presented here suggest the customer journey and source of value have 
a greater impact on household appeal.  
 
The results support the view that the state’s ability to borrow cheaply, absorb risks and deliver 
social and environmental benefits, provides a strong justification for public funding of 
investments such as residential retrofit (Stiglitz, 1993). However, given the scale of investment 
required, the extent to which day-to-day government spending alone can deliver this may be 
limited (Blyth et al., 2015). Therefore, countries such as Germany have funded large scale 
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investment through public banks, offering very low interest rates and favourable loan terms. 
This builds on previous research on the market-creating and shaping role that state investment 
banks can play (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016), particularly where such investments are seen as 
high risk by private finance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018). 
 
However, in countries without state investment banks, more ‘market led’ solutions are often 
favoured (Hall et al., 2016). This paper has described several examples of using public money 
to leverage significant private finance and reduce the cost of capital through tools such as 
credit enhancements (see Zimring, (2014a)). These approaches can also bring in customers 
who would otherwise not qualify for credit (Zimring et al., 2014c). Whilst this may leverage 
limited public funds and reduce the cost of capital, some argue that this represents a public 
subsidy to private capital (Bergman and Foxon, 2017) or a socialisation of risk and a 
privatisation of rewards (Mazzucato, 2011). However, some form of public support is likely to 
be required for those with difficulty in accessing low-cost capital or in rented accommodation 
and fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015). 
 
Privately funded mechanisms are likely to require robust forms of security or collateral such as 
mortgage eligibility and repossession (EE Mortgages), property tax default (PACE) and energy 
disconnection (On-bill). These findings support work such as Blyth et al., (2015) and Hall et al., 
(2015) on the potential role of institutional investors, such as pension funds in the energy 
system. Securitisation enables small loans to be pooled and sold through financial instruments 
such as PACE bonds in capital markets. However, this requires sufficient scale and standardised 
project performance protocols currently only widespread in the PACE market and ESA‘s in the 
non-residential sector. Therefore, widespread institutional financing of EE retrofit remains 
largely aspirational at present (Hall et al., 2015).   
 
3.7.2. Customer journey 
In interpreting the findings, this paper draws on the concept of the customer journey (Norton 
et al., 2013). Whilst the previous section largely concerned with how the features of finance 
mechanisms affect their appeal to investors, this research suggests the nature of customer 
journey has a greater impact on household appeal. 
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A key finding is that the success of schemes such as PACE and KfW’s CBRP owe a lot to the ease 
of the customer journey in procuring retrofit financing. PACE loans are often sold by the 
contractor, at the point of sale of the retrofit. The streamlined underwriting of PACE 
programmes has enabled loans to be approved over the telephone, during the contractor’s 
sales visit. Equally EE mortgages utilise a well-established process, which is usually essential 
when purchasing a property, whilst the KfW approach uses the customers’ existing bank and 
support from accredited project managers. This simplicity is often valued ahead of a low cost 
of capital by households – helping to explain why expensive credit card retrofit financing 
remains prevalent (Zimring et al., 2014a). 
 
These findings support previous critiques of the UK’s Green Deal which involved a complex 
vetting and application process, requiring a separate interface with a third-party provider 
(O’Keeffe et al., 2016; Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). This complexity may be further compounded 
when additional policy measures interact with retrofit programs, such as the smart meter 
rollout (McCoy and Lyons, 2017) reducing household uptake. This supports arguments for 
integrated business models for residential retrofit (Brown, 2018), including a financing offer to 
households alongside retrofit measures (Mahapatra et al., 2013). In an ESA, financing is fully 
integrated into the energy performance contract, effectively upstream of the client (Brown, 
2018).  
 
An important dimension of the customer journey relates to how the information is presented 
to households and by whom. This research identifies the point of sale as the critical juncture 
in the customer journey in which to promote both the retrofit measures and the financing 
package in a clear and compelling way to households. This supports previous research which 
identifies the significance of how costs and benefits of retrofit are presented to households 
(Hoicka et al., 2014) and the importance of a trusted and competent advisor in disseminating 
this information (O’Keeffe et al., 2016; Risholt and Berker, 2013). Our findings therefore 
suggest that schemes are most successful, when the technical and financial elements of the 
customer offering are integrated by a single competent advisor - as is the case in the German 
KfW scheme (Rosenow et al., 2013a). 
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Adopting a repayment channel, and form of security that is tied to the underlying asset, 
theoretically enables PACE, On-bill and Green mortgage/equity release approaches to address 
split incentive barriers (Bird and Hernández, 2012). However, only On-bill mechanisms address 
the landlord-tenant dilemma. Yet, in many examples from the USA this has not been the case. 
Outstanding debt on properties with PACE or On-bill loans may need to be settled when homes 
change hands (Zimring et al., 2014a), although can be partially offset by increased property 
values (Sayce and Haggett, 2016). The latter, in turn, requires credible labelling schemes to 
allow the energy efficiency properties to be identified by potential buyers, together with more 
widespread appreciation of the benefits of energy efficiency for mortgage repayments. 
 
3.7.3. Source of value  
The study demonstrates how successful retrofit finance mechanisms typically involve funding 
for wider renovation and enabling works as part of the finance package. This builds on 
contemporary research on residential retrofit, where broader motivations such as 
environmental concerns, improved comfort and living standards, property longevity and 
aesthetics are often valued more highly than cost savings (Fawcett and Killip, 2014), or at least 
act as important drivers for retrofit projects (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b). Thus, in many 
cases, financing provides a means of ‘addressing a problem’, such as a broken boiler or low 
levels of thermal comfort. Whilst the desire to save money is often a driver (Marchand et al., 
2015), households may be willing to spend more to finance these broader sources of value.  
 
Consequently, mechanisms that have requirements for energy bill neutrality, or only fund 
energy measures are likely to undermine these motivations. Many of those interviewed 
regarded the ‘Golden Rule’ element of the Green Deal as a mistake and pointed out that no 
such requirements are in place for other forms of consumer finance. Equally the narrow focus 
on energy measures alone, may leave a finance gap for important enabling works. However, 
there is a need to balance these issues with concerns over affordability (Leventis et al., 2017). 
Other forms of project performance guarantees such as energy performance contracts, or 
warranties are however, likely to be valued by both households and finance providers. This 
supports recent work on the potential for energy performance contracts to be a demand driver 
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for residential retrofit (Brown, 2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017). 
 
Critically, all those interviewed agreed that barriers for retrofit financing were of secondary 
importance for driving demand for residential retrofit. Indeed Borgeson et al. (2014) describe: 
‘lack of financing is seldom the primary reason that efficiency projects do not happen.’ Thus, 
financing should be seen as an enabler rather than a driver of demand, with the analogy that 
in the Green Deal ‘people were sold the loan instead of the car’ (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).  
 
3.8. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper presented a typology of finance mechanisms for residential retrofit, including 
examples that are delivering at scale. The paper develops a novel framework to understand 
the features of these mechanisms, including; the source of capital; financial instrument(s), 
project performance; point of sale; security and underwriting and the repayment channel. 
 
These features are shown to implicate three outcomes that affect the success of these finance 
mechanisms. Firstly, it is shown that a low cost of capital is key to the current economic viability 
of whole-house retrofits, such as those involving solid wall insulation. This can be achieved 
through public finance through state investment banks, municipal authorities or the blending 
of public and private sources through a range of credit enhancements. Alternatively, low cost 
private financing is likely to require robust forms of security, standardised project performance 
protocols and access to secondary markets through the aggregation of multiple projects into 
trade-able financial instruments. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, mechanisms that 
reduce complexity by simplifying the customer journey are likely to achieve much higher levels 
of uptake. Thirdly, by enabling non-energy measures such as general improvement works, 
schemes can appeal to broader sources of value that are more highly valued by households, 
often ‘addressing a problem’, such as broken boiler or low levels of comfort. 
 
Most importantly, the paper outlines how the finance mechanism alone is unlikely to be a 
driver of demand for whole-house retrofit, and so instead should be viewed as a necessary 
enabler of a much broader strategy. Thus, integrated business models that enable the wider 
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benefits of whole-house retrofits, alongside a range of up-front incentives and minimum 
standards are likely to be pre-requisites of a successful, ambitious retrofit programme. 
Consequently, a review of different retrofit incentives and investigation of how policy can 
support business model innovation, seem important avenues for further research. 
 
This paper has emphasised the scale and importance of financing the low carbon retrofit of 
residential buildings. Different countries and regions may adopt different approaches based 
on their specific institutional context, with different approaches serving certain market 
segments. However, this goal is unlikely to be achieved without a broad strategy to promote 
demand and build supply chain capacity - only then requiring appropriate financing solutions. 
This paper presents a template of how this can be done effectively and provides lessons from 
where it has not.  
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4. Article 3: How intermediaries promote business model innovation: the case of 
‘Energiesprong’ whole-house retrofits in UK and the Netherlands  
(Published in SPRU working paper series (SWPS)) 
 
Abstract 
Business model innovation is increasingly important for the diffusion of sustainable 
innovations, particularly those that are systemic in nature. In this paper we outline how 
systemic innovations - such as whole-house energy ‘retrofit’, may require new business models 
before they gain widespread adoption. Through a series of semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis, we undertake a case study of the ‘Energiesprong’ retrofit business model 
- contrasting this with the incumbent ‘atomised’ market model. We highlight the central role 
of an innovation intermediary - the Energiesprong ‘market development team’, in this business 
model innovation, and how Dutch policymakers sought to promote business model innovation 
through creation of this intermediary. In doing so we develop a novel framework - combining 
the components of business models with the functions of intermediaries to illustrate this case. 
Finally, the paper suggests this case and framework could provide lessons for how 
intermediaries and in turn policymakers might foster business model innovation in other 
sectors. 
 
4.1. Introduction  
The concept of the ‘business model’ has gained widespread use: as a means of classifying 
different businesses; a lens for academic research; and as an entrepreneurial tool for 
management practitioners (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). Increasingly the role of the 
business model is seen as critical for the diffusion of technological innovations (Baden-Fuller 
and Haefliger, 2013; Teece, 2010) and in sustainability transitions (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; 
Bolton and Hannon, 2016). This has led to a focus on ‘business model innovation’ as an 
important area for both incumbent and entrepreneurial firms (Chesbrough, 2010), in 
promoting sustainability, and in addressing climate change (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; 
Sarasini and Linder, 2018). Thus, the governance of ‘sustainability transitions’ may require new 
policies that foster business model innovation (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). However, very little 
has been written on how policymakers might actually promote business model innovation. In 
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this paper we argue that one approach is the support of innovation intermediaries (Kivimaa, 
2014; Mignon and Kanda, 2018). 
 
To advance this argument, we make three propositions. First, we argue that business model 
innovation may be particularly important for ‘systemic innovations’ – those which require 
integration and configuration with other complementary processes, practices and 
technologies, within a system that spans the boundaries of individual organisations (Midgley 
and Lindhult, 2015). Second, we build on the literature on innovation intermediaries (Kivimaa 
and Martiskainen, 2018a; Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008), and highlight the important role that 
these actors can play in business model innovation. Third, by developing a novel framework 
we suggest that policymakers can promote business model innovation through intermediaries 
to facilitate systemic change (Lente and Hekkert, 2003). We illustrate these ideas through the 
case of the Dutch Energiesprong initiative for whole-house retrofit - addressing the following 
research questions: 
 
1. How can business model innovation enable the diffusion of systemic innovations such 
as whole-house retrofit? 
2. How did an innovation intermediary promote the Energiesprong business model? 
3. How might policymakers promote business model innovation for sustainability through 
innovation intermediaries?  
 
Buildings, especially homes, are the largest single consumer of energy and producer of carbon 
emissions in most advanced economies (IPCC, 2014). These emissions can be reduced46 by the 
‘retrofit’ of three types of measure: energy efficiency improvements to the building fabric; the 
adoption of low carbon heating technologies; and electricity microgeneration such as solar 
photovoltaics (PV). Thus far, significant savings in the European Union have been achieved 
through incremental measures such as fluorescent lightbulbs, loft insulation and efficient 
boilers (Rosenow et al., 2016). These measures have been implemented through existing 
supply chains, requiring limited changes in consumer and industry practices. 
                                                        
46 Aside from more efficient appliances and behavioural changes 
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However, it is increasingly recognised that this approach will be insufficient to achieve the 
savings required to meet climate change targets (CCC, 2018; IPCC, 2014). Instead, emphasis is 
placed on the need for ‘whole-house retrofits’ involving multiple measures (Lewis and Smith, 
2013). This involves the effective integration of multiple measures and systems and 
consideration of how they interact within a specific building - whether installed at once or over 
time (Fawcett, 2014). Thus, having the features of ‘integrative’ as opposed to ‘modular’ 
technologies (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Recent research indicates that the diffusion of 
whole-house retrofit may therefore require business model innovation (Mlecnik et al., 2018) 
as well as significant policy support (Rosenow et al., 2017b).  
 
In this paper, we contrast the incumbent ‘atomised’ market model with the innovative 
‘Energiesprong’ business model – considered to have greater potential for the delivery of 
whole-house retrofits. Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted in the UK and the 
Netherlands to formulate a case study; we outline how the Energiesprong business model was 
developed by an innovation intermediary or ‘market development team’. Initially created by 
the Dutch government, although now operating independently internationally. We suggest this 
approach could provide a template for policymakers looking to promote business model 
innovation in other sectors – requiring further research to other contexts. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on systemic innovation, 
business models and innovation intermediaries; emphasising the lack of research on policy 
support for business model innovation, before outlining the conceptual framework in Section 
4.3. Section 4.4 summarises our case study methodology. Section 4.5 describes the operation 
and potential of the atomised market and Energiesprong business models and Section 4.6 
assesses the role of the innovation intermediary in the emergence of Energiesprong. Section 
4.7 discusses these findings in light of the existing literature on business model innovation, 
systemic intermediaries and innovation policy, while Section 4.8 concludes and provides 
recommendations for further research.  
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4.2. Systemic innovation, business models and innovation intermediaries  
4.2.1. Systemic innovation and whole-house retrofit 
The literature on systemic innovation is increasingly the point of departure for scholars 
grappling with the innovation policy challenges of the 21st century. Systemic innovations 
require complementary changes in supporting technologies, technical skills, cultural norms, 
user competences, organisational practices and regulations (Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). 
Systemic innovation may therefore result in entirely new ‘socio-technical systems’ - where 
technological, social and institutional elements co-evolve; resulting in whole system change 
(Foxon, 2011; Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). The importance of systemic innovation and its role 
in economic and sustainable development is recognised by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), who provide the following definition: 
 
“System innovations…alter existing system dynamics…entailing changes in both the 
components and the architecture of systems. They are characterised by three main 
features: 
1) disrupting or complementary types of knowledge and technical capabilities; 
2) fundamental changes in consumer practices and markets; and  
3) novel types of infrastructures, institutional rules and skill sets.” (OECD, 
2015a). 
 
Many of the sustainability challenges facing policy makers require systemic innovation (OECD, 
2015a) in a range of systems, from: food and agriculture (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009); healthcare 
(McMahon and Thorsteinsdóttir, 2013); transport (Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008); buildings 
(Mlecnik, 2013); and energy provision (Foxon et al., 2005). Systemic innovations contrast with 
incremental innovations; where gradual improvements in current technologies, processes or 
infrastructures can be easily adopted by incumbent actors, with little change required in 
underlying processes and practices (Mlecnik, 2013).  
 
Whole-house retrofit is perhaps an archetypal example of a systemic innovation (Mlecnik, 
2013) - needing complementary developments in regulations, financing, supply chain 
competences and household practices (Wilson et al., 2015), all requiring policy and 
institutional changes to be fully and effectively realised (Brown et al., 2018).  
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4.2.2. Business model innovation and sustainability 
Business models47 describe of the nature of value delivered to customers, how organisations 
and networks create value and the means of capturing revenues from that value (Hellström et 
al., 2015; Teece, 2018). Whilst the innovation studies literature focusses primarily on 
technological artefacts, there is growing recognition of the integral role of accompanying 
business models -particularly for radical, path breaking or systemic innovations (Chesbrough, 
2010). Although the majority of studies on business model innovation originate from the 
business and management literature (Massa and Tucci, 2013), the concept is increasingly 
prevalent in sustainability research (Boons et al., 2013). The importance of sustainable 
business model innovation is emphasised by Budde Christensen et al., (2012, p. 499): 
 
“it might be that innovative technologies that have the potential to meet key 
sustainability targets are not easily introduced by existing business models within a 
sector, and that only by changes to the business model would such technologies become 
commercially viable.”  
 
Hence, the economic, environmental and social value of innovation often remains latent, until 
commercialised through a complementary business model (Bohnsack et al., 2014). Radical 
innovations, which present challenges in capturing revenues, often pose the greatest need for 
new business models (Teece, 2010). Thus, business model innovation may be a particularly 
important component of systemic innovation (Boons et al., 2013). Incumbent business models 
may also be incompatible with long term sustainability and the direction of technological 
change (Roome and Louche, 2016). Business model innovation therefore presents two key 
opportunities; first to enable the diffusion of sustainable innovations, and second to 
reconfigure existing industries towards more sustainable practices (Massa and Tucci, 2013; 
Schaltegger et al., 2016). Recent studies therefore highlight the potential for integrated 
business retrofit business models (Brown, 2018; Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018) 
and energy performance contracts48 in the residential sector (Brown, 2018; Mcelroy and 
Rosenow, 2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017). 
 
                                                        
47 A more detailed definition used in this paper is provided in Section 3. 
48 Energy performance contracts include guaranteed reductions in energy consumption or costs for the client 
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However, organisations may face a range of barriers to business model innovation (Stubbs and 
Cocklin, 2008), including the ‘dominant logic’ of a firm or industry (Chesbrough, 2010) and 
wider cultural and structural barriers which have ‘co-evolved’ with incumbent business models 
(Bohnsack et al., 2014; Hannon et al., 2013). Organisations may thus lack the necessary 
knowledge, capabilities or complementary assets to innovate their existing business models, 
or enter new markets with new business models (Teece, 2018, 2010, 1986). These barriers and 
benefits may provide a rationale for policy intervention (Jaffe et al., 2005).  
 
However, existing literature provides limited insight as to how business model innovation 
might be governed (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). Innovation intermediaries have been shown to 
overcome barriers to systemic innovation (Lente and Hekkert, 2003) with others emphasising 
polices to promote these intermediaries (Kivimaa, 2014). Although some have studied 
intermediation in the retrofit context (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b) few have linked these 
ideas to business models.  
 
4.3. Intermediation for business model innovation 
In this section we integrate the literature on business models, with that on innovation 
intermediaries to develop a new conceptual framework. We first outline the detailed 
components of business models before introducing the literature on innovation 
intermediaries. Due to the challenges of business model innovation, we argue that innovation 
intermediaries may be important in the creation and adoption of new business models.  
 
4.3.1. Components of a business model  
Following Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013), we identify the key components of a business 
model as the value proposition, supply chain, customer interface, and financial model. To this 
we add the governance dimension described by Zott and Amit (2010). This approach captures 
the both the content of the business model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) and its mode of 
governance within organisations and wider networks (Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and Amit, 
2010). These components are integrated by Brown (Brown, 2018) and summarised in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Key components of a business model (Brown, 2018) 
Component Definition 
Value 
proposition 
The value proposition refers to the value or utility from goods and services that 
an organisation or network provides to the customer (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 
2013; Engelken et al., 2016) . 
Supply 
chain 
The supply chain describes the upstream relationships between an organisation 
and its suppliers (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This comprises the logistical 
and technical elements that enable delivery of the value proposition 
(Osterwalder, 2004). 
Customer 
interface 
The customer interface covers all downstream, customer-related interactions 
(Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This includes the relationship the customer 
has with the supplier organisations in terms of marketing, sales and distribution 
channels and the ongoing relationship with the product or service (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2010). 
Financial 
model 
The financial model constitutes the combination of an organisation’s capital and 
operational expenditures with its means of revenue generation (Osterwalder et 
al., 2005). This is linked to the value proposition, in terms of what products and 
services customers pay for and how revenues are collected and distributed. 
Governance Business model governance involves both the co-ordination and management of 
the other components and the organisational form of the business model (Amit 
and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit, 2010). As such, business models may involve a 
single organisation or a network of interdependent firms that interact to provide 
a service or product (Hellström et al., 2015). The range of governance 
approaches lie along a continuum, with integrated, hierarchical firms at one end, 
and arm's-length, market-based contractual relationships at the other (Treib et 
al., 2007). 
 
4.3.2. Innovation intermediaries and business models 
A range of policy instruments to promote innovation are identified by Edler and Fagerberg 
(2017). These are grouped into six types; various stages of research, development and 
deployment (R&D&D) funding; polices to develop capabilities and skills; policies to promote 
interaction and learning across networks; procurement policies to generate demand; 
regulations and standards; and missions and foresight policies which envisage future needs 
and set the direction of change. Recently scholars have emphasised the need for systemic 
innovation polices, which move beyond a focus on individual instruments and technologies - 
instead seeking to promote whole system change (Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). Kivimaa 
 128 
 
 
128 
(2014) therefore emphasises how government affiliated intermediaries may constitute a form 
of systemic innovation policy (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). 
 
Innovation intermediaries have been studied in different contexts since the 1990s (Bessant 
and Rush, 1995), covering a huge array of activities from technology transfer to innovation 
management and systems of innovation (Howells, 2006). Intermediaries can be characterised 
by their intermediation functions: for innovation in general (Howells, 2006); or in the context 
of sustainability transitions (Kivimaa et al., 2018; Mignon and Kanda, 2018). They can be 
grouped into specific types of actors based on the level and scale in which their operate, their 
mandate and normative orientation (Kivimaa et al., 2018). These actors may be key bridges or 
brokers in innovation systems, providing linkages, advocacy or technical services between 
multiple stakeholders, including suppliers and end-users (Howells, 2006; Hyysalo et al., 2018). 
Kivimaa et al., (2018) define innovation intermediaries for sustainability as: 
 
“actors and platforms that positively influence sustainability transition processes by 
linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources” 
 
Van Lente et al (2003) contrast ‘systemic’ intermediaries, with those that have a more bi-
lateral, or single technology focus (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). The actions of these 
intermediaries may therefore play a crucial role in facilitating the emergence, development 
and diffusion of systemic innovations (Lente and Hekkert, 2003) - such as whole-house retrofit 
(Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018). In the retrofit context, intermediaries may include local 
authority agents, charities or NGOs, third sector or individual actors who facilitate projects 
(Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018).  
 
We argue that systemic intermediaries may also play a role in promoting business model 
innovation. In their seminal work, Stewart and Hyysalo (2008) describe innovation 
intermediaries having three core roles: facilitating, configuring and brokering - which have 
been extensively applied in subsequent studies (Barnes, 2016; Kivimaa, 2014; Kivimaa et al., 
2018). In Table 8 we develop these ideas and apply them to the context of business model 
innovation. 
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Table 8 Key functions of an innovation intermediary in business model innovation 
Function Definition 
Facilitating Facilitating enables networking and collaboration as well as knowledge 
dissemination and learning (Howells, 2006). In the context of business model 
innovation this involves the support and co-ordination of the networks 
involved in the delivery of the value proposition (Hellström et al., 2015). Thus, 
potentially facilitating new approaches to business model governance, 
towards integrated or more networked arrangements (Treib et al., 2007).  
Configuring  Configuration involves the design and modification of technological, social 
and organisational innovations, to promote their appropriation and adoption 
among key stakeholders (Howells, 2006). Therefore, this involves the design, 
modification and testing of new business models with relevant users, 
suppliers and the wider regulatory environment. This is likely to include 
developing novel value propositions and financial models (Chesbrough, 
2010), such as energy performance contracts (Nolden et al., 2016) but also 
capabilities in supply chains and the customer interface (Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund, 2013). 
Brokering Innovation intermediaries may provide support through negotiation and 
representation with external sponsors or regulators (Stewart and Hyysalo, 
2008). Thus, intermediaries may seek to raise financial or human resources 
to sustain and develop innovative activity or undertake advocacy or lobbying 
activities - to alter the legal or policy environment (Howells, 2006). 
Intermediaries may also seek to create demand for the combination of 
products and services embedded within the business model they are seeking 
to promote (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009), what could be termed ‘market 
formation’ (Kivimaa et al., 2018). 
 
Table 8 presents our conceptual framework used for examining the Energiesprong case in 
Section 4.5. It connects Stewart and Hyysalo’s (2008) innovation intermediary roles with 
business model components (Brown, 2018) highlighting the role they play in business model 
innovation. 
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Table 9 Conceptual framework linking innovation intermediation to business model 
components 
 Facilitating – network 
formation and collaboration  
Configuring – business model 
design 
Brokering - advocacy and 
resource raising 
Value 
proposition 
Creating opportunities for 
new value propositions, by 
bringing new actors together- 
supporting and coordinating 
the networks involved 
(Hellström et al., 2015). 
Configuring the mix of 
products and services which 
form the new value 
proposition (Chesbrough, 
2010). 
 
Includes testing of alternative 
value propositions with users, 
suppliers and regulators. 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new value 
propositions. 
Supply chain Creating opportunities for 
new supply chain interactions 
- developing the relationship 
between the core business 
and its suppliers, which can 
be more complex in the case 
of systemic innovation 
(Mlecnik, 2013). 
Setting rules and contract 
terms for suppliers, as well as 
training and capacity building  
(Mlecnik, 2013). 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new supply 
chain configurations. 
Customer 
interface 
Creating new connections to 
potential customers, 
interfacing between 
customer expectations and 
new business model 
formation. 
Developing marketing and 
sales channels as well as new 
forms of customer 
engagement – including the 
use of new media (Brown, 
2018). 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new 
customer interfaces. 
 
Creating new markets by 
influencing regulations or 
local rules (Martiskainen 
and Kivimaa, 2018). 
Financial 
model 
Creating links to new 
financing actors to develop 
new financial models through 
new sources of capital or 
revenue streams. 
Developing new financial 
models – often linked to new 
value propositions, requiring 
interaction with finance 
providers and customers. 
Advocacy and lobbying  
to modify regulatory or 
policy environment to be 
more favourable to new 
financial models. 
 
Seeking new financial 
resources such as research 
and development (R&D) 
funding or other fundraising 
activity. 
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Governance By facilitating new networks 
and links between the other 
business model components 
this may lead to new modes 
of governance, towards more 
integrated or networked 
arrangements (Treib et al., 
2007). 
Developing the linkages 
between different actors 
involved in business model 
governance. This may include 
an active role in organisational 
management and ‘system 
building’ activities during the 
early phases of business model 
development (Bolton and 
Hannon, 2016).  
Advocacy and lobbying with 
regulators to overcome 
potential barriers to 
business model integration 
or outsourcing   
(Howells, 2006; Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2009; Kivimaa, 
2014). 
 
The combined business model and intermediation framework is shown in Figure 18 and 
illustrates how these elements work together to produce business model innovation. 
 
Figure 18 Business model innovation and intermediation framework 
 
4.4. Methodology  
This research involved a qualitative case study of a policy initiative to promote business model 
innovation for whole-house retrofit; the Energiesprong initiative. We draw on insights and 
empirical context from two wider research projects focussed on both (1) business models and 
finance mechanisms for residential retrofit and (2) the role of intermediaries in low energy 
housing innovation. Each project involved a total of thirty-eight and twenty-nine semi-
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structured interviews49 respectively, conducted between November 2016 and June 2018. This 
included seven interviews with actors directly involved in the Energiesprong initiative. Other 
interviews provided background both on the range of business model archetypes and financing 
mechanisms adopted as well as the nature of intermediation in the sector. A qualitative case 
study approach was considered appropriate given the need to develop an in-depth 
understanding of these relatively understudied processes in the retrofit context, to answer 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions (Yin, 1994) that contribute to theory development (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
In building this picture, the research was undertaken in three parts. 
 
Part one focussed on the diversity of business models and finance mechanisms adopted for 
residential retrofit. This initially involved nine scoping interviews with key ‘experts’ in the 
retrofit space in the UK, EU and USA (see Appendix A, Table A1). These experts were selected 
on the basis of their technical, academic and policy eminence within the retrofit sector, with 
further interviewees sourced through snowballing techniques (Yin, 1994). This was 
supplemented by extensive document analysis and attendance of industry events and 
seminars. The objective was to develop a typology of business models and finance mechanisms 
and understand how their design features contributed to their success in different contexts. 
The scoping interviews were followed by twenty-four interviews with key practitioners across 
the key business model and finance mechanism archetypes, to develop a rich understanding 
of their operation and the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. This identified two 
contrasting business model archetypes, which are explored in detail in this study. The 
‘atomised’ market model that has typified the delivery of single residential retrofit measures, 
and highly innovative net-zero energy performance contracts; with the ‘Energiesprong’ 
initiative the only known residential example. 
 
Part two provided context on intermediation in UK low energy housing sector (see (Kivimaa 
and Martiskainen, 2018b, 2018a; Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018)) and provided a background 
setting for analysis of intermediation in this case study. This included twenty-nine in-depth 
interviews and a workshop organised with stakeholders in February 2017, in which 
Energiesprong were a speaker (see Appendix A, Table A2).  
                                                        
49 The interviews were a mix of face to face and video conference calls 
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Part three involved an in-depth case study50 of the Energiesprong initiative. This phase involved 
six51 interviews during spring and summer 2018 with various actors in both the UK and the 
Netherlands. This included the client or housing provider; the construction industry partner; 
supporting policymakers, as well as the Energiesprong market development team intermediary 
themselves (see Appendix A, Table A1). The interviews focussed on understanding whole-
house retrofit as a systemic innovation; the nature of the Energiesprong business model; the 
role of the market development team in enabling business model innovation; the policy 
approach that brought it into being and the ongoing interaction between the intermediary, 
policymakers and other stakeholders. Again, these interviews were supplemented by 
document analysis and attendance of relevant industry events and seminars. 
 
Each interview was digitally recorded and transcribed and analysed using the NVivoÔ 
qualitative analysis software. Interviewees were offered options as to the level of disclosure 
and anonymity (reflected in the appendices). Interview data was coded and analysed the based 
on the framework outlined in Section 4.3.2. This also involved triangulating these findings with 
public available reports such as Energiesprong (2018, 2017, 2014), to add validity to the claims 
made in the following sections.  
4.5. Business model incumbency and innovation in residential retrofit 
The majority of EU low carbon retrofit has involved single measures delivered by separate 
contractors, without guarantees on energy saving performance. This has typically required 
multiple points of contact and has tended to be funded by a number of changing subsidy 
regimes such as energy supplier obligations, tax breaks or feed in tariff type schemes. This 
section first develops this ‘atomised’ market, business model - considered common retrofit 
practice. We then introduce the Energiesprong initiative, as a case study of an innovative 
Managed Energy Service Agreement (MESA) business model, delivered through a government 
funded intermediary. We therefore draw on the business model archetypes developed in 
                                                        
50 Phase one provided sufficient detail on the atomised market model 
51 One Energiesprong interview already took place in phase one 
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Article 1, including the: atomised market model; market intermediation model; one-stop-shop; 
energy services agreement (ESA); and managed energy services agreement (MESA).    
 
4.5.1. The ‘atomised’ market model 
Although the atomised market model has been fairly successful for incremental single 
measures (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014); this approach is considered problematic for undertaking 
whole-house retrofits. As outlined in Article 1 it creates issues for project co-ordination, energy 
performance gaps and unintended consequences such as air quality and damp issues - limiting 
consumer appeal. The following section explore this business model based on the components 
outlined in Table 7.   
 
Value proposition 
The traditional offer to households has been framed in terms of energy cost savings, rather 
than home improvement or increasing comfort. This was considered to be a mistake by many 
of those interviewed: 
 
“For most people … it’s not the economics that’s driving them, it really isn’t. First and 
foremost, its comfort, its often aesthetics, what you perceive as aspirational… It’s all 
these subtle things that are more cultural I think.” (Academic - Energy Efficiency Policy-
I#1) 
 
The focus on energy cost savings is especially problematic, given that energy savings are 
typically based on estimated rather than guaranteed performance: 
 
“to guarantee you performance…that's a different mind-set…and…selling performance 
is good because it puts a line of blame and accountability, which is what we don't have 
at the moment” (Director – BRE-I#4) 
 
Therefore, the narrow offer of estimated energy cost savings without any guarantees or 
warranties on the work, severely limits the appeal of a whole-house retrofit. It was also 
commented that this approach results in poor-quality installations, with limited liability or 
recourse potential due to the lack of aftercare or performance guarantees. 
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Supply chain  
The typical retrofit supply chain consists of multiple, fragmented installers, suppliers and 
consultants. It was discussed by several interviewees, that this is largely a reflection of the 
wider construction industry; typified by specialised subcontractors, each with their own 
division of labour and industry culture: 
 
“Solid wall insulation it’s like an…artisanal, industry…Rather than something which is at 
industrial scale, and those economies of scale are never going to happen, until you got 
the whole supply chain working” (Energy Saving Trust-I#3) 
 
This supply chain fragmentation, the lack of assured performance, measurement and 
verification alongside a skills gap were all seen to contribute to low quality retrofits, particularly 
for deeper measures such as solid wall insulation: 
 
“we've got issues around external wall insulation … we've got … green algae growing 
on the outside…we've got so many complaints coming in from private residents” (Social 
Housing Provider-I#35) 
 
Customer interface 
In the atomised market model, consumer engagement52 has typically involved single measures, 
leaving the customer to seek out and project manage more comprehensive work “largely the 
onus is on them at the moment” (Energy Saving Trust-I#3). In procuring multiple retrofit 
measures, customers therefore need to engage multiple consultants and contractors, each 
with their own marketing channels and points of sale: 
 
“[referring to the UK’s Green Deal53] what actually happened was the customer journey 
was a lot longer than expected.” (Energy Efficiency Consultant-I#12).  
 
This lack of co-ordination between different suppliers is therefore seen as complex, and likely 
to deter all but the most committed households. Without a trusted intermediary or a single 
point of contact, some interviewees also felt this made customers vulnerable to unscrupulous 
                                                        
52 Largely through the energy supplier obligations 
53 The Green Deal was a voluntary UK policy program based on a private sector finance mechanism, repaid on energy bills 
 136 
 
 
136 
contractors “if Mrs Jones goes direct to the company, the company can tell her anything can’t 
they” (Energy Efficiency Consultant-I#12). 
 
Financial model 
Specific financial models are not intrinsic to the atomised market model. However, this 
approach in synonymous with government grant and supplier obligation schemes; typified by 
stop start funding for single measures. Thus, many interviewees felt that this approach had 
resulted in a marketplace that was very grant dependent. It was further discussed that this 
policy approach had contributed to the piecemeal nature of installations and the very limited 
diffusion of whole-house retrofits. Whilst the UK’s recent Green Deal financing mechanism was 
intended to fund multiple measures, it still applied an incremental logic to financing: 
 
“Green Deal was set up to fund things on a measure by measure basis. So, you have 
this, then you have this, then you have this. … With the supplier obligations we worked 
on things …in the order of cost-effectiveness; in an ‘incrementalist’ approach” (Energy 
Saving Trust-I#3) 
 
Governance 
The atomised market model is associated with a market-based mode of governance, 
characterised by limited integration between the different elements of the business model: 
 
“at the moment there is no integration in the retrofit market …somebody goes out and 
gets a lead …they may get £50…they then come up with ‘yes it's got a solid wall yes it 
needs windows’ it becomes a sum of parts without…a plan” (Director - BRE-I#4) 
 
This mode of governance may be effective for large organisations, able to manage complex 
supply chains, multiple interfaces with suppliers and compare different financing options. 
However, it is considered a poor means of delivering whole-house retrofits for time poor 
households, who may have limited knowledge of the options available or the ability to 
undertake due diligence. 
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4.5.2. The Energiesprong MESA business model 
In a MESA, customers are offered an energy performance guarantee with the financing of 
measures included within the value proposition. Here, an ESCO also includes the energy supply 
contract (natural gas, electricity) as part of the offering, typically as a single energy service 
payment. In the case of Energiesprong, this equates to net-zero over the calendar year, 
although still requiring a supply contract for periods of low generation and grid export. The 
following section explores this business model based on the components outlined in Table 7.   
 
Value proposition 
In the Energiesprong model, customers are offered a comprehensive whole-house retrofit, 
based on guaranteed net-zero energy consumption. This typically involves offsite 
manufactured, insulated facades, integrated with renewable heat sources and PV panels. The 
contractor offers a 30-year energy performance guarantee for net-zero annual energy 
consumption amortised over the calendar year. This is based on a guaranteed internal 
temperature of 21°c in living spaces, and a set allowance of hot water and electricity 
consumption; analogous to a mobile phone contract with usage limits. The aim is also to reduce 
the duration of the retrofit to under one week using offsite manufacture and modularisation. 
However, the model does not proscribe any specific measures but rather the performance 
outcome: 
 
“This is a balanced scorecard…of outcomes, so that's energy, that's cost, that's 
overheating, that's noise, that's indoor air quality that do get genuinely measured, has 
sanctions if you do not meet them and it is over the long term” (Energiesprong 
Contractor-I#36) 
 
Another key aspect of the Energiesprong offering is the emphasis on the home improvement 
value of the whole-house retrofit. Homes are given a visual uplift and the retrofit typically 
includes a number of non-energy-based maintenance measures. Unlike the atomised market 
model, less emphasis is placed on energy costs savings, and instead on health and comfort 
benefits alongside property improvement value: 
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“I think…in terms of desirability…the push for such a scalable solution also needs to 
come from an angle where people actually want to have it”. (Energiesprong 
International Market Development-I#33) 
 
Supply chain 
The Energiesprong business model specifies performance rather than technical solutions. 
However, delivery of a net-zero energy retrofit requires an integrated supply chain, typically 
with a single ‘solution provider’. The Energiesprong model is also driving a move to 
industrialisation and offsite manufacture; with integrated energy modules that can be 
miniaturised, and mass-produced. It is thought that this process innovation will drive down 
costs and installation times through economies of scale; with one-day retrofits now being 
achieved in the Netherlands – despite each retrofit being bespoke. The Energiesprong model 
therefore adopts a performance-based approach to procurement: 
 
“In the past they would come up with a technical specification, price it up and invite 
competition on price. We are completely turning that round and saying you ask for a 
product performance to a fixed price point” (Energiesprong Project Manager-I#18) 
 
Moreover, this procurement route is seen to improve quality and collaboration between the 
client and contractor: 
 
“Energiesprong however, has real teeth, so therefore the quality is driven up because 
we are concerned to get it right.” (Energiesprong Contractor-I#36) 
 
Customer interface 
In the Energiesprong initiative, the initial target market has been the social housing sector. 
Achieving scale is considered to be easier in this market where multiple homes can be 
retrofitted under a single deal, also tending to have a more uniform housing stock. 
Interviewees felt that breaking into the owner occupier market would be much more 
challenging: 
 
“They are managing larger volumes; it is much easier to converse with a provider who 
is managing 50, 60, 70,000 homes, than to talk to individual private landlords of one or 
two flats.” (Energiesprong Project Manager-I#18) 
 
 139 
 
 
139 
The customer interface involves a single product offering, rather than separate, sales, audit, 
measures and financing from different providers. Whilst for social housing this interface is 
initially with the housing provider, significant emphasis is placed on household engagement: 
 
“there was quite an intensive consumer engagement process, which involved workshops 
with the tenants…in the local pub…so that the tenants could directly import what they 
wanted out of the scheme… It did genuinely make a difference” (Local Authority 
Partner-I#38) 
 
Moreover, a key marketing tool of the Energiesprong approach is the visual impact of the newly 
renovated house, creating what is termed ‘kerbside appeal’.  
 
Financial model 
As with other forms of energy performance contract, the financial model relies on realised 
energy savings to fund the cost of the measures. Given the retrofit results in net-zero energy, 
the entire energy bill is used to recover these costs. The model has thus far been adopted in 
the social housing sector, and benefits from the rolling up of future maintenance54 from the 
housing providers’ asset management budget: 
 
“The financing model therefore is…the aggregation of maintenance, major repair works 
and the additional revenue stream for thirty years from the energy plan that comes with 
the property.” (Energiesprong Project Manager-I#18) 
 
The strategy hinges on achieving economies of scale and learning rates, so that the financial 
model is viable based on energy costs savings and maintenance budgets alone - rather than 
reliant on subsidy as at present: 
 
“the way I see it…is…this massive prize of a self-financing business model, if we achieve 
that then there are millions and millions of homes that could be retrofitted” (Social 
Housing Provider-I#35) 
 
However, for the model to become viable in the private housing sector, third party sources of 
finance are likely to be necessary. The Dutch government is therefore exploring the use of 
                                                        
54 Such as those for wall and roofing repairs 
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mortgage financing and performance-based energy service agreements tied to the property. 
Critical to this is the cost of capital; “what we see now is cost of financing, structural cost of 
borrowing money is high in the UK, because it's fully commercial” (Energiesprong International 
Market Development-I#33). Therefore, several interviewees saw an ongoing role for 
government in bridging the funding gap and ensuring low interest rates.  
 
Governance 
The Energiesprong business model adopts an integrated mode of governance. Central to this 
has been the market development team, who have brought together the key stakeholders and 
facilitated collaboration and innovation towards a common goal: 
 
“We've made an innovation of the Energiesprong, and I guess this is one of the biggest 
things…it's the way, more the governance…the way it was organised” (Dutch Energy 
Policymaker-I#37) 
 
“So, there was quite a lot of collaboration…when we were developing our tender, we 
could do some market testing through Energiesprong, through the market development 
team” (Social Housing Provider-I#35) 
 
This ‘partnership approach’ has been central to developing a business model where customer 
interface, supply chain, financing and net-zero energy retrofit are integrated into an offering 
from a single solution provider - which can be easily understood by the customer. Thus, 
simplifying the customer journey, improving quality and is potentially scalable to create a mass 
market for whole-house retrofit. 
 
Table 10 compares the atomised market model and Energiesprong business model, illustrating 
the difference across the components of the respective business models.
Table 10 Comparison of the atomised market model and Energiesprong business models. 
Adapted from: (Brown, 2018) 
 ‘Atomised’ market model ‘Energiesprong’ energy performance contract  
Value 
proposition 
 
• Single measures  
• Emphasis on energy 
cost savings 
• Savings are estimated 
rather than guaranteed 
• Multiple measures or whole-house 
approach  
• Emphasis on home improvement and 
comfort 
• Energy performance contract  
• Energy service guarantee of temperature 
(21°c), hot water volume (150L/day) and 
electricity (fixed kWh/year) 
• Energy supply contract subsumed in energy 
service agreement 
Customer 
interface 
 
• Largely left to the 
market to promote and 
engage customers, with 
responsibility for the 
marketing and 
engagement for the 
different components 
(i.e. measures, audit, 
finance) of the retrofit 
typically separated 
• One point of contact for the promotion, 
marketing and sales of the full package 
necessary to achieve the retrofit, provided 
by the host company as a one-stop-shop  
• Emphasis on customer engagement 
through housing provider and face to face 
workshops 
Supply 
chain  
 
• Fragmented 
relationship with 
traditional separated 
trades (plumbers, 
carpenters etc.) 
installing the retrofit 
measures in sequence 
with limited co-
ordination  
• Highly integrated package of measures, 
using offsite manufacture techniques - 
provided in house or through trusted 
subcontractors 
• Supply chain may require legal and finance 
skillsets  
• Additional supply chain for electricity supply 
required, can be through fully licensed 
supplier model or through a white label 
scheme 
Financial 
Model  
 
• Finance is arranged via 
third party with little 
involvement in the 
retrofit process 
• Lender developer / investor seeking to use 
energy performance contract structure to 
fund retrofits  
• Lender captures energy savings and charges 
back to property owner based on historic 
consumption 
• Retrofit supplier assumes responsibility for 
payment of energy bill 
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 ‘Atomised’ market model ‘Energiesprong’ energy performance contract  
Governance 
 • Highly fragmented 
arrangement of 
suppliers with little co-
ordination between the 
various elements – 
project management is 
left to the customer  
• Integrated mode of governance where 
components of the business model are 
delivered and co-ordinated by a single 
organisation, who take responsibility for 
project delivery.  
 
4.6. Innovation intermediaries and residential retrofit 
In this section we first introduce the Energiesprong market development team as a case of an 
innovation intermediary. Subsequently we explore the key intermediation functions of 
facilitating, configuring and brokering (Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008) and how these contributed 
to the business model innovation outlined in the previous section. The case further illustrates 
how this radical business model necessitates systemic innovation across supply chains, legal, 
financing and regulatory spheres (Mlecnik, 2013). Drawing on the interviews from Article 1 we 
subsequently introduce two other intermediaries in the UK retrofit sector: The Energy Saving 
Trust and the RE:NEW program. We discuss how the narrower remit of these intermediaries is 
unlikely to facilitate the systemic changes that the Energiesprong market development team 
is looking to promote. 
 
4.6.1. Energiesprong market development team  
In 2013, the Dutch government funded a large-scale (€45 million) market led initiative to 
achieve net-zero energy homes known as the ‘Energiesprong’ or ‘energy leap’ initiative 
(Energiesprong, 2014). The aim was to overcome many of the issues identified in the previous 
section, thus, facilitating a self-sustaining market for net-zero energy homes55, through a new 
type of policy - delivered by an innovation intermediary.  
 
“There was a strong belief here in this ministry that we should not do this… ourselves. 
This is not [what] we are good at. [We] had to bring out new people with knowledge of 
the market to make a connection with the market... We are making policy… we're not 
judging business plans” (Dutch Energy Policymaker-I#37) 
                                                        
55 The program is focused both on net-zero-energy whole-house retrofit and new build 
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The Energiesprong initiative, since emerging from its pilot phase, has now begun a period of 
growth and expansion to other national contexts - having signed a deal with 175 housing 
industry partners in the Netherlands to deliver 110,000 net-zero energy homes by 2020 
(Energiesprong, 2014). This included the creation of market development teams in the UK, 
France, Germany and in North America, building on the Dutch experience (Energiesprong, 
2017). Thus far (2018), 4,500 net-zero energy homes (a mix of new-build and retrofit) have 
been delivered in the Netherlands, with 10 and 24 retrofits completed in the UK and France 
respectively - with many more planned (Energiesprong, 2018). Initially entirely state funded, 
the initiative is now supported by national and European Union innovation funds and a range 
of local authority, industry and public sector partners in these respective countries. 
 
To achieve its goals, the market development team performs three key forms of 
intermediation; facilitating, configuring and brokering that are crucial to business model 
innovation, and market formation. 
 
Facilitating  
The overarching role of the market development team is to co-coordinate the key stakeholders 
of the housing provider, the construction industry, financiers and policymakers, facilitating 
collaboration and learning. 
 
“So, what we saw is that it's much easier if you put an interlocutor or a catalyst in the 
middle that understands where the market needs to go …what the financing conditions 
need to be, what the regulatory conditions need to be, that you organise some demand, 
and then the market is right there.” (Energiesprong International Market Development-
I#33) 
 
This has involved multiple project partners including large construction companies, social 
housing providers, local authorities and municipalities. The aim has been to create a shared 
vision for net-zero energy buildings and develop a diverse skillset and knowledge base through 
events, publications and pilot projects. Interestingly, the market development team sees this 
role as temporary. It is hoped that over time and with sufficient experience, its role would 
become obsolete as the business model becomes mainstream.  
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Configuring 
The Energiesprong market development team were tasked to develop a novel solution that 
would overcome many of the issues surrounding the traditional atomised market model. 
Whilst funded by a large government grant in the Netherlands, it was effectively independent 
of the ministry that created it. This provided significant autonomy to fundamentally redesign 
the business model through which retrofit was delivered: 
 
“In the beginning... were able to do pretty radical things, right? Because there was 
nothing out there yet. Performance guarantees for 30 years, energy service plans, 
retrofit solution in a week? Nobody had…there was no example to look at the time… So, 
we really had to do a lot of activation. That budget allowed us to do that.” 
(Energiesprong International Market Development-I#33) 
 
This involved intensive innovation in partnership with contractors to determine what was 
technically possible, and extensive legal and policy work to develop the procurement approach 
and energy performance contracts. The Energiesprong team thus draws on extensive technical 
expertise, crucial in moving from concept to reality. However, the model has required re-
configuration to the UK context due to the different regulatory environment, industry culture 
and consumer expectations: 
 
“It was about promoting what had been done in the Netherlands, and saying, "This is 
how it works." I think what we've ended up with understanding… "It doesn't really work 
like that here." (Social Housing Provider-I#35) 
 
Brokering 
The market development team has also played a critical advocacy role - brokering policy 
changes, procurement volumes and raising financial and human resources. This included 
lobbying the Dutch government to allow placement of energy service charges on rents, 
performance-based efficiency subsidies, and mortgage eligibility assessments to account for 
net-zero-energy performance. This was made possible, because despite its independence 
Energiesprong was essentially an arm’s length government programme: 
 
“Interesting, why could we play this role? We were funded by the government. So, the 
fact that we brought together these organisations and we always said.... we're going to 
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work on the supply side. We're going to work on the demonstrable goal. Also, we're 
going to work with the legislator.” (Energiesprong founding partner-I#34) 
 
The UK team have also secured innovation funding through various European Union grants and 
are now seeking a large UK government grant of over £150 million - for thousands of homes. 
It is hoped this scale will enable the financial model to be fully commercial. Critical to this is 
also securing demand volume; where in the Netherlands housing providers have agreed to 
retrofit 110,000 homes to net-zero standards (Energiesprong, 2014). However, significant 
work remains for the model to become self-sustaining: 
 
“after you know, 45 million…. the idea was always that after that, the market would it 
do itself. That is still not the case here [Netherlands] and it's also not in the UK.” (Dutch 
Energy Policymaker-I#37) 
 
A summary of these intermediation activities and how they relate to the components of the 
Energiesprong business model is provided in Table 11. 
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Table 11 Intermediation activities for the Energiesprong business model  
 Facilitating – network formation 
and collaboration  
Configuring – business model 
design 
Brokering - advocacy and 
resource raising 
Value 
proposition 
Bringing together the necessary 
skillsets for energy performance 
contracts including expertise in 
offsite manufacture, asset and 
energy management, law and 
finance.  
Designing performance 
contracts and developing the 
customer offer through 
collaborative design with the 
stakeholders in the network.  
 
Testing the customer offer 
through small scale trials and 
feedback with the end user. 
In the Netherlands the 
intermediary secured 
regulatory changes 
surrounding energy 
service charges on social 
rents.  
Supply 
chain 
Co-ordinating actors within the 
supply chain to deliver net-zero 
energy retrofits through greater 
integration – facilitating learning 
and adoption of offsite 
manufacture techniques and 
modular solutions through 
collaborative procurement.  
Managing procurement, 
tender process and contract 
terms with suppliers, as well 
as training and capacity 
building with the retrofit 
supply chain. 
Securing agreement from 
housing providers for large 
order volumes for net-
zero energy homes – 
providing security for the 
supply chain to scale up 
operations.   
Customer 
interface 
Network formation and 
involvement of local community 
actors as well as public and 
private sector partners, holding 
regular events and outreach 
activities.  
Developing marketing 
materials and customer 
outreach in collaboration 
with the housing provider or 
other representatives of 
residents. This included social 
media channels as well as 
more conventional forms of 
engagement, including focus 
groups.  
Recruitment of housing 
association executives into 
the market development 
team to lobby for 
procurement of large 
numbers of net-zero 
energy retrofits within 
their host firms.  
Financial 
model 
Incorporating key financial 
stakeholders from both the 
private sector and government 
into the consortium from the 
earliest stages. 
Mobilising financial resources 
and designing contracts, 
building on dedicated 
financial and legal expertise 
to develop the financial 
model. 
In the Netherlands 
securing policy changes: 
for both efficiency 
subsidies and mortgage 
eligibility to be based on 
energy performance. 
 
UK and EU level: lobbying 
for innovation funding 
under EPRD; Interreg; and 
UK Industrial Strategy 
Challenge Fund.  
Governance A system building role – 
improving the links and between 
the elements of the business 
model towards an integrated 
mode of governance, through a 
single solution provider.  
Formalising the links within 
the supply chain and wider 
network. In the UK, case this 
involved the creation of a 
new business venture ‘Melius 
Homes’ which will act as an 
integrated solution provider.  
Widespread PR and 
advocacy campaign across 
UK and EU to promote the 
Energiesprong business 
model with business 
leaders, local authorities 
and the Industry. With the 
aim of creating a network 
of ‘advocates’. 
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4.6.2. Retrofit intermediaries and systemic innovation 
 
The UK has a history of different and overlapping intermediaries in the retrofit and energy 
efficiency space (see Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b for an overview). Two notable examples 
are the Energy Saving Trust (EST) and the RE:NEW program for London. The EST was set up by 
the UK government in 1993 to provide consumer advice and support in the implementation of 
energy efficiency policies. However, unlike Energiesprong its remit has limited scope for supply 
chain engagement: 
 
“one of the ideas which …. we’ve not thought about, or not focused on a lot is trying get 
the industry supply chain up and running for solid wall insulation ... as a consumer facing 
organisation we’ve tended to focus on what is [the] cost benefit for consumers installing 
solid wall insulation, which…[is currently] not going to pay back without additional 
assistance.” (Energy Saving Trust-I#3) 
 
In 2011 in England and Wales, the EST’s central government funding was cut by half, further 
limiting its reach and advisory role. In Scotland the EST has continued to receive funding from 
the Scottish government, acting as its main interlocutor for the HES and HEEPS funding and 
loan programs:  
 
“it is a pilot scheme that we're running on behalf of the Scottish government in just 
three of the local authority areas in Scotland … available to home owners … it's an 
equity loan. So, based on the equity that house holders have in their own property” 
(EST - HEEPS-I#24) 
 
The RE:NEW programme established in 2009 provides a framework for housing associations 
and local authorities to procure retrofit measures in Greater London. The scheme is designed 
to simplify, standardise and improve quality assurance in the procurement of retrofit projects. 
Therefore, the scheme is largely aimed at improving the relationship between the supply chain 
and the housing provider, rather than the interface with individual households.  
 
“some [housing providers] may have the skillset, some may not because they are just 
pulled in too many directions as big organisations, sometimes you need a bit of 
handholding, a bit of help” (Manager- RE:NEW - GLA-I#10) 
 
Both of these intermediaries have had success in facilitating, configuring and brokering the 
uptake of single measure residential retrofits in the UK. However, they have played a much 
more limited role in promoting whole-house retrofit and have done little to challenge the 
  
148 
underlying business model of the industry (Article 1). By contrast, the Energiesprong market 
development team has a broader remit to engage with multiple actors including the 
construction industry, housing providers, financiers and policymakers. The aim has been to 
promote the systemic changes necessary for such a radical business model to become viable 
as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 A comparison of three retrofit intermediaries in the UK 
 
Consequently, without such systemic intermediaries, radical business models such as the 
Energiesprong MESA will struggle to gain a foothold and deliver the widespread adoption of 
whole-house retrofits. However, given the scale of its ambitions, it remains to be seen if this 
Energiesprong will continue to be effective without the support of central government, as was 
the case in the Netherlands.  
 
 Energy Saving Trust RE:NEW London Energiesprong Market 
Development Team 
Facilitating  Core role in engaging end 
customer/households on energy 
efficiency and retrofit. 
 
Limited focus on other 
stakeholders 
Facilitate interaction 
between key supply chain 
actors and housing provider. 
 
Limited focus on other 
stakeholders 
Facilitate interaction 
between multiple 
stakeholders: client, 
supply chain, financiers, 
government  
Configuring Some development of financial 
model through low interest loans 
in Scotland  
 
No role in configuring retrofit 
value proposition - traditional 
business model largely 
unchallenged 
Configure contractual 
arrangement with supply 
chain through procurement 
framework. 
 
No role in configuring retrofit 
value proposition - traditional 
business model largely 
unchallenged 
As outcome of facilitation 
developed entirely novel 
business model for sector 
based on net-zero energy 
performance guarantee 
and supply chain 
industrialisation   
Brokering Brokering and advocacy with 
government on consumer 
energy issues and energy 
efficiency policy.  
 
Less influence since curtailment 
of government funding. 
Brokered deals at city level 
but limited input to wider 
policy, finance or industry 
landscape 
Brokered policy changes in 
the Netherlands, and 
secured funding through 
EU and UK innovation 
grants. 
 
Less influence since 
curtailment of 
government funding. 
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4.7. Discussion  
The goal of this paper was to understand how and why intermediaries and in turn policymakers 
might support business model innovation. We illustrate this though the case of an innovative 
business model for whole-house residential retrofit: the Energiesprong approach.  
 
In understanding the role of new business models in systemic innovation, the case of whole-
house retrofit is particularly instructive. Whole-house retrofit involves the assemblage and co-
ordination of a complex mix of technologies, processes, human and financial resources which 
interface both user and industry practices. Among these groups the imperative of saving 
energy remains a low priority. Equally, the wider regulatory and institutional environment 
remains poorly aligned to achieving this, particularly as it also constitutes a shift toward a more 
distributed energy supply system (Richter, 2013a). Whole-house retrofit thus represents an 
archetypal example of a systemic innovation (Mlecnik, 2013). 
 
This paper builds on an earlier phase of research involving a systematic comparison of 
alternative retrofit business models (Brown, 2018). We show that the traditional atomised 
market business model, whilst suitable for the delivery of single retrofit measures is poorly 
suited to whole-house retrofit and is a weak driver of demand.  
 
The Energiesprong initiative radically overhauls this approach, through an integrated business 
model. Thus, our findings support recent research on the potential for supply chain integration 
(Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018, 2012, n.d.) and energy performance contracts 
for promoting whole-house retrofit (Brown, 2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017). Therefore, 
these findings emphasise how the ‘integrative technologies’ - which characterise whole-house 
retrofit are best suited to hierarchical or integrated modes of governance (Hoetker, 2006; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). 
 
Consequently, business model innovation is able to exploit the added value of systemic 
innovations like whole-house retrofit - such as improved energy services and household 
comfort (Roelich et al., 2015). New business models achieve this by reconfiguring relationships 
within supply chains, mobilising financial resources and engaging customers in new or 
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improved ways (Boons et al., 2013). Our case further emphasises how the governance of the 
business model is critical for the integration and management of these components, and the 
impact this has on the customer (Hellström et al., 2015). Business model innovation thus 
reconfigures organisational practices and their management to enable systemic innovations to 
become viable: 
 
“of significance is the business model’s ability to create a fit between technology 
characteristics and (new) commercialisation approaches that both can succeed on given 
and new markets.” (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013) 
 
However, the adoption of innovative business models, such as the Energiesprong approach 
remains challenging - due to a range of cultural and structural barriers (Stubbs and Cocklin, 
2008). Our findings show how the incumbent business model is a product of the wider 
construction industry - characterised by fragmentation, lowest cost procurement, and few 
guarantees on performance. This reflects established ways of undertaking construction work 
and contract design, based on the ‘dominant logic’ of the industry (Chesbrough, 2010). Many 
SMEs lack the necessary knowledge for whole-house retrofits, capabilities such as energy 
monitoring and finance or complementary assets such as energy management ventures - 
preventing them from offering long term energy performance contracts (Teece, 2018, 2010, 
1986). As identified by Budde Christensen et al., (2012) incumbent firms may thus be locked 
into a path dependent business model, with a limited demand for whole-house retrofit, 
providing few incentives to change. 
 
Crucial to overcoming these barriers has been an open approach to innovation, where learning 
is widely disseminated rather than held within individual firms (Chesbrough, 2006). Thus, the 
market development team created standardised contracts and procurement processes, critical 
in reducing transaction costs for energy service contracts (Nolden et al., 2016). The 
intermediary also played an instrumental role in lobbying for policy changes and financial 
resources. Moreover, the negotiation of delivery volumes and the targeting of the social 
housing market is ostensibly an organisational ‘strategy’ rather than a business model (Teece, 
2010). Thus, the intermediary roles of configuring, facilitating and brokering (Stewart and 
Hyysalo, 2008) were critical for business model innovation, market formation and strategy for 
the diffusion of whole-house retrofit. Interestingly, the temporary nature of the market 
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development team was also observed in Kivimaa’s (2014) study of two Finnish innovation 
agencies. Both studies emphasise the risks of too short an intervention and the importance of 
maintaining neutrality whilst retaining policy influence - a challenging balancing act (Kivimaa 
and Martiskainen, 2018b; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). 
 
Where this study breaks new ground is by highlighting the role of an innovation intermediary 
in overcoming these barriers to business model innovation. We develop a novel framework 
(Table 9 and Figure 18) which integrates the components of the business model with 
intermediation functions for the first time. The Energiesprong market development team is 
therefore shown to be instrumental in developing the concept of a net-zero energy retrofit, 
engaging the supply chain to develop innovative approaches, as well as developing the legal 
and policy framework necessary for it to work. By highlighting the specific processes by which 
intermediaries can support business model innovation; these findings are an important 
contribution to the literature on innovation intermediaries (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009), and 
business model innovation (Bolton and Hannon, 2016) – emphasising how one can promote 
the other. 
 
Our case study also contributes to understanding the role of intermediaries and business 
model innovation in innovation policy. Drawing on Edler and Fagerberg’s (2017) typology; the 
formation of the market development team was primarily a policy to promote interaction and 
learning across networks. What is interesting is that the intermediary was able to engage with 
the market and influence policy in a range of other areas. This included: securing R&D&D 
funding in the form of European Union grants as well as changes to the energy efficiency 
subsidy regime; procurement policies to generate demand through volume agreements with 
public housing providers; changes in regulations and standards to allow energy service charges 
to be bundled with rent; and missions and foresight policies including the goal for net zero 
energy homes by 2050 and the gradual disconnection of neighbourhoods from the natural gas 
grid in the Netherlands.  
 
The catalytic role of the intermediary can thus be seen both in terms of market and policy 
formation. Recognising the limited generalisability of our case study approach, we suggest that 
by bringing together the literature on systemic innovation, business models and innovation 
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intermediaries - our findings and framework (Table 9 and Figure 18) provide some transferable 
theoretical insights. We demonstrate how government affiliated intermediaries like the 
Energiesprong market development team can be viewed as a decentralised and potentially 
effective form of innovation policy (Kivimaa, 2014). Policymakers created an intermediary who 
facilitated business model innovation, which in turn has enabled systemic innovation in the 
form of whole-house retrofit. Accordingly, policymakers wishing to promote business model 
innovation in other sectors, may achieve these aims through the creation of innovation 
intermediaries such as the market development team. 
 
However, the transferability and wider significance of these findings, both for the empirical 
context of retrofitting and intermediation for business model innovation, requires 
qualification. For now, the Energiesprong business model requires significant scale before it is 
viable without subsidy; thus, contingent on promising but as yet unrealised learning rates 
(Energiesprong, 2017). The findings also emphasise the greater challenges in entering the 
owner occupier market, where diversity of building forms and consumer preferences make 
mass produced solutions more challenging (Haines and Mitchell, 2014). Equally, these findings 
highlight issues of compatibility for the transfer of radical business models to new contexts. 
The absence of ‘net metering’ for renewable microgeneration, the lack of public financing 
support through low cost loans, or a general unwillingness for policymakers to promote specific 
technological solutions are all significant challenges for the UK. Therefore, these findings 
highlight the difficulty in transferring systemic innovations and new business models to 
different institutional contexts (Hall et al., 2016) and political economies (Baker et al., 2014). 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
In this paper we advance three related propositions. First, we outline how business model 
innovation may play a key role in unlocking the potential of systemic innovations. We illustrate 
how the radical ‘Energiesprong’ business model, based on zero-energy performance contracts, 
an industrialised supply chain, integrated governance and a simple customer offer, could 
greatly improve the appeal, delivery and scalability of whole-house energy retrofit. 
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Second, we show how a range of barriers to business model innovation may be overcome 
through an innovation intermediary; in our case the Energiesprong market development team. 
This intermediary has played an instrumental and catalytic role, facilitating stakeholder 
collaboration, configuring the design of the business model, and brokering the policy changes, 
financial resources and procurement volumes needed for the business model to be viable. 
 
Third, we describe how such entities can be created by policy, and in turn shape the policy and 
institutional landscape towards new business models. Our case demonstrates how the creation 
of a market facing intermediary enabled the Dutch government to achieve its policy aims 
through a decentralised body - the Energiesprong market development team. This 
intermediary’s role in market formation and business model innovation could thus present a 
template for both policymakers and academics looking to facilitate and study systemic 
innovation in a range of other sectors. Therefore, these findings show how policymakers can 
promote business model innovation through the creation and support of innovation 
intermediaries. These organisations may further shape the policy and institutional landscape, 
in a process of feedback between policy and market design in ways that market or government 
actors alone cannot.   
 
Given the limited generalisability of this single case study, future research could incorporate 
this framework into a more representative cross-sectional research design of the sector at 
large. Future research could also explore these processes in other sectors such as food, 
transport, healthcare or manufacturing; using the theoretical links we make in this paper. 
Future research on business models for whole-house retrofit could also incorporate 
quantitative methods, such as on project performance or customer satisfaction to add validity 
to the claims made here.  
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5. Article 4: Overcoming the systemic challenges of retrofitting residential buildings in 
the United Kingdom, A herculean task?  
(Pre-print, published in CIED book chapter) 
5.1. Introduction 
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a giant serpent with many heads. The second of the 12 
labours of Hercules was to kill the Hydra. However, when one of the Hydra's heads was cut off, 
two more grew in its place. In many ways, overcoming the ‘multi-headed-challenges’ of 
achieving widespread energy efficiency (EE) retrofit is an equally herculean task. Policy 
initiatives in the UK, such as the Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) and the Green Deal, have 
sought and failed to achieve the mass uptake of residential retrofit. This chapter will argue that 
such policies have failed to address four systemic challenges that constrain uptake for whole-
house retrofits, and that a more comprehensive and wide-reaching policy approach will be 
needed to overcome each of these challenges. The chapter is therefore focused on some of 
the solutions to these challenges from the perspective of three key elements of a retrofit: the 
business model, financing and intermediaries. It also discusses the ways in which policy could 
support these outcomes. 
 
Retrofit of buildings involves the “construction approach involving the action of introducing 
[retrofitting] new materials, products and equipment into an existing building with the aim of 
reducing the use of energy of the building” (Baeli, 2013, p. 17). This is different from renovating 
or refurbishing - which refers to work undertaken to repair homes or make them more 
aesthetically pleasing (Baeli, 2013). Retrofits of residential buildings have significant potential 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (CCC, 2016), fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015), and improve 
occupant health and wellbeing (Willand et al., 2015). However, in the UK, much of this 
potential is yet to be realised. Residential buildings account for almost a quarter of the UK’s 
carbon emissions (CCC, 2016), and for every £1 spent on retrofitting fuel poor homes an 
estimated £0.42 is saved in National Health Service spending (UKGBC, 2017). The Committee 
on Climate Change (CCC, 2015b) estimates that there is cost effective56 potential to reduce 
                                                        
56 The CCC define the cost-effective path as comprising measures that cost less than the projected carbon price across their 
lifetimes together with measures that may cost more than the projected carbon price but are necessary in order to manage 
costs and risks of meeting the 2050 target (CCC 2013). 
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direct emissions57 from all buildings by a third by 2030, with the need to achieve near-zero 
emissions from the sector by 2050 (CCC, 2016). It is estimated that this level of retrofit activity 
would create a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) effect of approximately £25.3bn in gross value 
added (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). The UK government has therefore announced a target 
for all UK homes to achieve an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating of C or above by 
2035 (HM Government, 2017).  
 
To achieve these targets, an increasingly comprehensive whole-house approach to residential 
retrofit will be needed (Hansford, 2015). Such an approach involves multiple measures with 
strategies for insulation, draught proofing, ventilation, heating systems and low carbon 
microgeneration (Hansford, 2015). However, the traditional policy approach to residential 
retrofit has tended to incentivise single measures and piecemeal interventions, which may 
cause damaging unintended consequences58; such as mould growth, poor air quality and in 
some cases structural damage (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). Thus, a comprehensive whole-
house retrofit; where the entire building is treated as a system rather than as individual 
elements or measures, can mitigate such issues and achieve greater reductions in emissions 
(Hansford, 2015). Much literature in this area has focussed on the key ‘barriers’ to uptake 
(Fylan et al., 2016; Kangas et al., 2018; Sorrell et al., 2004). However, this focus on barriers has 
tended to characterise retrofit decision making in terms of rational choices whilst ignoring 
broader social and contextual factors (Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the 
assumption that there is a latent demand for retrofit (Wilson et al., 2015).  
 
The UK is an interesting case study – although achieving major progress in power sector 
decarbonisation, it still has one of the least efficient housing stocks in Europe. This is despite 
recent policy initiatives for residential EE. This chapter starts with a brief overview of recent 
UK policy on residential retrofit. It then moves onto characterising four challenges that 
constrain demand for retrofits, then proposes solutions centred around three key elements of 
successful whole-house retrofits: business models (Brown, 2018); financing (Borgeson et al., 
                                                        
57 Those that result from heating, ventilation and cooling systems as well as and hot water. This term excludes emissions 
from electricity consumption  
58 Such as mould growth, poor air quality and interstitial condensation; due to poor detailing, and in-sufficient consideration 
of building physics, airtightness and ventilation  
  
156 
2013) and intermediaries (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018a). Drawing on recent empirical 
work at the CIED, we then argue that achieving these ambitions will require a comprehensive 
mix of policies (Kern et al., 2017; Kivimaa et al., 2018).  
 
5.2. UK policy on residential retrofit 
Improved EE has played a pivotal role in reducing the UK’s energy use and carbon emissions. 
On a temperature corrected basis, total UK household energy use decreased by 19% between 
2002 and 2016, despite a 1% increase in the number of households and a 10% increase in 
population (BEIS, 2017). Per-household energy consumption fell by 37% between 1970 and 
2015, with most of this decrease (29%) occurring since 2004 (BEIS, 2017). EE improvements in 
individual households have offset the 46% increase in the number of households, the 5.6oC 
increase in average internal temperatures and the rapid growth in appliance ownership over 
this period, with the result that total household energy consumption has increased by only 7% 
in 45 years. 
 
Although rising energy prices and the 2008 recession contributed to recent trends, the bulk of 
the reduction in per-household energy consumption can be attributed to public policies to 
improve EE (CCC, 2018; DECC, 2015a; Odyssee, 2017; Thurlwell et al., 2011). Of particular 
importance have been the major home insulation programmes funded by successive ‘supplier 
obligations’ (SOs) such as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT - 2008 to 2012) 
(Rosenow, 2012) and ECO – 2013 onwards. Since 1994, energy and carbon saving targets 
imposed on electricity and gas suppliers have allowed them to recover the costs through a levy 
on household energy bills. Also important were the requirement for condensing boilers within 
the UK Building Regulations and the progressive tightening of EU standards on the EE of 
electrical appliances (Thurlwell et al., 2011). Evaluations of these policies have shown them to 
be highly cost-effective, both in terms of the cost savings to participating households and in 
terms of broader societal welfare (Lees, 2006, 2008; Rosenow and Galvin, 2013). This 
experience supports the argument that market forces alone cannot deliver all cost-effective 
investments in residential buildings, owing to multiple and overlapping market failures. 
Instead, policy intervention can be used to increase the uptake of residential retrofit through 
a mix of regulation, public engagement and incentives.  
  
157 
 
Despite dozens of instruments in the broader EE policy mix, targeting residential buildings 
(Kern et al., 2017) and the apparent success in reducing energy demand through policy, in 
more recent years there has been a marked shift in the policy landscape. Previously, SOs 
supported relatively low-cost EE measures, and dedicated grant programmes funded through 
general taxation provided support for low-income households to invest in EE measures. The 
last version of such grant programmes - Warm Front, was terminated in 2011 and the 
government decided to radically change the way EE was delivered in the UK. Through the 
introduction of the Green Deal in 2013, an On-bill-repayment loan scheme, the government 
intended to trigger substantial investment in EE retrofits whilst the SO would fund only the 
costlier EE measures. It is now widely recognised that this approach failed - the Green Deal was 
effectively terminated in 2015 and funding provided through SOs has been significantly 
reduced (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). As a result, the uptake rate of EE improvements has stalled 
since 2012. 
 
There are, however, signs of a change to the approach taken. The Clean Growth Strategy, 
launched by the UK government on October 12, 2017, sets out ambitious long-term targets for 
EE - especially for buildings and would require a significant increase of the current EE 
improvement delivery rate. The targets specify that all homes as far as possible should reach 
Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) band C by 2035 and all fuel poor homes by 2030. This 
requires both adjusting the ambition levels of existing policies and the implementation of new 
instruments. At the time of writing, government is consulting on several new policy measures, 
and has recently introduced minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) for the private 
rented sector. 
 
5.3. Key challenges for residential retrofit 
The limited uptake of cost-effective EE measures; characterised as the ‘energy efficiency gap’ 
(Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), remains the focus of much academic and policy research. This is 
especially the case with residential buildings, where the benefits of retrofitting go beyond 
emissions reductions, including improvements to health and wellbeing, social welfare and 
economic development (UKGBC, 2017).  
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Previous literature on retrofit has adopted key ‘barriers’ to uptake as the theoretical basis for 
understanding this gap (Fylan et al., 2016; Rosenow et al., 2017a). Yet the original focus of 
much of this barriers literature, such as Sorrell et al., (2004), was on firm level decision making, 
rather than on households. As such, the focus on barriers has tended to characterise retrofit 
decision making in terms of rational economic choices, whilst downplaying social and 
contextual factors (Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the inherent assumption of 
latent demand for retrofit once these barriers are removed (Wilson et al., 2015). This framing 
has come to dominate the design of recent policy initiatives such as the Green Deal and ECO, 
which were predicated on households saving money on their energy bills (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2016). 
 
We argue that this framing is problematic, primarily because it misrepresents how, why and 
by whom home renovation decisions are made. This chapter instead frames the problem in 
terms of four interrelated challenges that continue to contribute to low household uptake of 
residential retrofits. This framing is an outcome of the empirical work conducted across the 
previous three articles. We therefore provide illustrative quotations as footnotes with 
reference to interview codes, which can be found in Appendix A.  
 
5.3.1. Information, engagement and trust 
 A lack of knowledge of the specific options and benefits of retrofit remains widespread 
amongst households in the UK (Marchand et al., 2015). While many of the technologies and 
tools exist to retrofit existing buildings, their uptake is not widespread, largely due to a lack of 
household knowledge and interest59 (Bonfield, 2016). Public engagement and marketing 
schemes have tried to generate demand but tended to be top-down (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2016), short term, and focus on specific subsidy schemes (UKGBC, 2017). This has also created 
a supply chain largely reliant on short term policy incentives60 (CCC, 2015b). Complicated 
                                                        
59 “Not everybody knows what's already possible. If more people would know it, it would scale up more rapidly. So, 
knowledge dissemination is always … important.” (I#34) 
60 “The industry is delivering against the signals and demands and policy levers. What's wrong is, there isn't joined up 
thinking. We are simply looking to the next step ahead and the danger is we will go up cul-de-sacs and … and come back 
down them again.” (I#36) 
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government programmes such as the Green Deal have often been difficult for households to 
grasp61 (Marchand et al., 2015). Households who do decide to retrofit often have to interact 
with multiple tradesmen and installers, who influence decisions on technology choices and 
subsequent use62 (Maby and Owen, 2015). These challenges of gaining appropriate advice, 
concerns over post-retrofit performance, combined with poor quality workmanship has 
undermined trust with the wider public63 (Pettifor et al., 2015).  
 
5.3.2. Uncertain benefits and quality 
Predicted energy and cost savings from retrofits are based on modelled energy performance. 
There is consistently a ‘performance gap’ between these models and actual energy 
performance outcomes64 (Fylan et al., 2016). This is characteristic of an industry with a 
reputation for low quality, with few contractual penalties for under-performance65 (Bonfield, 
2016). Equally, retrofit interventions may alter a buildings’ existing features, affecting a 
household’s routines and practices in ways that may make them reticent to change66 (Wilson 
et al., 2015). By only focusing on financial savings, policies have also failed to recognise that 
retrofits could be framed and promoted in terms of aesthetics, comfort and wellbeing 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Much evidence now suggests that those who undertake energy 
retrofits do so because of these non-economic sources of value67, such as environmental 
concerns, desire for improved comfort and living standards, property longevity and aesthetics 
(Fawcett and Killip, 2014; Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b).  
  
                                                        
61 “it is even more complex with a split occupancy and ownership; it is difficult enough to get started with those who own 
their house already” (I#14) 
62 “It's not the kind of thing that you know that there are many examples of anyone doing on their own.” (I#5) 
63 “I think there is still a challenge around trust…that's something that I've found so difficult.” (I#35) 
64 “You need guarantees for energy savings. The problem has been the performance gap in retrofit; no one has bothered to 
look at it.” (I#2) 
65 “You need to be rigorous, contractors need to be high quality, have guarantees that if it is not done properly you can go 
back” (I#1) 
66 “to overcome you know scepticism and risk aversion…if no one takes that risk you have no one to ask…or none of your 
friends have done it … you kind of can't get to that trust level.” (I#5) 
67 “They want to fix a problem in their home, whether that's a leaking roof, it's a thermostat issue, whatever that might be” 
(I#31) 
 
  
160 
5.3.3. Complexity, disruption and timing  
Whole-house retrofits involve multiple activities carried out by multiple contractors and 
consultants. Management of this process is complex and time consuming for the household68 
(Pettifor et al., 2015). Alongside the significant disruption of extensive works, this can be a 
major deterrent to uptake69 (Snape et al., 2015). Thus, households may prefer to retrofit 
gradually, when it is less disruptive to do so, despite the higher costs and longer duration 
(Fawcett, 2014). Consequently, energy retrofit may only be considered during wider 
renovations70 (Wilson et al., 2015). Identifying such ‘trigger points’ could therefore promote 
retrofit in certain circumstances, such as moving into a new home (Maby and Owen, 2015).  
 
5.3.4. Capital cost and split incentives 
Whilst retrofits result in long term energy savings, whole-house retrofits typically require long 
periods before the capital cost can be recovered in energy savings (Gouldson et al., 2015). 
Thus, many households lack access to up-front capital71, with the benefits of the investment 
not being realised when moving house or in a landlord-tenant situation – termed ‘split 
incentives’72 (Sorrell et al., 2004). Whilst the up-front cost barrier has largely been the focus of 
recent policy initiatives in the UK, the economics of long term financing is extremely sensitive 
to interest rates73 (Gouldson et al., 2015), particularly if energy bill neutrality74 is required 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Further, whilst households may value funding for wider non-energy 
measures, such as general repairs, the majority of policies fund EE measures alone75 (Borgeson 
et al., 2013). These four related challenges are shown in Figure 19. 
                                                        
68 “So, the way to do it it's to make it simpler and clear and really consumer centric.” (I#31) 
69 “Do you want it in your house if it's not final? I mean, I'm an energy specialist and I still replace my boiler much later than I 
was supposed to because it's a hassle, isn't it?” (I#38) 
70 “So, … use the existing stuff that's going on. I think that's a really important point. The … trigger points” (I#23) 
71 “Capital is addressed in very isolated pockets, and access to capital is certainly a barrier” (I#26) 
72 “There's a split incentive for renters to have more efficient housing or appliances.” (I#26) 
73 “your cost of capital, every % that you pay more or less on your interest rate tells you what you can do technically in your 
building, most heat engineers I know have not a clue about finance” (I#17) 
74 Energy bill neutrality may include requirements that modelled savings are ‘cash-flow positive’ meaning that finance 
repayments are equal to, or result in, net energy cost savings (Borgeson et al., 2013). 
75 “because you can't strip … out the pure energy component of an investment even if you use the best energy performance 
contract even if you're the best ESCO in the world even if you're doing this simplest thing such as changing the LED light bulbs 
of a street light.” (I#19) 
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Figure 19 Key systemic challenges for driving retrofit uptake 
 
Typically, policy interventions in this area have targeted one, or at most two, of these issues. 
However, to overcome these ‘multi-headed-challenges’ and deliver on the promise of 
residential retrofit, a systemic approach across multiple sectors and involving multiple 
government departments will be necessary (see Section 5.5). This article draws on three 
emerging research themes: business models; financing and intermediaries. Building on these 
insights we then propose policy solutions to overcome the challenges for the widespread 
diffusion of whole-house residential retrofit.  
 
5.4. Overcoming the challenges for residential retrofit  
In the following section we explore how best practice approaches to retrofit: business models; 
financing and intermediaries, can overcome many of the challenges that constrain uptake 
identified in the previous section.  
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5.4.1. Retrofit business models 
A business model is defined as the nature of the products or services delivered to customers; 
the activities involved in delivering these; and the means of capturing revenue from these 
activities (Boons et al., 2013). Many radical innovations only became widespread once a 
complimentary business model enabled their diffusion (Teece, 2010). Examples such as the 
MP3 player, low cost air travel and smartphones owe their success to the effective pairing of 
the technology with an appropriate business model and in many cases financing package. 
Emerging ‘service-based’ business models provide the useful end service rather than the 
technology or commodities themselves, shifting incentives for resource efficiency onto 
suppliers (Bocken et al., 2014). Consequently, energy service business models are promoted 
as a means of reducing energy demand (Labanca et al., 2014). Innovations such as distributed 
energy76 and whole-house retrofit may therefore require novel, complementary business 
models before they are viable on a large scale (Hall and Roelich, 2016). Drawing on recent 
research at the CIED (Brown, 2018), we argue that despite significant policy action in this area, 
a major reason for the lack of uptake of whole-house retrofit is the limitations of the traditional 
business model. 
 
The dominant business model for residential retrofit (Figure 20) is characterised by a piecemeal 
offering; with a fragmented supply chain, a focus on single (rather than multiple, 
complementary) measures, and no guarantees on performance. This is typically marketed on 
estimated energy cost and carbon savings and involves measures and technologies installed by 
separate contractors. Customers procure the individual measures, energy audits and finance 
separately, with the result that multiple interfaces are required for a whole-house residential 
retrofit. The offer of energy savings is based on modelled impacts of measures, and no 
performance guarantees are provided. Therefore, any finance package is based on estimated 
rather than guaranteed savings. Such an approach has typified the delivery of the EE through 
UK policies such as ECO and the Green Deal.  
                                                        
76 Defined as electricity generation feeding into the local distribution network (operating from 132kV down to 230V), as 
opposed to the regional or national transmission grid (which operates from 400kV and 275kV).  
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This approach introduces significant complexity for customers in managing multiple interfaces 
with sub-contractors, energy auditors and finance providers, also tending to result in major 
disruption for a whole-house retrofit. Equally, the narrow emphasis on estimated cost savings, 
without performance or ongoing maintenance guarantees, means uncertain benefits for the 
customer and provides limited trust on installation quality. Unsurprisingly, this approach has 
resulted in low demand for whole-house residential retrofits. 
 
Recently, novel, integrated business models for residential retrofit have begun to emerge. 
These approaches emphasise a broader source of value for a whole-house retrofit; focussed 
upon aesthetics, increased property value, comfort, health and wellbeing alongside energy and 
carbon savings. Such approaches involve integrated and increasingly industrialised supply 
chains providing comprehensive whole-house retrofits, through a single contractor or well 
integrated network of sub-contractors. These approaches are characterised by a simplified 
customer interface with a single expert point of contact to co-ordinate entire project. Some 
 
Customer 
Energy Auditor  
Installer Type 1 Installer Type 2 
Finance provider  
 Supply chain actor  
Retrofit measures 
Customer interface 
Finance 
repayments 
Up-front payments 
  Figure 20 The incumbent ‘atomised market model’ (Brown 2018) 
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examples also offer integrated financing packages, and in some cases energy performance 
guarantees. 
 
The Energiesprong initiative originated in the Netherlands and has expanded into the UK 
(Energiesprong, 2017). Customers are offered a whole-house residential retrofit, based upon 
net-zero energy consumption. Typically, an Energiesprong retrofit involves the rapid delivery 
and installation of off-site manufactured, insulated wall facades, integrated with renewable 
heat systems and photovoltaic panels as well as ventilation and controls. The provider offers a 
30-year energy performance guarantee (based on set internal temperature) for annual net-
zero energy consumption, with specified energy usage limits, alongside an upstream financing 
package. An energy service contractor (ESCO) also takes on responsibility for the payment of 
the energy bill of the customer to provide ‘total energy management’. This represents a holistic 
energy services offering to the household, commonly termed a Managed Energy Services 
Agreement (MESA) (Kim et al., 2012) shown in Figure 21. This approach is currently being 
trialled in multi-family buildings and across large social housing estates. 
Integrated business models such as the MESA have significant potential to drive demand for 
residential retrofit. By emphasising broader sources of value and including additional 
Energy 
Utility 
Customer 
ESCO 
  Energy Auditor Installer Type 2 Installer Type 1 
 Supply chain actor  
Retrofit measures 
Customer interface 
Energy savings 
performance contract 
payments (ESPC)* 
Energy Supply Contract 
(ESC) 
*finance is provided directly to the 
ESCO 
Finance provider 
Figure 21 Energiesprong Managed Energy Services Agreement (MESA) 
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renovation measures as part of the offering, suppliers can attract customers by appealing to 
the wider benefits of improved aesthetics, increased property value, comfort, health and 
wellbeing alongside energy and carbon savings. Creating a simplified customer journey 
through an integrated supply chain, project co-ordination and a financing offer reduces 
complexity and minimises disruption for households. Further, the offer of energy performance 
guarantees provides certainty surrounding the ongoing performance benefits of the retrofit 
and the quality of the installation. While this may be the optimal solution, it is worth noting 
that integrated business models also face barriers and their uptake has been slow in the 
residential sector (Kangas et al., 2018). 
 
Business model innovation involves novel approaches and relationships for the delivery of 
products and services (Chesbrough, 2010). However, incumbent business models may be 
heavily embedded with existing industry practices, technological artefacts and regulatory 
regimes (Hannon, 2012). Therefore, adopting integrated energy service business models 
remains a challenge for an industry dominated by small scale SMEs. 
 
5.4.2. Retrofit finance  
The up-front capital cost of retrofit measures and the split incentives faced by tenants and 
landlords, remain a key challenge for the scaling up of whole-house residential retrofits. Many 
UK households are also still in fuel poverty - defined as the necessity to spend more than 10% 
of household income on energy bills (Sovacool, 2015). 
 
As noted above, the UK’s market-based SOs have funded significant loft and cavity wall 
insulation, low energy lightbulbs and other low-cost measures (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). ECO. 
The latest evolution of the SO policies was initially designed to fund more expensive retrofit 
measures, such as solid wall insulation. It has since been criticised for its focus on single 
measures (Brown, 2018), dis-incentivising comprehensive installations, with no funding for 
complementary work such as ventilation and damp prevention (Hansford, 2015). SO policies 
require a levy on all households’ energy bills, and thus increase the energy bills of households 
that do not benefit from programmes such as ECO (Rosenow et al., 2013b). The ECO has now 
been redesigned focus on the ‘fuel poor’. Although, having added approximately £50 a year to 
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average household bills - a total of £1.3Bbn annually (DECC, 2013a), policies like ECO are 
arguably a poor tool for addressing fuel poverty (Rosenow et al., 2013b).  
 
Meeting the UK’s retrofit targets will require an estimated £85.2bn of net investment to 2035 
(Rosenow et al., 2017a). Achieving this level of investment through an SO like ECO could 
introduce politically unacceptable bill rises (Kern et al., 2017) and be particularly regressive for 
the fuel poor who do not adopt retrofit measures (Rosenow et al., 2013b). Previous fuel 
poverty policies such as Warm Front did not raise wider energy bills as they were funded by 
general taxation (Sovacool, 2015). A fuel poverty policy funded by general taxation is also more 
consistent with targeting the co-benefits of social welfare (Rosenow et al., 2013b) and 
improved health and well-being (UKGBC, 2017).  
 
Alongside fuel poverty grants, there is a likely need for repayable retrofit financing for the 
‘able-to-pay’ segment (Freehling and Stickles, 2016). The UK’s Green deal policy involved a 
novel finance mechanism, intended to deliver approximately 2 million retrofit installations per 
year and leverage billions of pounds of private sector investment. The scheme was based on 
private sector lending to households, paid back through energy bills–known as On-bill-
repayment. However, the scheme achieved a fraction of its targets, and resulted in a significant 
loss to the UK taxpayer before its premature scrappage in 2015 (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). 
 
A range of other retrofit finance mechanisms have been developed, in the UK, wider EU and 
USA, including several that have been markedly more successful than the Green Deal (EEFIG, 
2015). Examples include property assessed clean energy finance (PACE) in the USA, repaid 
through property taxes (Kim et al., 2012); low cost public loans (such as the German KfW 
scheme) (Schröder et al., 2011); utility funded On-bill-financing (Zimring et al., 2014a); retrofit 
mortgages (EEFIG, 2015); state backed guarantee funds (Borgeson et al., 2013); and energy 
service agreements (ESA) - where finance for measures is procured upstream by an ESCO as 
part of an energy performance contract (Kim et al., 2012).  
 
Examples of successful retrofit financing programmes, including Germany’s KfW programme 
and California’s PACE scheme, share some common features. These schemes typically include; 
a cost of capital that is low enough not to deter households and enable deeper retrofit 
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measures to remain cost effective (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016); a simplified customer journey - 
with finance often arranged by the contractor or project manager (Brown, 2018), use of an 
existing repayment channel (such as property taxes), attaching the debt to the property not 
the householder (resolving the spilt incentive issue); and funding for broader sources of value, 
such as wider renovation work or essential home improvements, that are often more highly 
valued by households (Fawcett and Killip, 2014).  
 
By contrast the Green Deal involved a complex vetting and application process that required a 
separate interface with a third-party provider, with no funding available for wider 
improvements. Introducing significant complexity that was likely to be off-putting for most 
households. The Green Deal also had relatively high interest rates of 7-11% (Marchand et al., 
2015). Indeed, the total cost of capital amounted to at least 49% of total Green Deal Plan costs 
over 15 years (UKGBC, 2014). Programmes such as the KfW scheme offer finance at extremely 
low or zero interest rates (>2%) (Schröder et al., 2011). Such offers are likely to be more 
appealing to households (Marchand et al., 2015) and drastically improve the economics of 
whole-house retrofits with longer payback periods (UKGBC, 2014). 
 
Several approaches exist to reduce the cost of capital for retrofit finance. Privately funded 
schemes such as PACE and retrofit mortgages are secured against the property and can be 
securitised and sold to secondary markets – reducing risk and transaction costs for investors 
(Borgeson et al., 2013). State actors may also assist in reducing the cost of capital, particularly 
where customers face difficulties or high costs in accessing finance. Policy options include 
interest subsidies (Gouldson et al., 2015), state provision of subordinated (high risk) capital 
(Zimring et al., 2014a), investor guarantee funds (Borgeson et al., 2013) or the direct provision 
of low cost loans, as has been the case in Germany’s KfW programme (Schröder et al., 2011).  
 
However, there are limits to what financing alone can achieve. In most cases financing is likely 
to be an enabler of retrofit projects rather than a driver of demand (Borgeson et al., 2014). 
Consequently, policymakers can introduce a range of incentives to promote demand for 
retrofit. These include fiscal or energy supplier incentives, such as variable property taxes (i.e. 
stamp duty or council tax), income tax rebates, VAT reductions or EE feed in tariffs (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017; UKGBC, 2013). Some can be made fiscally neutral through penalizing 
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properties that do not meet a certain performance level (UKGBC, 2013). Incentives are likely 
to be particularly effective when they are available at key junctures when broader renovation 
decisions are being made. Thus, approaches that target key trigger points such as when 
properties change hands, during extensive renovations or heating replacements, are likely to 
be most successful (Maby and Owen, 2015). 
 
5.4.3. Retrofit intermediaries  
Intermediaries – that can be individuals, organisations or platforms – facilitate innovation 
processes (and broader transition processes) by educating, collecting and allocating financial 
and human resources, assessing new technologies and practices, creating partnerships, and 
influencing changes in regulations and rules (Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008). They may also shape 
how innovation occurs when it faces the user and negotiate on behalf of other actors (Stewart 
and Hyysalo, 2008). Intermediaries may act as a single point of contact between households 
and retrofit contractors. In this section, we focus on how intermediaries can (1) stimulate, 
guide and manage different whole-house retrofit projects, and (2) aid the creation of a market 
for new retrofit business models and financing solutions, supporting a transition towards a low 
energy housing stock. 
 
To address the challenges of information, engagement and trust as well as the complexity of 
whole-house retrofits, intermediary actors are needed both at project level (e.g. specific 
retrofits) and the broader market level. In the former, intermediaries interconnect different 
technological, human and financial solutions. In the latter, they can have a crucial role in 
building trust and aggregating and disseminating clear and reliable information on retrofit 
techniques, suppliers and contractors.  
 
A review of European case studies (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b) shows that two types of 
intermediaries are specifically important in driving the market for retrofit. First, innovation 
funders such as Innovate UK are important in supporting successful piloting of complex 
architectural or systemic innovation (i.e. interconnecting innovative and standard solutions to 
deliver whole-house retrofits). Second, social housing providers and local community actors 
are crucial in market creation and advancing retrofits in practice. Yet, the role of social housing 
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providers has lately diminished through policies introducing rent caps and ‘right to buy’ 
schemes, as well as local authority budget cuts – leaving less resources for housing providers 
to carry out retrofits in their building stock. In addition, business networks, such as the Passive 
House Platform in Belgium (Mlecnik, 2013) are important in pooling together different types 
of companies and solutions to create new business models and promote retrofitting. In the UK, 
the Green Deal Pioneering Places also stimulated cooperatives to deliver retrofits. What still 
seems to be largely lacking in the UK are intermediaries that can effectively stimulate the 
market for whole-house retrofitting by owner occupiers and private landlords, at the 
community level. 
 
At the project level, intermediaries are needed to stimulate interest in whole-house retrofits, 
share experiences among home owners, and provide necessary expertise during planning and 
implementation. Platforms, such as Eco Open Houses in the City of Brighton and Hove, 
organised in 2008 and between 2010-2015, enabled people to see and visit sustainable homes. 
These cases demonstrate that such events have been extremely useful in providing 
information, stimulating engagement and sharing knowledge on whole-house retrofits, as well 
as providing details of trusted local tradespeople and installers. When planning and executing 
whole-house retrofits, individual actors taking up intermediary roles – for example, architects, 
building cooperatives or local authority officers taking actions beyond their usual roles - are 
valuable in helping households make choices over technologies and materials. Previous 
research has shown the importance of local authority energy managers, planners (Lovell, 2008) 
and sustainability officers (Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018) as important intermediaries in 
project planning and implementation.  
 
Recent CIED research involved a case study of a 3-bedroom terraced home built in 1860 in 
Southampton Street, Brighton. The house was part of a local project obtaining funding from 
the ‘Green Deal Pioneer Places’ Programme (a national government-funded programme that 
sought to demonstrate the benefits of EE). The house has undergone an extensive retrofit, 
motivated by the owners’ interest in climate change and sustainable living, though the owners 
had no specific knowledge or interest to carry out a retrofit themselves. This was coordinated 
by the Green Building Partnership, which was formed initially to take part in the programme. 
The owners therefore did not have to acquire knowledge on the technical or policy aspects of 
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the retrofit. The retrofit measures included external solid wall insulation, loft insulation, 
improved windows, new boiler and heating controls - involving multiple partners. While the 
Green Building Partnership led the process, from the perspective of the owner, there was no 
one key intermediary communicating between the broader scheme and the owners, leading 
to some confusion. Southampton Street later became part of local Eco Open Houses event, 
acting as an example to others. 
 
Without these intermediary roles, projects may become much more complicated. 
Intermediaries provide information on the retrofit options available for the building projects 
and help to create a plan that meets regulations. More support is, however, needed from 
dedicated intermediaries, to facilitate ‘one-stop-shops’ for retrofitting (Brown, 2018), through 
which households can access trustworthy advice on technological and financing options, as 
well as tradesmen, contractors and installers. In this way intermediaries are often the key 
actors in providing information for households on the options and benefits of undertaking 
whole-house retrofits; engaging communities and supply chains to promote retrofit at a local 
level; and are also likely to be more trusted than actors with a financial stake in promoting 
certain services or products.  
 
Overall, some factors for successful intermediaries can be depicted. On a broader scale, most 
impact occurs over a longer timeframe. For example, the Centre on Alternative Technology 
established in the 1970s still influences the expectation and visions behind home retrofits. 
Whilst the Eco Open Houses events have been popular in Brighton, they were not organised in 
2016-2017, creating uncertainty about future knowledge exchange and example setting 
locally. Another important determinant in market formation is the positioning between 
ambitious sustainability aims and connections to business and supply chains.  
 
Innovative business models, such as the Energiesprong approach, owe much of their success 
to dedicated intermediaries, often initiated by government policy. Energiesprong was brought 
into being through a €45m grant from the Dutch government, and the setting up of a market 
development team (Energiesprong, 2017). These market development teams brought together 
stakeholders including; the construction industry, housing providers, policy makers and 
financiers to radically re-think the business model through which EE retrofit is delivered. Whilst 
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these approaches still face challenges, they could represent a template for how the UK could 
deliver on its ambitious retrofit targets. 
 
5.5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In the ancient Greek myth, the Hydra was invulnerable only if it retained at least one head. 
Heracles, realising that he could not defeat the Hydra alone, worked with Iolaus, and through 
a combination of decapitating the beasts’ multiple heads and burning the stumps with a 
firebrand, stopped them growing back. The Hydra's remaining immortal head was cut off with 
a golden sword given to Heracles by Athena. Heracles placed the head—still alive and 
writhing—under a great rock and shot it with an arrow dipped in the Hydra's poisonous blood. 
Thus, his second task was complete. 
 
The previous sections outline how tackling the ‘multi-headed-challenges’ of whole-house 
residential retrofit, will require a similarly sophisticated and multifaceted approach. Promoting 
business model innovation, delivering a range of financing options and incentives along with 
the establishment of strategic intermediaries, at both local community and national levels will 
require a wide reaching and systemic policy strategy. This strategy should incorporate a mix of 
regulations, financing and incentives along with the establishment of new institutions and the 
recognition of EE as a strategic infrastructure priority. Equally, different solutions will be 
required for socially rented, privately rented and owner occupier sectors. This will require 
joined up action across multiple government departments including but not limited to: 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government’s (MHCLG), the Treasury (HMT), Education (DfE) and Health (DH), the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP), Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the National 
Infrastructure Commission (NIC). The following section provides an outline of the range of 
policies (Table 13) that could contribute to achieving the enormous potential for the whole-
house retrofit of residential buildings.  
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Table 13 Policy mix for achieving widespread whole-house residential retrofit in the UK 
Policy type Policy  Challenge addressed Government 
department  
Regulation 
(sticks) 
EE as an Infrastructure Priority and given the level of strategic support and status 
as other forms of infrastructure (Frontier Economics Ltd, 2015) 
All HMT, NIC 
Minimum EE Standards (MEES) moving to EPC C in 2035 (Sustainable Energy 
Association, 2017) 
All MHCLG 
New retrofit quality assurance standard such as home Quality Mark (Bonfield, 
2016) 
Uncertain energy 
savings and quality 
BEIS, MHCLG 
Financial  
(carrots) 
Financial Incentives at trigger points, options could include: (UKGBC, 2013) 
-Variable Stamp duty 
-Variable Council tax 
-0% VAT on renovation work that includes retrofit 
-Income tax rebates 
-EE Feed in Tariff 
Capital cost and split 
incentives 
Complexity, 
disruption and timing 
BEIS, HMT, 
HMRC 
Government backed low interest financing mechanism secured to property and 
available at point of sale of retrofit (Borgeson et al., 2013) 
Capital cost and split 
incentives 
Complexity, 
disruption and timing 
BEIS, HMT, NIC 
Fuel poverty obligation funded by general taxation (Rosenow et al., 2013b) Capital cost and split 
incentives 
BEIS, HMT, DH, 
DWP 
New 
institutions 
and 
intermediaries 
(tambourines) 
National Retrofit Taskforce/Agency (Rosenow et al., 2017a) with central 
Information Hub and a Data Warehouse  
All  BEIS, MHCLG, 
HMT, DfE, DH, 
NIC 
Area based intermediaries based on Community Social Enterprise or Local 
Authority Arm’s Length Management Organization (ALMO) delivery models 
(UKGBC, 2017). Market facing intermediaries and standardised procurement 
frameworks (Nolden et al., 2016) 
Information, 
engagement and 
trust  
Complexity, 
disruption and timing 
BEIS, MHCLG, 
HMT, DfE, DH, 
NIC 
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5.5.1. Standards and regulations   
EE retrofits create economic benefits that are often several multiples of the initial investment 
(Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). Cost effective investments in residential EE to 2035 have a 
current net present value of £7.5bn. With wider benefits such as GDP effects and health 
improvements that could be up to £47bn (Rosenow et al., 2017a). Thus, EE investments share 
the characteristics of other forms of infrastructure as identified in HM Treasury’s valuation 
guidance (Frontier Economics Ltd, 2015). Therefore, we argue that EE should be re-framed as 
an infrastructure priority by the UK government and given the level of strategic support and 
status as other forms of infrastructure; such as road, rail and supply side energy infrastructure 
and be included within the remit of the NIC (Rosenow and Cowart, 2017). 
 
The UK Clean Growth Plan set an aspirational goal for all residential buildings to achieve and 
EPC level C or higher by 2035. We support these aims, but argue the government could go 
further, mandating minimum EE standards (MEES) for the owner occupier sector in the 2020s. 
This could take the form of a gradual step change through to a minimum EPC level of C by 2035 
at the point of sale, with potential for ever tightening standards moving into the 2040s and 
beyond (Sustainable Energy Association, 2017).  
 
There remain concerns surrounding the standard and quality of many installations currently 
funded under ECO, particularly solid wall insulation, which is to be a key part of the UK’s targets 
(Hansford, 2015). Therefore, we support the findings of the recent Each Home Counts – ‘The 
Bonfield Review’, that the government should establish a new quality assurance standard such 
as a home Quality Mark (Bonfield, 2016). Such a policy should be designed not to introduce a 
further regulatory and cost burden on SMEs and could build on existing standards of good 
practice along the lines of the Investor Confidence Project in the commercial sector (Investor 
Confidence Project, 2015).  
 
Taken together these three high-level regulatory policies would set the strategic direction for 
UK residential retrofit policy and would send market signals for the development of integrated 
business models, novel financing solutions and market intermediaries. However, on their own, 
top down regulations are unlikely to build a sufficient market for whole-house retrofit. 
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5.5.2. Financial measures  
Overcoming the up-front capital cost of EE retrofit remains a challenge for many households. 
Current fuel poverty schemes such as ECO are limited in size and have inherent design flaws 
(Rosenow et al., 2013b). For those in fuel poverty we instead propose that these costs should 
largely be met through government grants in the form of a fuel poverty obligation paid for by 
general taxation. This would allow the government to better spread the costs of such a scheme, 
and if properly designed could reduce spending in areas such as health, social care and welfare 
(Rosenow et al., 2017a). 
 
For the ‘able to pay’ segment a range of market led financing mechanisms may eventually 
emerge, including mortgage-based approaches and other private sector offerings. Yet, we 
argue that the government should learn the lessons of the failed Green Deal and promote a 
new low-cost financing mechanism tied to the property, perhaps retaining the On-bill 
repayment channel. Successful financing schemes such as Germany’s KfW program have used 
government funds to provide a low cost of capital, involved a simplified customer journey and 
funded broader sources of value such as wider renovation works, which are likely to be 
perceived as higher value by households (Schröder et al., 2011). 
 
Although providing sources of lending for EE measures is key to enabling retrofit projects, it is 
unlikely that low cost financing alone will be drive demand for retrofit (Borgeson et al., 2014). 
Therefore, government can introduce a range of fiscal incentives at key trigger points to 
promote uptake. These might include; variable VAT, stamp duty land tax, council tax, income 
tax rebates or an EE feed in tariff for households who have undertaken measures – with 
increasing benefits for deeper retrofits (UKGBC, 2013). Such approaches will be most effective 
when they are targeted at key trigger points such as moving home or when undertaking major 
renovations (Maby and Owen, 2015). 
 
5.5.3. New institutions and intermediaries  
A key challenge for residential retrofit remains the paucity of information, engagement and 
trust within communities. Recent work at the UK Green Building Council (2017) has highlighted 
a new role for intermediaries to catalyse retrofit and regeneration activity in local areas. These 
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actors would engage local communities on the benefits of retrofit and re-generation and be 
the key point of contact for: information, marketing, financing and project delivery, through 
dedicated project managers/coordinators – drawing on the pre-existing networks of diffuse 
intermediaries already operating in many communities (Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018). 
These intermediaries could be based on Community Social Enterprise or Local Authority Arm’s 
Length Management Organization (ALMO) delivery models, and funded through a combination 
of local authority budgets, central government grants and community shares (UKGBC, 2017).  
 
Intermediaries also play a role in promoting business model innovation for the delivery of 
whole-house residential retrofit. Examples such as the Dutch Energiesprong scheme (Brown, 
2018) and the RE:FIT program in London (Nolden et al., 2016) demonstrate how public bodies 
can promote business model innovation, through the creation of new market facing 
intermediaries and standardised procurement frameworks. These initiatives help reduce 
transaction costs and bring together stakeholders to foster learning, new funding approaches 
and supply chain integration.  
 
Achieving the promise of residential retrofit and tackling the ‘multi-headed-challenges’ that 
stand in the way, will require a joined up and co-ordinated strategy - as outlined in this chapter. 
To deliver this vision, we argue that the UK government should set up a National Retrofit 
Taskforce. This body would be responsible for the planning and delivery of the MEES targets 
through an overarching strategy, monitoring and verification process that brings together key 
stakeholders, including, Government, Third sector, Industry and Consumer groups (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017). This new high-level intermediary would also be responsible for the 
management of a central Information Hub (to act as a collection point for best practice advice 
and guidance) and a Data Warehouse (to act as a store for property-level data and information) 
(Bonfield, 2016). Advising multiple government departments, this body could monitor progress 
towards the UK’s targets for the sector and propose polices to keep this progress on track.  
 
Climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge facing humanity in the 21st century. Buildings 
are perhaps the biggest single contributor to carbon emissions, with the existing residential 
buildings by far the largest component (CCC, 2016). Such a herculean challenge will require an 
equally herculean effort. We argue that the considerable rewards are more than worth rising 
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to this challenge, and that the proposals presented here could go a long way towards achieving 
this. 
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6. Discussion 
This chapter discusses the findings of this thesis in the context of the wider literature on 
business models, finance, residential retrofit and retrofit policy. It synthesises the findings of 
the four articles and discusses their combined contribution to the research aims. Section 6.1 
indicates the contribution of the thesis to the broader theoretical literature; Section 6.2 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology; Section 6.3 discusses the 
empirical findings of the thesis to the understanding of residential retrofit; Section 6.4 explores 
the wider policy relevance of the findings; and Section 6.5 summarises the overall contribution 
to knowledge of the thesis. 
 
6.1. Conceptual contributions  
This thesis makes three main conceptual contributions to the academic literature on business 
models, finance and innovation studies. First, the merits of a business model framing and the 
contribution of governance as a component of business models is illustrated, followed by a 
novel typology of retrofit business models. Second, the value of the novel framework 
describing the features of a finance mechanism, is demonstrated, followed by a novel typology 
retrofit finance mechanisms. Third, it is argued that business model innovation may be a 
necessary component of systemic innovation, further highlighting the role of innovation 
intermediaries.  
6.1.1. Business model components  
This thesis contributes to the business model literature by demonstrating how business model 
governance is an essential component common to all business models (Ritter and Lettl, 2018); 
thus adopting a modified version of Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, (2013) components framework 
- synthesising several elements from the literature (Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and Amit, 
2010). This highlights some important limitations of Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) well 
known ‘business model canvas'. While suitable for case studies, (Foxon et al., 2015; Hannon et 
al., 2013; Joyce and Paquin, 2016), the nine-point framework is too cumbersome for a cross-
sectional research design. Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013),  therefore, aggregate these to 
four components: value proposition, supply chain, customer interface and financial model. 
These components enable commensurability of the components of different business models 
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within an industry (Osterwalder, 2004) – although provide no description of how they are 
linked.  
 
The business model framework used in this thesis addresses this gap through the addition of 
the governance component. This concept, most associated with Zott and Amit, (2001; 2010) 
emphasises how networks typify the delivery of most products and services. Thus, governance 
describes how business model components are integrated and whether a hierarchical or 
market logic dominates (Hellström et al., 2015; Wells, 2013). This has significant implications 
for the nature and success of business models. 
 
The significance of business model governance is illustrated by how different archetypes 
involve different modes of governance (Articles 1 and 3). Whilst the atomised market model 
operates a market-based logic, where no single focal firm dominates (Zott and Amit, 2010); 
the one-stop-shop business model involves an integrated mode of governance – typically 
through a single organisation. Thus, the mode of governance is the critical means of 
differentiating these business models, even where the fundamental value proposition is the 
same. Moreover, both Articles 1 and 3 show that this integrated mode of governance is a more 
effective means of delivering whole-house retrofit, whereas in other industries more 
disaggregated business models may be more effective (Amit and Zott, 2001). 
 
This strengthens Boons and Lüdeke-Freund’s (2013) four components, by showing who 
governs these activities and how well they fit together (Wells, 2013; Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Consequently, Figure 22, shows how the five components used in this thesis relate to the nine 
from Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) business model canvas - highlighting the role of 
governance. Therefore, this provides a useful contribution to the business model literature, 
particularly for comparing alternative business models.  
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However, this framework also has several limitations. Firstly, as shown in Figure 22, the 
aggregation of Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) nine components to five obscures some 
detail. For example, a common theme across the interviews was the importance of customer 
segmentation (a sub component of the customer interface in Figure 22) between housing 
tenure, demographics and building type.  
 
Furthermore, the business model concept itself lacks the detail of individual studies of: supply 
chain dynamics; customer relationships; marketing; and revenue models (Baden-Fuller and 
Morgan, 2010; DaSilva and Trkman, 2014) or studies of the social and cultural relationships 
between firms, individuals and society (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009). Equally, there 
are issues of wider relevance beyond the business model, such as the political and economic 
context and social and cultural practices which influence the viability and relevance of 
particular business models (Wells, 2013).  
 
Figure 22 Business model framework. Adapted from: Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), 
Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, (2013) and Zott and Amit, (2010)  
VALUE 
PROPOSITION 
 
CUSTOMER INTERFACE SUPPLY CHAIN 
FINANCIAL MODEL  
GOVERNANCE 
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These weaknesses can, however, also be viewed as strengths. The business model provides a 
comprehensive overview of an organisation and its networks; drawing together several 
dimensions and situating them within a single framework (Ritter and Lettl, 2018). Therefore, 
as Section 6.2 will show, the strength of the business model concept is its synthesis of several 
fields including: management, economics, innovation studies and sociology (Foss and Saebi, 
2018). By combining elements of these perspectives, the business model can more fully explain 
how organisations create, deliver and capture value - clarifying their role in technological 
change. Thus, providing an appropriate conceptual framework for addressing the research 
aims of this thesis.  
 
6.1.2. Finance mechanisms and financial models  
This thesis makes an important conceptual contribution to the literature on finance for energy 
efficiency and sustainable innovation. The framework developed in Article 2 identified the 
generic features common to different finance mechanisms as the source of capital; the 
financial instrument(s); the project performance requirements; the point of sale; the nature of 
the security and underwriting; repayment channel and the customer journey. As shown in 
Article 2, this allowed a comparison of these features, helping to explain why certain 
mechanisms are more or less successful. This framework could be applied to different forms 
of financing for energy systems or to other sectors. 
 
The review of the academic literature in Article 2 demonstrated that few existing studies 
provide a conceptual basis for understanding the features of alternative mechanisms (Diaz-
Rainey et al., 2017). This thesis addresses this gap, contributing to broader debates on the role 
of finance in the energy transition. While several studies have discussed the structural and 
cultural barriers to investment in sustainable innovations and new asset classes (Auerswald 
and Branscomb, 2003; Hall et al., 2015; Masini and Menichetti, 2013, 2012), this study, along 
with several others (Blyth et al., 2015; Gouldson et al., 2015; Hall et al., 2016; Mazzucato and 
Penna, 2016), identifies some of the ways these barriers can actually be overcome. Thus, 
Article 2 describes how the features of alternative forms of finance can affect their success in 
different contexts.  
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Article 2 also introduces a novel typology of six retrofit finance mechanism archetypes which 
are differentiated by their features, moving from the most to the least common these include: 
public loan/credit enhancement(s); On-bill finance and repayment; property assessed clean 
energy financing, green mortgages; energy service agreement financing; and community 
financing. Whilst different mechanisms with different features (such as different ratios of debt 
and equity (Tapia, 2012)) will be more or less suitable in different sectors; this thesis identifies 
three important outcomes for the success of finance mechanisms - the cost of capital, the 
customer journey and the sources of value funded.  
 
Firstly, and most obviously, the cost of capital is critical for the viability of capital-intensive 
investments, such as those which characterise sustainable energy systems (Donovan and 
Corbishley, 2016; Donovan and Nuñez, 2012). Secondly, reducing the complexity of the 
customer journey in procuring finance (Norton et al., 2013) and the transaction costs for 
finance providers (Sorrell, 2007; Yildiz, 2014), can greatly increase the efficacy of financing 
solutions - particularly for smaller scale investments such as residential retrofit. Thirdly, 
funding for broader sources of value, in this case wider renovation measures - may be critical 
in the success of retrofit finance mechanisms (Borgeson et al., 2014). Different forms of 
financing affect these issues in complex ways. However, mechanisms, which foreground them 
in their design are likely to be more successful.  
 
The thesis also identifies the relationship between finance and business models - another area 
that is neglected in the literature. Residential retrofit often necessitates third-party financing 
as an integral part of the financial model (Blyth et al., 2015). Whereas in many sectors 
customers pay for the full cost of products and services, others necessitate a range of financing 
solutions to enable the value proposition to be realised (OECD, 2015b). Articles 1, 2 and 3 
outline how retrofit finance mechanisms are an essential component of effective business 
models. Thus, while distinct from the financial model (DaSilva and Trkman, 2014), integrated 
finance mechanisms an essential element of a successful retrofit business model. 
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6.1.3. Business models and systemic innovation  
This thesis demonstrates the importance of new business models in the diffusion of systemic 
innovations. Systemic  innovations require  complementary  changes  in  supporting  
technologies,  technical  skills,  cultural  norms, user  competences,  organisational  practices  
and  regulations (Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). Previous authors have emphasised the 
importance of business model innovation in technological change (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 
2013; Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2009) and how radical technologies are 
most likely to require new business models (Teece, 2010). Whilst previous studies implicitly 
link business model and systemic innovation (Boons et al., 2013; Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 
2013; Mlecnik, 2013; Rohrbeck et al., 2013), Article 3 argues that in many cases one may be a 
pre-condition of the other. 
 
Therefore, systemic innovations, such as whole-house retrofit, are often incompatible with 
incumbent business models (Mlecnik, 2013). As shown in Articles 1 and 3, complementary 
innovation in the value proposition, supply chain, customer interface, financial model and 
mode of governance can promote the adoption of systemic innovations - particularly when 
deployed in combination (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). Therefore, new business models 
enable systemic changes in ways technological innovation alone cannot. By formalising these 
links and demonstrating them empirically; this thesis provides a useful contribution to the 
literature on systemic and business model innovation.  
 
Article 1 also identifies a novel typology of business model archetypes, moving from the 
incumbent to the most innovative these are the: atomised market model; market 
intermediation model; one-stop-shop energy services agreement (ESA); and managed energy 
services agreement (MESA). Articles 1 and 3 argue that the more innovative archetypes based 
on energy performance contracts facilitate the adoption of whole-house retrofit - often 
requiring complementary innovations in process and technology (Massa and Tucci, 2013). 
These archetypes therefore involve varying degrees of both technological and business model 
innovation. These findings emphasise the value of identifying exemplary business model 
archetypes as shown in other studies (Bohnsack et al., 2014; Hall and Roelich, 2016). 
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Article 3 outlines the role of innovation intermediaries as catalysts for business model 
innovation, drawing on the Energiesprong case study. Few previous studies have identified 
how policymakers can support business model innovation. Article 3 argues that setting up or 
supporting innovation intermediaries could be one such way. Drawing on Stewart and Hyysalo 
(2008), intermediaries are shown to overcome barriers to business model innovation (Stubbs 
and Cocklin, 2008) through the activities of facilitating stakeholder engagement, configuring 
new business model designs and brokering external support and regulatory changes. Article 3, 
therefore, contributes to the innovation policy literature (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; 
Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012) suggesting how policymakers can promote business model 
innovation through the support of innovation intermediaries developing a novel framework 
(Table 9) – exemplified by the Energiesprong case.  
 
These findings and the Energiesprong case are an example of an intermediary operating at the 
system or sector level. Such ‘systemic intermediaries’ have been observed to broker between 
multiple actors within innovation systems: between firms, research institutes, government, 
infrastructure providers and financiers (Kivimaa et al., 2018; Lente and Hekkert, 2003). As 
outlined in Article 3, the Energiesprong case is notable for the intermediaries’ engagement 
with multiple actors including Dutch financial, energy and housing regulators, social housing 
providers, construction industry actors as well as banks and other financial institutions. These 
findings suggest that creating the selection environment necessary to facilitate radical business 
models, such as that for whole-house retrofit, necessitates such a wide strategy of engagement 
(Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009; Mlecnik, 2013). The case also suggests that the initial success of 
this strategy in the Netherlands was largely contingent on the close support and relationships 
with government (Kivimaa, 2014). This is consistent with other studies who have argued that 
systemic intermediaries are likely to require strong policy support to remain effective (Hannon 
and Skea, 2014). 
 
Several other studies argue that intermediaries may be supported by policymakers to facilitate 
sustainable innovation by acting as catalysts in collaborations between universities, 
government and industry (Barrie et al., 2017; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Kivimaa, 2014; 
Lente and Hekkert, 2003). Although Barrie et al., (2017) show how an intermediary facilitated 
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circular economy business models, few previous studies have explicitly emphasised their role 
in business model innovation.  
 
The relationships between the business model, finance mechanism and business model 
innovation frameworks developed in this thesis are shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.. The figure highlights the centrality of governance within business models. The figure 
also shows the relationship between the features of finance mechanisms and their relationship 
to the business model. Finally, illustrating the role of innovation intermediaries in promoting 
business model innovation.  
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Facilitating involves bringing together the key 
stakeholders involved in business model governance 
 
Configuring involves the design and modification of 
internal business model components  
 
Brokering concerns external advocacy, resource raising 
and market formation activities  
Figure 23 Relationship between conceptual frameworks 
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6.2. Methodological considerations  
This section evaluates the methodological approach and its suitability for addressing the 
research aims. This thesis involved an iterative research design – with focus of the articles and 
plan for gathering data developed reflexively throughout the project (Maxwell, 2012). This 
approach had particular value for a thesis by papers, with each article becoming a building 
block in the development of the conceptual and empirical understanding of the thesis. 
 
The inductive approach adopted in Articles 1 and 2 was essential for developing the conceptual 
frameworks. This approach is consistent with the principles of inductive ‘theory building' as 
described by De Vaus, (2002) and Yin, (1994). In particular, the development of the conceptual 
framework for Article 2 involved a ‘grounded theory’ approach (Glaser and Strauss, 2017). This 
framework was an essential pre-requisite to the subsequent cross-sectional study - given the 
limited literature differentiating alternative forms of financing. A grounded approach has been 
successfully used in a previous study of ESCO business models (Hannon, 2012) - helping to 
develop the conceptual foundations for subsequent phases of analysis.  
 
The cross-sectional research design in Articles 1 and 2 provided a means of comparing key 
retrofit business model archetypes and finance mechanisms; drawing on the concepts from 
the previous phase. This approach was more akin to deductive theory testing (De Vaus, 2002); 
although the respective frameworks provided a structure to discuss competing explanations, 
rather than a predictive hypothesis. This qualitative cross-sectional design, comparing different 
business models in a sector, is consistent with other studies into electricity supply (Hall and 
Roelich, 2016) and electric vehicle business models (Bohnsack et al., 2014). Comparative 
studies such as these, help develop explanations of why specific features of business models 
affect their success – such as in facilitating the uptake of whole-house retrofit. 
 
Case studies provide greater depth of understanding than cross-sectional studies. Article 3 
involved an in-depth case study of an innovative business model, identified in Article 1 as an 
important avenue for further investigation. This depth of understanding would not have been 
possible through a cross-sectional study - validating the iterative strategy advocated by 
Maxwell (2012). The results are consistent with Flyvbjerg’s (2006) assertion of the value of 
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‘exemplars’ such as the Energiesprong case - as observed in other case studies of innovative 
business models, such as Chesbrough and Rosenbloom’s (2002) study of Xerox printers, Budde 
Christensen et al’s., (2012) exploration of an electric auto-mobility business model and 
Olofsson et al’s., (2018) study of an electricity retail social enterprise.  
 
The synthesis of the findings in Article 4 provides an overview of their contribution and begins 
to draw together some wider insights for policy. Building on this synthesis and viewing the 
overall research strategy (Figure 9); the four articles in combination provide an answer to the 
primary research question.  
 
There are however limitations to the research methodology.  
 
First, the reliance upon particular ‘experts’ for the scoping interviews creates a risk of selection 
bias, in that the individuals chosen may not be representative of the wider field. This was 
mitigated through a sampling strategy based on interviewing authors from several publications 
in the respective fields - from academic, industry and government sources. Subsequently, 
snowballing techniques provided a means of sourcing further interviewees (Yin, 1994), 
although all these sampling approaches are still subject to a degree of selection bias.  
 
Secondly, the frameworks and typologies developed inevitably over simplify complex 
phenomena (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). These concepts were corroborated with 
published documents and established industry terminology, as well as with the interviewees 
themselves. However, the business model and financing archetypes in this thesis may miss 
variants or features which have greater importance in some circumstances.  
 
Thirdly, the qualitative research methods employed have inherent limitations as well as 
strengths. Qualitative data such as that derived from interviews is inseparable from the context 
and interpretation of both the interviewee and interviewer77. Whilst this in itself is not 
problematic (Kvale, 2008), these epistemological issues are not discussed in any depth in this 
thesis. Further, while a qualitative approach provides greater depth and nuanced 
                                                        
77 Although quantitative research is also subject to such biases (Kvale, 2008)  
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understanding - this is at the expense of breadth and generalisability (Grix, 2010). The potential 
of a quantitative research approach for future studies is therefore discussed in Section 7.2. 
 
In summary, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis is considered appropriate, 
acknowledging these limitations and the resources available. The option for broadening the 
research methodology to other data sources and quantitative approaches is discussed in 7.2.  
 
6.3. Empirical contribution and limitations  
This section outlines the empirical contributions of the thesis and discusses these in the 
context of the literature on residential retrofit, energy service business models and energy 
efficiency finance. Firstly, the need for a whole-house approach to retrofit is introduced, 
followed by an evaluation of the role of new business models and finance mechanisms. 
Subsequently, the critical challenges for the uptake of whole-house retrofit are explored, 
including a discussion of the extent to which new business models and finance mechanisms 
may overcome these challenges. This includes discussion of how the findings provide a broader 
contribution to the literature. 
 
6.3.1. The need for whole-house retrofit  
A core thread running throughout this thesis is the need for a whole-house approach to 
residential retrofit. Historically, the UK has made significant progress through single retrofit 
measures (Rosenow, 2012). The UK’s climate change targets are however, necessitating the 
uptake of more invasive and complex interventions into homes (CCC, 2018). It is increasingly 
recognised that these retrofit measures have the potential to cause damaging unintended 
consequences, especially for these more complex interventions (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). 
These issues as highlighted in the interviews (Articles 1 & 3) are corroborated by several sector 
wide studies, which highlight problems, especially with SWI and heat pumps delivered under 
UK government subsidy schemes (Hansford, 2015; Milsom, 2016).  
 
As outlined in Section 1.4.6 a whole-house approach is likely to mitigate unintended 
consequences and deliver a greater and more rapid reduction in emissions. Whole-house 
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retrofits involve a strategy for the whole building, involving multiple measures and an 
understanding of how they interact - whether installed at once or over time (Fawcett, 2014; 
Fawcett et al., 2014). Equally, a whole-house multi-measure approach that covers building 
fabric, low carbon heat and electricity microgeneration, is needed to deliver the scale and pace 
of change required to meet climate change targets (Gupta et al., 2015). An integrated whole-
house strategy is therefore likely to overcome the issues of the piecemeal approach (Shrubsole 
et al., 2014), and realise the multiple benefits outlined Section 1.4.4. Although previous studies 
have touched on these arguments (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012; Dowson et al., 2012; Fawcett, 
2014; Shrubsole et al., 2014), this thesis explicitly calls for the whole-house approach to be the 
cornerstone of any home retrofit strategy.  
 
6.3.2. The role of new business models 
A second key argument of this thesis is that new business models are needed to deliver whole-
house retrofits. As outlined in Article 1, the incumbent ‘atomised market' business model, is 
considered unsuitable, due to inherent complexities in project management, the lack of 
assured performance and the ‘silos’ of the current supply chain. Articles 1, 3 and 4 instead 
argue that new business models involving a range of core principles can overcome the issues 
inherent in the incumbent business model.  
 
These principles include a value proposition that guarantees energy performance (Mcelroy and 
Rosenow, 2018), even if it does not deliver cost savings. This value proposition should also 
deliver improvements to comfort, aesthetics, health and wellbeing (Fawcett and Killip, 2014) 
as part of a broader renovation offering (UKGBC, 2017). This will require increasingly integrated 
supply chains, with single solution providers offering holistic packages of measures (Mahapatra 
et al., 2013). The Energiesprong case study from Article 3, also demonstrates the value of 
industrialisation and process innovation, both as a means of delivering economies of scale and 
also in reducing the time and hassle of the interventions. A linked issue is the need for a single 
customer interface, reducing complexity and improving trust (Brown et al., 2014).  
 
Thus, the emphasis on the customer journey – both in the delivery of the measures (Articles 1 
and 3) and the procurement of finance – is a key determining factor in the success of retrofit 
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business models. Relatedly, the long payback periods and split incentives, inherent in retrofit 
projects (Bird and Hernández, 2012) necessitates a financial model based on a long term 
financing mechanism. Business models that integrate a financing offer into the value 
proposition or provide assistance in accessing capital will therefore be more readily adopted 
(Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4). In aggregate, these findings suggest that integrated modes of 
governance -where the components of the supply chain, customer interface and financing are 
brought together to form co-ordinated offering (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018, 
2012) - are more likely to be successful for the delivery of residential retrofit. This is in stark 
contrast to the market-based logic that has dominated the sector to date.  
 
By identifying the full range of retrofit business models and the key factors for their success, 
(Articles 1 and 3) this thesis makes a substantial contribution to the currently limited literature 
on retrofit business models (Gauthier and Gilomen, 2016; Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et 
al., 2018, 2012; Moschetti and Brattebø, 2016). These findings should be of substantive value 
to researchers, practitioners and policymakers in this field. 
 
6.3.3. Financing whole-house retrofits 
This thesis also makes an important and timely contribution to the literature on retrofit and 
energy efficiency finance. As outlined in Article 2, the extant literature is both conceptually and 
empirically limited. Previous studies explore the economics of energy efficiency and barriers 
to investment (Sorrell et al., 2004), the issues of split incentives for tenants (Bird and 
Hernández, 2012) supplier obligation policies (Rosenow, 2012; Rosenow and Galvin, 2013) and 
specific financing mechanisms (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016; Schröder et al., 2011). However, 
there remain few studies evaluating the range of different financing mechanisms (as defined 
in Section 1.5.5) or the features of successful ones. 
 
This thesis addresses this gap in the literature, by introducing a typology of retrofit finance 
mechanisms (Article 2 and Section 6.1.2) as well as three key principles for successful 
mechanisms. The first key principle is that the up-front cost and long payback periods of whole-
house retrofit necessitate a low cost of capital (Figure 17). This is consistent with previous 
studies emphasising the role of interest rates in the failure of the UK’s Green Deal (Rosenow 
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and Eyre, 2016, 2014) and the success of Germany’s KfW scheme (Rosenow, 2013; Schröder 
et al., 2011). However, Article 2 argues that two other principles are likely to have a greater 
impact on household appeal. The second principle concerns the customer journey in procuring 
retrofit financing. Long or complex customer journeys are likely to deter households from 
procuring financing. This is consistent with several studies and Article 1 which emphasise 
complexity and the ‘hassle factor’ in the low uptake of whole-house retrofits (O’Keeffe et al., 
2016; Risholt and Berker, 2013; Snape et al., 2015). A third principle concerns the sources of 
value and range of measures that are funded. Articles 1, 2 and 3 all emphasise the importance 
of a broad value proposition that includes general home improvement and renovation. Thus, 
successful finance mechanisms should fund these value propositions of wider home 
improvement - as was observed in several of the examples in Article 2 (Fawcett and Killip, 2014; 
Wilson et al., 2015) - rather than energy efficiency measures alone. However, a further 
message from Article 2 is that financing alone is likely to be of limited importance in driving 
demand for retrofit. The following sections therefore sets out how new business models, 
finance mechanisms intermediaries and policy initiatives will be required in combination to 
generate demand. 
 
6.3.4. Overcoming the challenges of whole-house retrofit 
Several challenges continue to constrain the uptake and delivery of whole-house retrofit. As 
argued in Article 4, the traditional ‘barriers’ framing (Sorrell et al., 2011, 2004) ignores wider 
issues that influence the adoption of retrofit measures. From a literature review and interviews 
this thesis identified four broader challenges which undermine demand and hamper delivery 
of whole-house retrofit, namely: 1) uncertain benefits and quality; 2) complexity, disruption 
and timing; 3) up-front capital cost and split incentives and 4) information, engagement and 
trust. 
 
In this section, these concepts structure the discussion of how new business models, finance 
mechanisms and policy approaches can promote the uptake of whole-house retrofit. This 
builds on recent work such as Fylan et al., (2016) and Kangas et al., (2018) in identifying a 
broader range of barriers, but argues that this ‘barriers’ framing itself is problematic. Instead, 
the overarching challenge for whole-house retrofit is one of generating demand, rather than 
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overcoming barriers (Wilson et al., 2015). This shift in rhetoric has important implications for 
how the retrofit issue is framed and the solutions proposed. The following sections discuss 
each of these challenges in turn and the extent to which new business models and finance 
mechanisms can overcome them. 
 
Uncertain benefits and quality 
A critical factor in the limited uptake of whole-house retrofit is the uncertain benefits and 
quality of retrofit work. Much of this is due to a ‘performance gap' that remains commonplace 
(Gupta and Gregg, 2016). Alongside concerns over the energy performance and the quality of 
retrofits, many households remain dubious about its benefits (Wilson et al., 2015).  
 
New business models address these challenges primarily through new value propositions. As 
shown in Articles 1, 3 and 4, value propositions based upon energy performance guarantees 
can overcome performance gaps through long-term contracts with guaranteed energy or cost 
savings. These findings support other studies on the potential of residential energy 
performance contracts for overcoming the performance gap (Mcelroy and Rosenow, 2018; 
Winther and Gurigard, 2017). Additionally, the Energiesprong case demonstrates how 
‘unintended consequences’ can be mitigated, such as through additional guarantees for 
interior air quality supported by enhanced monitoring (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). These 
findings also provide the first comprehensive academic examples of residential energy 
performance contracts (Steinberger et al., 2009). 
 
Energy service business models based on energy performance contracts often have high 
transaction costs (Sorrell, 2007). The examples in this thesis reduced these costs through 
standardisation and economies of scale. The energy service agreement examples of ICF Habitat 
and RENESCO focussed on large multi-family apartments. Although Energiesprong has 
targeted single-family dwellings; it focusses on the social housing sector - brokering deals for 
multiple homes using standardised documents and retrofitting entire terraces at a time. These 
findings emphasise the importance of customer segmentation; with performance contracts 
being much more challenging in the single-family, owner-occupier segment - due to high 
transaction costs (Sorrell, 2007). A further finding was the importance of value propositions 
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which offer broader home improvement measures and foreground the non-financial aspects 
of retrofits (Gram-Hanssen, 2014); together with finance mechanisms that fund those broader 
sources of value (Article 2). Again, these findings are consistent with other studies on the 
importance of the non-energy benefits of retrofits (Fawcett and Killip, 2014; Walker et al., 
2014; Wilson et al., 2015). 
 
Complexity, disruption and timing 
The complex and disruptive nature of whole-house retrofit combined with a lack of integration 
with wider renovations is critical in explaining its limited uptake. Unlike single measures, whole-
house retrofits typically involve the coordination and management of multiple tradespeople, 
suppliers and consultants (Dowson et al., 2012). As shown in Article 1 the complexities in 
project management, which characterise the incumbent business model are likely to be off-
putting for many households (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., n.d.).  
 
Business models based on integrated supply chains and process innovation can reduce this 
complexity, minimise disruption and reduce the duration of works. These business models 
integrate the governance of multiple activities under the remit of a single organisation, or 
through a well-co-ordinated network of sub-contractors. As shown in Articles 1 and 3, this 
enables a more effective delivery and coordination of multiple measures and energy 
performance outcomes, even without energy performance guarantees. These findings 
complement the growing literature on the value of integrated business models or ‘one-stop-
shops’ for the delivery of whole-house retrofit (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik, 2013; Mlecnik 
et al., 2018, 2012). Article 2 also shows the importance of finance mechanisms that integrate 
with the business model, in reducing this complexity. The Energiesprong case from Article 3 
further shows how through process innovation, offsite manufacture and modular design – 
zero-energy retrofits can be achieved in a single day, with the occupants remaining in the 
home. This supports the argument for one-off retrofits as opposed to staged approaches 
(Fawcett, 2014). 
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Capital cost and split incentives 
The financial barriers surrounding the up-front capital cost and split incentives are perhaps the 
most well-known yet understudied challenge for the uptake of retrofit. Overcoming these 
challenges requires a range of financing solutions, tailored to specific tenure types and 
demographics. Article 2 outlines the diversity of retrofit financing mechanisms and emphasises 
how their design features affect their success in different contexts. Examples such as green 
mortgages may play a significant role for homeowners, and low-interest loans from public 
banks may be necessary for certain income groups. The thesis therefore contributes to the 
currently limited literature on energy efficiency finance (Copiello, 2016; Parker and Guthrie, 
2016; Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010).  
 
In many cases, finance mechanisms can address split incentives by securing and linking 
repayments to the underlying asset (Article 2). Further, as outlined in the previous section the 
success of these mechanisms is also contingent on the cost of capital, the ease of the customer 
journey and the sources of value that are funded. Hence, as shown in Articles 1 and 3 these 
mechanisms have important implications for the wider business model, as a necessary element 
of its financial model.  
 
However, there are limits to what finance mechanisms can achieve. As discussed in Article 4 a 
large proportion of UK households are in fuel poverty. Arguably the social welfare and health 
benefits of retrofit justify an approach based on grants for these segments, funded through 
general taxation (Rosenow et al., 2013b). Further, the findings from Articles 2 and 4 emphasise 
that financing alone is a weak demand driver and that, alongside new business models and 
financing mechanisms, a range of fiscal incentives may be more effective (Rosenow et al., 
2014). These issues are discussed further in Section 6.4.2. 
 
Information, engagement and trust 
Above all, the majority of households remain unaware and disengaged with whole-house 
retrofit and have a mistrust of the construction industry at large. Thus, a lack of knowledge of 
the options for and benefits of retrofit pervades the majority of the general public (Marchand 
et al., 2015).  
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The extent to which new business models and finance mechanisms can overcome these 
challenges is contingent on their ability to reach customers and offer them a compelling value 
proposition. Here the role of the customer interface is critical. Both Articles 1 and 3 emphasise 
how a single point of contact, can improve trust and communication on a project, itself a 
product of integrated supply chains. Web platforms such as Retrofitworks (Article 1), represent 
a new means of engaging consumers, enabled by developments in information technology 
(Teece, 2018). These findings complement research on the potential of such platforms to drive 
collaboration between supply chains and promote consumer engagement (Mlecnik et al., 
2011). 
 
Further, the Energiesprong case study emphasises how a value proposition of improved 
aesthetic appeal of the newly renovated house can be a key driver of demand (Fawcett and 
Killip, 2014). However, the extent to which these factors alone can drive consumer 
engagement remains to be seen and appears reliant on significant marketing activities from 
small firms operating in a nascent sector. Therefore, Article 4 argues for the need for 
engagement policies, particularly at the local and community level; building on recent research 
on the role of customer-facing intermediaries in this capacity (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018; 
Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018).  
 
6.4. Policy implications  
This section outlines the contribution of this thesis to broader retrofit, energy and innovation 
policy debates. Firstly, drawing on the empirical findings, it is shown how policymakers might 
overcome barriers to business model innovation, through innovation intermediaries. A range 
of wider policy recommendations to promote whole-house retrofit are then discussed. 
 
6.4.1. Intermediation for business model innovation  
Business model innovation may be crucial in meeting retrofit targets, although incumbent 
businesses face both cultural and structural barriers to innovating their business models 
(Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008). As shown in Articles 1, 2 and 3 these include: the conservatism of 
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the industry; a lack of skills and competencies in areas such as energy monitoring and finance; 
fragmentation within the supply chain; and the need to adopt innovative technologies and 
processes such as offsite manufacture (Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2018, 2010, 1986). This 
thesis therefore emphasises an important role for policymakers in overcoming these barriers 
and the challenges, outlined above.  
 
Article 3 highlights the role of innovation intermediaries supported by public policy in 
promoting integrated business models, - such as the Energiesprong market development 
team. These intermediaries are seen to focus on both the internal processes of developing new 
business models (facilitation and configuration) as well as helping to modify the external 
selection environment (brokering) to be more favourable to these new business models 
(Bolton and Hannon, 2016). Thus, the market development team developed a vision for net-
zero-energy homes; facilitated collaboration between key stakeholders; was involved in the 
design and configuration of a radical new business model; and brokered policy changes and 
secured financial resources. Energiesprong market development team was successful in 
achieving policy influence due to its status as an arm’s length intermediary, funded by the 
Dutch government. This status facilitated changes to regulations surrounding energy 
performance contracts, renewable energy subsidies, Dutch planning regulations, mortgage 
eligibility guidelines and to seek further innovation funding (Article 3). The market 
development team is now attempting to catalyse the market for whole-house retrofit in the 
UK.  
 
This thesis therefore highlights a role for policymakers to promote business model innovation 
by supporting innovation intermediaries – consistent with examples of intermediation polices 
for circular economy business models (Barrie et al., 2017). These findings show the need for 
further work to explore if these lessons are transferrable to other sectors - also emphasising 
the limits of business models and finance mechanisms in overcoming the challenges for 
retrofit. Thus, an interesting finding (Article 3) is the intermediaries’ role in brokering broader 
policy changes (Kivimaa, 2014). Article 4 therefore outlines a range of other polices required 
to deliver the widespread uptake of whole-house retrofit in the UK. The following section 
discusses these broader policy implications of the thesis. 
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6.4.2. Wider implications for UK policy  
Delivering the extensive uptake of whole-house retrofit in the UK will require a wide-ranging 
and systemic policy approach to support new business models, finance mechanisms and 
intermediaries. As shown in the previous section, new business models and finance 
mechanisms can overcome many of the challenges to the uptake of whole-house retrofit, 
described in Section 6.2. However, this will require complementary changes in standards and 
regulations (EPCs, UK SAP), financial and fiscal policies and new institutions and intermediaries 
(Rosenow et al., 2017b). In this way, business models and financing are not alternatives to 
effective public policy, but complementary developments in the wider economy that often 
require policy interventions to be realised.  
 
Many of the financing mechanisms discussed in Article 2 owe their existence to public policy -
such as the direct government funding of the KfW low-interest loan schemes, or the use of the 
tax collection channels of US local governments to fund PACE. While a range of mechanisms 
may eventually become prevalent, these are unlikely to emerge on their own and may 
necessitate regulatory changes, public subsidy of interest rates (Gouldson et al., 2015) and 
policies to promote household engagement. By identifying the range of different mechanisms 
and explaining why certain approaches are more successful, this thesis provides some lessons 
for policymakers for the support of future financing programs. 
 
This thesis argues that repayable finance mechanisms should play a more significant future 
role than supplier obligation polices (Rosenow et al., 2013b). Whilst supplier obligations have 
delivered the majority of retrofit savings to date (Rosenow and Eyre, 2014), they are poorly 
suited to whole-house retrofit. This is due to a focus on least cost, single measures - as opposed 
to a broad spectrum of solutions, and a lack of funding for wider non-energy measures (Articles 
1, 2 & 3). Supplier obligations - traditionally based only on carbon savings, thus tend to create 
unintended consequences and perverse incentives (Hansford, 2015; Milsom, 2016) and place 
significant levies on energy bills which can be regressive (Kern et al., 2017). However, both 
supplier obligations and finance mechanisms should necessarily play a more limited role in 
addressing fuel poverty, where grant-based schemes should dominate (Article 4). Article 4 also 
points to the potential role of fiscal incentive schemes such as variable stamp duty as a demand 
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driver (Jahn and Rosenow, 2017; Rosenow et al., 2014; UKGBC, 2013). However, the complex 
ways these funding sources could interact is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
An important, but often overlooked, area concerns household engagement - helping to explain 
much of the low uptake of whole-house retrofits (Balcombe et al., 2014; Marchand et al., 
2015). While improved business models can assist in this area, they are unlikely to be sufficient. 
Various studies highlight the potential contribution of intermediary actors such as local 
authorities, NGOs and community groups in providing information and encouraging household 
engagement (Kivimaa et al., 2018; Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018a). In many cases, these 
actors are under-resourced and lack the powers to effect meaningful change at scale. 
Therefore, to support these activities and coordinate local actors, Article 4 proposes a role for 
a national body or task-force – following similar recommendations from Hansford (2015) and 
Rosenow and Cowart (2017). This body would build on a tradition of arm’s-length government 
agencies focused on specific policy objectives; which in this case would be to facilitate the 
widespread and comprehensive retrofit of the UK’s homes.  
 
Article 4 also calls for the introduction of minimum energy performance standards (EPCs) 
across all UK housing – consistent with several recent studies (Brown et al., 2018; Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017; Sustainable Energy Association, 2017). However, even if stringent standards 
were imposed and enforced, these would be unlikely to overcome the challenges identified in 
Section 6.2. Consequently, minimum EPC regulations should be viewed as complementary to 
new business models and finance mechanisms rather than a substitute. Article 4 also supports 
studies emphasising how the current policy framework surrounding training, accreditation, 
energy assessment monitoring and verification requires updating (Kelly et al., 2012; Mcelroy 
and Rosenow, 2018). Thus in addition, new quality assurance methodologies and accreditation 
standards would seem an essential step – as are currently being proposed in the UK (Bonfield, 
2016).  
 
Finally, this thesis argues that residential retrofit (and wider energy efficiency) should be 
considered a national infrastructure priority, in a similar manner to other forms of 
infrastructure. This would indicate political will at the highest levels of government and would 
be justified by the macroeconomic benefits that retrofit generates (Rosenow et al., 2018; 
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Washan et al., 2014). These arguments build on some recent academic studies (Bergman and 
Foxon, 2017) although have been more extensively explored in non-academic policy literature 
(Frontier Economics Ltd, 2015; Washan et al., 2014).  
 
6.5. Summary of contribution 
This section has shown the contribution that new business models and finance mechanisms 
can make to increase the uptake of whole-house retrofit. New value propositions based on 
energy performance contracts and broader renovation value, may address performance gaps 
and improve household appeal. Integrated supply chains reduce the complexity and disruption 
of whole-house retrofits, particularly when combined with financing and process innovations 
such as offsite manufacture. A range of finance mechanisms can overcome issues of access to 
capital and split incentives and are most effective when these are ‘hand in glove’ with the wider 
business model. Thus, improved value propositions and integrated supply chains may present 
a compelling offer to households when promoted through a single and simplified customer 
interface. The corollary is that an integrated approach to business model governance is most 
effective in the retrofit context, due to the complexity faced by household in managing 
multiple suppliers, consultants and financing options.  
 
While essential, new business models and finance mechanisms should be viewed as elements 
of a broader strategy involving training, regulations, civil society and political leadership – all 
necessary for widespread whole-house retrofit in the UK. These new business models and 
financing mechanisms are unlikely to emerge on their own and will often require policy 
support. This thesis has therefore highlighted how public policy can promote business model 
innovation through the support of innovation intermediaries. These intermediaries can help to 
create the market conditions for innovative business models as well as engage households, 
secure the necessary financial resources and regulatory changes for these models to be 
successful. 
 
 A summary of the conceptual and empirical contributions of this thesis is shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14 Summary of the conceptual and empirical contributions of this thesis 
Conceptual contribution Evidence 
1. Governance is a core component of a business model alongside the value 
proposition, supply chain customer interface and financial model  
Articles 
1 & 3 
2. The key features of finance mechanisms are: the source of capital; the 
financial instrument(s); the project performance requirements; the point of 
sale; the nature of the security and underwriting and the repayment channel. 
Article 2 
3. Business model innovation may be an essential pre-requisite to the adoption 
of systemic innovations such as whole-house retrofit 
Article 3 
4. Innovation intermediaries may play a key role in promoting business model 
innovation such as for whole-house retrofit. 
Article 3 
Empirical contribution  
5. A whole-house approach to retrofit will be necessary for meeting the UK’s 
climate change targets and requires new kinds of business models and 
finance mechanisms to be more widely adopted 
Chap. 1 
6. New business models and financing mechanisms can overcome the 
challenges for whole-house retrofit in the following ways:  
• Value propositions based on energy performance guarantees and 
wider renovation value deliver broader and more certain benefits 
• Integrated supply chains and process innovation reduce costs, 
complexity and disruption  
• A single customer interface and simplified customer journey reduce 
complexity and increase consumer engagement  
• A financial model based on an integrated financing mechanism and 
linked to energy performance outcomes enable all the above 
• Integrated business model governance through a single provider or 
well-coordinated network of subcontractors is more effective for the 
delivery of whole-house retrofit 
Article 1, 
2, 3 & 4 
7. A low cost of capital, simplified customer journey and funding for broader 
sources of value such as wider renovation measures are crucial in the design 
of retrofit finance mechanisms  
Article 2 
8. The traditional barriers framing for the energy efficiency gap is excessively 
narrow. Instead this thesis introduces four related challenges which limit 
demand and hamper delivery: 1) uncertain benefits and quality; 2) 
complexity, disruption and timing; 3) up-front capital cost and split incentives 
and 4) information, engagement and trust. 
Article 4 
9. Widespread uptake of whole-house retrofit will require a systemic policy 
approach supporting new business models, finance mechanisms and 
intermediaries; requiring supporting changes in standards and regulations, 
financial and fiscal policies and new institutions and intermediaries 
Article 4 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis has shown how and why new business models and finance mechanisms can 
promote the uptake of whole-house retrofits and has identified the key characteristics of 
successful models and mechanisms. It has further argued that innovation intermediaries may 
be a new policy approach to facilitate their uptake. The findings point to the need for a step-
change in how retrofits are promoted, delivered and funded – which in turn will require an 
overhaul of the traditional policy approach. To conclude, Section 7.1 summarises the answers 
to each of the research questions, while Section 7.2 suggests some avenues for future 
research. 
7.1. Answers to research questions 
Research question 1 How and why can new business models encourage the uptake of whole-
house retrofit? 
The uptake of whole-house retrofit can be greatly increased through the adoption of new and 
integrated business models, such as energy service agreements based on energy performance 
contracts. These business models can: better facilitate wider sources of value that are actually 
desired by households, such as home improvement; deliver realised energy performance 
outcomes; enable supply chain integration and process innovation – driving down costs and 
installation times; smoothen the customer journey and reduce complexity in project 
management; as well as leverage of new forms of finance through a more robust and long-
term business case based on realised savings. 
 
New business models are likely to be particularly important for the diffusion of systemic 
innovations, such as whole-house retrofit. This is because systemic innovations require 
complementary technological change and reconfiguration of regulations, organisational and 
social practices across multiple domains. Innovative business models are, however, able to 
address these multiple and overlapping domains simultaneously. New business models may 
thus exploit the emergent features of new technologies through new value propositions, 
reconfigured networks and supply chains, leverage new types of financial resources and 
engage users and consumers in new and innovative ways. 
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Research question 2 How and why can new finance mechanisms encourage the uptake of 
whole-house retrofit? 
Although finance can promote the uptake of whole-house retrofit, it should be viewed as an 
enabler rather than a driver of demand - an essential part of the wider business model. The 
key design features, of finance mechanisms, are the source of capital; the financial 
instrument(s); the project performance requirements; the point of sale; the nature of the 
security and underwriting and the repayment channel. Effective retrofit finance mechanisms 
are successful for three key reasons. Firstly, the capital-intensive and long-term nature of 
whole-house retrofits necessitates mechanisms that have a low cost of capital. Second, 
successful mechanisms involve a simplified customer journey, so that they fit ‘hand in glove' 
with the business model for the delivery of the measures. Third, mechanisms that fund broader 
sources of value, including non-energy measures – often solving an existing problem for the 
household, are more likely to be adopted. These mechanisms may require various forms of 
policy support to play a significant role in countries such as the UK. 
 
Research question 3. How can public policy encourage new business models for whole-house 
retrofit through intermediaries? 
Incumbent actors and organisations in the retrofit sector may face multiple barriers to business 
model innovation, presenting a role for policymakers to help promote it. This role requires 
activities to facilitate network formation and collaboration, the configuration and testing of 
new business models in the marketplace, as well as independent brokering and advocacy– 
procuring financial resources and regulatory changes. The Energiesprong example from the 
Netherlands provides an exemplary case study, indicating that such a role may be successfully 
achieved by independent intermediaries who can act as a catalyst between the key 
stakeholders in industry, finance, housing and government but retain independence from 
them.  
 
Research question 4  How can the uptake of whole-house retrofit in the UK be accelerated by 
public policy? 
Delivering the goal of widespread whole-house retrofit will necessitate a systemic policy 
approach across multiple domains. This will include a role for new business models and finance 
mechanisms supported by changes in regulation, taxation, public spending and incentives as 
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well as softer measures including information and engagement programmes, market 
intermediation activities to promote business model innovation and supply chain 
development, as well as high-level political leadership. 
 
Together these approaches can overcome four key challenges that undermine demand and 
delivery of whole-house retrofit: a widespread lack of information, engagement and trust with 
households on the options for and advantages of retrofit; the uncertain benefits and quality of 
retrofit work; the significant complexity, disruption and poor integration with the timing of 
other renovation decisions; and, the up-front capital cost and split incentives between 
landlords and tenants, or those looking to move. Without such an approach, countries such as 
the UK are unlikely to overcome the problems with the current piecemeal strategy and realise 
the enormous benefits of whole-house retrofit for the environment and society. 
 
7.2. Avenues for further research 
Contemplating the contribution of this thesis to the literature, and the gaps it leaves, this 
section provides some suggestions for further research. 
 
Firstly, the conclusions drawn in this thesis come from empirical data from the supply side. 
Hence the study of business models, finance mechanisms and policy solutions are primarily 
derived from semi-structured interviews with experts and practitioners, rather than from users 
or households. Given the lack of previous research on these issues, the absence of studies 
which identify the features of these approaches or ready-made typologies of retrofit business 
models and financing; the approach taken here is a logical first step. However, building on 
these findings there is an important opportunity for research to explore the perceptions of 
these different approaches in practice. Perhaps drawing on wider research methods such as 
focus groups or surveys with households, as well as meta-analyses of multiple case studies.  
 
Second, there is a qualitative bias to the research. Building on the conceptual foundations and 
the range of ‘types' developed here, several avenues for quantitative investigation are 
apparent. As described above, some larger scale surveys of user perceptions, energy 
performance outcomes and project costs across various business model archetypes, could add 
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validity to some of the claims made here. Equally, studies of the cost of capital, utilising the 
financing variables developed in Article 2 to quantify which factors are most important would 
be valuable. Thus, developing an understanding of how these features influence the cost of 
capital in different contexts - although this may present some challenges in data collection.  
 
A third important avenue for future research concerns the application of the theoretical 
contributions developed here to other domains. As argued in the previous section the features 
of finance mechanisms framework could be applied to other studies on different forms of 
financing for energy efficiency or other forms of sustainable infrastructure such as power, 
housing, transport or waste systems. Equally, the combined business model and 
intermediation framework developed in Article 3 may have useful application to other sectors 
where business model innovation is being promoted; such as the circular economy, energy 
other service business models or those designed to enhance natural capital such as organic 
farming and permaculture models. 
 
7.3. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has shown the potential contribution of new business models, finance mechanisms 
and supporting policy approaches - through innovation intermediaries, for increasing the 
uptake of whole-house retrofits. The significance of these findings is in their contribution to 
addressing one of the most important and intractable policy problems of the 21st century – the 
energy consumption, carbon emissions, social welfare and health impacts of the current 
housing stock. 
 
Famous examples of the novel pairing of technology with an innovative business model show 
how previously unwanted technologies such as the mp3 player and electric vehicles have since 
become highly desirable. However, it remains to be seen if innovative business models such as 
Energiesprong will become household names alongside the likes of Apple and Tesla. The 
success of these approaches, therefore, remains contingent on developing products and 
services that people actually want to buy - emphasising the limits of what new business models 
and finance alone can achieve. In any case, there remains a critical role for policy in enabling 
these new business models and finance mechanisms to succeed, as well as creating a 
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regulatory environment to facilitate the uptake of whole-house retrofits to millions of homes 
in the coming decades. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 Consolidated interview list  
Interview 
number  
Archetype Organisation Actor Date 
Business model interviews 
 Expert Scoping  
#1 All 
 
University of Oxford Senior Research 
Fellow - energy 
efficiency policy 
25/11/2016 
#2 United Kingdom Green 
Building Council 
(UKGBC) 
Policy Advisor  02/12/2016 
#3 Energy Saving Trust 
(EST) 
Senior Insight 
Manager  
29/11/2016 
#4 Building Research 
Establishment (BRE)  
Director (Wales) 20/12/2016 
#5 Energy Programs 
Consortium 
Counsel and 
Director of 
Finance Programs 
(USA) 
17/02/2017 
#6 Buildings Performance 
Institute Europe 
(BPIE)/Reshape 
innovation 
Innovation 
Strategist - 
Founder 
(Reshape 
Innovation) 
01/03/2017 
#7 Georgia Institute of 
Technology (USA) 
Professor of 
Energy Policy 
13/02/2017 
#8 Association for 
Environmental Studies 
and Sciences (AESS) 
(USA) 
Principal and 
Independent 
Consultant 
14/02/2017 
 Practitioner  
(#4) Atomised 
market model 
Building Research 
Establishment (BRE) 
Director (Wales) 20/12/2016 
#9 Sustainable Design 
Collective 
Architect – 
Managing 
Director  
17/11/2016 
#10 Market 
intermediary 
model 
 
Greater London 
Authority (RE:NEW) 
Program Manager 
– Energy 
01/03/2017 
#11 Nottingham Energy 
Partnership  
Contracts 
Manager  
15/12/2016 
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#12 Birmingham Energy 
Savers (BES) 
(Consultant) 
Sustainability 
Consultant  
25/01/2017 
#13 One-stop-shop 
 
Retrofit works / Parity 
projects  
Director 21/12/2016 
#14 Segel AS - Norway Business 
Development 
Consultant 
2/02/2017 
#15 Brighton and Hove 
Energy Services 
Company (BHESCo) 
CEO 23/02/2017 
(#6) Energy Service 
Agreement  
 
Energies POSIT'IF - Paris 
France  
Innovation 
Strategist - 
Founder 
(Reshape 
innovation) 
01/03/2017 
#16 ICF Habitat- Paris, 
France 
Head of Energy & 
Water 
16/02/2017 
#17 RENESCO – Riga, Latvia Managing 
Director 
02/02/2017 
#18 Managed Energy 
Service 
Agreement  
 
Energiesprong – UK, 
Netherlands 
Project manager 
/Rainmaker 
12/12/2016 
Finance Mechanism Interviews 
 Expert Scoping 
#19 All 
 
Climate Strategy and 
Partners 
Anonymous 27/07/2017 
#20 United Kingdom Green 
Building Council 
(UKGBC) 
Anonymous 09/11/2017 
(#4) Building Research 
Establishment (BRE) 
Director (Wales) 20/12/2016 
(#5) Energy Programmes 
Consortium (USA) 
Counsel and 
Director of 
Finance Programs 
(USA) 
17/02/2017 
#21 Climate Bonds Initiative Anonymous 08/08/2017 
#22 Marksman Consulting 
LLP 
Anonymous 14/08/2017 
#23 Energy Pro Ltd Anonymous 14/08/2017 
 Practitioner 
#24 Public/ credit 
enhancement  
Energy Saving Trust 
Home Energy Efficiency 
Anonymous 09/10/2017 
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Programme Scotland 
(EST-HEEPS) 
#25 Amber Infrastructure 
(LEEF/MEEF) 
Anonymous 30/11/2017 
#26 On Bill Finance 
and Repayment  
National Conference of 
State Legislatures 
(NCSL) (USA) 
Anonymous 30/11/2017 
#27 Business Energy and 
Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS) 
Anonymous 30/11/2017 
#28 Energy Service 
Agreement  
 
Servizi Energia 
Ambiente (SEA) 
Anonymous 22/11/2017 
#29 Joule Assets Europe Anonymous 19/10/2017 
(#17) RENESCO – Riga, Latvia Managing 
Director 
02/02/2017 
#30 Property 
Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE) 
RENEW Financial Anonymous 17/11/2017 
#31 PACE Nation Anonymous 20/10/2017 
#32 Energy 
Efficiency 
Mortgage 
European Mortgage 
Federation (EeMAP) 
Anonymous 12/10/2017 
(#15) Community 
Finance 
Brighton and Hove 
Energy Services 
Company (BHESCo) 
CEO 23/02/2017 
Energiesprong case study interviews 
Interview 
number  
Actor Type Organisation Actor Date 
(#18) Intermediary  Energiesprong Market 
Development Team  
  
Project Manager 12/12/2016 
#33 Head of 
International 
Market 
Development 
15/05/2018 
#34 Founding Partner 20/06/2018 
#35 Client  Nottingham City Homes Head of Energy 
and Sustainability 
29/06/2018 
#36 Contractor Melius Homes Director  31/05/2018 
#37 Policymaker 
(Netherlands) 
Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations 
Director Building 
& Energy 
20/06/2018 
#38 Policymaker 
(UK)  
Nottingham City 
Council 
Head of Energy 
and Sustainability  
13/06/2018 
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Table A2 Low energy housing intermediaries: Sequence of interviews, interviewee types and 
focus. (supplementary material for Article 3, not conducted by candidate)  
Interview 
round 
No. of 
interviews 
Type of interviewees Focus Timing of 
interviews 
1st 10 I1 NGO, I2 charity, I3 charity, I4 
research organisation, I5 charity, I6 
campaign, I7 NGO, I8 membership 
organisation, I9 network 
organisation, I10 ex-government 
UK building 
energy 
efficiency 
policy 
development 
July–
September 
2014 
2nd 12 I11 social enterprise, I12 community 
organisation, I13 anonymous, I14 
social housing fund, I15 charity, I16 
research organisation, I17 social 
enterprise, I18 local administration, 
I19 social enterprise, I20 local 
administration, I21 social enterprise, 
I22 membership organisation 
Developments 
in UK low-
energy 
homes; 
activities of 
specific 
organisations 
May 
2015–
March 
2016 
3rd 7 I23 membership organisation, I24 
network organisation, I25 ex-
government, I26 academic-
practitioner, I27 network 
organisation, I28 academic-
practitioner, I29 consultancy 
Activities and 
influence of 
intermediary 
organisations 
on policy 
development 
May 2017, 
February–
March 
2018 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 Key financial terminology  
Asset backed securities 
Securities issued by a special purpose company that holds a package of low-risk assets 
whose cash flows are sufficient to service the bonds. Unlike covered bonds they do not 
remain on the balance sheet of the issuer. 
Bill neutrality 
Finance for energy efficiency measures whose repayments are less to or equal than the 
project cost savings from those measures 
Capital markets 
A financial market in which longer-term debt (generally with maturity of longer than one 
year) and equity instruments are traded 
Cash flows or ‘receivables’ 
Accounts receivable, based on future sources of income from a contract or finance 
repayments 
Covered bonds  
Unlike asset backed securities covered bonds are “covered” by both the issuer (usually a 
bank) and the reference portfolio of projects (assets, usually mortgages). Remaining on the 
balance sheet of the issuer  
Credit enhancements 
Broadly defined, credit enhancements are a class of tools that reduce lender or investor 
risk by delivering these capital providers with a level of protection against losses in the 
event of borrower default or delinquency 
Credit rating (i.e. AAA) 
Credit rating agencies typically assign letter grades to indicate ratings. These rating scale 
ranging from AAA (excellent) and AA+ to C and D. A debt instrument with a rating below 
BBB- is considered to be speculative grade or a ‘junk bond’, which means it is more likely to 
default on loans. 
Factoring 
Invoice Factoring is a financial transaction and a type of debt finance in which a business 
sells its accounts receivable (invoices) to a third party (factoring company) at a discount.  
Institutional investor 
Institutional investors are financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf 
of other investors such as pensions, insurance and private wealth funds. These liabilities 
are typically long term, and so these investors may be interested in correspondingly long-
term investments.  
Lien  
A lien is a legal right granted by the owner of property, by a law or otherwise acquired by a 
creditor. A lien serves to guarantee an underlying obligation, such as the repayment of a 
loan. If the underlying obligation is not satisfied, the creditor may be able to seize the asset 
that is the subject of the lien 
Liquidity 
Liquidity describes the degree to which an asset or security can be quickly bought or sold 
in the market without affecting the asset's price. 
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Principal 
Principal refers to the original sum of money borrowed in a loan, or put into an investment. 
Similarly, can also refer to the face value of a bond. 
Project finance  
Project finance is the financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public 
services based upon a non-recourse or limited recourse financial structure, in which 
project debt and equity used to finance the project are paid back from the cash flow 
generated by the project 
Secondary markets 
A financial market in which securities that have been previously issued (and are thus 
second hand) can be resold  
Securitisation 
Securitisation is the process of taking an illiquid asset, or group of assets, and through 
financial engineering, transforming it (or them) into a security 
Security 
A security is a negotiable financial instrument that holds some type of monetary value. It 
represents an ownership position in a publicly-traded corporation (via stock), a creditor 
relationship with a governmental body or a corporation (represented by owning that 
entity's bond), or rights to ownership as represented by an option 
Senior debt  
Senior debt is borrowed money that a company or project must repay first if it goes out of 
business. In this sense its repayment is senior to the junior or junior comp 
Special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
A special purpose vehicle is a subsidiary company with an asset/liability structure and legal 
status that makes its obligations secure even if the parent company goes bankrupt. They 
are often used to finance projects ‘off balance sheet’ of the participating firms 
Structural funds   
The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are financial tools set up to implement the 
regional policy of the European Union. They aim to reduce regional disparities in income, 
wealth and opportunities. The Structural Funds are made up of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) 
Subordinated debt 
Junior Debt is a loan or security that ranks below other loans or securities with regard to 
claims on assets or earnings. Junior debt is also known as a ‘junior security’ or junior loan. 
In the case of borrower default, creditors who own junior debt won't be paid out until after 
senior debt-holders are paid in full 
Subprime mortgage 
A subprime mortgage is a type of mortgage that is normally issued by a lending institution 
to borrowers with low credit ratings. As a result of the borrower's lower credit rating, a 
conventional mortgage is not offered because the lender views the borrower as having a 
larger-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan 
Tranches  
Tranches are portions of debt or securities that are structured to divide risk or 
group characteristics in ways that are marketable to various investors. Each portion, or 
tranche, is one of several related securities such as senior or junior tranches with different 
risks, rewards and maturities to appeal to different types of investors. 
 
  
 
228 
Underwriting 
Involves research and assessment of the risk an application for finance presents. This helps 
to create the market for securities by accurately pricing risk and setting fair rates that 
adequately cover the true cost of lending money or providing insurance. If a specific 
applicant's risk is deemed too high, underwriters may refuse the offer. 
 
Table B2 Article 2 interview quotations 
Source of 
capital  
'this is something that should be financed by the state... I think this is the 
state’s responsibility…by definition the state is the cheapest borrower, 
nobody can borrow cheaper than the state' (RENESCO -#17) 
‘actually, that's considerably less risk than the government is absolutely 
willing bar falling over itself to take in other parts in other areas of its 
portfolio.’ (Climate Strategy and Partners-#19) 
‘looking at something that might need to be scaled up.…I guess there are 
other options that the government would need to look at…what budget 
might be necessary, where they might come from, how the government 
might be able to raise that kind of funding etcetera.’ (EST - HEEPS-#24) 
‘PACE [is] bundled together in a way that large scale, long term investors 
can buy it, under the certain rules...So the vast majority of what we've done 
has ultimately—its funded long term by pension funds, insurance companies 
and money managers’ (RENEW Financial-#30) 
‘Look at the problem develop a solution and bring in the institutional capital 
ready to invest at the right time. And that would take a very small amount 
of public money relative to the investment’ (Energy Pro-#23) 
‘If you went out in the market and said, "I've got social-housing retrofit with 
external wall insulation"…most people would run a mile. So, we're there to 
alleviate that’ (Amber Infrastructure-#25). 
Financial 
Instrument  
‘One of the problems at the moment is that we've got too much equity 
coming in, so the equity guys want 10-15% return, the debt guys want 2-
10%, the more we can make it like debt and secure it the lower the cost of 
the money’ (Marksman Consulting-#22). 
‘We can't nationalise the industry anymore, it would be way too expensive. 
Cooperatives represent a way of creating social enterprise for the energy 
industry’ (BHESCo-#15) 
‘Every several months…we bundle everything that we've financed using that 
line of credit…and we then do a rated securitisation where we sell the cash 
flows…as a bond into the asset backed securities market’ (RENEW Financial-
#30) 
‘When you go in residential, first is really difficult to find big, big projects’ 
(SEA-ESCO-#28). 
‘I start to feel from investment funds [they are] interested in buildings 
because what they have learned from experience is that energy 
performance contract has a really low risk from a long payment point of 
view’ (SEA-ESCO-#28). 
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Project 
performance 
‘[Energy performance guarantees] have the potential to make a huge 
difference on… [consumer] confidence.’ (Energy Programmes Consortium-
#5) 
‘Investors aren't going to accept an ESCO's performance guarantee at face 
value. They need to understand how the savings were calculated and this 
needs to be backed by strong financial modelling. They also need to know 
that the client is financially healthy, and possibly that the performance and 
savings are insurable.’ (Joule Assets Europe-#29) 
‘One you need standardisation. And that's where the Investor Confidence 
Project…comes in…standardisation of everything. The whole process has to 
be really standardised’. (Energy Pro-#23) 
‘In the US PACE market, there is no requirement that a project reaches a 
savings to investment ratio greater than one. Some projects do not meet 
this test and still go ahead with financing’ (PACE Nation-#31) 
‘anecdotally from one of the downsides we heard from industry is that 
actually really big-ticket stuff [doesn’t happen] because of the Golden Rule 
cap’ (Policy Manager - BEIS-#27). 
‘It is about selling health and well-being it is about creating better internal 
environment where people have the opportunities to live in a warmer, dryer 
stable building. But the mechanism is EE and carbon - it is never going to 
work...It is a flawed matrix for success’ (Director - BRE-#4). 
Point of sale  ‘If you need to buy a car, you don't need $30,000. You just go in…You pay a 
couple thousand dollars down. You drive out with the car. You're billed every 
month. So, you solved this upfront cost issue in like virtually every other 
category of things. But until…we've solved it in this residential energy sector, 
it's impossible to get people to do these types of projects and scale.’ 
(RENEW Financial-#30) 
‘it was actually kind of a pain in the ass to get a Green Deal loan … So, I'm 
like well then why the hell would you pay 9% for it. You know you're not 
gaining anything you know from that programme’ (Energy Programmes 
Consortium-#5) 
‘That meant that literally while the [PACE] contractors was there he can get 
the customer approved on an iPad. And go ahead … same day. Huge deal.’ 
(Energy Programmes Consortium-#5) 
‘the need for an integrated business model, the need for a mechanism that 
fits into that, hand in glove. And then at the very end we then fill that with 
the appropriate financial instrument’ (Climate Strategy and Partners-#5) 
Security and 
underwriting 
 
‘most commercial lenders want a lot more security as you'd expect. So, 
we're able to look at a non-secure position. Especially if … we're more 
comfortable with the entity, just put it that way, like a major housing 
association or local authority’ (Amber Infrastructure-#5) 
‘(In PACE) we get kind of pulled into that whole regime which means it's very 
secure. And if you don't pay your property taxes over time, really, really bad 
things happen, right?’ (RENEW Financial-#30) 
‘if a household or an applicant stops making their repayment…it may be 
possible in certain situations, for there to be some flexibility for example, 
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reducing monthly repayments based on the householder's affordability, or 
providing a repayment holiday.’ (EST - HEEPS-#24) 
‘Contractors are the original points of contact for homeowners. Typically, a 
contractor can conduct a simple eligibility check 'over-the-kitchen-counter' 
and determine whether a project can go ahead or not. This can be done 
using PACE provider's software on a tablet. Then the contractor can guide a 
homeowner through the necessary improvements. The homeowner will 
receive a phone call from a PACE provider to confirm the project and go over 
the terms and conditions of PACE financing’ (PACE Nation-#31) 
‘I spoke with people who used to run [Green Deal], and with people who 
analysed t it at Brussels level…and you know, had to boil it down to one 
example is that, sometimes it took up to 60 days for people to get the 
financing, and I think that's just insanity.’ (PACE Nation-#31) 
Repayment 
channel 
‘That's what makes it. So, when you take PACE, you get a new line item on 
your property tax bill …And that is collected in the same time and in exactly 
the same manner with exactly all of the same rules and laws in all other 
parts of your property tax bill. And you can't partially pay’(RENEW Financial-
#30) 
‘Something such as on bill or a performance contract can help clarify the 
repayment terms by adding simplicity, by including the information on a bill 
or combining it with energy savings as well.’ (Energy Policy Specialist - NCSL-
#26) 
‘So, based on the equity that house holders have in their own property, they 
need to be left with at least 30% equity after the loan value has been taken 
off’ (EST-HEEPS-#24) 
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Appendix C – Appended Articles  
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Business models for residential retrofit in the UK: a critical
assessment of five key archetypes
Donal Brown
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Abstract The comprehensive retrofit of residential
buildings has significant potential to reduce carbon
emissions and provide additional heath and economic
benefits. However, in countries such as the UK, much of
this potential is yet to be realised. This paper shows how
the concept of ‘business models’ (BMs) can be a pow-
erful tool for understanding the challenge of improving
energy performance and reducing carbon emissions in
residential buildings. Through a review of contemporary
literature and 18 semi-structured interviews, the paper
describes and compares five distinct BM archetypes: the
atomised market model, market intermediation model,
one-stop-shop, energy services agreement andmanaged
energy services agreement. These models range from
the traditional approach to highly innovative energy
service contracts. The paper further illustrates how the
UK and EU market for retrofitting residential buildings
is beginning to trial the more innovative BMs. These
emerging BMs are characterised by increasingly
industrialised processes and integrated supply chains, a
holistic customer offering and single point of sale, long-
term energy-saving performance contracts (ESPC) and
integral project finance. It is argued that whilst the
traditional BM is suitable for the implementation of
single or piecemeal energy-saving measures, BM inno-
vation will be required to meet the UK’s ambitious
climate change targets.
Keywords Energy efficiency. Retrofit . Housing .
Businessmodels . ESCO . ESPC . Value proposition .
Supply chain . Customer interface . Financial model .
Governance
Introduction
The United Kingdom (UK) has an ambitious target to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80% by
2050, relative to 1990 levels (Treasury, 2008). To this
end, the UK government has set legally binding, 5-year
carbon budgets that include targets for reducing emis-
sions in all sectors of the UK economy (CCC 2013). In
2016, buildings were responsible for over a third of the
UK’s GHG emissions, with 22% from the residential
sector alone (CCC 2016). Improving the energy efficien-
cy of residential buildings can also improve occupant’s
health (Willand et al. 2015) and reduce fuel poverty
(Sovacool 2015). In the UK, the energy performance of
residential buildings is measured using the ‘Standard
Assessment Procedure’ (SAP),1 where a SAP score of
100 equates to an exemplary dwelling. In 2012, the
average SAP for UK homes was 59, compared to only
45 in 1996 (DECC 2015).
Progress in improving the energy performance of res-
idential buildings has stalled since 2012 (CCC 2016). The
UK still has one of the oldest and least energy efficient
Energy Efficiency
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9629-5
1 SAP quantifies a dwelling’s performance in terms of energy use per
unit floor area, a fuel-cost-based energy efficiency rating (the SAP
Rating) and emissions of CO2 (the Environmental Impact Rating)
(GOV.UK 2017).
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housing stocks in Europe, and two thirds of the existing
buildings are likely to exist in 2050 (Fylan et al. 2016).
Older, solid walled properties constitute around 27% of
the UK stock and have a large energy-saving potential
(Element Energy 2013), yet only around 4% have had
solid wall insulation (SWI) installed (CCC 2016). The
UK also has a high proportion (67%) of owner-occupied
housing, with 19% in social housing and 14% in private
rented sectors (CCC 2016). The Committee on Climate
Change (CCC 2015) estimates that there is cost effective2
potential to reduce direct emissions3 from all buildings by
32% to 2030, with further savings available from the
implementation of onsite microgeneration, with the need
to achieve near-zero emissions from the sector by 2050
(CCC 2016). A 2013 policy initiative to improve energy
efficiency in this sector (the ‘Green Deal’) proved to be a
high-profile failure, achieving only 15,000 installations
(mostly new boilers) rather than the two million a year
that were envisaged (Rosenow and Eyre 2016). Since the
remaining policies for energy efficiency in housing are
relatively limited in ambition and scope, the carbon tar-
gets for this sector may not be achieved (Guertler and
Rosenow 2016).
Emissions from UK residential buildings largely de-
rive from gas use for space and water heating, and elec-
tricity use for lighting and appliances. Alongside efficient
appliances and behaviour changes, the majority of these
emissions can be reduced by the retrofit of three types of
measure (Mallaburn and Eyre 2014): improving the
building fabric of properties, adopting low-carbon heat
technologies such as heat pumps and building-integrated
electricity microgeneration, such as solar PV (CCC
2013). The CCC projections for 2030 include 2 million
SWI and 2.5 million heat pump installations. This repre-
sents a sevenfold increase in properties with SWI and a
massive upscaling in low-carbon heat (CCC 2016).
The improper installation of deeper single measures
such as SWI has, however, the potential to cause damaging
unintended consequences4 (Davies and Oreszczyn 2012).
A comprehensive residential retrofit, where the entire
building is treated as a system rather than as individual
elements or measures, is likely to mitigate such issues
and achieve greater reductions in emissions (Hansford
2015). Such an approach typically involves multiple
measures and strategies for insulation, draught proofing,
ventilation and heating systems, and may also include
microgeneration (Milsom 2016). Consequently, if the
UK is to meet its ambitious climate change targets,
comprehensive residential retrofit, involving multiple
coordinated measures will need to become the norm
(Lewis and Smith 2013).
This paper argues that despite significant policy
action in this area, a major reason for the slow progress
is the limitations of the traditional business model
(BM) through which energy efficiency measures are
delivered. This model is characterised by a piecemeal
offering, with a fragmented supply chain, a focus on
single (rather than multiple, complementary) measures,
and no guarantees on performance. Yet, research that
identifies how alternative BMs might be more effective
in delivering comprehensive residential retrofit is largely
absent from the literature.
This study addresses this gap. First, it uses the BM
concept to better understand the challenge of residential
retrofit; second, it identifies the range of BMs currently
used for delivering residential retrofit in the UK and the
EU; third, it evaluates how and why the characteristics
of these BMs influence their potential in delivering
comprehensive residential retrofits.
The study addresses the following research
questions:
1. What insights does the BMs concept offer for the
challenge of residential retrofit?
2. What BMs are currently used for residential retrofit
and how do they differ?
3. How and why do the characteristics of these alter-
native BMs influence their potential for delivering
comprehensive residential retrofit?
Through a review of the academic literature on
both BMs and residential retrofit, together with
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from
the residential retrofit industry, this paper explores
how more innovative BMs could enable greater uptake
of comprehensive residential retrofit. The paper is
structured as follows: BLiterature on business models,
energy services and residential retrofit^ section
2 The CCC defines the cost-effective path as comprising measures that
cost less than the projected carbon price across their lifetimes together
with measures that may cost more than the projected carbon price, but
are necessary in order to manage costs and risks of meeting the 2050
target (CCC 2013).
3 Those that result from heating, ventilation and cooling systems as
well as and hot water. This term excludes emissions from electricity
consumption.
4 Such as mould growth, poor air quality and interstitial condensation,
due to poor detailing, and in-sufficient consideration of building phys-
ics, airtightness and ventilation (Milsom 2016)
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summarises the theoretical literature on BMs and the em-
pirical literature on residential retrofit, and outlines the
value of using the former to understand the latter.
BMethods^ section outlines the research methodology,
whilst BRetrofit business models: five key archetypes^
section describes five key BM archetypes for residential
retrofit. BSummary of findings^ section summarises the
empirical results and highlights the implications for the
successful delivery of comprehensive residential retrofit.
BDiscussion^ section places these findings in the context
of the wider literature on BMs and residential retrofit.
BConclusions^ section concludes and provides some sug-
gestions for further research.
Literature on business models, energy services
and residential retrofit
Literature on business models
Throughout history, the development of new BMs has
been instrumental to the diffusion of innovations such as
commercial aviation, modern customer electronics and
the Internet (Teece 2010). Meeting the sustainability
challenges of the twenty-first century is likely to require
a major transition in many sectors of the economy. This
transition requires the development and rapid diffusion
of multiple low-carbon innovations throughout the
housing sector. Thus, innovations such as distributed
energy5 and comprehensive residential retrofit may
require novel BMs before they are viable on a large
scale, due to their incompatibility with existing industry
practices (Hall and Roelich 2016; Winther and Gurigard
2017). Consequently, various scholars have identified
how such systemic innovations may have specific
characteristics that are more suitable to certain novel
BMs (Hall and Roelich 2016; Richter 2012; Steinberger
et al. 2009). In addition, new BMs for energy services
may also enable a more comprehensive approach to
improving the energy performance of buildings (Kangas
et al. 2017).
The BM is therefore increasingly adopted as lens
for evaluating firm strategies to address sustainability
challenges (Boons et al. 2013). Yet, whilst a few key
studies provide points of reference for characterising
BMs, the term remains contested, both in terms of the
organisational components that are described
(Osterwalder et al. 2005) and the system boundaries
of individual firms or networks of firms (DaSilva and
Trkman 2014; Upward and Jones 2015; Zott et al.
2011). Perhaps the most commonly used definition is
from Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) who identify
four basic components: the value proposition, the
supply chain, the customer interface and the financial
model (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 2013). This char-
acterisation provides a ‘meta-model’ of features that
are generic to all BMs and can thus be applied in
multiple contexts (Osterwalder et al. 2005). BMs
therefore incorporate the nature of the value deliv-
ered to customers, the activities involved in deliver-
ing that value and the means of capturing revenue
from these activities (Boons et al. 2013).
However, the study of the BM of individual firms
overlooks the interdependent and networked nature of
the delivery of good and services (Hellström et al. 2015;
Zott and Amit 2010). BMs thus involve a range of
activities that may span the boundaries of multiple or-
ganisations (Zott and Amit 2010). This highlights the
need for what has been termed a systems perspective on
BMs (Bolton and Hannon 2016). This perspective em-
phasises the governance of BMs, both in terms of the
role of different actors and the chosen mode of gover-
nance, for example, from highly integrated to highly
outsourced approaches (Amit and Zott 2001).
Business models, energy services and residential retrofit
Several studies use the BM concept to describe how
organisations provide energy services (Duplessis et al.
2012; Hannon et al. 2015; Kindström and Ottosson
2016; Labanca et al. 2014; Okkonen and Suhonen
2010). Energy service BMs move beyond the prevailing
value proposition based on the sale of energy commod-
ities (gas, electricity, fuel oil), towards an alternative
value proposition based on the energy service itself
(warmth, light, hot water) (Steinberger et al. 2009). This
creates incentives for suppliers to reduce energy demand
in order to minimise the energy cost of supplying the
service (Bertoldi et al. 2006; Sorrell 2007). Where these
contracts include guaranteed reductions in energy con-
sumption or costs for the client, they are termed Energy
Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC), with the rele-
vant supplier being termed an Energy Service Company
5 Defined as electricity generation feeding into the local distribution
network (operating from 132 kV down to 230 V), as opposed to the
regional or national transmission grid (which operates from 400 kVand
275 kV).
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(ESCO) (Kindström and Ottosson 2016). The market
for ESPCs is largely confined to industry and non-
residential buildings (Hannon and Bolton 2015;
Kindström and Ottosson 2016; Okkonen and Suhonen
2010), since the transaction costs in the residential mar-
ket are relatively high (Sorrell 2007). However, Bleyl-
Androschin and Schinnerl (2007) propose a number of
models for ESPCs that could promote building envelope
refurbishment. Indeed, several residential examples of
ESPCs are now emerging across the EU (Irrek et al.
2013; Labanca et al. 2014).
Relatively few academic studies investigate BMs for
residential retrofit. Recent UK case studies focus on new
models for distributed energy (Foxon et al. 2015; Hall
and Roelich 2016; Hannon and Bolton 2015), but do not
assess the specific challenges posed by residential retro-
fit. Gauthier and Gilomen (2016) compare two French
case studies of residential retrofit BMs, but focus on
individual firms within the project, rather than the over-
all retrofit process. Mahapatra et al. (2013) evaluate the
opportunities and barriers of one-stop-shop BMs in
Scandinavia for residential retrofit, where multiple
services and finance are provided by one organisation.
Winther and Gurigard (2017) explore a failed attempt to
implement ESPC contracts in a Norwegian case study,
whilst Moschetti and Brattebø (2016) map out possible
alternative BMs for residential buildings, yet provide
limited empirical examples.
Cost effective energy efficiency measures face
several barriers to their implementation (Sorrell et al.
2004). These barriers can be grouped into four catego-
ries: financial, social and behavioural, supplier compe-
tence and performance risk (Fylan et al. 2016). The five
components of the BM outlined in BLiterature on busi-
ness models^ section correspond to each of these inter-
related barriers. Studies identify problems with a value
proposition focused on estimated, rather than guaran-
teed energy performance (Pettifor et al. 2015), and final
energy services, such as temperature and comfort
(Roelich et al. 2015). Further barriers to uptake are
identified as a customer interface that is ineffective in
engaging consumers (Owen et al. 2014; Wilson et al.
2015), poorly developed supply chains and retrofit per-
formance gaps (where modelled savings are not
realised) (Gupta and Chandiwala 2010; Kelly et al.
2012; Snape et al. 2015) and a lack of appeal in the
financial model (Marchand et al. 2015). Other studies
have identified the importance of intermediary actors in
the governance of retrofit (Bleyl et al. 2013; Kivimaa
and Martiskainen 2017) and as a means of reducing trans-
action costs for ESCOBMs (Nolden et al. 2016). Thus, the
five components of BMs provide a comprehensive frame-
work for understanding the solutions to these barriers.
Business model framework for residential retrofit
The following section describes how a BM framework
can improve understanding of the challenges in
delivering residential retrofit. This framework combines
the four components of BMs outlined by Boons and
Lüdeke-Freund (2013) with the additional component
of BM governance as described by Amit and Zott
(2001) and Zott and Amit (2010). The components of
a BM are therefore the value proposition, supply chain,
customer interface, financial model and BM
governance.
Value proposition
The value proposition refers to the value or utility from
goods and services that an organisation provides to the
customer (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 2013; Engelken
et al. 2016). New BMs do not necessarily provide a
novel value proposition (Lopez et al. 2014), although a
shift towards ESPCs may also create stronger incentives
for energy efficiency improvements (Steinberger et al.
2009). Thus, the value proposition may constitute sim-
ply the implementation of energy-saving retrofit mea-
sures or a move towards some form of ESPC. Suppliers
may also emphasise other sources of value for cus-
tomers, such as improvements in aesthetics, comfort,
health and well-being rather than energy cost savings
alone (Knoeri et al. 2016). ESPCs may also enable more
comprehensive residential retrofit projects (Kangas et al.
2017; Winther and Gurigard 2017).
Supply chain
The supply chain is the upstream relationships between
an organisation and its suppliers (Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund 2013). This comprises the logistical and techni-
cal elements that enable delivery of the value proposi-
tion (Osterwalder 2004). In the context of residential
retrofit, the supply chain includes the design and
delivery of the retrofit, encompassing both the installation
and the operational phases, potentially across multiple
suppliers and consultants. Both integration of the
supply chain and improvements in project management
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may enable more comprehensive residential retrofits
(Mahapatra et al. 2013) increased material efficiency
and quality control (Lopez et al. 2014) and
industrialisation/automation of manufacturing processes
and logistics, such as the use of off-site manufacture
techniques (Energiesprong 2014).
Customer interface
The customer interface covers all downstream,
customer-related interactions (Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund 2013). This includes the relationship the cus-
tomer has with the supplier organisations in terms of
marketing, sales and distribution channels and the on-
going relationship with the product or service
(Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010). In a retrofit context,
the customer may include homeowners, landlords or
social housing providers. Where customers separately
source retrofit measures, finance and energy audits, they
may encounter multiple interfaces and points of sale.
Financial model
The financial model constitutes the combination of
an organisation’s capital and operational expenditures
with its means of revenue generation from business
activities (Osterwalder et al. 2005). Typically, the finan-
cial objective in energy retrofits is to recover the capital
costs of the measures from the saving in energy bills or
from the revenues from onsite electricity generation. A
range of financing mechanisms have thus been devel-
oped to overcome the initial capital cost, where the
objective is typically to ensure that repayments are equal
to or lower than the energy cost savings. A suitable
finance mechanism is often the catalyst for a viable
retrofit project, with the associated cost of capital being
critical to the economic viability of many measures
(Gouldson et al. 2015).
Business model governance
BM governance involves both the control and man-
agement of the individual components (Zott and
Amit 2010) and the organisational form of the BM
(Amit and Zott 2001). As such, BMs may involve a
constellation of firms that interact to provide a ser-
vice or product (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 2013),
leading to interdependencies between various actors
in the delivery of the value proposition (Zott and
Amit 2010). Consequently, the range of governance
approaches lie along a continuum, with integrated,
hierarchical firms at one end, and arm’s-length,
market-based contractual relationships at the other
(Treib et al. 2007). Where a hierarchical approach is
adopted, the BM components are internal to a single
organisation, whereas in a market-based approach,
multiple organisations are likely to be involved.
More common is a hybrid of these, with most BMs
employing varying degrees of market-based, hierar-
chical and trust-based governance; the latter involv-
ing recurrent relationships with trusted partners
(Bradach and Eccles 1989; Eriksson 2008).
In residential retrofit, managers, intermediaries and
government actors may each play important roles in
governance (Bolton and Hannon 2016). Governance
(or lack of) becomes a particularly important consider-
ation in highly networked arrangements where interme-
diaries (Bleyl et al. 2013; Kivimaa and Martiskainen
2017), such as community (Seyfang et al. 2013), mu-
nicipal actors (Webb et al. 2016) work alongside private
firms. In particular, innovative BMs may require these
system builders to foster trust and coordinate the actions
of multiple stakeholders (Bolton and Hannon 2016).
Methods
This study began with a comprehensive review of the
academic and grey literature on retrofit BMs. The liter-
ature review identified a number of texts and reports6
that described the range of approaches to retrofit that are
currently employed in the UK and EU (De Groote et al.
2016; Edrich et al. 2010; EST 2011; Jankel 2013; Kats
et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Koh et al. 2013; Mahapatra
et al. 2013; Milin and Bullier 2011; Straub 2016;
Sweatman and Managan 2010; The Rockefeller
Foundation and DB Climate Change Advisors 2012).
Five key archetypes of retrofit BMs were subsequently
identified, summarised in Table 1 and described in detail
in BRetrofit business models: five key archetypes^
6 These texts were identified fromGoogle, Google Scholar and Scopus
using several search terms. Search terms included retrofit BM, retrofit
financial model, energy efficiency BM, retrofit intermediary, residen-
tial energy service contracts, community retrofit, cooperative retrofit,
local authority retrofit, retrofit one-stop-shop, energy services agree-
ment, residential energy performance contract and managed energy
service agreement
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section . All these models currently exist in the EU, but
some are much more widespread than others. The
criteria for their differentiation were the five key BM
components outlined in BBusiness model framework for
residential retrofit^ section.
The literature review was followed by scoping
interviews with eight prominent experts in the resi-
dential retrofit field (see ‘Expert scoping’ in Table 3
appendix). The aim was to test the validity and rep-
resentativeness of five archetypes and gain an over-
view of current practice in the UK and wider EU
residential retrofit market. The selection of inter-
viewees involved identification of the key organisa-
tions involved in the residential energy efficiency
sector, including, academic, technical, advocacy and
policy actors. Snowballing techniques were then used
to develop contacts and source further interviewees
(Kvale 2008).
Building on the insights from the expert interviews,
the BM framework was refined, and an interview
protocol developed for practitioners from each of
the BM archetypes, with the aim of including at least
two representatives of each archetype (see ‘Practi-
tioners’ in Table 3). The sample was initially drawn
from the UK but was expanded to include other EU
Member States, including France, Latvia and the
Netherlands, to obtain representatives of the more
innovative and less common archetypes. The inter-
view questions were designed to develop a detailed
understanding of the structure and operation of the
BM and how this influenced their success in deliver-
ing residential retrofit. Both sets of interviews were
supplemented by documentary analysis of publicly
available reports, where available.
Each interview was recorded, transcribed and cod-
ed using the NVivo 11™ software. This enabled
detailed analysis of the responses, allowing common
themes to be identified along with areas for further
investigation. These methods were considered appro-
priate, given the need to develop a qualitative under-
standing of the role and importance of the different
variables within in the BM framework, as well to test
the validity of the archetypes through discussion with
expert stakeholders (Kvale 2008). The use of several
case studies for each archetype allowed identification
of their commonalities and to control for more idio-
syncratic elements. It is recognised that this method
provides less granular detail than could be obtained
from in-depth case studies and provides a less
representative sample than could be obtained from a
large survey. However, the chosen method is suitable
for addressing the research questions given resource
constraints.
Retrofit business models: five key archetypes
The following sections describe each of the five retrofit
archetypes in turn. Each section provides examples of
the archetype, identifies its distinguishing features and
assesses how these characteristics influence the potential
for delivering retrofits of residential buildings, particu-
larly for more comprehensive approaches.
‘Atomized’ market model
The atomized market model continues to be the
primary model delivering residential retrofit in the
UK. Through an offering based on estimated energy
cost and carbon savings, this model involves indi-
vidual retrofit measures and technologies installed by
separate contractors. Customers source the individual
measures, energy audits and finance separately, with
the result that multiple customer interfaces or points
of contact are required for a comprehensive residen-
tial retrofit. The offer of energy savings is based on
modelled impacts of measures, and no guarantees are
provided. Therefore, any finance package is based on
estimated rather than guaranteed cost savings. The
details of the model are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Whilst a highly fragmented and market-based BM is
the norm for many industries, interviewees agreed that
this ‘siloed’ approach does not work well for compre-
hensive residential retrofit.
B[Supply chain integration] is extremely poor;
there has been a focus on single measures for
the last 20/25 years. It is going to be hard to make
the shift to a more comprehensive approach. Sin-
gle measures have their place, but you want to
have mechanisms to do more comprehensive res-
idential retrofit.^ (Academic - energy efficiency
policy)
This focus on singlemeasures stems directly from the
atomised and uncoordinated nature of the dominant
model;
Energy Efficiency
Bwhat we’ve got in the UK is where the customer
has to be this project manager…That’s complex, it
might work; for ringing somebody up when you
boiler breaks down…[but] it’s not the route for
a…. ramping up [of] energy efficiency measures^
(Energy Saving Trust)
Such an approach has typified the delivery of the
energy efficiency measures required and subsidised by
UK policy, such as the Supplier Obligations and Green
Deal, as well as the low-carbon heat measures
subsidised by the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) and
microgeneration Feed In Tariff (FIT). Thus, this ap-
proach has resulted in very few comprehensive residen-
tial retrofits—instead tending to deliver a succession of
piecemeal interventions at different times, linked to an
ever-evolving policy landscape.
BWe have tended to focus in the UK on subsidy…
installers, who do one thing; you can get a grant
for doing x measures, get some carbon credits
from the energy company…and that's it. They
don't care about how it performs, they don’t care
about how it actually impacts on the end user, they
just go in and install one measure.^ (Policy Ad-
visor - UKGBC)
This model has not helped develop an effective supply
chain for residential retrofit, particularly for SWI, which
requires a more comprehensive approach involving addi-
tional measures such as ventilation and draught proofing.
BI’ve been around probably now over 3000
houses that have had external wall insulation
and I haven't seen any done right, and that is a
fairly damning indictment of the industry…You
have got industry-standard details which intro-
duce cold bridging. There is no assessment of
ventilation it is almost inevitable it's going to go
wrong.^ (Director - BRE)
Market intermediation model
The market intermediation model, shown in Fig. 2, is
also a relatively common delivery model for residential
retrofit in the UK and the EU. This model usually
involves the implementation of government subsidy
schemes, focused on single measures and uses estimates
of the associated energy cost and carbon savings from a
basic energy audit. However, a key difference is the role
of an intermediary organisation, who coordinate the
supply chain and provide the customer interface through
marketing activities and project management, thus, sim-
plifying the customer journey. These schemes typically
involve a Local Authorities (LA) or NGOs who offer
information, consultancy and procurement guidance to
the client and may also offer a range of specialist ser-
vices and financing assistance. If the intermediary is
trusted by potential customers, their involvement can
lower transaction costs, facilitate project implementa-
tion and help raise awareness of retrofit opportunities
in the residential sector, building upon existing trusted
relationships at the area or community level.
UK examples of this model include the RE:NEW
scheme implemented by the Greater London Authority
(GLA), the Birmingham Energy Savers (BES) scheme,
involving a partnership between Birmingham City
Council and Carillion2F7 and the Nottingham Energy
7 A large international construction firm, headquartered in the UK
Customer
Energy Auditor
Installer Type 1 Installer Type 2
Finance provider
Supply chain actor
Retrofit measures
Customer interface
Finance repayments
Up-front payments
Fig. 1 The ‘atomized’ market
model
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Partnership (NEP) an NGO initiative in Nottingham.
These schemes commonly utilise relationships with lo-
cal housing providers and LAs. The RE:NEW scheme
has focussed on the social housing sector and has facil-
itated the retrofit of over 127,000 London homes, saving
around 46 k tonnes of carbon dioxide a year (GLA
2017). The NEP scheme focuses on the privately owned
and rented sector, with an emphasis on households in
fuel poverty. Both these schemes owe their success to
the trusted relationships between households and their
housing provider, or council; Bworking with the LA, it’s
that trusted brand^ (Retrofit Intermediary).
By contrast, the large-scale BES scheme was a major
failure. This is in part attributed to the use of a multina-
tional private sector partner for the marketing and deliv-
ery of measures to households, rather than using the
councils branding and a local SME supply chain
(Watson 2014); BThere [was] a lot of installers who
don’t deserve trust, I wouldn’t touch them with a
bargepole^ (Sustainability Consultant - BES).
RE:NEW has supported additional carbon savings
above and beyond what would have otherwise occurred
in the delivery of government and business-as-usual
planned programs. BThe majority of organisations fed
back [Its been] faster, deeper and with less risk
involved^ (Manager- RE:NEW - GLA).
However, these programs have done little to alter the
underlying model of the industry and encourage the
development of comprehensive residential retrofit with
an integrated supply chain; B[in the end] it reverted to
the piecemeal offer that we’ve identified is the problem^
(Sustainability Consultant - BES). The reliance on na-
tional subsidy schemes, where Bchanges in policy mean
that [the] model is ever changing^ (Retrofit Intermedi-
ary), also means that there is very little retrofit activity
once these schemes have ended. This stop-start nature
of funding is a key factor in the lack of a well-developed
supply chain for comprehensive residential retrofit in the
UK. This may be changing, with schemes such as
RE:NEW looking to support more novel value proposi-
tions and longer term finance models (e.g., the
Energiesprong approach discussed below). It was ar-
gued that whilst future retrofit policy programs should
recognise the importance of long-term industry led so-
lutions, Bthere is always going to be a role for
intermediaries^ (Academic - energy efficiency policy)
even where integrated BMs are adopted.
One-stop-shop
The one-stop-shop BM (Fig. 3) involves an integrated
supply chain and customer interface that provides a
single point of contact for the customer. The supplier
offers a ‘holistic’ design and build including a compre-
hensive package of services, a more extensive model-
ling and design phase, the production of a comprehen-
sive residential retrofit plan and the implementation of
multiple complementary measures. Delivery of these is
coordinated through either a single company or a well-
integrated network of subcontractors. As shown in
Fig. 3, some BMs also include finance as part of the
offer, whilst several operate as cooperatives. The coop-
erative approach typically involves both suppliers and
households as coop members, who receive dividends on
their equity investment in retrofit projects.
Although more established in Scandinavia
(Mahapatra et al. 2013; Straub 2016), the UK examples
of this BM include the Retrofitworks project that utilises
an online portal and cooperative approach to link sup-
pliers to customers looking for retrofit and home
auditing services through its sister company Parity Pro-
jects. The Brighton and Hove Energy Services Co-op
(BHESCo) also uses a cooperative approach and a low-
cost financing offer based on issuing shares to the local
community. A key emphasis in the BM is a focus on the
needs of the client and a simplification of the customer
Customer
Energy Auditor Installer Type 1 Installer Type 2Finance provider
Market Intermediary
Supply chain actor
Retrofit measures
Customer interface
Finance repayments
Up-front payments
Fig. 2 Market intermediary
model
Energy Efficiency
journey. Segel AS is a consultancy providing specialist
guidance on the implementation of one-stop-shops in
continental Europe and Scandinavia;
BThe value proposition……is a holistic retrofitting
and single point of contact, easiness in the project,
and project management...many of them also in-
clude help for the client in the application for
grants...and confidence that the solutions chosen
are right for [them]^ (Segel AS - Business
Consultant)
This approach typically facilitates comprehensive
residential retrofits and may be applied in conjunction
with other forms of renovation. In several of the Scan-
dinavian examples, local SMEs collaborate with a larger
company such as Bravida3F8 or national hardware
chains a means of generating customers. In the case of
Retrofitworks, the online portal is a key part of the
customer interface where members of the cooperative
can advertise works and have bids placed by the supply
chain who are also cooperative members. Key to the
success of these BMs is the role of specialist retrofit
coordinators or project managers;
Ba person who understands what every element of
the good retrofit looks like; isn't an expert in all of
them but knows when they look dodgy or when an
expert is needed to be brought in on certain things.
So is about the genuine coordination…so I am a
massive advocate of that and its built-in within…
Retrofitworks.^ (Retrofitworks/Parity Projects)
Whilst not all these examples offer financing,
BHESCo combines their retrofit offering with a
community share issue to provide a financing package
to its customers.
BIt’s based on this virtuous circle, you become a
member of the co-op…you invest…,you get a 5%
return on investment. We invest your money into…
energy efficiency, the customer pays from the sav-
ings in their energy bill^ (BHESCo)
At present, the model is based on a hire purchase
agreement4F9 or what may be termed a capital lease,
with the assumption that if the person moves, they will
see uplift in its value that will enable the lease to be paid
off. However, offering competitive financing remains a
challenge with considerable risk.
BOur…cost of capital is 5%, but we may have to
consider whether we can offer that in the future…
its very tricky and very difficult [to offer compet-
itive finance]^ (BHESCo)
Energy services agreement (ESA)
The ESA involves a form of ESPC, where building
occupants are provided with an energy performance
guarantee for specific energy services, usually over a
period of 15 years or more. Instead of paying for units
of heating fuel, occupants are guaranteed a level of
performance such as a specified internal temperature
(i.e. 21 °C) and a certain volume of hot water at a
specified temperature. Such an approach is synonymous
with the ESCO model in that measures and the sub-
sequent guarantee are provided by an ESCO, who are
8 Bravida is an installation and service company with about 9000
employees at more than 160 locations in Sweden, Norway, Denmark
and Finland.
9 Under an HP agreement, the debtor hires the goods and then pays an
agreed amount by instalments. Whilst still making payments, the
debtor is not allowed to sell or dispose of the goods without the lender’s
permission.
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engaged as part of a long-term contract, with con-
tractual penalties for under-performance. However,
this model differs from the more common examples
in the public and municipal sectors (where the debt
for the retrofit measures is taken on by the building
occupants or tenant)10 as measures are financed di-
rectly by the ESCO or upstream through a third party
financier5F (The Rockefeller Foundation and DB
Climate Change Advisors 2012). These projects typ-
ically consist of an integrated offering, covering a
comprehensive residential retrofit of building fabric
and heating measures, by a well-coordinated supply
chain with design, build and operate phases under
one contract. A comprehensive residential retrofit is a
likely pre-condition to offering a temperature guar-
antee, thus ensuring modelled savings are realised
and energy consumption is controlled (Fig. 4).
The review did not identify any examples of ESA
contracts for residential retrofit in the UK, but examples
exist in France and Latvia. The French state-owned
railway company SNCF also manages a significant
number of social housing properties under its subsidi-
ary; ICF Habitat. ICF has undertaken several schemes
based on an ESA model, focused on medium-to-high-
density multifamily buildings. The Energies POSIT’IF
is an ESA model for privately owned or rented multi-
family buildings in greater Paris. In addition,
RENESCO is a social enterprise involved in the retrofit
of dilapidated multifamily buildings in former Soviet-
era housing in Eastern Europe, particularly Latvia.
The Latvian example is notable for its value propo-
sition involving a focus on structural improvement as a
selling point.
BWe are not just conserving energy, our main task
is conserving the building, we are protecting the
building from the elements…about 15% of our
total investment has nothing to do with energy
efficiency^ (RENESCO).
The risk of offering the ESPC is mitigated through a
well-integrated BM BThis was possible because of one
entity taking a decision and co-ordinating the invest-
ments [and works]^ (RENESCO). Such an approach
means a single point of contact and recourse for the
client: Bthe main advantage of the [ESPC contract] is
that we have only one firm to talk to^ (ICF Habitat). The
successful coordination of the model therefore relies
heavily on the design of effective contracts; Bwe as a
buyer have to make them talk together, so we have to
design a process^’ (ICF Habitat).
An important component of the ESA model is the
Bbridge of finance and technology^ (RENESCO). Un-
der the ICF Habitat model, the capital is supplied by the
housing provider, with the financial agreement upstream
from the tenant. Whilst a large semi-public actor such as
ICF can borrow at a relatively low cost of capital,
RENESCO must source funds in private capital mar-
kets. RENESCO have chosen to use ‘on balance sheet’
finance, meaning the debt obligation is tied to the firm
rather than the building owner. Based on their current
cost of capital, Bthe renovation can be paid by the
energy efficiency alone in 15 years^ (RENESCO).
However, the economics of their offering are very sen-
sitive to the financing terms and the size of their portfo-
lio. Therefore, RENESCO Bhope to sell off the cash-
flows of the first 15 buildings^ under a forfeiting scheme
they are developing in collaboration with the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
This means that RENESCO can shift successful projects
off their balance sheet and sell them on to investors in
10 After significant desk-based and interview research, the author
could not find any examples of this BM in the UK or EU residential
retrofit sector—thus, it is excluded from the paper.
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secondary markets, improving their borrowing condi-
tions BSo, we get our equity back, we have our capital
back, we can pay back the loan, we hopefully make a
little bit of a profit^ (RENESCO).
Managed energy services agreement (MESA)
The MESA model (Fig. 5) is like the ESA approach in
that the ESCO provides guarantees for the energy per-
formance of plant and building fabric measures,
installed during a retrofit (Kim et al. 2012). However,
in the MESA model, the contracting organisation also
takes on responsibility for the payment of the energy bill
in an energy supply contract (ESC) upstream of the
customer; to provide total energy management. This
requires additional capability in energy supply and pro-
curement. This also introduces a potential role for re-
newable electricity, storage and demand side manage-
ment as part of the MESA. This level of integration also
incentivises an integrated supply chain and represents a
holistic energy services offering to the customer.
Whilst the MESA is more common in the commer-
cial or public sector, the Dutch government has funded a
large-scale trial of this approach in the social housing
sector, known as the Energiesprong or ‘energy leap’
initiative (Energiesprong 2014). The scheme has thus
far delivered approximately 1800 comprehensive resi-
dential retrofits in the Netherlands, largely focusing on
single family semi-detached or terraced units. At the
time of writing the first UK trial is about to commence
in Nottingham (Energiesprong 2017). This is the only
known example of a MESA in the EU residential sector.
Energiesprong do not deliver the measures or the
guarantee but instead their market development team
acts as an intermediary between the client and
contractor, providing technical assistance in implemen-
tation. Customers are offered a comprehensive residen-
tial retrofit, based upon net-zero energy consumption.
Typically, an Energiesprong retrofit involves the deliv-
ery of off-site manufactured, insulated facades, integrat-
ed with renewable heat systems and PV panels as well
as lighting and controls. The contractor offers a 30-year
energy performance guarantee for net-zero annual ener-
gy consumption, amortised over the calendar year. This
is based on a guaranteed internal temperature of 21 °C in
living spaces and a set allowance of hot water and
electricity consumption, akin to a mobile phone contract
with usage limits. A comprehensive residential retrofit,
with electricity microgeneration, is a likely pre-
condition to offering a net-zero energy guarantee,
ensuring modelled savings are realised and heat and
electricity consumption are controlled.
BThe main premise of Energiesprong is an
outcome-based procurement approach, specifying
what it needs to do for the next 30 years; a long list
of energy related measures; comfort, health and
quality elements. So therefore, our approach is
entirely technology agnostic^ (Energiesprong UK)
Again, the value proposition emphasises the health,
comfort and aesthetic benefits, ahead of energy cost
savings.
BThe quality of the design- the ‘kerbside appeal’
of the refurbished property…It is a complete en-
velope, so it gives an opportunity to redesign the
property and uplift the value, not because of the
energy efficiency economics, but the design im-
provements of the property^ (Energiesprong UK)
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The aim is to create demand through a desirable
customer offering;
Bit was new, it was exciting, and everybody looked at
it. You had owner occupiers knocking on the door and
saying, BCan I buy one of those?^ So, it is really being
able to see, to display the product, which is a brand new
refurbished house^ (Energiesprong UK)
The Energiesprong model requires significant pro-
cess innovation, in the form of developing entire insu-
lated facades using offsite manufacture techniques, to
enable an installation time of less than 1 week. This
process of mass production and industrialisation is key
to enabling ESPCs for single family dwellings. Such an
industrialised approach also drives down costs for SWI,
which would otherwise be prohibitively expensive.
BSo therefore, it is a challenge given to industry…
because there is no technical specification, but an
outcome-based specification it is more [like] a
product design approach in industry; akin to au-
tomotive and other sectors.^ (Energiesprong UK)
The EnergiesprongMESA has thus far been applied in
the social housing sector, and Bthe financing model there-
fore is a combination...of maintenance, major repair
works. And the additional revenue stream for thirty years
from the energy plan that comes with the property.^
(Energiesprong UK). However, at present, the net-zero
energy retrofit is too expensive to enable a payback
within the 30-year contact. BThe [current] market price
for a 3-bed terraced property of 80 m2 we would be
looking at £70k. As a starting point, maybe a trajectory
to £40k, £35k [is needed]^. The Energiesprong UK team
are hoping to build up a large order-book that would
enable industrialisation of the supply chain and econo-
mies of scale. Currently, the model is reliant on several
sources of grant funding including the EU Interreg
scheme. However, for long-term economic viability, a
cost of capital at < 2% is also likely to be required.
Summary of findings
A summary of the five archetypes and how they differ in
terms of the BM components is provided in Table 1. The
results of the empirical study have provided insights into
the characteristics of successful retrofit BMs, including
some generalisable findings that drawn lessons from all
five archetypes, summarised in Table 2.
Discussion
The preceding sections have identified five BMs for the
delivery of residential retrofit and evaluated the potential
of these models based on recent cases in the UK and EU.
Previous studies discuss the emergence of one-stop-
shop BMs for single family homes (Mahapatra et al.
2013) and the potential of ESCO models in this sector
(Moschetti and Brattebø 2016; Winther and Gurigard
2017), but have provided few empirical examples. This
study builds on this work through identifying the energy
service agreement (ESA) and managed energy service
agreement (MESA) models involving residential
ESPCs, along with the market intermediation model.
These are contrasted with the incumbent ‘atomized’
market model that typifies most residential retrofits in
the UK and EU. The study thus contributes to the
literature on residential retrofit by identifying and eval-
uating the broader range of BMs in this area.
The findings in Table 2 support the argument that
ESPCs have a significant potential for energy saving in
residential buildings (Steinberger et al. 2009). In addition,
the study demonstrates the importance of an emphasis on
comfort, health and well-being and the improved condi-
tion of the property as per the value proposition (Pätäri
and Sinkkonen 2014; Sunikka-Blank and Galvin 2016).
Supply chain integration (where multiple measures and
design services are provided by a single organisation) is
shown as critical for the delivery of comprehensive res-
idential retrofit, particularly for single-family houses.
This supports previous literature on one-stop-shop retrofit
BMs (Mahapatra et al. 2013; Mlecnik et al. 2012).
Through this more integrated approach, performance
gaps (Dowson et al. 2012) and negative unintended
consequences, such as mould and poor air quality, can
also be minimized (Hansford 2015). In turn, this can
strengthen the reputation of the industry and further
simplify the customer journey. This contrasts with the
highly fragmented and ‘siloed’ supply chains that have
characterised most residential retrofit delivery to date.
The inclusion of financing options as part of the
retrofit package may also be a critical driver. Whilst
many UK suppliers are unable to provide financing,
the more integrated businesses models, such as
BHESCo and the ESA and MESA models, include
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long-term finance packages to cover the up-front cost of
measures. However, the associated cost of capital is
critical in determining the economic viability of com-
prehensive residential retrofit measures such as SWI
(Gouldson et al. 2015). Indeed, the Energiesprong mod-
el is currently reliant on several forms of grant funding
for its economic viability. Whilst the existence of an
ESPC is likely to reduce the perceived risk for investors,
several other factors will also be important (Donovan
and Corbishley 2016).
Low customer demand is perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge for the upscaling of whole-house retrofit. A lack
of visibility and knowledge of retrofit measures can be a
key barrier (Marchand et al. 2015), as well as the hassle
for the occupants (Snape et al. 2015). Indeed, retrofit
interventions may also affect current practices in the
home (such as heating behaviour), the inherent qualities
of the property and other competing needs and desires
(Gram-Hanssen 2014;Wilson et al. 2015). Retrofit mea-
sures are not typically differentiated from other renova-
tion decisions (Wilson et al. 2015). Thus, other renova-
tions (such as bathroom replacement) may present op-
portunities for retrofit at certain points in a properties’
life cycle (Achtnicht and Madlener 2014). Occupants
may also balance potential economic benefits of retrofits
against building heritage and aesthetic concerns
(Sunikka-Blank and Galvin 2016).
This study shows that a BMwith a simplified customer
interface, with one point of contact for the retrofit process,
reduces this complexity and may address barriers to up-
take (Mahapatra et al. 2013). Examples, such as the
Energiesprong scheme, utilise industrialised processes to
Table 2 Main findings and application of business model framework
Business model component Key findings
Value proposition: what value is embedded in the product/service
offered by the firm
• Value proposition should place less on emphasis on carbon and energy
cost savings. Focus instead on comfort, health benefits, aesthetics,
building longevity and uplift in value
• Energy performance guarantees can be more attractive to customers and
can help reduce performance gaps, although they add risk and cost for
contractors
Supply chain: how are upstream relationships with suppliers,
structured and managed
• Integrated supply chains can improve quality and reduce unintended
consequences, but the required holistic skillset is lacking in the UK due
to highly ‘siloed’ disciplines
• The role of a retrofit coordinator may therefore be an essential
component for the successful delivery of comprehensive residential
retrofit
Customer interface: how are downstream relationships
with customers, structured and managed
• A single and trusted point of contact is very important, particularly for
single family schemes
• Cooperative and community-based approaches offer a key means of
customer engagement for retrofit
• Integrated supply chain or one-stop-shops can help but general lack of
awareness of retrofit and customer engagement at all levels
Financial model: the nature of operational expenditures, and the
means of revenue generation from the business activities
• Low cost of capital is essential for the viability of long-term
comprehensive approaches due to the low rates of return
• Energy performance guarantees can reduce perceived risk for investors,
and thereby lower cost of capital
• An integrated financing package provided with the retrofit is also likely
to encourage customer demand
Governance: coordinating the BM may involve a multi actor
network; spanning multiple organisations
• Successful retrofits involve the coordination of the various elements of
the BM; this helps both suppliers and customers
• Networked approaches such as the ‘atomized’ market model are only
suitable for single measures. Comprehensive residential retrofit is
better delivered through integrated BMs; where the supply chain,
customer interface and financial model are brought together as a
coordinated offering
• The role of intermediary organisations, i.e. municipalities or
cooperatives likely to be crucial, particularly for novel BMs
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reduce retrofit timescales and the visual upgrade of exter-
nal facades, and could drive increased demand through
‘kerbside appeal’. The role of intermediaries or facilitators
may be particularly important in promoting the uptake of
novel BMs (Bleyl et al. 2013), involving coordinated
marketing efforts, capacity and trust building with energy
agencies, supply chains, LAs, and the media (Long et al.
2015; Stieb and Dunkelberg 2013).
If the BM is characterised as the network through
which the product or service is delivered, the gover-
nance of this network becomes critical. This builds on
other work that identifies the role of network gover-
nance in delivering energy service BMs (Hellström
et al. 2015). The findings suggest that integrated BMs
are likely to be most suitable for comprehensive resi-
dential retrofit, where the individual components of the
BM are coordinated by a single actor to provide a simple
and holistic offering to the customer.
At present, these innovative BMs are relatively rare,
with the ESA and MESAmodels largely being trialled in
multifamily buildings and social housing. With the UK’s
large share of private rented, owner occupier and single-
family housing (Element Energy 2013), a significant
challenge remains to scale up these models to impact
the wider residential market. In the MESA example in
this study, the ESPC is included into the rental agreement.
In the owner occupier sector, this would supplant the
energy supply contract and would therefore require alter-
ations to UK legislation surrounding the energy
switching rights of consumers (Ofgem 2016). The Dutch
Energiesprong policy aimed to address the retrofit chal-
lenge and produce BM innovation (Energiesprong 2017).
This included a range of regulatory changes, public
funding commitments and the establishment of a ‘market
development team’, to promote a radical shift in industry
practice (Energiesprong 2017). Highlighting that a mix of
policy solutions may be required to overcome the multi-
faceted challenges of comprehensive residential retrofit
and promote BM innovation.
This paper described the breadth of BMs adopted for
residential retrofit, including novel and innovative exam-
ples, using desk-based research and qualitative interviews.
Whilst this approach enabled a detailed understanding of
each archetype, the smaller number of participants in-
volved means the results are harder to generalise than
quantitative results. The pre-testing of the frameworkwith
‘experts’ was intended to prevent key approaches and
elements being missed; although it is acknowledged, this
could introduce selection bias in the choice of
interviewees. Equally, the use of in-depth case studies
would have provided greater depth of understanding for
specific approaches, at the expense of breadth. However,
acknowledging these weaknesses, the approach adopted
provides a balance between these factors and is deemed
appropriate for the research aims.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated how BMs can be a useful
framework for understanding the challenges posed by
residential retrofit. The paper has identified five archetypes
that are currently being used for residential retrofit within
the EU, compared them in terms of their value proposition,
supply chain, customer interface and financial model and
overall BM governance and showed how differences in
these elements can help explain their relative potential in
delivering comprehensive residential retrofit.
The paper has shown how more innovative BMs
could expand the market for comprehensive residential
retrofits in the UK. Elements of a successful BM include
the following:
& A value proposition focussed primarily upon aes-
thetics, comfort, health and well-being and includes
guaranteed rather than estimated energy perfor-
mance savings
& An integrated and industrialised supply chain pro-
viding a comprehensive whole-house approach
& A simplified customer interface with a single expert
point of contact
& A financial model that includes a low-cost financing
mechanism integral to the offering
& Coordinated governance of these four components
through an integrated BM
This is in stark contrast to the highly ‘atomized’,
market-oriented approach adopted as the primary UK
delivery model to date.
Two issues in particular merit further research. First,
the nature of the finance mechanism remains a key chal-
lenge, so further research should aim to identify how
alternative mechanisms could enable long-term finance
with a low cost of capital. Second, future work should
identify the challenges of BM innovation in the sector,
the barriers to such innovation and how both industry and
policymakers can respond to these challenges.
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There are multiple gains from comprehensive
residential retrofit, including health and economic
benefits that go beyond energy and carbon savings.
This paper has shown how viewing this challenge
through the lens of BMs can provide valuable new
insights. What is clear is that the incumbent ap-
proach is not delivering the scale of change needed,
which necessitates the rapid growth in comprehen-
sive whole-house retrofit in a short period. Meeting
ambitious carbon targets requires a sea change in
the industry and the diffusion of innovative BMs,
such as those outlined in this paper. Achieving this
will require new ways of thinking in both industry
and policy.
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Appendix
Table 3 Interview details
BMBM archetype Organisation Actor
Expert scoping
All University of Oxford Senior Research Fellow - energy
efficiency policy
United Kingdom Green Building Council (UKGBC) Policy Advisor
Energy Saving Trust (EST) Senior Insight Manager
Building Research Establishment (BRE) Director (Wales)
Energy Programs Consortium Counsel and Director of Finance
Programs (USA)
Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE)/Reshape innovation Innovation Strategist - Founder
(Reshape Innovation)
Georgia Institute of Technology (USA) Professor of Energy Policy
Association for Environmental Studies and Sciences (AESS) Principal and Independent Consultant
Practitioner
Atomized market model Building Research Establishment (BRE) Director (Wales)
Sustainable Design Collective Architect – Managing Director
Market intermediary model Greater London Authority (RE:NEW) Program Manager -Energy
Nottingham Energy Partnership Contracts Manager
Birmingham Energy Savers (BES) (Consultant) Sustainability Consultant
One-stop-shop Retrofit works/Parity projects Director
Segel AS - Norway Business Development Consultant
Brighton and Hove Energy Services Company (BHESCo) CEO
ESA Energies POSIT’IF - Paris France Innovation Strategist - Founder
(Reshape innovation)
ICF Habitat- Paris France Head of Energy & Water
RENESCO – Riga, Latvia Managing Director
MESA Energiesprong – UK, Netherlands Project manager/Rainmaker
Energy Efficiency
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-
ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made.
References
Achtnicht, M., & Madlener, R. (2014). Factors influencing
German house owners preferences on energy retrofits.
Energy Policy, 68, 254–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2014.01.006.
Amit, R., & Zott, C. (2001). Value creation in E-business.
Strategic Management Journal, 22(6–7), 493–520.
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.187.
Bertoldi, P., Hinnells, M., & Rezessy, S. (2006). Liberating the
power of Energy Services and ESCOs in a liberalised energy
market. In Proceedings of the EEDAL 2006 Conference.
London, UK.
Bleyl, J. W., Adilipour, N., Bareit, M., Bourgois, C.-H., &
Vanstraelen Fedesco Knowledgecenter, L. (2013). ESCo
market development: a role for Facilitators to play. In
ECEEE Summer Studies (pp. 3–472). Belambra
Presqu’île de Giens, France. Retrieved from http://www.
kompetenzzentrum-contracting.de/fileadmin/uploads_
redaktion/PDF/Literatur_Download/IEADSMTask XVI_
eceee papers No. 3-472-13_ESCo Facilitator_130322.
pdf.
Bleyl-Androschin, J., & Schinnerl, D. (2007). Comprehensive
refurbishment of buildings with energy services. In ECEEE
2007 summer study. Saving energy—Just do it! 817 (pp.
817–828 ) . Re t r i e v ed f r om h t t p : / / e d i t . e c e e e .
org/library/conference_proceedings/eceee_Summer_
Studies/2007/Panel_5/5.039/paper
Bolton, R., & Hannon, M. (2016). Governing sustainability tran-
sitions through business model innovation: towards a sys-
tems understanding. Research Policy, 45(9), 1731–1742.
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RESPOL.2016.05.003.
Boons, F., & Lüdeke-Freund, F. (2013). Business models for
sustainable innovation: state-of-the-art and steps towards a
research agenda. Journal of Cleaner Production, 45, 9–19.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.07.007.
Boons, F., Montalvo, C., Quist, J., & Wagner, M. (2013).
Sustainable innovation, business models and economic per-
formance: an overview. Journal of Cleaner Production, 45,
1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.08.013.
Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Markets versus hierarchies:
from ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology,
15(Richardson 1972), 97–118. https://doi.org/10.1146
/annurev.so.15.080189.000525.
CCC. (2013). Committee on Climate Change. Fourth carbon
budget review—part 2. Retrieved from https://www.theccc.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1785b-CCC_TechRep_
Singles_Book_1.pdf
CCC. (2015). The Fifth Carbon Budget—the next step towards a
low-carbon economy—November 2015. Retrieved from
https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11
/Committee-on-Climate-Change-Fifth-Carbon-Budget-
Report.pdf
CCC. (2016). Meeting Carbon Budgets—2016 Progress Report to
Parliament. Retrieved from https://www.theccc.org.
uk/publications/
DaSilva, C. M., & Trkman, P. (2014). Business model: what it is
and what it is not. Long Range Planning, 47(6), 379–389.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2013.08.004.
Davies, M., & Oreszczyn, T. (2012). The unintended conse-
quences of decarbonising the built environment: A UK case
study. Energy and Buildings, 46, 80–85.
DeGroote,M., Lefever,M., & Reinaud, J. (2016). Scaling up deep
energy renovation unleashing the potential through innova-
tion & industrialisation.
DECC (2015). Energy efficiency statistical summary 2015 Energy
Efficiency Deployment Office.
Donovan, C., &Corbishley, C. (2016). The cost of capital and how
it affects climate change mitigation investment. Grantham
Institute Briefing Paper, (15). Retrieved from www.
imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications
Dowson, M., Poole, A., Harrison, D., & Susman, G. (2012).
Domestic UK retrofit challenge: barriers, incentives and cur-
rent performance leading into the Green Deal. Energy Policy,
50, 294–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.019.
Duplessis, B., Adnot, J., Dupont, M., & Racapé, F. (2012). An
empirical typology of energy services based on a well-
developed market: France. Energy Policy, 45, 268–276.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.031.
Edrich, B., Beagley, K., Webber, P., & Kelling, S. (2010). Kirklees
warm zone final report 2007–2010, 25.
Element Energy (2013). Review of potential for carbon savings
from residential energy efficiency. Retrieved from
https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12
/Review-of-potential-for-carbon-savings-from-residential-
energy-efficiency-Final-report-A-160114.pdf.
Energiesprong (2014). Transition Zero, 1–30.
Energiesprong (2017). United Kingdom—Energiesprong.
Retrieved March 7, 2017, from http://energiesprong.
eu/country/united-kingdom/.
Engelken, M., Römer, B., Drescher, M., Welpe, I. M., & Picot, A.
(2016). Comparing drivers, barriers, and opportunities of
business models for renewable energies: a review.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 60, 795–809.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.163.
Eriksson, P. E. (2008). Procurement and governance management:
development of a conceptual procurement model based on
different types of control. EconStor., 91, 558–564. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10273-011-1262-2.
EST (2011). Local authority large scale retrofit: a review of finance
models. Retrieved from http://www.energysavingtrust.org.
uk /Pub l i ca t ions2 /Loca l -de l ive ry /Fund ing-and-
finance/Local-authority-large-scale-retrofit-A-review-of-
finance-models.
Foxon, T. J., Bale, C. S. E., Busch, J., Bush, R., Hall, S., &
Roelich, K. (2015). Low carbon infrastructure investment:
extending business models for sustainability. Infrastructure
Complexity, 2(1), 4. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40551-015-
0009-4.
Fylan, F., Glew, D., Smith, M., Johnston, D., Brooke-Peat, M.,
Miles-Shenton, D., Fletcher, M., Aloise-Young, P., & Gorse,
Energy Efficiency
C. (2016). Reflections on retrofits: overcoming barriers to
energy efficiency among the fuel poor in the United
Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science, 21, 190–198.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.08.002.
Gauthier, C., & Gilomen, B. (2016). Business models for sustain-
ability: energy efficiency in urban districts. Organization &
Environment, 29(1), 124–144. https://doi.org/10.1177
/1086026615592931.
GLA. (2017). RE:NEW success | London City Hall. Retrieved
March 7, 2017, from https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-
do/environment/energy/renew-0/renew-success.
Gouldson, A., Kerr, N., Millward-Hopkins, J., Freeman, M. C.,
Topi, C., & Sullivan, R. (2015). Innovative financing models
for low carbon transitions: exploring the case for revolving
funds for domestic energy efficiency programmes. Energy
Policy, 86 , 739–748. ht tps: / /doi .org/10.1016/j .
enpol.2015.08.012.
GOV.UK (2017). Standard Assessment Procedure —GOV.UK.
Retrieved September 28, 2017, from https://www.gov.
uk/guidance/standard-assessment-procedure.
Gram-Hanssen, K. (2014). Retrofitting owner-occupied housing:
remember the people. Building Research & Information,
4 2 ( 4 ) , 3 9 3 – 3 9 7 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 0 8 0
/09613218.2014.911572.
Guertler, P., & Rosenow, J. (2016). Buildings and the 5th carbon
budget. London.
Gupta, R., & Chandiwala, S. (2010). Understanding occupants:
feedback techniques for large-scale low-carbon domestic
refurbishments. Building Research & Information, 38(5),
530–548. https://doi.org/10.1080/09613218.2010.495216.
Hall, S., & Roelich, K. (2016). Business model innovation in
electricity supply markets: the role of complex value in the
United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 92, 286–298. https://doi.
org/10.1016/J.ENPOL.2016.02.019.
Hannon, M. J., & Bolton, R. (2015). UK Local Authority engage-
ment with the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model: key
characteristics, benefits, limitations and considerations.
Energy Policy, 78, 198–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2014.11.016.
Hannon, M. J., Foxon, T. J., & Gale, W. F. (2015). BDemand pull^
government policies to support Product-Service System ac-
tivity: The case of Energy Service Companies (ESCos) in the
UK. Journal of Cleaner Production, 108, 1–16. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.05.082.
Hansford, P. (2015). Solid wall insulations: unlocking demand and
driving up standards. London.
Hellström, M., Tsvetkova, A., Gustafsson, M., & Wikström, K.
(2015). Collaboration mechanisms for business models in
distributed energy ecosystems. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 102, 226–236. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jclepro.2015.04.128.
Irrek, W., Suerkemper, F., Labanca, N., & Bertoldi, P. (2013).
ESCOs for residential buildings: market situation in the
European Union and policy recommendations. ECEEE
Summer Study Proceedings, 1339–1347.
Jankel, Z. (2013). Delivering and funding housing retrofit: a
review of community models. Retrieved from http://www.
instituteforsustainability.co.uk/uploads/File/Delivering and
Funding Housing Retrofit report_March 2013.pdf.
Kangas, H.-L., Lazarevic, D., & Kivimaa, P. (2017). Technical
skills, disinterest and non- functional regulation: energy
efficiency barriers viewed in an ecosystem of energy service
companies. Energy Policy, 114, 63–76. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.11.060.
Kats, G., Menkin, A., Dommu, J., & Debold, M. (2011). Energy
efficiency financing—models and strategies. Capital E.
Kelly, S., Crawford-Brown, D., & Pollitt, M. G. (2012). Building
performance evaluation and certification in theUK: is SAP fit
for purpose? Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,
16 ( 9 ) , 6861–6878 . h t t p s : / / do i . o rg / 10 . 1016 / j .
rser.2012.07.018.
Kim, C., O’Connor, R., & Bodden, K. (2012). Innovations and
opportunities in energy efficiency finance. Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati. Retrieved from http://www.wsgr.
com/publications/pdfsearch/wsgr-ee-finance-white-paper.
pdf.
Kindström, D., & Ottosson, M. (2016). Local and regional energy
companies offering energy services: key activities and impli-
cations for the business model. Applied Energy, 171, 491–
500. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.03.092.
Kivimaa, P., & Martiskainen, M. (2017). Innovation, low energy
buildings and intermediaries in Europe: systematic case study
review. Energy Efficiency, 11(1), 31–51. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12053-017-9547-y.
Knoeri, C., Steinberger, J. K., & Roelich, K. (2016). End-user
centred infrastructure operation: towards integrated end-use
service delivery. Journal of Cleaner Production, 132, 229–
239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.08.079.
Koh, L., Jones, C. R., Genovese, A., Acquaye, A., Marchand, R.,
& Scott, F. (2013). Promoting the Green Deal to low income
communities: initial insights from Yorkshire & The Humber.
Sheffield.
Kvale, S. (2008). Doing interviews. Sage.
Labanca, N., Suerkemper, F., Bertoldi, P., Irrek, W., & Duplessis,
B. (2014). Energy efficiency services for residential build-
ings: market situation and existing potentials in the European
Union. Journal of Cleaner Production, 109, 284–295.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.02.077.
Lewis, J., & Smith, L. (2013). Breaking the barriers: an industry
review of the barriers to Whole House Energy Efficiency
Retrofit and the creation of an industry action plan—Energy
Efficiency Partnership for Buildings (EEPB) (Vol. 86).
Long, T. B., Young, W., Webber, P., Gouldson, A., & Harwatt, H.
(2015). The impact of domestic energy efficiency retrofit
schemes on householder attitudes and behaviours. Journal
of Environmental Planning and Management, 58(10), 1853–
1876. https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2014.965299.
Lopez, F. J. D., Becker, J., Eris, B., Koers, W., & Bastein, T.
(2014). New business models that support resource
efficiency.
Mahapatra, K., Gustavsson, L., Haavik, T., Aabrekk, S., Svendsen,
S., Vanhoutteghem, L., Paiho, S., & Ala-Juusela, M. (2013).
Business models for full service energy renovation of single-
family houses in Nordic countries. Applied Energy, 112,
1558–1565. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.01.010.
Mallaburn, P. S., & Eyre, N. (2014). Lessons from energy effi-
ciency policy and programmesin the UK from 1973 to 2013.
Energy Efficiency, 7, 23–41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-
013-9197-7.
Marchand, R. D., Koh, S. C. L., &Morris, J. C. (2015). Delivering
energy efficiency and carbon reduction schemes in England:
lessons from Green Deal Pioneer Places. Energy Policy,
Energy Efficiency
84(January 2013), 96–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2015.04.035.
Milin, C., & Bullier, A. (2011). Energy retrofitting of social
housing through energy performance contracts. A feedback
from the FRESH project : France , Italy , United Kingdom
and Bulgaria. FRESH (financing energy refurbishment for
social housing).
Milsom, E. (2016). Solid wall heat losses and the potential for
energy saving. Consequences for consideration to maximise
SWI benefits: a route-map for change. Watford. Retrieved
from www.bre.co.uk
Mlecnik, E., Kondratenko, I., Cré, J., Vrijders, J., Degraeve, P.,
Van Der Have, J. A., … Paiho, S. (2012). Collaboration
opportunities in advanced housing renovation. Energy
Procedia, 30, 1380–1389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
egypro.2012.11.152
Moschetti, R., & Brattebø, H. (2016). Sustainable business models
for deep energy retrofitting of buildings: state-of-the-art and
methodological approach. Energy Procedia, 96(1876), 435–
445. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2016.09.174.
Nolden, C., Sorrell, S., & Polzin, F. (2016). Catalysing the energy
service market: the role of intermediaries. Energy Policy, 98,
420–430.
Ofgem. (2016). Switching Programme Design Principles V1.0
DESIGN PRINCIPLES Impacts on customers. Retrieved
from https://w0077w.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016
/06/switching_programme_design_principles.pdf
Okkonen, L., & Suhonen, N. (2010). Business models of heat
entrepreneurship in Finland. Energy Policy, 38(7), 3443–
3452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.018.
Osterwalder, A. (2004). Business model ontology—PhD Thesis.
l’Université de Lausanne.
Osterwalder, A., & Pigneur, Y. (2010). Businessmodel generation:
a handbook for visionaries, game changers, and challengers.
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0307-10.2010.
Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., & Tucci, C. L. (2005). Clarifying
business models: origins, present, and future of the concept.
Communications of the Association for Information Systems,
16(16), 1–25. http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol16/iss1/1.
Owen, A., Mitchell, G., & Gouldson, A. (2014). Unseen influ-
ence—the role of low carbon retrofit advisers and installers in
the adoption and use of domestic energy technology. Energy
Policy, 73 , 169–179. ht tps: / /doi .org/10.1016/j .
enpol.2014.06.013.
Pätäri, S., & Sinkkonen, K. (2014). Energy service companies and
energy performance contracting: is there a need to renew the
business model? Insights from a Delphi study. Journal of
Cleaner Production, 66, 264–271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jclepro.2013.10.017.
Pettifor, H., Wilson, C., & Chryssochoidis, G. (2015). The appeal
of the green deal: empirical evidence for the influence of
energy efficiency policy on renovating homeowners. Energy
Policy, 79 , 161–176. ht tps: / /doi .org/10.1016/j .
enpol.2015.01.015.
Richter, M. (2012). Utilities’ business models for renewable ener-
gy: a review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,
16 ( 5 ) , 2483–2493 . h t t p s : / / do i . o rg / 10 . 1016 / j .
rser.2012.01.072.
Roelich, K., Knoeri, C., Steinberger, J. K., Varga, L., Blythe, P. T.,
Butler, D., Gupta, R., Harrison, G. P., Martin, C., & Purnell,
P. (2015). Towards resource-efficient and service-oriented
integrated infrastructure operation. Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 92, 40–52. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.11.008.
Rosenow, J., & Eyre, N. (2016). A post mortem of the Green Deal:
austerity, energy efficiency, and failure in British energy
policy. Energy Research and Social Science, 21, 141–144.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.07.005.
Seyfang, G., Park, J. J., & Smith, A. (2013). A thousand flowers
blooming? An examination of community energy in the UK.
Energy Policy, 61, 977–989. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2013.06.030.
Snape, J. R., Boait, P. J., & Rylatt, R. M. (2015). Will domestic
consumers take up the renewable heat incentive? An analysis
of the barriers to heat pump adoption using agent-based
modelling. Energy Policy, 85, 32–38. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.05.008.
Sorrell, S. (2007). The economics of energy service contracts.
Energy Policy, 35(1), 507–521. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2005.12.009.
Sorrell, S., Schleich, J., O’Malley, E., & Scott, S. (2004). The
economics of energy efficiency: barriers to cost-effective
investment. Books. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Sovacool, B. K. (2015). Fuel poverty, affordability, and energy
justice in England: policy insights from the Warm Front
Program. Energy, 93, 361–371. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
energy.2015.09.016.
Steinberger, J. K., van Niel, J., & Bourg, D. (2009). Profiting from
negawatts: reducing absolute consumption and emissions
through a performance-based energy economy. Energy
Policy, 37(1), 361–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2008.08.030.
Stieb, I., & Dunkelberg, E. (2013). Objectives, barriers and occa-
sions for energy efficient refurbishment by private
homeowners. Journal of Cleaner Production, 48, 250–259.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.09.041.
Straub, A. (2016). Cohereno: COllaboration for Housing Nearly
Zero-Energy RENOvation publishable report. Delft.
R e t r i e v e d f r o m h t t p : / / w w w . c o h e r e n o .
eu/fileadmin/media/Dateien/COHERENO-Publishable-
Report-2016.pdf
Sunikka-Blank, M., & Galvin, R. (2016). Irrational homeowners?
How aesthetics and heritage values influence thermal retrofit
decisions in the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social
Science , 11 , 97–108. ht tps: / /doi .org/10.1016/ j .
erss.2015.09.004.
Sweatman, P., &Managan, K. (2010). Financing energy efficiency
building retrofits international policy and business model
review and regulatory alternatives for Spain. Climate
Strategy and Partners. Madrid. Retrieved from www.
climatestrategy.es
Teece, D. J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and inno-
vation. Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 172–194. https://doi.
org/10.1016/J.LRP.2009.07.003.
The Rockefeller Foundation, & DB Climate Change Advisors
(2012). United States building energy efficiency retrofits
market sizing and financing models.
Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007). Modes of governance:
towards a conceptual clarification. Journal of European
Public Policy, 14(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080
/135017606061071406.
Energy Efficiency
Upward, A., & Jones, P. (2015). An ontology for strongly sustain-
able business models: defining an enterprise framework com-
patible with natural and social science. Organization &
Env i ro nmen t , 1–27 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1177
/1086026615592933.
Watson, A. (2014). To what extent has Green Deal policy facili-
tated energy efficiency retrofit supply chain development: a
case study of Birmingham.
Webb, J., Hawkey, D., & Tingey, M. (2016). Governing cities for
sustainable energy: the UK case. Cities, 54, 28–35.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.10.014.
Willand, N. ., Ridley, I. ., & Maller, C. . (2015). Towards
explaining the health impacts of residential energy efficiency
interventions—a realist review. Part 1: Pathways. Social
Science and Medicine, 133, 191–201. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.02.005.
Wilson, C., Crane, L., & Chryssochoidis, G. (2015). Why do
homeowners renovate energy efficiently? Contrasting per-
spectives and implications for policy. Energy Research and
Social Science, 7, 12–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
erss.2015.03.002.
Winther, T., & Gurigard, K. (2017). Energy performance
contracting (EPC): a suitable mechanism for achieving ener-
gy savings in housing cooperatives? Results from a
Norwegian pilot project. Energy Efficiency, 10(3), 577–596.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-016-9477-0.
Zott, C., & Amit, R. (2010). Business model design: an activity
system perspective. Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 216–
226. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2009.07.004.
Zott, C., Amit, R., &Massa, L. (2011). The business model: recent
developments and future research. Journal of Management,
3 7 ( 4 ) , 1 0 1 9 – 1 0 4 2 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 11 7 7
/0149206311406265.
Energy Efficiency
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Worth the risk? An evaluation of alternative finance mechanisms for
residential retrofit
Donal Browna,c,⁎, Steve Sorrella, Paula Kivimaaa,b
a Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand, Sussex Energy Group, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Jubilee Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK
b Finnish Environment Institute SYKE, Mechelininkatu 34a, Helsinki, Finland
c School of Earth and Environment, The University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Energy efficiency
Finance
Retrofit
Split incentives
Domestic buildings
Cost of capital
A B S T R A C T
Improving energy efficiency, de-carbonising heating and cooling, and increasing renewable microgeneration in
existing residential buildings, is crucial for meeting social and climate policy objectives. This paper explores the
challenges of financing this ‘retrofit’ activity. First, it develops a typology of finance mechanisms for residential
retrofit highlighting their key design features, including: the source of capital; the financial instrument(s); the
project performance requirements; the point of sale; the nature of the security and underwriting the repayment
channel and customer journey. Combining information from interviews and documentary sources, the paper ex-
plores how these design features influence the success of the finance mechanisms in different contexts. First, it is
shown that a low cost of capital for retrofit finance is critical to the economic viability of whole-house retrofits.
Second, by funding non-energy measures such as general improvement works, finance mechanisms can enable
broader sources of value that are more highly prized by households. Thirdly, mechanisms that reduce complexity
by simplifying the customer journey are likely to achieve much higher levels of uptake. Most importantly we
discuss how finance alone is unlikely to be a driver of demand for whole-house retrofit, and so instead should be
viewed as a necessary component of a much broader retrofit strategy.
1. Introduction
CO2 emissions from energy used in residential buildings result from
space and water heating, and electricity used for cooling, lighting and
appliances. These emissions constitute a significant proportion of total
emissions in advanced economies (IPCC, 2014). Aside from more effi-
cient appliances and behavioural changes, emissions from the existing
building stock can be reduced by the retrofit of three main types of
measure: improving the energy efficiency (EE) of the building fabric;
adopting low carbon heating, ventilation and cooling technologies
(HVAC); and building integrated electricity microgeneration, such as
solar photovoltaics (PV) (CCC, 2013). Thus, in this paper ‘retrofit’ fi-
nance potentially includes funding for all three types of intervention.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have set ambitious
goals for the retrofit of buildings (50% energy reduction from 2050
baseline scenario (IPCC, 2014)), to keep global temperature rises below
2 °C as part of the 2015 Paris agreement. Since 1970 emissions from all
buildings have more than doubled and in 2010 constituted around 19%
of global carbon emissions (IPCC, 2014). Many retrofit measures deliver
net cost savings or are cost effective,1 when compared to other climate
mitigation measures (CCC, 2018; IEA, 2017). However, delivering these
ambitious targets, will necessitate increasingly comprehensive ‘whole-
house’ retrofits, involving multiple integrated building fabric, HVAC,
and microgeneration measures (Brown, 2018).
Delivering the 2 °C scenario will require an estimated $31Tn of in-
vestment in buildings globally over the next four decades (IEA, 2013). A
significant proportion of historical energy efficiency measures has in-
volved self-financing by firms and households (IEA, 2017; Webber
et al., 2015). However, an important source of EE investment in recent
years in both Europe and North America (12% of total) has come from
market based instruments such as supplier obligation policies, paid for
by a levy on electricity and gas bills (IEA, 2017). These policies have
typically delivered single home retrofit measures (Rosenow, 2012).
Achieving sufficient ‘whole house’ retrofits through supplier
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.12.033
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obligations alone could lead to significant increases in household en-
ergy bills (Kern et al., 2017), thus having a negative impact on low
income households who do not undertake retrofit measures (Rosenow
et al., 2013b). Whilst ‘fuel poverty’2 objectives could be better achieved
through general taxation (Rosenow et al., 2013b), there is a need for
effective, repayable finance mechanisms for the ‘able-to-pay’ segments
(Freehling and Stickles, 2016).
In this paper, finance mechanisms are considered distinct from
targeted subsidies, supplier obligations (IEA, 2017), or fiscal incentive
schemes such as property tax breaks (Rosenow et al., 2014). A finance
mechanism is thus defined as the provision of capital for retrofit mea-
sures through equity and/or debt that is repaid to the lender (Leventis
et al., 2017). A range of retrofit finance mechanisms have been devel-
oped, in the European Union (EU) and USA. The features of and reasons
for success of these alternative approaches are the main focus of this
study.
A comprehensive study of finance mechanisms for domestic retrofit
is largely absent from the academic literature - with most studies
published being non-academic, having limited consideration for the
specific issues of residential buildings, or involving a different unit of
analysis, such as supplier obligations (Rosenow, 2012). Further, an
empirical investigation of factors that contribute to household appeal
and the cost of capital is presently lacking. The role of different types of
financing and their impact on projects remains somewhat of a ‘black
box’ in the energy studies field more generally. This paper aims to open
up the features of alternative finance mechanisms, and to understand
the extent to which they can promote the uptake of whole-house retrofit
-drawing on selected examples in Europe and North America.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background
to the context of residential retrofit and reviews the literature on ret-
rofit finance. Section 3 introduces the conceptual framework for the
features of finance mechanisms along with the cost of capital. Section 4
outlines the methodology. Section 5 introduces a new typology of ret-
rofit finance mechanisms, while Section 6 describes how these me-
chanisms differ according to the framework. Section 7 discusses the
findings. Section 8 concludes and provides recommendations for policy
and research. A glossary of key financial terminology used in the paper
is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
2. Background on energy efficiency, residential retrofit and
finance
Residential retrofit produces a range of environmental, social and
economic benefits, making it an important area for academic and policy
research (Kerr et al., 2017). Energy savings from residential retrofit and
a shift away from fossil fuel-based heating and cooling have the po-
tential to significantly mitigate anthropogenic climate change. The
IPCC (2014) estimate that, through improved EE, energy use from
buildings could be stabilised by mid-century, compared to a current
baseline where this is set to double. Thus, the EU has set a target of 27%
improvement in EE by 2030 (EC, 2014) and the revised Directive for the
Energy Performance of Buildings has set a near zero-energy aspiration
for the existing building stock (EC, 2018). Residential retrofits have also
been shown to improve occupant health and wellbeing (Curl et al.,
2015; Willand et al., 2015), reduce fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015) and
lead to job creation and economic growth (EEFIG, 2015; Washan et al.,
2014). Retrofit may also produce private benefits to households, in-
cluding increased property value (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Fuerst et al.,
2015), significant savings in energy bills and improved thermal comfort
(Aravena et al., 2016; Gillingham et al., 2009). However, much of this
potential remains unexploited.
The lack of investment in seemingly cost effective EE measures, is
commonly termed the ‘energy efficiency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).
Firms, public sector actors and households are seen to underinvest in
EE, due to multiple ‘barriers’ that constrain uptake (Kangas et al., 2018;
Sorrell et al., 2004). Although many factors that contribute to a low
demand for EE are likely to be outside of what financing alone can
achieve (Wilson et al., 2015), tailored financing solutions can make an
important contribution to the uptake of retrofit measures (Rezessy and
Bertoldi, 2010), particularly in the residential sector (Freehling and
Stickles, 2016).
Historically, a large proportion of global investment in residential
retrofit has involved either self-financing or energy supplier obligations
(IEA, 2017). However, meeting the 2 °C target will likely require third-
party sources of finance (EEFIG, 2015), particularly as energy suppliers
see their market capitalisation shrink and attempt to de-leverage3 their
balance sheets due to declining revenues and market share (Blyth et al.,
2015; Bolton and Foxon, 2015). Incumbent energy suppliers also lack
incentives to fund EE investments, as their current business model relies
on increasing throughput sales of energy (Knoeri et al., 2016). Existing
financial institutions, such as banks and institutional investors, also
remain reticent towards such investment due to an unfamiliarity with
the technologies, regulatory risk, short investment horizons, high
transaction costs and a lack of suitable finance mechanisms (Bolton and
Foxon, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; Stone, 2014).
The United Kingdom's (UK) ‘Green Deal’ policy provides an inter-
esting case of an innovative finance mechanism, intended to deliver
approximately 2 million retrofit installations per year and leverage
billions of pounds of investment. The scheme was based on private
sector lending to households, paid back through a levy on energy bill-
s–known as ‘on-bill repayment’ (OBR). However, the scheme only
achieved a fraction of its target, and resulted in a significant loss to UK
taxpayers before its premature scrappage in 2015 (Rosenow and Eyre,
2016).
A range of more successful retrofit finance mechanisms, however,
provide some important lessons (EEFIG, 2015). Examples include the
USA's Property Assisted Clean Energy finance (PACE) programmes (Kim
et al., 2012); low cost loans delivered by the German KfW state bank
(Schröder et al., 2011); other forms of on-bill-financing and repayment
(On-bill) (Zimring et al., 2014a); green mortgages (Ecology Building
Society, 2017); and state-backed guarantee funds (Borgeson et al.,
2013). In addition, energy service agreements (ESA), where finance for
measures is procured upstream by an Energy Service Company (ESCo)
as part of an energy saving performance contract have been used in
multi-family housing and commercial buildings (Labanca et al., 2014).
Yet, academic studies on alternative approaches to EE finance are
largely absent from the energy and climate journals, with leading fi-
nance journals largely silent on energy issues in general (Diaz-Rainey
et al., 2017). The literature on ‘green finance’ has tended to focus on
high level flows of energy finance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018), or
the challenges of funding large renewable energy projects (Blyth et al.,
2015). Hall et al. (2016) also highlight the challenges of financing
distributed energy systems, where differing national institutional con-
texts influence the financial solutions available.
A handful studies have discussed the potential of alterative retrofit
finance mechanisms, including potential revolving retrofit funds
(Gouldson et al., 2015), the UK's Green Deal (Marchand et al., 2015;
Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), and the successful German KfW programme
(Rosenow et al., 2013a). Others have explored how energy performance
contracts could finance residential retrofit (Winther and Gurigard,
2017) but have not foregrounded the financial component of such
models. Bergman and Foxon (2017) discussed the challenges for
2 The definition of fuel poverty in the UK, is where fuel costs that are above
average (the national median level), and these fuel costs leave a residual in-
come that is below the UK's official poverty line (DECC, 2013).
3 Leverage involves the use of borrowed money: typically, the use of various
forms of debt. Firms or projects may be considered over leveraged when their
balance sheets excessive levels of debt compared to equity.
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reorienting finance towards EE in the UK and argue for a re-framing of
EE as infrastructure financing. Previous work has also discussed the
potential of novel financing solutions for overcoming the spilt incentive
barrier (Bird and Hernández, 2012). But taken together, these studies
provide only limited insights into what the features of a successful fi-
nance mechanism might be. This paper seeks to address this gap in the
literature.
3. Features of a finance mechanism and the cost of capital
Access to capital and split incentives are a significant barrier to re-
sidential retrofit. Often household savings or conventional financing
solutions, such as secured and unsecured loans may be unavailable, or
unsuitable (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010). Many also face split incentives
- where the benefits of an investment do not fully accrue to the investor
(Bird and Hernández, 2012). The classic example is the pervasive
‘landlord tenant dilemma’, where energy savings accrue to the tenant,
with the landlord making the investment. Homeowners may also face
split incentives if they move out before their initial investment has been
recovered and if the value of that investment cannot be capitalised in
the sale price. Thus, many conventional forms of financing4 do not
address split incentives (Bird and Hernández, 2012). In response, a
range of retrofit finance mechanisms have been developed to overcome
these barriers (EEFIG, 2015). Fig. 1 summarises the conceptual frame-
work of key design features of finance mechanisms, which are described
in detail in Table 1.
Fig. 1. Process diagram of an EE finance mechanism.
4 Conventional forms of financing such as home equity, credit cards, bank
loans or conventional mortgages are excluded from this study. Whilst these
approaches may be used to fund retrofit measures they are considered distinct
from mechanisms designed to fund energy efficiency specifically - as the latter
are designed to utilise the savings generated from the retrofit measures and in
many cases to overcome specific barriers such as split incentives.
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Table 1
The key design features of finance mechanisms.
Feature Description
Source of capital • Investment in EE may come from single or multiple sources. Banks, institutional investors, firms, governments or even citizens may provide
financing.• Debt is typically provided by banks and institutional investors, whilst other non-financial corporations may also provide loans (Buchner et al., 2015b).• Equity providers tend to be different (although there is often overlap) and can include project developers, ESCOs, co-operatives, private investors/
citizens and venture capital funds (Buchner et al., 2015a).• Public bodies may provide all of the capital, or provide credit enhancementsa including: juniorb (high risk) debt with private finance providers providing
the senior (low risk) debt (EEFIG, 2015); interest rate reductions (Gouldson et al., 2015); or credit guarantee funds – all with the aim of reducing risk,
the cost of capital and leveraging private funding (Zimring, 2014a).
Financial instrument • Finance may take the form of debt or equity, or a combination of the two.c• Debt finance typically consists of loans provided by financial institutions or equipment providers in the form of leases (Sorrell, 2005). Debt may be
issued directly to the homeowner or upstream to energy suppliers, ESCOs or to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)d (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010).• Securitisatione involves aggregating loans into tradeable ‘securities’, thus drawing in sources of capital who would normally only invest in larger
projects (OECD, 2015). Small scale loans to households can be aggregated and securitised and sold into secondary markets,f often in the form of bonds
(Borgeson et al., 2013).• Equity takes the form of part ownership or share issues. Stakeholder models such as cooperatives adopt largely equity based approaches (Walker,
2008), although in commercial finance equity tends to be costlierg than debt (Tapia, 2012), despite its theoretical equivalence (Modigliani and Miller,
1958). The majority of domestic retrofit schemes are debt-financed, although ESCOs may use their own equity to finance projects, as part of energy
performance contracts (Leventis et al., 2017).
Project performance • The post intervention performance of EE retrofits is of critical importance to both financiers and building occupants. Evaluating the potential of a
retrofit is likely to require an energy model and audit and ideally data on past energy consumption (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010).• Financiers may place a range of requirements on project performance. This may include requirements that measures are ‘cash-flow positive’ meaning
that finance repayments are less than or equal to energy bill savings – often referred to as energy bill neutrality (Borgeson et al., 2013).• Savings-backed arrangements such as energy performance contracts include requirements for actual energy performance outcomes, such as kW h
savings, guaranteed cost reductions or even guaranteed temperatures (Sorrell, 2005).• Financiers may also require projects to be standardised to best practice guidelines (Investor Confidence Project, 2015) or be accredited to industry
quality standards (Bonfield, 2016). Alternatively, funders may place less strict requirements on energy performance outcomes, or enable wider non-
energy measures to be funded (Borgeson et al., 2013).
Point of sale • The point of sale is the interface through which the customer accesses finance. The nature of this interface has important implications for the
customer journeyh (Norton et al., 2013) for a retrofit project.• In many cases, finance has a separate point of sale from the contractor providing the retrofit measures. This may include the use of the customer's
existing bank (Schröder et al., 2011), a special mortgage product (Ecology Building Society, 2017) or an additional third party provider. In other cases
the retrofit provider may offer an integrated finance package as part of the retrofit, or as part of an energy performance contract (Borgeson et al.,
2013).• Previous studies have shown that the uptake of retrofit schemes is strongly influenced by how information is presented (Hoicka et al., 2014; Long
et al., 2015); the nature of the financial rewards (upfront payments or long term savings) (Collins et al., 2018); and the channels through which the
scheme is promoted (Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2011).
Security and Underwriting • Mortgages are secured by the financial institution's ability to repossess the home should a customer default on their loan (Borgeson et al., 2013).
Other forms of security include property taxes or energy bills, meaning the threat of court proceedings or disconnection can be applied (Zimring,
2014b).• The underwriting process is how financiers determine the underlying credit-worthiness of the asset or borrower. Underwriting may be focussed upon
the asset to which finance is secured (i.e. the historic repayments of property taxes or energy bills), or upon the borrower through metrics such as
personal credit ratings (Leventis et al., 2017). Publicly funded programmes may place less emphasis on security and underwriting, particularly if they
are targeting low-income households (EEFIG, 2015).
Repayment channel • The repayment channel is how funds are repaid to the creditor or shareholders. A range of repayment channels exist for EE projects and are an
important area for new policy and legal frameworks (EEFIG, 2015).• Repayments can be made through conventional personal or corporate loan repayments, through energy bills, service charges, collected via property
taxes or through rent or mortgage repayments.• Equity returns are then distributed through dividends, although these may be contingent on the performance of the asset or company (EEFIG, 2015).
Further, equity release models may only require payment once the property is sold (Scottish Government, 2017). Where repayments are linked to the
underlying asset such as with property taxes or energy bills, this can enable transferability of the retrofit finance from one occupant to the next,
thereby addressing split incentive problems (Borgeson et al., 2013).
Customer Journey • The customer journey is defined as the sequence of events that customers experience to learn about, purchase and interact with products and
services (Norton et al., 2013). Although individual elements of a finance mechanism influence the customer journey, the concept summarizes the
household's experience of how these elements are integrated.• Complex or lengthy customer journeys have been shown to negatively impact the uptake of residential retrofit finance (O’Keeffe et al., 2016). Specific
issues include poor integration with the timing of wider renovations (Fawcett, 2014), complex applications and limited information (Marchand et al.,
2015), low trust in the provider (Risholt and Berker, 2013), and a lack of co-ordination with the supply chain (Brown, 2018).
a Credit enhancements are a set of approaches usually offered by public actors, which reduce lender or investor risk by providing some form of protection or
guarantee in the event of default, bankruptcy or delinquency.
b Junior Debt is a loan or security that ranks below other loans or securities with regard to claims on assets or earnings. Junior debt is also known as a ‘Subordinated
debt’ or subordinated loan. In the case of borrower default, creditors who own subordinated debt won't be paid out until after senior debtholders are paid in full.
c Many retrofit programmes may be partly based on grants or other public subsides, however the focus of this study is to analyse the dynamics of the finance
mechanisms, rather than the influence of grants or subsidy instruments on the underlying economic viability of retrofit measures.
d A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a company with a specific and often short-term purpose, with a structure and legal status that allows the SPV to fail or go
bankrupt without bringing down the wider organisations involved the transaction. They are designed isolate risk and allow organisations to finance projects ‘off
balance sheet’.
e Securitisation is a form of financial engineering where groups of illiquid assets are bundled together, often by aggregating multiple smaller securities, and
transforming them into a tradable security in secondary markets.
f A secondary market allows for securities (such as loans) to be resold, often in aggregation and are thus second hand.
g Debt is senior to equity, so in a bankruptcy, the debt holders get paid before the equity holders. Therefore, equity providers (shareholders) require dividends that
tend to reflect these higher risks with higher associated rewards and are often linked to project profitability.
h The customer journey is defined as the sequence of events that customers experience in order to learn about, purchase and interact with products and services
(Norton et al., 2013).
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3.1. The features of a finance mechanism and the customer journey
See Fig. 1 and Table 1.
3.2. The cost of capital
The cost of capital is of critical importance for determining the
economics of capital-intensive investments, such as retrofit (Donovan
and Corbishley, 2016). The cost of capital consists of the weighted
average cost of debt (e.g. the interest rates attached to a bank loan) and
equity (e.g. the returns required by shareholders). Due to the effects of
compound interest, the cost of capital has increasing significance for
long term, capital-intensive investments (Donovan and Corbishley,
2016).
Fig. 2 provides a simple illustration. Assuming a fixed repayment of
£100/month and a loan maturity of 20 years, the figure shows the total
amount that can be borrowed at 0%, 5% and 10% interest rates re-
spectively. Whilst a household could borrow £ 24,000 (the principal) at
0%, this reduces to £14,954.65 at 5%, and only £10,216.27 at 10% –
where at 10% the total interest is higher than the principal. Conse-
quently, assuming fixed payments and loan term, the cost of capital
limits the amount that can be borrowed and in turn the extent of the
retrofit measures funded.
Previous studies show that the interest rates on loans can limit the
appeal of retrofit finance mechanisms such as the UK's Green Deal
(Marchand et al., 2015; Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), whilst low interest
rates were an important success factor in Germany's KfW scheme
(Rosenow et al., 2013a; Schröder et al., 2011). This high cost of capital
is also likely to significantly limit the feasible range of retrofit measures
that can be funded (UKGBC, 2014). However, Borgeson et al. (2014)
question the extent to which the cost of capital is a barrier, emphasising
how high interest credit card financing for retrofit remains prevalent in
the USA.
4. Methods
This study takes a qualitative approach, involving analysis of in-
terviews and secondary data, including a comprehensive review of the
‘grey literature’ on EE finance. Whilst there are few academic studies on
the topic, numerous policy briefs, publicly commissioned studies and
consultancy reports exist from a range of public, private and third
sector sources. This review identified several texts with recurring de-
scriptions of the key approaches to retrofit finance in both domestic and
commercial buildings (EEFIG, 2015; EST, 2011; Investor Confidence
Project, 2015; Kats et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Sweatman, 2012;
Sweatman and Managan, 2010; The Rockefeller Foundation and DB
Climate Change Advisors, 2012; Zimring, 2014b). Examination of this
literature led to the development of a typology of six archetypes of
finance mechanisms used to fund residential retrofit in the EU and USA.
For simplicity, some archetypes, such as public guarantee funds and
state bank loans were aggregated under a single heading, whilst others,
such as leasing, were excluded due to limited examples being available
in the residential sector. This typology is summarised in Table 2 and
described in detail in Section 5.
Subsequently, eighteen semi structured interviews were carried out,
split into two phases: ‘expert scoping’ and ‘practitioner’ interviews.
During Spring/Summer 2017, eight prominent experts (Table B1) in the
EE finance community were interviewed. Several interviewees were
authors in the key texts described above, notably the European Com-
mission funded Energy Efficiency Finance Group report (EEFIG, 2015),
whilst others were selected through personal contacts and snowballing
techniques (Yin, 1994). The aim was to understand the key drivers and
barriers for residential EE financing; which design features of a finance
mechanism are most important; and why certain approaches are more
effective. Information was also sought on how the policy and institu-
tional context shapes the preference for and viability of different ap-
proaches.
Building on the insights from the expert interviews, a protocol was
developed to interview practitioners pertaining to each of the six fi-
nance mechanisms in the proposed typology. The aim was to include at
least two representatives of each type, with the sample drawn from the
EU and the USA. Many of the mechanisms under study, such as PACE,
have only been adopted in certain USA states, notably California.
Understanding both the mechanism's features and the policy and in-
stitutional context in which they operate is therefore important.
Questions were designed to probe each of the design features of finance
mechanisms (described in Section 3), and the drivers and barriers to the
adoption of those mechanisms, including broader contextual factors.
During Summer/Autumn 2017, ten semi-structured practitioner inter-
views (Table A1) were conducted.
Interviews were coded using the NVivo 11™ software, allowing
common themes to be identified along with areas for further in-
vestigation. This qualitative approach was considered appropriate,
given the need to develop a rich understanding of the role and im-
portance of different features of finance mechanisms, and their broader
contextual setting (Yin, 1994). The pre-testing of the framework with
‘experts’ was intended to prevent key approaches and elements being
missed, although it is acknowledged this could introduce bias in the
selection of interviewees.
5. Typology of retrofit finance mechanisms
Building on the review of grey literature, a number of distinct fi-
nance mechanisms can be identified. These approaches are dis-
tinguished by variations in the key features identified in Section 3. The
range of approaches to financing residential retrofit was discussed
Fig. 2. The impact of the interest rate on borrowing potential, assuming a fixed repayment and term.
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during the expert scoping interviews, leading to the development of a
typology of six archetypes of finance mechanism, namely, public loan/
credit enhancement, on-bill finance and repayment, property assessed clean
energy financing, green mortgages, energy service agreement financing, and
community financing. The typology is described in this section and
summarised in Table 2. The following types are drawn from prominent
contemporary examples and their nomenclature reflects common ter-
minology within the industry. The typology is ordered from the more
widespread publicly funded approaches, to the more niche community
financing.
Some overlap exists between the different archetypes, with the
possibility that hybrid forms may emerge.
5.1. Public loan/ credit enhancement
Public retrofit finance mechanisms typically involve low cost loans
provided by governments, but may also include a range of credit en-
hancements to be blended with private capital (EEFIG, 2015). The most
prominent example is Germany's CO2 Building Rehabilitation Pro-
gramme (CBRP). Germany's state bank, the KfW, provides loans to
households arranged through commercial banks. Funds are raised on
capital markets,5 and offered at very low rates of interest (> 2%)
(Rosenow et al., 2013a). The bank is able to offer these low rates pri-
marily due to its AAA rating; a product of its public status, with addi-
tional state funding to further subsidise interest rates (Schröder et al.,
2011). In 2007, the CBRP issued €5bn in loans, and the programme is
estimated to have reduced carbon emissions from the existing building
stock by 24% between 1990 and 2006, with an average of a 59% re-
duction per property in 2006 (Schröder et al., 2011).
Less well-known schemes are the Home Energy Scotland (HES) loan
and Home Energy Efficiency Programme for Scotland (HEEPS) equity
loans, funded by the Scottish government. Both programmes offer 0%6
interest loans. The HEEPS equity loan is repaid upon the sale of the
property. However, it is more common for public funded programmes,
such as the HES and KfW loans, to be unsecured and linked to the in-
dividual rather than the property (Zimring et al., 2014a). Both the
CBRP and the HEEPS equity loan schemes allow funding for wider re-
novation measures (Schröder et al., 2011), with the HEEPS equity loan
allowing 45% of the maximum £40,000 to be spent on non-efficiency
measures (EST, 2017).
Credit enhancements blend public money with private capital in a
single fund. For example, the Joint European Support for Sustainable
Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) programme, administered by the
European Investment Bank, mobilises grants from European structural
funds7 (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2010). Such mechanisms typically involve
the low cost public capital occupying the junior (high risk) tranche8 of a
fund, which is then blended with private sources (Zimring, 2014b). This
Table 2
The key features of six archetypes of finance mechanism for residential retrofit.
5 Generally, these markets involve the trading of longer-term debt and equity
instruments, typically with a maturity of a year or more.
6 A small administration fee and inflation index linking is applied.
7 The European Structural Funds are a set of financial tools designed to ad-
dress inequalities in income, wealth and economic opportunities within the
Member states of the European Union.
8 Tranches are different portions of debt within the capital structure of a fund
or project finance structure that are designed to divide risk or group different
characteristics such as rewards, maturity and size in ways that are marketable
to various classes of investor. This typically includes equity components, junior
and senior debt but may also include mezzanine and other hybrid forms of
finance.
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reduces risk for the private providers, with the public money absorbing
the first losses should customers default. A prominent example is the
London & Mayors EE Funds (LEEF & MEEF) (LEEF, 2012). Such
schemes aim to leverage high ratios of private to public capital for EE
investments with LEEF and MEEF raising £100m (50:50 private/public
ratio) and £1 bn respectively (70:30 private/public ratio) (Amber In-
frastructure). Other examples may include loan loss reserve funds and
guarantees9 or direct interest rate subsidies (Zimring, 2014a).
5.2. On-bill finance and repayment (On-bill)
On-bill mechanisms involve the repayment of loans via the energy
bill (electricity, gas or dual-fuel). The investment is typically secured by
the right to disconnect supply, if left unpaid (Zimring et al., 2014a).
These approaches are divided into two types, with different sources of
capital. On-bill financing (OBF) involves energy bill-payer or public
funds, whilst on-bill repayment (OBR) refers to the use of third party,
private capital (Zimring, 2014b). In the USA, UK and Canada over 20
on-bill programmes have provided over $1.05Bn of financing to
households for EE improvements, delivering $76m in 2014 alone
(Zimring et al., 2014a).
The UK's Green Deal is probably the most well-known example of
OBR and included requirements for energy bill neutrality as part of its
‘Golden rule’, meaning savings had to be equal to or greater than loan
repayments. The Green Deal also precluded non-energy measures from
financing (7–11% interest rate). The scheme had very limited uptake.
Of the 614,383 assessments undertaken, only 15,138 households
adopted a Green Deal plan by October 2015 (DECC, 2015), far less than
the millions of installations that were hoped for (Rosenow and Eyre,
2016). However, in many cases these assessments may have led to self-
financing (Webber et al., 2015).
A range of other on-bill programmes in North America have been
more successful. Manitoba Hydro's public OBF scheme has funded almost
$300m in efficiency improvements in single-family residences since
2001, although 95% of the loans have funded single-measure window,
door or furnace replacements (Zimring et al., 2014a). Some smaller scale
programmes, such as Clean Energy Works Oregon (CEWO) OBR private
finance, have funded whole-house retrofits with loans of up-to $30,000
(Zimring et al., 2014b). Several of these programmes offer reduced in-
terest rates (0–5%) through public funds and credit enhancements, and
have very low rates of default (0–3%) (Zimring et al., 2014a).
5.3. Property assessed clean energy (PACE)
PACE was developed in 2007 and allows municipalities in the USA
to fund home and commercial retrofit using land-secured special im-
provement districts (Kim et al., 2012). These are debt instruments
linked to a specific geographical area and secured by land or property.
Traditionally they are a means of funding municipal infrastructure in-
vestments, through an additional charge on the property tax bill,
common in the USA. The assessment districts were devised by Benjamin
Franklin in the 17th century as a means to fund improvements that
meet a ‘valid public purpose’. (Energy Pro). Originally in PACE, local
governments funded retrofit measures and attached a tax lien10 (a form
of security that allows claims on tax payments) to properties that
benefit from the improvement works. Most PACE funding now comes
from the private sector, although still uses the bond issuance and tax
collection powers of municipal or local governments (Kim et al., 2012).
The PACE financing is secured as a senior lien on the property and is re-
payed along with other municipal charges and assessments, on the
property tax bill - which provides investors with robust repayment se-
curity11 (DOE, 2016).
Most residential PACE projects have been concentrated in
California, with private providers such as RENEW Financial securitising
PACE debt for re-sale to capital markets (RENEW Financial).
Residential PACE financing has risen dramatically in recent years, fa-
cilitating more than $4 billion in clean energy investments (Leventis
et al., 2017), with RENEW Financial achieving an average 28–27%
reduction in home energy use on their projects (RENEW Financial).
There is currently no national or state requirement for energy bill
neutrality within PACE schemes.
5.4. Green mortgages
Mortgage or home equity financing provides the mainstay of ex-
tension and renovation funding to existing homes, usually through a
mortgage-extension or re-mortgage. Loans are secured to the property
and typically have a duration of 25 years or more. However, some
mortgage providers offer a range of Green or EE mortgage products
designed to provide lending specifically for retrofit.
Mortgage underwriting is based on the applicant's ability to repay.
Whilst a significant proportion of outgoings relate to energy costs,
current underwriting methods use arbitrary techniques to determine
these costs. Initiatives including the UK LENDERS (2017) and EU
EeMAp (2017) projects are seeking to promote actual energy usage data
in these underwriting calculations. Thus, lenders may provide increased
lending for more efficient properties at reduced interest rates–as the
higher disposable income reduces the risk of default (EeMAp, 2017).
The LENDERS project estimates that monthly savings equivalent to two
Energy Performance Certificate (EPC)12 bands, could equate to around
£4000 in additional mortgage finance (LENDERS, 2017). Eventually
this may create a modest ‘green premium’, increasing property values
for the most efficient properties (EeMAp, 2017), also providing addi-
tional borrowing for retrofit measures.
Whilst mainstream European mortgage lenders are yet to offer EE
mortgage products, some specialist lenders such as the UK's Ecology
Building Society offer both additional lending for retrofit projects and
also interest rate discounts of 0.25% for each EPC improvement level
(Ecology Building Society, 2017). In the USA, the Fannie Mae mortgage
company's Green financing for multi-family buildings reached $3.6
billion in 2016, involving preferential interest rates and additional
borrowing for energy and water efficiency property improvements
(Leventis et al., 2017). The UK government is now looking to promote
‘innovative green mortgage products’ as part of its Clean Growth Plan
(HM Government, 2017).
5.5. Energy service agreement (ESA) financing
Energy service agreements (ESAs) are a form of financing to fund
energy performance contracts. In a traditional energy performance
contract,13 the ESCO implements a retrofit and provides an energy
9 A loan loss reserve or guarantee sets aside a limited pool of funds from
which financial institutions can recover a portion of their losses in the event of
borrower defaults. Several examples exist in the US including the
MichiganSaves single family loan loss reserve scheme (Zimring, 2014a).
10 A lien is a legal right granted by the owner of property to a creditor to claim
rights to or seize an asset that is the subject of the lien. The lien guarantees the
underlying obligation to repay the creditor, such as claims against residential
property for repayment of a loan.
11 “Subject to the structure of a state's PACE statute…the PACE obligation may
result in a property tax lien on the property. If applicable…the failure to pay property
taxes, including PACE assessments, could trigger foreclosure and property loss even if
the property owner is current on other mortgage lien(s)” (DOE, 2016).
12 EPCs are a measure of a buildings energy efficiency and running costs,
based on a standardised assessment procedure. Most EU member states employ
some form of EPC and they are typically rated from A to G, with A being an
exemplary dwelling.
13 In an energy performance contract without a financing package from the
ESCO, the client will need to find other forms of capital to fund the retrofit.
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performance guarantee and a commitment to maintain the assets under
the contract for a given period. Energy performance contracts have
been most common in the public sector, where public actors can access
cheap capital and, thus, ESCOs typically provide engineering services
without any financial component (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Recently
energy performance contract and ESCO models have been growing in
the small commercial and residential sectors (Labanca et al., 2014).
Under an ESA, a finance provider will arrange financing directly with
the ESCO or SPV (typically 7–10% interest), with the end user or
household paying for measured performance improvements - usually
derived from a baseline of past consumption (Kim et al., 2012). This
effectively shifts the financing upstream from the household to provide
an integrated offer of finance and measures through an energy service
charge. In some models the ESCO will initially use its own funds and
then sell on the cash flows or ‘receivables’ of proven projects to a third-
party financier in a process known as ‘factoring’14 (EEFIG, 2015). In a
pure ESA, the third-party financier will fund projects from the begin-
ning, usually via an SPV, where projects are aggregated and sold into
secondary markets to institutional investors (SUSI Partners, 2017).
Although in 2014, over $150m of USA ESCO revenues were gen-
erated through projects in public housing, most this was funded using
working capital from the housing provider rather than an ESA struc-
ture. However, since 2011 PosiGen have offered an ESA for residential
solar and EE and completed 8400 projects in the USA (Leventis et al.,
2017). The model has also been gaining traction in Europe in the multi-
family sector. RENESCO provide an ESA for the deep retrofit and re-
novation of dilapidated eastern European housing, while Servizi En-
ergia Ambiente (SEA) offers ESAs and energy performance contracts to
the Italian multi-family market. RENESCO have invested over €4m in
15 Soviet-era blocks and are developing a factoring fund with the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (RE-
NESCO 2015). SEA are currently negotiating to refinance several pro-
jects, with financing partners (SUSI Partners, 2017). Several large in-
vestment funds are now beginning to become involved in the ESA
market, including the UK's Green Investment Group (2017).
5.6. Community financing
Community financing mechanisms use equity capital from multiple
individuals, each providing a small component of funding for a project.
Often this involves groups organised around a local geographical area,
adopting ‘co-operative type’ legal structures. Typically the number of
shares (and votes) an individual can hold is limited (Yildiz, 2014).
Projects are funded through a share issue. However, often these shares
cannot be easily sold on, requiring long term commitment from project
investors, who may value wider community benefits (Yildiz, 2014).
Community finance mechanisms are common for renewable energy,
where in Germany, over 500 energy co-operatives with 80,000+
members have invested up to €800 million in solar PV (EEFIG, 2015).
Yet, there are a growing number of examples of this being used to fund
residential EE projects. The Brighton and Hove Energy Services Co-op
(BHESCo) in the UK use a co-operative approach and a low-cost fi-
nancing offer (5%) to fund retrofits, based on issuing shares to the local
community with an annual return of 5% (BHESCo). A number of ex-
amples also exist in Germany (EEFIG, 2015).
6. Key features of retrofit finance mechanisms
The following section outlines the key findings from both sets of
stakeholder interviews in relation to the features of these finance me-
chanisms as outlined in Section 3. The discussion draws upon insights
from each of the archetypes of finance mechanisms described in the
previous section, with the aim of identifying some more generalizable
findings. A summary of relevant interview quotes for each feature of is
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
6.1. Source of capital
Two interviewees felt that government should be the primary source
of capital for residential retrofit. It was argued that the multiple social
and environmental benefits of retrofits are ‘public goods’, justifying
state financing. Equally, government bodies typically have the lowest
cost of borrowing and are able to offer the longest term, lowest interest
loans to the widest range of customers. It was emphasised that gov-
ernments already absorbed significant risk in other areas, providing
credit guarantees and low-cost loans for a range of sectors from infra-
structure to first time house purchases.
However, most interviewees (eleven out of eighteen) considered
that the required investment (~ $1.3 trillion to 2035 in the EU (EEFIG,
2015)) could not be met from public sources alone. Indeed, whilst many
small publicly funded programmes utilised day-to-day government
spending, (such as the HES and HEEPS loans in Scotland), scaling this
up could be a challenge. Therefore, many stressed the need to bring in
low-cost institutional capital.15 The only scheme to have achieved this
at significant scale has been PACE in California, with ESA models being
better developed in the commercial sector. Crucial to accessing these
sources of capital is project standardisation and the use of aggregation
or securitisation techniques discussed in the following sections.
Aside from PACE, leveraging significant private capital for re-
sidential retrofit has involved public co-financing and credit enhance-
ment approaches. Programmes such as LEEF/MEEF and some on-bill
schemes in the USA use public money to reduce risk for private in-
vestors. Through provision of the ‘at risk’ or junior tranche of a fund or
project finance structure, these approaches are able to leverage sig-
nificant sums of private capital and achieve high ratios of private to
public investment.
Germany's CBRP programme is able to overcome the constraints on
day-to-day public spending through the use of the borrowing powers of
the KfW state bank. Thus, the programme is able to access large
amounts of low-cost funding via the capital markets. However, five
interviewees described how this approach owes a lot to the specific
institutional context in Germany and similar approaches would require
significant institutional change in countries such as the USA or UK,
where no equivalent banks exist.
6.2. Financial instruments and secondary markets
Most of those interviewed agreed that the long term, low yield
nature of retrofit investments lends itself to debt financing. However,
BHESCo co-operative emphasised that community equity finance me-
chanisms could also play an important role in empowering citizens to
engage in retrofit at a local level. Community shareholders may also
accept lower returns in exchange for local community and environ-
mental benefits.
EnergyPro in particular emphasised that accessing institutional in-
vestor capital is likely to require aggregated financial instruments, such(footnote continued)
Therefore, this model is not considered a standalone finance mechanism and is
not included in the study.
14 Invoice Factoring involves the sale of project accounts and revenues (re-
ceivables) to a third party at a discount. This allows the issuing company to shift
these projects with corresponding debt and future cash flows off their balance
sheet - enabling them to deleverage and take on additional projects.
15 Institutional investors are a class of investor who trade in securities of
sufficient scale and quantity that they qualify for preferential treatment and
lower commissions. Typical institutional investors include pension funds and
life insurance companies.
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as bonds enabling small loans to be pooled and traded in capital mar-
kets. Unlike central governments, state banks such as KfW are less
constrained by national fiscal policy and deficit reduction as they are
able to issue bonds directly into capital markets (Schröder et al., 2011).
Equally EE mortgages can utilise the well-established ‘covered bonds’16
markets, which are used for trading mortgage securities (European
Mortgage Federation). Private sector PACE programmes in the USA,
have successfully aggregated multiple retrofit loans through secur-
itisation and sold them as PACE bonds into the asset-backed securities
market (RENEW Financial).
Achieving sufficient scale was described by six respondents as the
key challenge in accessing these secondary markets. Most institutional
investors require minimum investments of at least £2m. Several ex-
amples of the ESA/energy performance contract approach have suc-
cessfully sold on project receivables, often by aggregating several pro-
jects once the revenue streams or cash flows had been proven.
Therefore, ESA models are an attractive means of bringing in institu-
tional investors, although these models have so far only been used for
the non-residential and multi-family markets. To appeal to institutional
investors, achieving standardised projects, that can be aggregated and
securitised was identified a key challenge by both Energy Pro and the
European Mortgage Federation. Ensuring and demonstrating project
quality is therefore important for reassuring both investors and
households, mitigating the issues associated with the securitisations of
sub-prime mortgages during the 2008 financial crisis.
6.3. Project performance
Long-term performance contracts as part of ESA financing structures
provide a clear revenue stream that can appeal to investors in a similar
way to power purchase agreements for renewable generation. Whilst it
was recognised that energy performance guarantees could also be a key
driver for households, Joule Assets Europe emphasised, this alone
would not be sufficient to reassure private investors. Therefore, stan-
dardised procurement and quality assurance frameworks, such as the
Investor Confidence Project (2015) for commercial buildings, were seen
as important for attracting finance into residential retrofit.
However, requirements for energy bill neutrality such as the Green
Deal's ‘Golden Rule’ was criticised by several interviewees. Such re-
quirements prevent non-energy measures from being funded and ob-
struct deeper retrofits, particularly at high interest rates (Fig. 2). For
example, measures such as solid wall insulation could not be funded
under the Green Deal. Restricting the focus to carbon and energy sav-
ings was also seen as a major constraint on household demand. Since
customers value funding for general renovation work and aesthetic
improvements, restricting funding to efficiency measures alone limits
the appeal of the finance package. Mechanisms, such as the CBRP and
the HEEPS equity loan and PACE to a lesser extent, allow for wider
renovation measures to be funded. These schemes also do not impose
strict requirements for energy bill neutrality. However, it was noted
that this needs to be balanced against affordability concerns for re-
payments significantly above current energy bills.
6.4. Point of sale
The point of sale for finance, and the ease and availability of pro-
curing financing alongside the retrofit was viewed as critical by all
interviewees. The analogy of the purchase of a car or mobile phone was
used by several interviewees. In these mature sectors, suppliers provide
a financing package as part of their offer to customers, whereas many
retrofit programmes, require a separate interface, involving a long and
complex application process. This is also usually separated from the
process of actually procuring the retrofit measures.
The complexity of schemes such as the Green Deal, with a separate
point of sale, is considered to be a major barrier. The success of PACE is
partly attributed to the fact that approved contractors can offer finan-
cing through the scheme at the point of sale of the retrofit. This means
that customers are able to procure the retrofit measures and financing
on the same day and from the same person. This simplicity can dra-
matically increase uptake, although it requires a streamlined under-
writing and approval process from the PACE loan provider, usually
initially over the telephone. However, challenges remain with con-
tractors’ lack of literacy in financing, and financiers’ lack of literacy in
energy efficiency. Equally, Energy Programmes Consortium (USA)
emphasised that whilst USA contractors are able to promote certain
financing packages, UK contractors must be accredited with the
Financial Conduct Authority before they can provide such advice.
Similar arrangements exist in other EU countries. These findings high-
light the importance of the presentation of the finance offering to
prospective households, the levels of trust in the finance provider and
quality of information provided.
6.5. Security and underwriting
Different mechanisms require different forms of security and un-
derwriting processes, whilst most public mechanisms are unsecured.
Although there are some examples of private unsecured lending, this
typically involves a high cost of capital for what is perceived as a high-
risk loan without collateral. Both PACE and on-bill approaches involve
novel forms of security, tied to the property tax regime and energy bills
respectively. Theoretically this leads to streamlined underwriting and
draws in people with lower credit ratings – as the debt is secured to the
underlying asset, rather than the individual. However, this is not always
the case, with one interviewee describing how it could take up to 60
days to get a Green Deal loan. Rapid underwriting and unconventional
security can also raise concerns about the appropriateness of offering
finance to vulnerable households who would otherwise not qualify for
credit. EE mortgage models also require the inclusion of EPCs as part of
the underwriting, although is unlikely to add a significant burden on
already extensive mortgage eligibility assessments.
Thus, private sector funded mechanisms are likely to require a ro-
bust form of security or collateral in order to provide lending at lower
interest rates (< 10%). Publicly funded approaches offer greater flex-
ibility on both underwriting and repayment terms so could therefore
provide a good option for those in rented accommodation, on low in-
comes, with a poor credit history, or some combination thereof.
6.6. Repayment channel
The use of an existing repayment channel was viewed as a key
benefit of the PACE, on-bill and mortgage-based approaches. Thus,
adopting an existing bill that customers are unable to partially pay or
refuse to pay the retrofit component of.
Both PACE and on-bill approaches are theoretically transferable to
the new occupier of a property, addressing the split incentive issue –
although currently PACE finance is only available to homeowners.
Equally, mortgage or equity-release approaches such as HEEPS in
Scotland, see the remaining debt resolved once the property is sold,
through the equity share. Therefore, finance for measures that add
value to the property strengthens the case for using mortgage-based
financing. However, case studies from the USA have shown that the
debt from PACE and On-bill schemes is transferred to the new occupant
only about 50% of the time, thus requiring the outstanding payment on
sale (Leventis et al., 2017). Further, both Energy Pro and PACE Nation
highlighted how the PACE approach would be particularly challenging
for the UK given its different system of property taxation and municipal
finance.
16 Covered bonds are backed both by the issuer -usually a bank and the
portfolio of projects-typically mortgages. Unlike asset backed securities they
remain on the balance sheet of the issuer and are thus considered very secure.
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7. Discussion
This paper introduced a typology of six financing mechanisms cur-
rently adopted for residential retrofit across the EU and USA.
Developing a novel framework, the paper has further identified six key
features of these mechanisms and shown how these contribute to the
success or failure of the mechanism. The following section discusses the
findings in the context of the literature on residential retrofit and EE
finance. It is shown how the six features influence three outcomes that
are critical for the successful uptake of residential retrofit: cost of ca-
pital, source of value and customer journey. The paper then discusses how
the institutional and policy context of different states is likely to shape
the viability of these approaches and the policy solutions required.
7.1. Cost of capital
The stakeholder interviews explored the significance of the cost of
capital for the financing of residential retrofit projects, particular for
more expensive, ‘whole house’ approaches. The impact of the interest
rate on household appeal has previously been highlighted by several
studies on retrofit finance (Marchand et al., 2015; Rosenow and Eyre,
2016). Typically, deeper retrofits require capital expenditure of at least
£15–20,000 (BEIS, 2017) and have payback periods of 20 years or
more. Thus, in combination with requirements for energy bill neu-
trality, higher interest rates may prevent deeper (but ultimately ne-
cessary) measures like solid wall insulation from being financed. Al-
though those with sufficient access to capital, or other forms of
household borrowing may continue to self-finance retrofits (Webber
et al., 2015), a lack of access to low cost finance remains a key barrier
the uptake of residential retrofit. These higher costs may be offset by
private benefits such as higher house prices (Brounen and Kok, 2011).
However, the findings presented here suggest the customer journey and
source of value have a greater impact on household appeal.
The results support the view that the state's ability to borrow
cheaply, absorb risks and deliver social and environmental benefits,
provides a strong justification for public funding of investments such as
residential retrofit (Stiglitz, 1993). However, given the scale of invest-
ment required, the extent to which day-to-day government spending
alone can deliver this may be limited (Blyth et al., 2015). Therefore,
countries such as Germany have funded large scale investment through
public banks, offering very low interest rates and favourable loan terms.
This builds on previous research on the market-creating and shaping
role that state investment banks can play (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016),
particularly where such investments are seen as high risk by private
finance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018).
However, in countries without state investment banks, more
‘market led’ solutions are often favoured (Hall et al., 2016). This paper
has described several examples of using public money to leverage sig-
nificant private finance and reduce the cost of capital through tools
such as credit enhancements (see Zimring, 2014a). These approaches
can also bring in customers who would otherwise not qualify for credit
(Zimring et al., 2014c). Whilst this may leverage limited public funds
and reduce the cost of capital, some argue that this represents a public
subsidy to private capital (Bergman and Foxon, 2017) or a socialisation
of risk and a privatisation of rewards (Mazzucato, 2011). However,
some form of public support is likely to be required for those with
difficulty in accessing low-cost capital or in rented accommodation and
fuel poverty (Sovacool, 2015).
Privately funded mechanisms are likely to require robust forms of
security or collateral such as mortgage eligibility and repossession (EE
Mortgages), property tax default (PACE) and energy disconnection (On-
bill). These findings support work such as Blyth et al. (2015) and Hall
et al. (2015) on the potential role of institutional investors, such as
pension funds in the energy system. Securitisation enables small loans
to be pooled and sold through financial instruments such as PACE
bonds in capital markets. However, this requires sufficient scale and
standardised project performance protocols currently only widespread
in the PACE market and ESA's in the non-residential sector. Therefore,
widespread institutional financing of EE retrofit remains largely as-
pirational at present (Hall et al., 2015).
7.2. Customer journey
In interpreting the findings, this paper draws on the concept of the
customer journey (Norton et al., 2013). Whilst the previous section lar-
gely concerned with how the features of finance mechanisms affect
their appeal to investors, this research suggests the nature of customer
journey has a greater impact on household appeal.
A key finding is that the success of schemes such as PACE and KfW's
CBRP owe a lot to the ease of the customer journey in procuring retrofit
financing. PACE loans are often sold by the contractor, at the point of
sale of the retrofit. The streamlined underwriting of PACE programmes
has enabled loans to be approved over the telephone, during the con-
tractor's sales visit. Equally EE mortgages utilise a well-established
process, which is usually essential when purchasing a property, whilst
the KfW approach uses the customers’ existing bank and support from
accredited project managers. This simplicity is often valued ahead of a
low cost of capital by households – helping to explain why expensive
credit card retrofit financing remains prevalent (Zimring et al., 2014a).
These findings support previous critiques of the UK's Green Deal
which involved a complex vetting and application process, requiring a
separate interface with a third-party provider (O’Keeffe et al., 2016;
Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). This complexity may be further compounded
when additional policy measures interact with retrofit programmes,
such as the smart meter rollout (McCoy and Lyons, 2017) reducing
household uptake. This supports arguments for integrated business
models for residential retrofit (Brown, 2018), including a financing offer
to households alongside retrofit measures (Mahapatra et al., 2013). In
an ESA, financing is fully integrated into the energy performance con-
tract, effectively upstream of the client (Brown, 2018).
An important dimension of the customer journey relates to how the
information is presented to households and by whom. This research
identifies the point of sale as the critical juncture in the customer
journey in which to promote both the retrofit measures and the finan-
cing package in a clear and compelling way to households. This sup-
ports previous research which identifies the significance of how costs
and benefits of retrofit are presented to households (Hoicka et al., 2014)
and the importance of a trusted and competent advisor in disseminating
this information (O’Keeffe et al., 2016; Risholt and Berker, 2013). Our
findings therefore suggest that schemes are most successful, when the
technical and financial elements of the customer offering are integrated
by a single competent advisor – as is the case in the German KfW
scheme (Rosenow et al., 2013a).
Adopting a repayment channel, and form of security that is tied to
the underlying asset, theoretically enables PACE, on-bill and Green
mortgage/equity release approaches to address split incentive barriers
(Bird and Hernández, 2012). However, only on-bill mechanisms ad-
dress the landlord-tenant dilemma. Yet, in many examples from the
USA this has not been the case. Outstanding debt on properties with
PACE or on-bill loans may need to be settled when homes change hands
(Zimring et al., 2014a), although can be partially offset by increased
property values (Sayce and Haggett, 2016). The latter, in turn, requires
credible labelling schemes to allow the energy efficiency properties to
be identified by potential buyers, together with more widespread ap-
preciation of the benefits of energy efficiency for mortgage repayments.
7.3. Source of value
The study demonstrates how successful retrofit finance mechanisms
typically involve funding for wider renovation and enabling works as
part of the finance package. This builds on contemporary research on
residential retrofit, where broader motivations such as environmental
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concerns, improved comfort and living standards, property longevity
and aesthetics are often valued more highly than cost savings (Fawcett
and Killip, 2014), or at least act as important drivers for retrofit projects
(Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018). Thus, in many cases, financing
provides a means of ‘addressing a problem’, such as a broken boiler or
low levels of thermal comfort. Whilst the desire to save money is often a
driver (Marchand et al., 2015), households may be willing to spend
more to finance these broader sources of value.
Consequently, mechanisms that have requirements for energy bill
neutrality, or only fund energy measures are likely to undermine these
motivations. Many of those interviewed regarded the ‘Golden Rule’
element of the Green Deal as a mistake and pointed out that no such
requirements are in place for other forms of consumer finance. Equally
the narrow focus on energy measures alone, may leave a finance gap for
important enabling works. However, there is a need to balance these
issues with concerns over affordability (Leventis et al., 2017). Other
forms of project performance guarantees such as energy performance
contracts, or warranties are however, likely to be valued by both
households and finance providers. This supports recent work on the
potential for energy performance contracts to be a demand driver for
residential retrofit (Brown, 2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017).
Critically, all those interviewed agreed that barriers for retrofit fi-
nancing were of secondary importance for driving demand for re-
sidential retrofit. Indeed Borgeson et al. (2014) describe: ‘lack of fi-
nancing is seldom the primary reason that efficiency projects do not happen.’
Thus, financing should be seen as an enabler rather than a driver of
demand, with the analogy that in the Green Deal ‘people were sold the
loan instead of the car’ (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).
8. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper presented a typology of finance mechanisms for re-
sidential retrofit, including examples that are delivering at scale. The
paper develops a novel framework to understand the features of these
mechanisms, including; the source of capital; financial instrument(s),
project performance; point of sale; security and underwriting and the re-
payment channel.
These features are shown to implicate three outcomes that affect the
success of these finance mechanisms. Firstly, it is shown that a low cost
of capital is key to the current economic viability of whole-house ret-
rofits, such as those involving solid wall insulation. This can be
achieved through public finance through state investment banks, mu-
nicipal authorities or the blending of public and private sources through
a range of credit enhancements. Alternatively, low cost private finan-
cing is likely to require robust forms of security, standardised project
performance protocols and access to secondary markets through the
aggregation of multiple projects into trade-able financial instruments.
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, mechanisms that reduce
complexity by simplifying the customer journey are likely to achieve
much higher levels of uptake. Thirdly, by enabling non-energy mea-
sures such as general improvement works, schemes can appeal to
broader sources of value that are more highly valued by households,
often ‘addressing a problem’, such as broken boiler or low levels of
comfort.
Most importantly, the paper outlines how the finance mechanism
alone is unlikely to be a driver of demand for whole-house retrofit, and
so instead should be viewed as a necessary enabler of a much broader
strategy. Thus, integrated business models that enable the wider ben-
efits of whole-house retrofits, alongside a range of up-front incentives
and minimum standards are likely to be pre-requisites of a successful,
ambitious retrofit programme. Consequently, a review of different
retrofit incentives and investigation of how policy can support business
model innovation, seem important avenues for further research.
This paper has emphasised the scale and importance of financing
the low carbon retrofit of residential buildings. Different countries and
regions may adopt different approaches based on their specific
institutional context, with different approaches serving certain market
segments. However, this goal is unlikely to be achieved without a broad
strategy to promote demand and build supply chain capacity – only
then requiring appropriate financing solutions. This paper presents a
template of how this can be done effectively and provides lessons from
where it has not.
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How can intermediaries promote business model innovation: the case of ‘Energiesprong’ whole-
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Abstract 
Business model innovation is increasingly important for the diffusion of sustainable innovations 
- particularly those that are systemic in nature. In this paper we outline how systemic 
innovations, such as whole-house energy ‘retrofit’, may require new business models before 
they gain widespread adoption. Through a series of semi-structured interviews and document 
analysis, we undertake a case study of the ‘Energiesprong’ retrofit business model - contrasting 
this with the incumbent ‘atomised’ market model. We highlight the central role of an 
innovation intermediary - the Energiesprong ‘market development team’, in this business 
model innovation, and how Dutch policymakers sought to promote business model innovation 
through creation of this intermediary. In doing so we develop a novel framework - combining 
the components of business models with the functions of intermediaries to illustrate this case. 
Finally, the paper suggests this case and framework could provide lessons for how 
intermediaries and in turn policymakers might foster business model innovation in other 
sectors. 
 
Keywords 
• Business models 
• Energy efficiency retrofit 
• Systemic innovation 
• Business model innovation 
• Intermediaries 
• Innovation policy 
 
1. Introduction  
The concept of the ‘business model’ has gained widespread use: as a means of classifying 
different businesses; a lens for academic research; and as an entrepreneurial tool for 
management practitioners (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). Increasingly the role of the 
business model is seen as critical for the diffusion of technological innovations (Baden-Fuller 
and Haefliger, 2013; Teece, 2010) and for ‘sustainability transitions’ (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; 
Bolton and Hannon, 2016). This has led to a focus on ‘business model innovation’ as an 
important area for both incumbent and entrepreneurial firms (Chesbrough, 2010), in 
promoting sustainability, and in addressing climate change (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; 
Sarasini and Linder, 2018). Thus, the governance of sustainability transitions may require new 
policies that foster business model innovation (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). However, very little 
has been written on how policymakers might actually promote business model innovation. We 
argue that one such approach is the support of innovation intermediaries (Kivimaa, 2014; 
Mignon and Kanda, 2018). 
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In this paper, we make three propositions. First, we argue that business model innovation may 
be particularly important for ‘systemic innovations’ – those which require integration and 
configuration with other complementary processes, practices and technologies, within a 
system that spans the boundaries of individual organisations (Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). 
Second, we build on the literature on innovation intermediaries (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 
2018a; Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008), and highlight the important role that these actors can play 
in business model innovation. Third, by developing a novel framework we suggest that 
policymakers can promote business model innovation through intermediaries to facilitate 
systemic change (Lente and Hekkert, 2003). We illustrate these ideas through the case of the 
Dutch Energiesprong initiative for whole-house retrofit, addressing the following research 
questions: 
 
1. How can business model innovation enable the diffusion of systemic innovations 
such as whole-house retrofit? 
2. How did an innovation intermediary promote the Energiesprong business model? 
3. How might policymakers promote business model innovation for sustainability 
through innovation intermediaries?  
 
Buildings, especially homes, are the largest single consumer of energy and producer of carbon 
emissions in most advanced economies (IPCC, 2014). These emissions can be reduced1 by the 
‘retrofit’ of three types of measure: energy efficiency improvements to the building fabric; the 
adoption of low carbon heating technologies; and electricity microgeneration such as solar 
photovoltaics (PV). Thus far, significant savings in the European Union have been achieved 
through incremental measures such as fluorescent lightbulbs, loft insulation and efficient 
boilers (Rosenow et al., 2016). These measures have been implemented through existing 
supply chains, requiring limited changes in consumer and industry practices. 
 
However, it is increasingly recognised that this approach will be insufficient to achieve the 
savings required to meet climate change targets (CCC, 2018; IPCC, 2014). Instead, emphasis is 
placed on the need for ‘whole-house retrofits’ involving multiple measures (Lewis and Smith, 
2013). This involves the effective integration of multiple measures and systems and 
consideration of how they interact within a specific building - whether installed at once or over 
time (Fawcett, 2014). Thus, having the features of ‘integrative’ as opposed to ‘modular’ 
technologies (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Recent research indicates that the diffusion of 
whole-house retrofit may therefore require business model innovation (Mlecnik et al., 2018) 
as well as significant policy support (Rosenow et al., 2017).  
 
In this paper, we contrast the incumbent ‘atomised’ market model with the innovative 
‘Energiesprong’ business model – considered to have greater potential for the delivery of 
whole-house retrofit. Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted in the UK and the 
Netherlands to formulate a case study; we outline how the Energiesprong business model was 
developed by an innovation intermediary or ‘market development team’. Initially created by 
the Dutch government, although now operating independently internationally. We suggest this 
                                                     
1 Aside from more efficient appliances and behavioural changes 
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approach could provide a template for policymakers looking to promote business model 
innovation in other sectors – requiring further research to other contexts. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on systemic innovation, 
business models and innovation intermediaries, emphasising the lack of research on policy 
support for business model innovation, before outlining the conceptual framework. Section 3 
summarises our case study methodology. Section 4 describes the operation and potential of 
the atomised market and Energiesprong business models and assesses the role of the 
innovation intermediary in the emergence of Energiesprong. Section 5 discusses these findings 
in light of the existing literature on business model innovation, systemic intermediaries and 
innovation policy, while Section 6 concludes and provides recommendations for further 
research.  
 
2. Systemic innovation, business models and innovation intermediaries  
 
2.1. Systemic innovation and whole-house retrofit 
The literature on systemic innovation is increasingly the point of departure for scholars 
grappling with the innovation policy challenges of the 21st century. Systemic innovations 
require complementary changes in supporting technologies, technical skills, cultural norms, 
user competences, organisational practices and regulations (Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). 
Systemic innovation may therefore result in entirely new ‘socio-technical systems’ - where 
technological, social and institutional elements co-evolve; resulting in whole system change 
(Foxon, 2011; Midgley and Lindhult, 2015). The importance of systemic innovation and its role 
in economic and sustainable development is recognised by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), who provide the following definition: 
 
“System innovations…alter existing system dynamics…entailing changes in both the 
components and the architecture of systems. They are characterised by three main 
features: 
1) disrupting or complementary types of knowledge and technical capabilities; 
2) fundamental changes in consumer practices and markets; and  
3) novel types of infrastructures, institutional rules and skill sets.” (OECD, 2015). 
 
Systemic innovations contrast with incremental innovations; where gradual improvements in 
current technologies, processes or infrastructures can be easily adopted by incumbent actors, 
with little change required in underlying processes and practices (Mlecnik, 2013). Many of the 
sustainability challenges facing policy makers in a range of systems from: food and agriculture 
(Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009); healthcare (McMahon and Thorsteinsdóttir, 2013); transport 
(Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008); buildings (Mlecnik, 2013); and energy provision (Foxon et al., 
2005) – require such systemic innovation (OECD, 2015). 
 
Whole-house retrofit is perhaps an archetypal example of a systemic innovation (Mlecnik, 
2013) - needing complementary developments in regulations, financing, supply chain 
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competences and household practices (Wilson et al., 2015), all requiring policy and 
institutional changes to be fully and effectively realised (Brown et al., 2018).  
 
2.2. Business model innovation and sustainability 
Business models2 describe of the nature of value delivered to customers, how organisations 
and networks create value and the means of capturing revenues from that value (Hellström et 
al., 2015; Teece, 2018). Whilst the innovation studies literature focusses primarily on 
technological artefacts, there is growing recognition of the integral role of accompanying 
business models - particularly for radical, path breaking or systemic innovations (Chesbrough, 
2010). Although the majority of studies on business model innovation originate from the 
business and management literature (Massa and Tucci, 2013), the concept is increasingly 
prevalent in sustainability research (Boons et al., 2013). The importance of sustainable 
business model innovation is emphasised by Budde Christensen et al., (2012, p. 499): 
 
“it might be that innovative technologies that have the potential to meet key 
sustainability targets are not easily introduced by existing business models within a 
sector, and that only by changes to the business model would such technologies become 
commercially viable.”  
 
Hence, the economic, environmental and social value of innovation often remains latent, until 
commercialised through a complementary business model (Bohnsack et al., 2014). Radical 
innovations, which present challenges in capturing revenues, often pose the greatest need for 
new business models (Teece, 2010). Thus, business model innovation may be a particularly 
important component of systemic innovation (Boons et al., 2013). Incumbent business models 
may also be incompatible with long term sustainability and the direction of technological 
change (Roome and Louche, 2016). Business model innovation therefore presents two key 
opportunities; first to enable the diffusion of sustainable innovations, and second to 
reconfigure existing industries towards more sustainable practices (Massa and Tucci, 2013; 
Schaltegger et al., 2016). Recent studies therefore highlight the potential for integrated retrofit 
business models (Brown, 2018; Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018) and energy 
performance contracts3 in the residential sector (Brown, 2018; Mcelroy and Rosenow, 2018; 
Winther and Gurigard, 2017). 
 
However, organisations may face a range of barriers to business model innovation (Stubbs and 
Cocklin, 2008), including the ‘dominant logic’ of a firm or industry (Chesbrough, 2010) and 
wider cultural and structural barriers which have ‘co-evolved’ with incumbent business models 
(Bohnsack et al., 2014; Hannon et al., 2013). Organisations may thus lack the necessary 
knowledge, capabilities or complementary assets to innovate their existing business models, 
or enter new markets with new business models (Teece, 2018, 2010, 1986). These barriers and 
benefits may provide a rationale for policy intervention (Jaffe et al., 2005).  
 
Yet, existing literature provides limited insight as to how business model innovation might be 
governed (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). Innovation intermediaries have been shown to 
                                                     
2 A more detailed definition used in this paper is provided in Section 3. 
3 Energy performance contracts include guaranteed reductions in energy consumption or costs for the client 
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overcome barriers to systemic innovation (Lente and Hekkert, 2003) with authors emphasising 
polices to promote these intermediaries (Kivimaa, 2014). Although some authors have studied 
intermediation in the retrofit context (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018b) few have linked these 
ideas to business models.  
 
2.3. Intermediation for business model innovation 
In this section we integrate the literature on business models, with that on innovation 
intermediaries to develop a new conceptual framework. We first outline the detailed 
components of business models before introducing the literature on innovation 
intermediaries. Due to the challenges of business model innovation, we argue that innovation 
intermediaries may be important in the creation and adoption of new business models.  
 
2.3.1. Components of a business model  
Following Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013), we identify the key components of a business 
model as the value proposition, supply chain, customer interface, and financial model. To this 
we add the governance dimension described by Zott and Amit (2010). This approach captures 
both the content of the business model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) and its mode of 
governance within organisations and wider networks (Hellström et al., 2015; Zott and Amit, 
2010). These components are integrated by Brown (2018) and summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Key components of a business model (Brown, 2018) 
Component Definition 
Value 
proposition 
The value proposition refers to the value or utility from goods and services that 
an organisation or network provides to the customer (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 
2013; Engelken et al., 2016) . 
Supply 
chain 
The supply chain describes the upstream relationships between an organisation 
and its suppliers (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This comprises the logistical 
and technical elements that enable delivery of the value proposition 
(Osterwalder, 2004). 
Customer 
interface 
The customer interface covers all downstream, customer-related interactions 
(Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013). This includes the relationship the customer 
has with the supplier organisations in terms of marketing, sales and distribution 
channels and the ongoing relationship with the product or service (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2010). 
Financial 
model 
The financial model constitutes the combination of an organisation’s capital and 
operational expenditures with its means of revenue generation (Osterwalder et 
al., 2005). This is linked to the value proposition, in terms of what products and 
services customers pay for and how revenues are collected and distributed. 
Governance Business model governance involves both the co-ordination and management of 
the other components and the organisational form of the business model (Amit 
and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit, 2010). As such, business models may involve a 
single organisation or a network of interdependent firms that interact to provide 
a service or product (Hellström et al., 2015). The range of governance 
approaches lie along a continuum, with integrated, hierarchical firms at one end, 
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and arm's-length, market-based contractual relationships at the other (Treib et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.3.2. Innovation intermediaries and business models 
A range of policy instruments to promote innovation are identified by Edler and Fagerberg 
(2017). These are grouped into six types; various stages of research, development and 
deployment (R&D&D) funding; polices to develop capabilities and skills; policies to promote 
interaction and learning across networks; procurement policies to generate demand; 
regulations and standards; and missions and foresight policies which envisage future needs 
and set the direction of change. Recently scholars have emphasised the need for systemic 
innovation polices, which move beyond a focus on individual instruments and technologies - 
instead seeking to promote whole system change (Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). Kivimaa 
(2014) therefore emphasises how government affiliated intermediaries may constitute a form 
of systemic innovation policy (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). 
 
Innovation intermediaries have been studied in multiple contexts since the 1990s (Bessant and 
Rush, 1995), covering a huge array of activities from technology transfer to innovation 
management and systems of innovation (Howells, 2006). Intermediaries can be characterised 
by their intermediation functions: for innovation in general (Howells, 2006), or in the context 
of sustainability transitions (Kivimaa et al., 2018; Mignon and Kanda, 2018). They can be 
grouped into specific types of actors based on the level and scale in which their operate, their 
mandate and normative orientation (Kivimaa et al., 2018). These actors may be key bridges or 
brokers in innovation systems, providing linkages, advocacy or technical services between 
multiple stakeholders, including suppliers and end-users (Howells, 2006; Hyysalo et al., 2018). 
Kivimaa et al., (2018) define innovation intermediaries for sustainability as: 
 
“actors and platforms that positively influence sustainability transition processes by 
linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources” 
 
Van Lente et al (2003) contrast ‘systemic’ intermediaries, with those that have a more bi-
lateral, or single technology focus (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). The actions of these 
intermediaries may therefore play a crucial role in facilitating the emergence, development 
and diffusion of systemic innovations (Lente and Hekkert, 2003) - such as whole-house retrofit 
(Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018). In the retrofit context, intermediaries may include local 
authority agents, charities or NGOs, third sector or individual actors who facilitate projects 
(Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018).  
 
We argue that innovation intermediaries may also play a role in promoting business model 
innovation. In their seminal work, Stewart and Hyysalo (2008) describe innovation 
intermediaries having three core roles: facilitating, configuring and brokering - which have 
been extensively applied in subsequent studies (Barnes, 2016; Kivimaa, 2014; Kivimaa et al., 
2018). In Table 2 we develop these ideas and apply them to the context of business model 
innovation. 
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Table 2 Key functions of an innovation intermediary in business model innovation 
Function Definition 
Facilitating Facilitating enables networking and collaboration as well as knowledge 
dissemination and learning (Howells, 2006). In the context of business model 
innovation this involves the support and co-ordination of the networks 
involved in the delivery of the value proposition (Hellström et al., 2015). Thus, 
potentially facilitating new approaches to business model governance, 
towards integrated or more networked arrangements (Treib et al., 2007).  
Configuring  Configuration involves the design and modification of technological, social 
and organisational innovations, to promote their appropriation and adoption 
among key stakeholders (Howells, 2006). Therefore, this involves the design, 
modification and testing of new business models with relevant users, 
suppliers and the wider regulatory environment. This is likely to include 
developing novel value propositions and financial models (Chesbrough, 
2010), such as energy performance contracts (Nolden et al., 2016) but also 
capabilities in supply chains and the customer interface (Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund, 2013). 
Brokering Innovation intermediaries may provide support through negotiation and 
representation with external sponsors or regulators (Stewart and Hyysalo, 
2008). Thus, intermediaries may seek to raise financial or human resources 
to sustain and develop innovative activity or undertake advocacy or lobbying 
activities to alter the legal or policy environment (Howells, 2006). 
Intermediaries may also seek to create demand for the combination of 
products and services embedded within the business model they are seeking 
to promote (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009), what could be termed ‘market 
formation’ (Kivimaa et al., 2018). 
 
Table 3 presents our conceptual framework used for examining the Energisprong case in 
Section 4. It connects Stewart and Hyysalo’s (2008) innovation intermediary roles with business 
model components (Brown, 2018) highlighting the role they play in business model innovation. 
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Table 3 Conceptual framework linking innovation intermediation to business model 
components 
 Facilitating – network 
formation and collaboration  
Configuring – business model 
design 
Brokering - advocacy and 
resource raising 
Value 
proposition 
Creating opportunities for 
new value propositions, by 
bringing new actors together- 
supporting and coordinating 
networks (Hellström et al., 
2015). 
Configuring the mix of 
products and services which 
form the new value 
proposition (Chesbrough, 
2010). 
 
Includes testing of alternative 
value propositions with users, 
suppliers and regulators. 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new value 
propositions. 
Supply chain Creating opportunities for 
new supply chain interactions 
- developing the relationship 
between the core 
firm/businesses and their 
suppliers, which can be more 
complex in the case of 
systemic innovation (Mlecnik, 
2013). 
Setting rules and contract 
terms for suppliers, as well as 
training and capacity building  
(Mlecnik, 2013). 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new supply 
chain configurations. 
Customer 
interface 
Creating new connections to 
potential customers, 
interfacing between 
customer expectations and 
new business model designs. 
Developing marketing and 
sales channels as well as new 
forms of customer 
engagement – including the 
use of new media (Brown, 
2018). 
Advocacy and lobbying to 
modify regulatory or policy 
environment to be more 
favourable to new 
customer interfaces. 
 
Creating new markets by 
influencing regulations or 
local rules (Martiskainen 
and Kivimaa, 2017). 
Financial 
model 
Creating links to new financial 
actors to develop new 
financial models through new 
sources of capital or revenue 
streams. 
Developing new financial 
models – often linked to new 
value propositions, requiring 
interaction with finance 
providers and customers. 
Advocacy and lobbying  
to modify regulatory or 
policy environment to be 
more favourable to new 
financial models. 
 
Seeking new financial 
resources such as research 
and development (R&D) 
funding or other private 
sector fundraising activities. 
Governance By facilitating new networks 
and links between the other 
business model components 
this may lead to new modes 
of governance, towards more 
integrated or networked 
arrangements (Treib et al., 
2007). 
Developing the linkages 
between different actors 
involved in business model 
governance. This may include 
an active role in organisational 
management and ‘system 
building’ activities during the 
early phases of business model 
development (Bolton and 
Hannon, 2016).  
Advocacy and lobbying with 
regulators to overcome 
potential barriers to 
business model integration 
or outsourcing 
(Howells, 2006; Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2009; Kivimaa, 
2014). 
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The combined business model and intermediation framework is shown in Figure 1 and 
illustrates how these elements work together to produce business model innovation. 
 
Figure 1 Business model innovation and intermediation framework 
 
3. Methodology  
This research involved a qualitative case study of a policy initiative to promote business model 
innovation for whole-house retrofit; the Energiesprong initiative. We draw on insights and 
empirical context from two wider research projects focussed on both (1) business models and 
finance mechanisms for residential retrofit and (2) the role of intermediaries in low energy 
housing innovation. Each project involved a total of thirty-nine and twenty-nine semi-
structured interviews4 respectively, conducted between November 2016 and June 2018. This 
included seven interviews with actors directly involved in the Energiesprong initiative. Other 
interviews provided background both on the range of business model archetypes and financing 
mechanisms adopted as well as the nature of intermediation in the sector. A qualitative case 
study approach was considered appropriate given the need to develop an in-depth 
understanding of these relatively understudied processes in the retrofit context, to answer 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions (Yin, 1994) that contribute to theory development (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
In building this picture, the research was undertaken in three parts. 
 
Part one focussed on the diversity of business models and finance mechanisms adopted for 
residential retrofit. This initially involved nine scoping interviews with key ‘experts’ in the 
retrofit space in the UK, EU and USA (see Appendix A, Table A1). These experts were selected 
on the basis of their technical, academic and policy eminence within the retrofit sector, with 
further interviewees sourced through snowballing techniques (Yin, 1994). This was 
                                                     
4 The interviews were a mix of face to face and video conference calls 
 
 
Value 
proposition
Financial 
Model
Supply 
Chain
Customer 
Interface Governance  
Facilitating involves bringing 
together the key stakeholders 
to involved in business model 
governance 
 
Configuring involves the 
design and modification of 
internal business model 
components  
 
Brokering concerns external 
advocacy, resource raising 
and market formation 
activities  
Facilitating involves bringing together 
the key stakeholders involved in the 
business model 
 
Configurin  involves the design and 
modification of internal business model 
components  
 
Brokering concerns external advocacy, 
resource raising and market formation 
activities  
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supplemented by extensive document analysis and attendance of industry events and 
seminars. The objective was to develop a typology of business models and finance mechanisms 
and understand how their design features contributed to their success in different contexts. 
The scoping interviews were followed by twenty-four interviews with key practitioners across 
the key business model and finance mechanism archetypes, to develop a rich understanding 
of their operation and the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. This identified two 
contrasting business model archetypes, which are explored in detail in this study. The 
‘atomised’ market model that has typified the delivery of single residential retrofit measures, 
and highly innovative net-zero energy performance contracts; with the ‘Energiesprong’ 
initiative the only known residential example. 
 
Part two provided context on intermediation in the UK low energy housing sector (see (Kivimaa 
and Martiskainen, 2018b, 2018a; Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2017)) and provided a background 
setting for analysis of intermediation in this case study. This included twenty-nine in-depth 
interviews and a workshop organised with stakeholders in February 2017, in which 
Energiesprong were a speaker (see Appendix B, Table B1).  
 
Part three involved an in-depth case study5 of the Energiesprong initiative. This phase involved 
six6 interviews during spring and summer 2018 with various actors in both the UK and the 
Netherlands. This included the client or housing provider; the construction industry partner; 
supporting policymakers, as well as the Energiesprong market development team intermediary 
themselves (see Appendix C, Table C1). The interviews focussed on understanding whole-
house retrofit as a systemic innovation; the nature of the Energiesprong business model; the 
role of the market development team in enabling business model innovation; the policy 
approach that brought it into being and the ongoing interaction between the intermediary, 
policymakers and other stakeholders. Again, these interviews were supplemented by 
document analysis and attendance of relevant industry events and seminars. 
 
Each interview was digitally recorded and transcribed and analysed using the NVivo 
qualitative analysis software. Interviewees were offered options as to the level of disclosure 
and anonymity (reflected in the appendices). Interview data was coded and analysed the based 
on the framework outlined in Section 2.3.2. This also involved triangulating these findings with 
public available reports such as Energiesprong (2018, 2017, 2014), to add validity to the claims 
made in the following sections.  
 
4. Business model incumbency and innovation intermediation in residential retrofit 
The following section explores two contrasting business models and the role of an innovation 
intermediary; based on the framework outlined in Section 2.3.2. This section first outlines the 
‘atomised’ market, business model - considered typical retrofit practice. We then introduce 
the Energiesprong initiative, as a case study of retrofit business model innovation, delivered 
through a government funded intermediary.  
 
                                                     
5 Phase one provided sufficient detail on the atomised market model 
6 One Energiesprong interview already took place in phase one 
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4.1. The ‘atomised’ market model 
The majority of EU low carbon retrofit has involved single measures delivered by separate 
contractors, without guarantees on energy saving performance. This has typically required 
multiple points of contact and has tended to be funded by a number of changing subsidy 
regimes such as energy supplier obligations, tax breaks or feed in tariff type schemes. Although 
this approach has been fairly successful for incremental single measures (Rosenow and Eyre, 
2014); this ‘atomised market model’ is considered problematic for undertaking whole-house 
retrofits. Creating issues for project co-ordination, energy performance gaps and unintended 
consequences such as air quality and damp issues - limiting consumer appeal.  
4.1.1. Value proposition 
The traditional offer to households has been framed in terms of energy cost savings, rather 
than home improvement or increasing comfort. This was considered to be a mistake by many 
of those interviewed: 
 
“For most people … it’s not the economics that’s driving them, it really isn’t. First and 
foremost, its comfort, its often aesthetics, what you perceive as aspirational… It’s all 
these subtle things that are more cultural I think.” (Academic - Energy Efficiency Policy) 
 
The focus on energy cost savings is especially problematic, given that energy savings are 
typically based on estimated rather than guaranteed performance: 
 
“to guarantee you performance…that's a different mind-set…and…selling performance 
is good because it puts a line of blame and accountability, which is what we don't have 
at the moment” (Director – BRE) 
 
Therefore, the narrow offer of estimated energy cost savings without any guarantees or 
warranties on the work, severely limits the appeal of a whole-house retrofit. It was also 
commented that this approach results in poor-quality installations, with limited liability or 
recourse potential due to the lack of aftercare or performance guarantees. 
 
4.1.2. Supply chain  
The typical retrofit supply chain consists of multiple, fragmented installers, suppliers and 
consultants. It was discussed by several interviewees, that this is largely a reflection of the 
wider construction industry; typified by specialised subcontractors, each with their own 
division of labour and industry culture: 
 
“Solid wall insulation it’s like an…artisanal, industry…Rather than something which is at 
industrial scale, and those economies of scale are never going to happen, until you got 
the whole supply chain working” (Energy Saving Trust) 
 
This supply chain fragmentation, the lack of assured performance, measurement and 
verification alongside a skills gap were all seen to contribute to low quality retrofits, particularly 
for deeper measures such as solid wall insulation: 
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“we've got issues around external wall insulation … we've got … green algae growing 
on the outside…we've got so many complaints coming in from private residents” (Social 
Housing Provider) 
 
4.1.3. Customer interface 
In the atomised market model, consumer engagement7 has typically involved single measures, 
leaving the customer to seek out and project manage more comprehensive work “largely the 
onus is on them at the moment” (Energy Saving Trust). In procuring multiple retrofit measures, 
customers therefore need to engage multiple consultants and contractors, each with their own 
marketing channels and points of sale: 
 
“[referring to the UK’s Green Deal8] what actually happened was the customer journey 
was a lot longer than expected.” (Energy Efficiency Consultant).  
 
This lack of co-ordination between different suppliers is therefore seen as complex, and likely 
to deter all but the most committed households. Without a trusted intermediary or a single 
point of contact, some interviewees also felt this made customers vulnerable to unscrupulous 
contractors “if Mrs Jones goes direct to the company, the company can tell her anything can’t 
they” (Energy Efficiency Consultant). 
 
4.1.4. Financial model 
Specific financial models are not intrinsic to the atomised market model. However, this 
approach in synonymous with government grant and supplier obligation schemes; typified by 
stop start funding for single measures. Thus, many interviewees felt that this approach had 
resulted in a marketplace that was very grant dependent. It was further discussed that this 
policy approach had contributed to the piecemeal nature of installations and the very limited 
diffusion of whole-house retrofits. Whilst the UK’s recent Green Deal financing mechanism was 
intended to fund multiple measures, it still applied an incremental logic to financing: 
 
“Green Deal was set up to fund things on a measure by measure basis. So, you have 
this, then you have this, then you have this. … With the supplier obligations we worked 
on things …in the order of cost-effectiveness; in an ‘incrementalist’ approach” (Energy 
Saving Trust) 
 
4.1.5. Governance 
The atomised market model is associated with a market-based mode of governance, 
characterised by limited integration between the different elements of the business model: 
 
                                                     
7 Largely through the energy supplier obligations 
8 The Green Deal was a voluntary UK policy program based on a private sector finance mechanism, repaid on 
energy bills 
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“at the moment there is no integration in the retrofit market …somebody goes out and 
gets a lead …they may get £50…they then come up with ‘yes it's got a solid wall yes it 
needs windows’ it becomes a sum of parts without…a plan” (Director - BRE) 
 
This mode of governance may be effective for large organisations, able to manage complex 
supply chains, multiple interfaces with suppliers and compare different financing options. 
However, it is considered a poor means of delivering whole-house retrofits for time poor 
households, who may have limited knowledge of the options available or the ability to 
undertake due diligence. 
 
4.2. Case study: The Energiesprong initiative  
In 2013, the Dutch government funded a large-scale (€45 million) market led initiative to 
achieve net-zero energy homes known as the ‘Energiesprong’ or ‘energy leap’ initiative 
(Energiesprong, 2014). The aim was to overcome many of the issues identified in the previous 
section, thus, facilitating a self-sustaining market for net-zero energy homes9, through a new 
type of policy - delivered by a market intermediary. The Energiesprong market development 
team developed a radical solution based around a highly innovative business model involving: 
a net-zero energy performance contract; an integrated and industrialised supply chain; a single 
customer interface; a financial model based on the performance contract, and co-ordinated 
governance of these elements aided by the market development intermediary.  
 
The Energiesprong initiative, since emerging from its pilot phase, has now begun a period of 
growth and expansion to other national contexts - having signed a deal with 175 housing 
industry partners in the Netherlands to deliver 110,000 net-zero energy homes by 2020 
(Energiesprong, 2014). This included the creation of market development teams in the UK, 
France, Germany and in North America, building on the Dutch experience (Energiesprong, 
2017). Thus far, 4,500 net-zero energy homes (a mix of new-build and retrofit) have been 
delivered in the Netherlands, with 10 and 24 retrofits completed in the UK and France 
respectively - with many more planned (Energiesprong, 2018). Initially entirely state funded, 
the initiative is now supported by national and European Union innovation funds and a range 
of local authority, industry and public sector partners in these respective countries. The 
following section explores the Energiesprong business model in more detail including its Dutch 
origins and recent translation to the UK market. 
 
4.2.1. Value proposition 
In the Energiesprong model, customers are offered a comprehensive whole-house retrofit, 
based on guaranteed net-zero energy consumption. This typically involves offsite 
manufactured, insulated facades, integrated with renewable heat sources and PV panels. The 
contractor offers a 30-year energy performance guarantee for net-zero annual energy 
consumption amortised over the calendar year. This is based on a guaranteed internal 
temperature of 21c in living spaces, and a set allowance of hot water and electricity 
consumption; analogous to a mobile phone contract with usage limits. The aim is also to reduce 
                                                     
9 The program is focused both on net-zero-energy whole-house retrofit and new build 
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the duration of the retrofit to under one week using offsite manufacture and modularisation. 
However, the model does not proscribe any specific measures but rather the performance 
outcome: 
 
“This is a balanced scorecard…of outcomes, so that's energy, that's cost, that's 
overheating, that's noise, that's indoor air quality that do get genuinely measured, has 
sanctions if you do not meet them and it is over the long term” (Energiesprong 
Contractor) 
 
Another key aspect of the Energiesprong offering is the emphasis on the home improvement 
value of the whole-house retrofit. Homes are given a visual uplift and the retrofit typically 
includes a number of non-energy-based maintenance measures. Unlike the atomised market 
model, less emphasis is placed on energy costs savings, and instead on health and comfort 
benefits alongside property improvement value: 
 
“I think…in terms of desirability…the push for such a scalable solution also needs to 
come from an angle where people actually want to have it.” (Energiesprong 
International Market Development) 
 
4.2.2. Supply chain 
The Energiesprong business model specifies performance rather than technical solutions. 
However, delivery of a net-zero energy retrofit requires an integrated supply chain, typically 
with a single ‘solution provider’. The Energiesprong model is also driving a move to 
industrialisation and offsite manufacture; with integrated energy modules that can be 
miniaturised, and mass-produced. It is thought that this process innovation will drive down 
costs and installation times through economies of scale; with one-day retrofits now being 
achieved in the Netherlands – despite each retrofit being bespoke. The Energiesprong model 
therefore adopts a performance-based approach to procurement: 
 
“In the past they would come up with a technical specification, price it up and invite 
competition on price. We are completely turning that round and saying you ask for a 
product performance to a fixed price point” (Energiesprong Project Manager) 
 
Moreover, this procurement route is seen to improve quality and collaboration between the 
client and contractor: 
 
“Energiesprong however, has real teeth, so therefore the quality is driven up because 
we are concerned to get it right.” (Energiesprong Contractor) 
 
4.2.3. Customer interface 
In the Energiesprong initiative, the initial target market has been the social housing sector. 
Achieving scale is considered to be easier in this market where multiple homes can be 
retrofitted under a single deal, also tending to have a more uniform housing stock. 
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Interviewees felt that breaking into the owner occupier market would be much more 
challenging: 
 
“They are managing larger volumes; it is much easier to converse with a provider who 
is managing 50, 60, 70,000 homes, than to talk to individual private landlords of one or 
two flats.” (Energiesprong Project Manager) 
 
The customer interface involves a single product offering, rather than separate, sales, audit, 
measures and financing from different providers. Whilst for social housing this interface is 
initially with the housing provider, significant emphasis is placed on household engagement: 
 
“there was quite an intensive consumer engagement process, which involved workshops 
with the tenants…in the local pub…so that the tenants could directly import what they 
wanted out of the scheme… It did genuinely make a difference” (Local Authority 
Partner) 
 
Moreover, a key marketing tool of the Energiesprong approach is the visual impact of the newly 
renovated house, creating what is termed ‘kerbside appeal’.  
 
4.2.4. Financial model 
As with other forms of energy performance contract, the financial model relies on realised 
energy savings to fund the cost of the measures. Given the retrofit results in net-zero energy, 
the entire energy bill can be used to recover these costs. The model has thus far been adopted 
in the social housing sector, and benefits from the rolling up of future maintenance10 from the 
housing providers’ asset management budget: 
 
“The financing model therefore is…the aggregation of maintenance, major repair works 
and the additional revenue stream for thirty years from the energy plan that comes with 
the property.” (Energiesprong Project Manager) 
 
The strategy hinges on achieving economies of scale and learning rates, so that the financial 
model is viable based on energy costs savings and maintenance budgets alone - rather than 
reliant on subsidy as at present: 
 
“the way I see it…is…this massive prize of a self-financing business model, if we achieve 
that then there are millions and millions of homes that could be retrofitted” (Social 
Housing Provider) 
 
However, for the model to become viable in the private housing sector, third party sources of 
finance are likely to be necessary. The Dutch government is therefore exploring the use of 
mortgage financing and performance-based energy service agreements tied to the property. 
Critical to this is the cost of capital; “what we see now is cost of financing, structural cost of 
borrowing money is high in the UK, because it's fully commercial” (Energiesprong International 
                                                     
10 Such as those for wall and roofing repairs 
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Market Development). Therefore, several interviewees saw an ongoing role for government in 
bridging the funding gap and ensuring low interest rates.  
 
4.2.5. Governance 
The Energiesprong business model adopts an integrated mode of governance. Central to this 
has been the market development team, who have brought together the key stakeholders and 
facilitated collaboration and innovation towards a common goal: 
 
“We've made an innovation of the Energiesprong, and I guess this is one of the biggest 
things…it's the way, more the governance…the way it was organised” (Dutch Energy 
Policymaker) 
 
“So, there was quite a lot of collaboration…when we were developing our tender we 
could do some market testing through Energiesprong, through the market development 
team” (Social Housing Provider) 
 
This ‘partnership approach’ has been central to developing a business model where customer 
interface, supply chain, financing and net-zero energy retrofit are integrated into an offering 
from a single solution provider - which can be easily understood by the customer. Thus, 
simplifying the customer journey, improving quality and is potentially scalable to create a mass 
market for whole-house retrofit. 
 
Table 4 compares the atomised market model and Energiesprong business model, illustrating 
the difference across the components of the respective business models.
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Table 4 Comparison of the atomised market model and Energiesprong business models. 
Adapted from: (Brown, 2018) 
 ‘Atomised’ market model ‘Energiesprong’ energy performance contract  
Value 
proposition 
 
• Single measures  
• Emphasis on energy 
cost savings 
• Savings are estimated 
rather than guaranteed 
• Multiple measures or whole-house 
approach  
• Emphasis on home improvement and 
comfort 
• Energy performance contract  
• Energy service guarantee of temperature 
(21c), hot water volume (150L/day) and 
electricity (fixed kWh/year) 
• Energy supply contract subsumed in energy 
service agreement 
Customer 
interface 
 
• Largely left to the 
market to promote and 
engage customers, with 
responsibility for the 
marketing and 
engagement for the 
different components 
(i.e. measures, audit, 
finance) of the retrofit 
typically separated 
• One point of contact for the promotion, 
marketing and sales of the full package 
necessary to achieve the retrofit, provided 
by the host company as a one-stop-shop  
• Emphasis on customer engagement 
through housing provider and face to face 
workshops 
Supply 
chain  
 
• Fragmented 
relationship with 
traditional separated 
trades (plumbers, 
carpenters etc.) 
installing the retrofit 
measures in sequence 
with limited co-
ordination  
• Highly integrated package of measures, 
using offsite manufacture techniques - 
provided in house or through trusted 
subcontractors 
• Supply chain may require legal and finance 
skillsets  
• Additional supply chain for electricity supply 
required, can be through fully licensed 
supplier model or through a white label 
scheme 
Financial 
Model  
 
• Finance is arranged via 
third party with little 
involvement in the 
retrofit process 
• Lender developer / investor seeking to use 
energy performance contract structure to 
fund retrofits  
• Lender captures energy savings and charges 
back to property owner based on historic 
consumption 
• Retrofit supplier assumes responsibility for 
payment of energy bill 
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 ‘Atomised’ market model ‘Energiesprong’ energy performance contract  
Governance 
 
• Highly fragmented 
arrangement of 
suppliers with little co-
ordination between the 
various elements – 
project management is 
left to the customer  
• Integrated mode of governance where 
components of the business model are 
delivered and co-ordinated by a single 
organisation, who take responsibility for 
project delivery.  
 
4.3. Innovation intermediary 
The Energiesprong market development team was funded by a €45 million grant from the 
Dutch government, as an arm’s length, market-led initiative; considered a radical step change 
in both innovation and energy efficiency policy in the Netherlands: 
 
“There was a strong belief here in this ministry that we should not do this… ourselves. 
This is not [what] we are good at. [We] had to bring out new people with knowledge of 
the market to make a connection with the market... We are making policy… we're not 
judging business plans” (Dutch Energy Policymaker) 
 
To achieve its goals, the market development team performs three key forms of 
intermediation; facilitating, configuring and brokering that are crucial to business model 
innovation, and market formation. 
 
4.3.1. Facilitating  
The overarching role of the market development team is to co-coordinate the key stakeholders 
of the housing provider, the construction industry and policymakers, facilitating collaboration 
and learning. 
 
“So, what we saw is that it's much easier if you put an interlocutor or a catalyst in the 
middle that understands where the market needs to go …what the financing conditions 
need to be, what the regulatory conditions need to be, that you organise some demand, 
and then the market is right there.” (Energiesprong International Market Development) 
 
This has involved multiple project partners including large construction companies, social 
housing providers, local authorities and municipalities. The aim has been to create a shared 
vision for net-zero energy buildings and develop a diverse skillset and knowledge base through 
events, publications and pilot projects. Interestingly, the market development team sees this 
role as temporary. It is hoped that over time and with sufficient experience, its role would 
become obsolete as the business model becomes mainstream.  
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4.3.2. Configuring 
The Energiesprong market development team were tasked to develop a novel solution that 
would overcome many of the issues surrounding the traditional atomised market model. 
Whilst funded by a large government grant in the Netherlands, it was effectively independent 
of the ministry that created it. This provided significant autonomy to fundamentally redesign 
the business model through which retrofit was delivered: 
 
“In the beginning... were able to do pretty radical things, right? Because there was 
nothing out there yet. Performance guarantees for 30 years, energy service plans, 
retrofit solution in a week? Nobody had…there was no example to look at the time… So, 
we really had to do a lot of activation. That budget allowed us to do that.” 
(Energiesprong International Market Development) 
 
This involved intensive innovation in partnership with contractors to determine what was 
technically possible, and extensive legal and policy work to develop the procurement approach 
and energy performance contracts. The Energiesprong team thus draws on extensive 
expertise, crucial in moving from concept to reality. However, the model has required re-
configuration to the UK context due to the different regulatory environment, industry culture 
and consumer expectations: 
 
“It was about promoting what had been done in the Netherlands, and saying, "This is 
how it works." I think what we've ended up with understanding… "It doesn't really work 
like that here." (Social Housing Provider) 
 
4.3.3. Brokering 
The market development team has also played a critical advocacy role - brokering policy 
changes, procurement volumes and raising financial and human resources. This included 
lobbying the Dutch government to allow placement of energy service charges on rents, 
performance-based efficiency subsidies, and mortgage eligibility assessments to account for 
net-zero-energy performance. This was made possible, because despite its independence 
Energiesprong was essentially an arm’s length government programme: 
 
“Interesting, why could we play this role? We were funded by the government. So, the 
fact that we brought together these organisations and we always said.... we're going to 
work on the supply side. We're going to work on the demonstrable goal. Also, we're 
going to work with the legislator.” (Energiesprong founding partner) 
 
The UK team have also secured innovation funding through various European Union grants and 
are now seeking a large UK government grant of over £150 million - for thousands of homes. 
It is hoped this scale will enable the financial model to be fully commercial. Critical to this is 
also securing demand volume; where in the Netherlands housing providers have agreed to 
retrofit 110,000 homes to net-zero standards (Energiesprong, 2014). However, significant 
work remains for the model to become self-sustaining: 
 
 20 
“after you know, 45 million…. the idea was always that after that, the market would it 
do itself. That is still not the case here [Netherlands] and it's also not in the UK.” (Dutch 
Energy Policymaker) 
 
A summary of these intermediation activities and how they relate to the components of the 
Energiesprong business model is provided in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Intermediation activities for the Energiesprong business model  
 Facilitating – network formation 
and collaboration  
Configuring – business model 
design 
Brokering - advocacy and 
resource raising 
Value 
proposition 
Bringing together the necessary 
skillsets for energy performance 
contracts including expertise in 
offsite manufacture, asset and 
energy management, law and 
finance.  
Designing performance 
contracts and developing the 
customer offer through 
collaborative design with the 
stakeholders in the network.  
 
Testing the customer offer 
through small scale trials and 
feedback with the end user. 
In the Netherlands the 
intermediary secured 
regulatory changes 
surrounding energy 
service charges on social 
rents.  
Supply 
chain 
Co-ordinating actors within the 
supply chain to deliver net-zero 
energy retrofits through greater 
integration – facilitating learning 
and adoption of offsite 
manufacture techniques and 
modular solutions through 
collaborative procurement.  
Managing procurement, 
tender process and contract 
terms with suppliers, as well 
as training and capacity 
building with SMEs in the 
retrofit supply chain. 
Securing agreement from 
housing providers for large 
order volumes for net-
zero energy homes – 
providing security for the 
supply chain to scale up 
operations.   
Customer 
interface 
Network formation and 
involvement of local community 
actors as well as public and 
private sector partners, holding 
regular events and outreach 
activities.  
Developing marketing 
materials and customer 
outreach in collaboration 
with the housing provider or 
other representatives of 
residents. This included social 
media channels as well as 
more conventional forms of 
engagement, including focus 
groups.  
Recruitment of housing 
association executives into 
the market development 
team to lobby for 
procurement of large 
numbers of net-zero 
energy retrofits within 
their host firms.  
Financial 
model 
Incorporating key financial 
stakeholders from both the 
private sector and government 
into the consortium from the 
earliest stages. 
Mobilising financial resources 
and designing contracts, 
building on dedicated 
financial and legal expertise 
to develop the financial 
model. 
In the Netherlands 
securing policy changes: 
for both efficiency 
subsidies and mortgage 
eligibility to be based on 
energy performance. 
 
UK and EU level: lobbying 
for innovation funding 
under EPRD; Interreg; and 
UK Industrial Strategy 
Challenge Fund.  
Governance A system building role – 
improving the links and between 
the elements of the business 
model towards an integrated 
mode of governance, ideally 
through a single solution 
provider.  
Formalising the links within 
the supply chain and wider 
network. In the UK, case this 
involved the creation of a 
new business venture ‘Melius 
Homes’ which will act as an 
integrated solution provider.  
Widespread PR and 
advocacy campaign across 
UK and EU to promote the 
Energiesprong business 
model with business 
leaders, local authorities 
and the Industry. With the 
aim of creating a network 
of ‘advocates’. 
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5. Discussion  
The goal of this paper was to understand how and why intermediaries - and in turn 
policymakers, might support business model innovation. We illustrate this though the case of 
an innovative business model for whole-house residential retrofit: the Energiesprong 
approach.  
 
In understanding the role of new business models in systemic innovation, the case of whole-
house retrofit is particularly instructive. Whole-house retrofit involves the assemblage and co-
ordination of a complex mix of technologies, processes, human and financial resources which 
interface both user and industry practices. Among these groups the imperative of saving 
energy remains a low priority. Equally, the wider regulatory and institutional environment 
remains poorly aligned to achieving this, particularly as it also constitutes a shift toward a more 
distributed energy supply system (Richter, 2013). Whole-house retrofit thus represents an 
archetypal example of a systemic innovation (Mlecnik, 2013). 
 
This paper builds on an earlier phase of research involving a systematic comparison of 
alternative retrofit business models (Brown, 2018). We show that the traditional atomised 
market business model, whilst suitable for the delivery of single retrofit measures is poorly 
suited to whole-house retrofit and is a weak driver of demand. The Energiesprong initiative 
radically overhauls this approach, through an integrated business model.  
 
Thus, our findings support recent research on the potential for supply chain integration 
(Mahapatra et al., 2013; Mlecnik et al., 2018, 2012, n.d.) and energy performance contracts 
for promoting whole-house retrofit (Brown, 2018; Winther and Gurigard, 2017). Therefore, 
these findings emphasise how the ‘integrative technologies’ - which characterise whole-house 
retrofit are best suited to hierarchical or integrated modes of governance (Hoetker, 2006; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). 
 
Consequently, business model innovation is able to exploit the added value of systemic 
innovations like whole-house retrofit - such as improved energy services and household 
comfort (Roelich et al., 2015). New business models achieve this by reconfiguring relationships 
within supply chains, mobilising financial resources and engaging customers in new or 
improved ways (Boons et al., 2013). Our case further emphasises how the governance of the 
business model is critical for the integration and management of these components, and the 
impact this has on the customer (Hellström et al., 2015). Business model innovation thus 
reconfigures organisational practices and their management to enable systemic innovations to 
become viable: 
 
“of significance is the business model’s ability to create a fit between technology 
characteristics and (new) commercialisation approaches that both can succeed on given 
and new markets.” (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013) 
 
However, the adoption of innovative business models, such as the Energiesprong approach 
remains challenging - due to a range of cultural and structural barriers (Stubbs and Cocklin, 
2008). Our findings show how the incumbent business model is a product of the wider 
construction industry - characterised by fragmentation, lowest cost procurement, and few 
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guarantees on performance. This reflects established ways of undertaking construction work 
and contract design, based on the ‘dominant logic’ of the industry (Chesbrough, 2010). Many 
SMEs lack the necessary knowledge for whole-house retrofits, capabilities such as energy 
monitoring and finance, or complementary assets such as energy management ventures - 
preventing them from offering long term energy performance contracts (Teece, 2018, 2010, 
1986). As identified by Budde Christensen et al., (2012) incumbent firms may thus be locked 
into a path dependent business model, with a limited demand for whole-house retrofit, 
providing few incentives to change. 
 
Crucial to overcoming these barriers has been an open approach to innovation, where learning 
is widely disseminated rather than held within individual firms (Chesbrough, 2006). Thus, the 
market development team created standardised contracts and procurement processes, critical 
in reducing transaction costs for energy service contracts (Nolden et al., 2016). The 
intermediary also played an instrumental role in lobbying for policy changes and financial 
resources. Moreover, the negotiation of delivery volumes and the targeting of the social 
housing market is ostensibly an organisational ‘strategy’ rather than a business model (Teece, 
2010). Thus, the intermediary roles of configuring, facilitating and brokering (Stewart and 
Hyysalo, 2008) were critical for business model innovation, market formation and strategy for 
the diffusion of whole-house retrofit. Interestingly, the temporary nature of the market 
development team was also observed in Kivimaa’s (2014) study of two Finnish innovation 
agencies. Both studies emphasise the risks of too short an intervention and the importance of 
maintaining neutrality whilst retaining policy influence - a challenging balancing act (Kivimaa 
and Martiskainen, 2016; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). 
 
Where this study breaks new ground is by highlighting the role of an innovation intermediary 
in overcoming these barriers to business model innovation. We develop a novel framework 
(Table 3 and Figure 1) which integrates the components of the business model with 
intermediation functions for the first time. The Energiesprong market development team is 
therefore shown to be instrumental in developing the concept of a net-zero energy retrofit, 
engaging the supply chain to develop innovative approaches, as well as developing the legal 
and policy framework necessary for it to work. By highlighting the specific processes by which 
intermediaries can support business model innovation; these findings are an important 
contribution to the literature on innovation intermediaries (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009), and 
business model innovation (Bolton and Hannon, 2016) – emphasising how one can promote 
the other. 
 
Our case study also contributes to understanding the role of intermediaries and business 
model innovation in innovation policy. Drawing on Edler and Fagerberg’s (2017) typology; the 
formation of the market development team was primarily a policy to promote interaction and 
learning across networks. What is interesting is that the intermediary was able to engage with 
the market and influence policy in a range of other areas. This included: securing R&D&D 
funding in the form of European Union grants as well as changes to the energy efficiency 
subsidy regime; procurement policies to generate demand through volume agreements with 
public housing providers; changes in regulations and standards to allow energy service charges 
to be bundled with rent; and missions and foresight policies including the goal for net zero 
energy homes by 2050 and the gradual disconnection of neighbourhoods from the natural gas 
grid in the Netherlands.  
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The catalytic role of the intermediary can thus be seen both in terms of market and policy 
formation. Recognising the limited generalisability of our case study approach, we suggest that 
by bringing together the literature on systemic innovation, business models and innovation 
intermediaries - our findings and framework (Table 3 and Figure 1) provide some transferable 
theoretical insights. We demonstrate how government affiliated intermediaries like the 
Energiesprong market development team can be viewed as a decentralised and highly effective 
form of innovation policy (Kivimaa, 2014). This policy created an intermediary who facilitated 
business model innovation, which in turn has enabled systemic innovation in the form of 
whole-house retrofit. Accordingly, policymakers wishing to promote business model 
innovation in other sectors, may achieve these aims through the creation of innovation 
intermediaries such as the market development team. 
 
However, the transferability and wider significance of these findings, both for the empirical 
context of retrofitting and intermediation for business model innovation, requires 
qualification. For now, the Energiesprong business model requires significant scale before it is 
viable without subsidy; thus, contingent on promising but as yet unrealised learning rates 
(Energiesprong, 2017). The findings also emphasise the greater challenges in entering the 
owner occupier market, where diversity of building forms and consumer preferences make 
mass produced solutions more challenging (Haines and Mitchell, 2014). Equally, these findings 
highlight issues of compatibility for the transfer of radical business models to new contexts. 
The absence of ‘net metering’ for renewable microgeneration, the lack of public financing 
support through low cost loans, or a general unwillingness for policymakers to promote specific 
technological solutions are all significant challenges for the UK. Therefore, these findings 
highlight the difficulty in transferring systemic innovations and new business models to 
different institutional contexts (Hall et al., 2016) and political economies (Baker et al., 2014). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we advanced three related propositions. First, we outline how business model 
innovation may play a key role in unlocking the potential of systemic innovations. We illustrate 
how the radical ‘Energiesprong’ business model, based on zero-energy performance contracts, 
an industrialised supply chain, integrated governance and a simple customer offer, could 
greatly improve the appeal, delivery and scalability of whole-house energy retrofit. 
 
Second, we show how a range of barriers to business model innovation may be overcome 
through an innovation intermediary; in our case the Energiesprong market development team. 
This intermediary has played an instrumental and catalytic role, facilitating stakeholder 
collaboration, configuring the design of the business model, and brokering the policy changes, 
financial resources and procurement volumes needed for the business model to be viable. 
 
Third, we described how such entities can be created by policy, and in turn shape the policy 
and institutional landscape towards new business models. Our case demonstrates how the 
creation of a market facing intermediary enabled the Dutch government to achieve its policy 
aims through a decentralised body - the Energiesprong market development team. This 
intermediary’s role in market formation and business model innovation could thus present a 
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template for both policymakers and academics looking to facilitate and study systemic 
innovation in a range of other sectors. 
 
Concisely, these findings show how policymakers can promote business model innovation 
through the creation and support of innovation intermediaries. These organisations may 
further shape the policy and institutional landscape, in a process of feedback between policy 
and market design in ways that market or government actors alone cannot.  
 
Given the limited generalisability of this single case study, future research could incorporate 
this framework into a more representative cross-sectional research design of the sector at 
large. Future research could also explore these processes in other sectors such as food, 
transport, healthcare or manufacturing - using the theoretical links we make in this paper. 
Future research on business models for whole-house retrofit could also incorporate 
quantitative methods, such as on project performance or customer satisfaction to add validity 
to the claims made here. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 Business Model interviews  
Business model 
archetype 
Organisation Actor 
Expert Scoping 
All 
 
University of Oxford Senior Research Fellow - energy efficiency policy 
United Kingdom 
Green Building 
Council (UKGBC) 
Policy Advisor  
Energy Saving Trust 
(EST) 
Senior Insight Manager  
Building Research 
Establishment (BRE)  
Director (Wales) 
Energy Programs 
Consortium 
Counsel and Director of Finance Programs (USA) 
Buildings 
Performance Institute 
Europe 
(BPIE)/Reshape 
innovation 
Innovation Strategist - Founder 
(Reshape Innovation) 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology (USA) 
Professor of Energy Policy 
Association for 
Environmental 
Studies and Sciences 
(AESS) 
Principal and Independent Consultant 
Practitioner 
Atomized 
market model 
Building Research 
Establishment (BRE) 
Director (Wales) 
Sustainable Design 
Collective 
Architect – Managing Director  
Market 
intermediary 
model 
 
Greater London 
Authority (RE:NEW) 
Program Manager -Energy 
Nottingham Energy 
Partnership  
Contracts Manager  
Birmingham Energy 
Savers (BES) 
(Consultant) 
Sustainability Consultant  
One stop shop 
 
Retrofit works / Parity 
projects  
Director 
Segel AS - Norway Business Development Consultant 
Brighton and Hove 
Energy Services 
Company (BHESCo) 
CEO 
 32 
Energy Service 
Agreement  
 
Energies POSIT'IF - 
Paris France  
Innovation Strategist - Founder 
(Reshape innovation) 
ICF Habitat- Paris 
France 
Head of Energy & Water 
RENESCO – Riga, 
Latvia 
Managing Director 
Managed 
Energy Service 
Agreement  
 
Energiesprong – UK, 
Netherlands 
Project manager /Rainmaker 
Table A2 Finance Mechanism Interviews  
Finance Mechanism Organisation 
Expert Scoping 
All 
 
Climate Strategy and Partners 
United Kingdom Green Building Council (UKGBC) 
Building Research Establishment (BRE)  
Energy Programmes Consortium (USA) 
Climate Bonds Initiative 
Marksman Consulting LLP 
Energy Pro Ltd 
Practitioner 
Public/credit enhancement  Energy Saving Trust Home Energy Efficiency Programme 
Scotland (EST-HEEPS) 
Amber Infrastructure (LEEF/MEEF) 
On Bill Finance and 
Repayment  
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
Energy Service Agreement  
 
Servizi Energia Ambiente (SEA) 
Joule Assets Europe 
RENESCO – Riga, Latvia 
PACE RENEW Financial 
PACE Nation 
Energy Efficiency Mortgage European Mortgage Federation (EeMAP) 
Community Finance Brighton and Hove Energy Services Company (BHESCo) 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 Low energy housing intermediaries: Sequence of interviews, interviewee types and 
focus. 
Interview 
round 
No. of 
interviews 
Type of interviewees Focus Timing of 
interviews 
1st 10 I1 NGO, I2 charity, I3 charity, I4 
research organisation, I5 charity, I6 
campaign, I7 NGO, I8 membership 
organisation, I9 network 
organisation, I10 ex-government 
UK building 
energy 
efficiency 
policy 
development 
July–
September 
2014 
2nd 12 I11 social enterprise, I12 community 
organisation, I13 anonymous, I14 
social housing fund, I15 charity, I16 
research organisation, I17 social 
enterprise, I18 local administration, 
I19 social enterprise, I20 local 
administration, I21 social enterprise, 
I22 membership organisation 
Developments 
in UK low-
energy 
homes; 
activities of 
specific 
organisations 
May 
2015–
March 
2016 
3rd 7 I23 membership organisation, I24 
network organisation, I25 ex-
government, I26 academic-
practitioner, I27 network 
organisation, I28 academic-
practitioner, I29 consultancy 
Activities and 
influence of 
intermediary 
organisations 
on policy 
development 
May 2017, 
February–
March 
2018 
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Appendix C  
Table C1 Energiesprong case study interviews  
Actor Type Organisation Role 
Intermediary  Energiesprong Market Development Team 
X3 
 
Project Manager 
Head of International 
Market Development  
Founding Partner  
Client  Nottingham City Homes Head of Energy and 
Sustainability 
Contractor Melius Homes Director  
Policymaker 
(Netherlands) 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations 
Director Building & 
Energy 
Policymaker (UK)  Nottingham City Council Head of Energy and 
Sustainability  
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Ghosh and Johan Schot
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Leadership in Megascience Projects. David Eggleton 
August
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7 Overcoming the systemic 
challenges of retrofitting residential 
buildings in the United Kingdom
A Herculean task?
Donal Brown, Paula Kivimaa,  
Jan Rosenow and Mari Martiskainen
Introduction
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a giant serpent with many heads. The 
second of the 12 labours of Hercules was to kill the Hydra. However, when one 
of the Hydra’s heads was cut off, two more grew in its place. In many ways, over-
coming the ‘multi- headed-challenges’ of achieving widespread energy efficiency 
(EE) retrofit is an equally Herculean task. Policy initiatives in the UK, such as 
the Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) and the Green Deal, have sought and 
failed to achieve the mass uptake of residential retrofit. This chapter will argue 
that such policies have failed to address four systemic challenges that constrain 
uptake for whole house retrofits, and that a more comprehensive and wide- 
reaching policy approach will be needed to overcome each of these challenges. 
The chapter is therefore focused on some of the solutions to these challenges 
from the perspective of three key elements of a retrofit: the business model, 
financing and intermediaries. It also discusses the ways in which policy could 
support these outcomes.
 Retrofit of buildings involves the ‘construction approach involving the 
action of introducing [retrofitting] new materials, products and equipment 
into an existing building with the aim of reducing the use of energy of the 
building’ (Baeli, 2013, p. 17). This is different from renovating or refurbishing 
– which refers to work undertaken to repair homes or make them more 
aesthetically pleasing (Baeli, 2013). Retrofits of residential buildings have 
significant potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (CCC, 2016), fuel 
poverty (Sovacool, 2015), and improve occupant health and wellbeing 
(Willand et al., 2015). However, in the UK, much of this potential is yet to 
be realised. Residential buildings account for almost a quarter of the UK’s 
carbon emissions (CCC, 2016), and for every £1 spent on retrofitting fuel 
poor homes an estimated £0.42 is saved in National Health Service spending 
(UKGBC, 2017). The Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015b) estim-
ates that there is cost- effective1 potential to reduce direct emissions2 from all 
buildings by a third by 2030, with the need to achieve near- zero emissions 
from the sector by 2050 (CCC, 2016). It is estimated that this level of retrofit 
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activity would create a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) effect of approxi-
mately £25.3 billion in gross value added (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). The 
UK government has therefore announced a target for all UK homes to 
achieve an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating of C or above by 
2035 (HM Government, 2017).
 To achieve these targets, an increasingly comprehensive whole house approach 
to residential retrofit will be needed (Hansford, 2015). Such an approach involves 
multiple measures with strategies for insulation, draught proofing, ventilation, 
heating systems and low- carbon microgeneration (ibid.). However, the traditional 
policy approach to residential retrofit has tended to incentivise single measures 
and piecemeal interventions, which may cause damaging unintended con-
sequences;3 such as mould growth, poor air quality and in some cases structural 
damage (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). Thus, a comprehensive whole house retro-
fit; where the entire building is treated as a system rather than as individual ele-
ments or measures, can mitigate such issues and achieve greater reductions in 
emissions (Hansford, 2015). Much literature in this area has focused on the key 
‘barriers’ to uptake (Fylan et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 2004; Kangas et al., 2018). 
However, this focus on barriers has tended to characterise retrofit decision- making 
in terms of rational choices while ignoring broader social and contextual factors 
(Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the assumption that there is a 
latent demand for retrofit (Wilson et al., 2015).
 The UK is an interesting case study – although achieving major progress in 
power sector decarbonisation, it still has one of the least efficient housing stocks in 
Europe. This is despite recent policy initiatives for residential EE. This chapter 
starts with a brief overview of recent UK policy on residential retrofit. It then 
moves onto characterising four challenges that constrain demand for retrofits, then 
proposes solutions centred around three key elements of successful whole house 
retrofits: business models (Brown, 2018); financing (Borgeson et al., 2013) and 
intermediaries (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018). Drawing on recent empirical 
work at the CIED, we then argue that achieving these ambitions will require a 
comprehensive mix of policies (Kern et al., 2017; Kivimaa et al., 2018).
UK policy on residential retrofit
Improved EE has played a pivotal role in reducing the UK’s energy use and 
carbon emissions. On a temperature corrected basis, total UK household energy 
use decreased by 19 per cent between 2002 and 2016, despite a 12 per cent 
increase in the number of households and a 10 per cent increase in population 
(BEIS, 2016). Per- household energy consumption fell by 37 per cent between 
1970 and 2015, with most of this decrease (29 per cent) occurring since 2004 
(ibid.). EE improvements in individual households have offset the 46 per cent 
increase in the number of households, the 5.6°C increase in average internal 
temperatures and the rapid growth in appliance ownership over this period, with 
the result that total household energy consumption has increased by only 7 per 
cent in 45 years.
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 Although rising energy prices and the 2008 recession contributed to recent 
trends, the bulk of the reduction in per- household energy consumption can 
be attributed to public policies to improve EE (CCC, 2017; CEBR, 2011; 
DECC, 2015; Odyssee, 2017). Of particular importance have been the major 
home insulation programmes funded by successive ‘supplier obligations’ (SOs) 
such as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT – 2008 to 2012) 
(Rosenow, 2012) and ECO – 2013 onwards. Since 1994, energy and carbon- 
saving targets imposed on electricity and gas suppliers have allowed them to 
recover the costs through a levy on household energy bills. Also important 
were the requirement for condensing boilers within the UK Building Regula-
tions and the progressive tightening of EU standards on the EE of electrical 
appliances (CEBR, 2011). Evaluations of these policies have shown them to 
be highly cost- effective, both in terms of the cost savings to participating 
households and in terms of broader societal welfare (Lees, 2006, 2008; 
Rosenow and Galvin, 2013). This experience supports the argument that 
market forces alone cannot deliver all cost- effective investments in residen-
tial buildings, owing to multiple and overlapping market failures. Instead, 
policy intervention can be used to increase the uptake of residential retrofit 
through a mix of regulation, public engagement and incentives.
 Despite dozens of instruments in the broader EE policy mix targeting resi-
dential buildings (Kern et al., 2017) and the apparent success in reducing 
energy demand through policy, in more recent years there has been a marked 
shift in the policy landscape. Previously, SOs supported relatively low- cost EE 
measures, and dedicated grant programmes funded through general taxation 
provided support for low- income households to invest in EE measures. The 
last version of such grant programmes – Warm Front, was terminated in 2011 
and the government decided to radically change the way EE was delivered in 
the UK. Through the introduction of the Green Deal in 2013, an on- bill-
repayment loan scheme, the government intended to trigger substantial 
investment in EE retrofits while the SO would fund only the costlier EE meas-
ures. It is now widely recognised that this approach failed – the Green Deal 
was effectively terminated in 2015 and funding provided through SOs has 
been significantly reduced (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). As a result, the uptake 
rate of EE improvements has stalled since 2012.
 There are, however, signs of a change to the approach taken. The Clean 
Growth Strategy, launched by the UK government on 12 October 2017, sets 
out ambitious long- term targets for EE – especially for buildings and would 
require a significant increase of the current EE improvement delivery rate. The 
targets specify that all homes as far as possible should reach EPC band C by 
2035 and all fuel poor homes by 2030. This requires both adjusting the ambition 
levels of existing policies and the implementation of new instruments. At the 
time of writing, government is consulting on several new policy measures, and 
has recently introduced minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) for the 
private rented sector.
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Key challenges for residential retrofit
The limited uptake of cost- effective EE measures, characterised as the ‘energy 
efficiency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), remains the focus of much academic 
and policy research. This is especially the case with residential buildings, where 
the benefits of retrofitting go beyond emissions reductions, including improve-
ments to health and wellbeing, social welfare and economic development 
(UKGBC, 2017).
 Previous literature on retrofit has adopted key ‘barriers’ to uptake as the 
theoretical basis for understanding this gap (Fylan et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 
2004). Yet the original focus of much of this barriers literature, such as Sorrell 
et al. (2004), was on firm level decision- making, rather than on households. As 
such, the focus on barriers has tended to characterise retrofit decision- making in 
terms of rational economic choices, while downplaying social and contextual 
factors (Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the inherent assumption 
of latent demand for retrofit once these barriers are removed (Wilson et al., 
2015). This framing has come to dominate the design of recent policy initiatives 
such as the Green Deal and ECO, which were predicated on households saving 
money on their energy bills (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).
 We argue that this framing is problematic, primarily because it misrepresents 
how and why home renovation decisions are made, and by whom. This chapter 
instead frames the problem in terms of four interrelated challenges that con-
tinue to contribute to low household uptake of residential retrofits.
Information, engagement and trust
A lack of knowledge of the specific options and benefits of retrofit remains wide-
spread among households in the UK (Marchand et al., 2015). While many of the 
technologies and tools exist to retrofit existing buildings, their uptake is not wide-
spread, largely due to a lack of household interest (Bonfield, 2016). Public engage-
ment and marketing schemes have tried to generate demand but tended to be 
top- down (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), short term and focus on specific subsidy 
schemes (UKGBC, 2017). This has also created a supply chain largely reliant on 
short- term policy incentives (CCC, 2015a). Complicated government programmes 
such as the Green Deal have often been difficult for households to grasp (Marchand 
et al., 2015). Households who do decide to retrofit often have to interact with mul-
tiple tradesmen and installers, who influence decisions on technology choices and 
subsequent use (Maby and Owen, 2015). These challenges of gaining appropriate 
advice, concerns over post- retrofit performance, combined with poor- quality work-
manship, has undermined trust with the wider public (Pettifor et al., 2015).
Uncertain benefits and quality
Predicted energy and cost savings from retrofits are based on modelled energy 
performance. There is consistently a ‘performance gap’ between these models 
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and actual energy performance outcomes (Fylan et al., 2016). This is character-
istic of an industry with a reputation for low quality, with few contractual penal-
ties for under- performance (Bonfield, 2016). Equally, retrofit interventions may 
alter a building’s existing features, affecting a household’s routines and practices 
in ways that may make them reticent to change (Wilson et al., 2015). By only 
focusing on financial savings, policies have also failed to recognise that retrofits 
could be framed and promoted in terms of aesthetics, comfort and wellbeing 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Much evidence now suggests that those who under-
take energy retrofits do so because of these non- economic sources of value, such 
as environmental concerns, desire for improved comfort and living standards, 
property longevity and aesthetics (Fawcett and Killip, 2017; Kivimaa and Mar-
tiskainen, 2018).
Complexity, disruption and timing
Whole house retrofits involve multiple activities carried out by multiple con-
tractors and consultants. Management of this process is complex and time con-
suming for the household (Pettifor et al., 2015). Alongside the significant 
disruption of extensive works, this can be a major deterrent to uptake (Snape 
et al., 2015). Thus, households may prefer to retrofit gradually, when it is less 
disruptive to do so, despite the higher costs and longer duration (Fawcett, 
2014). Consequently, energy retrofit may only be considered during wider reno-
vations (Wilson et al., 2015). Identifying such ‘trigger points’ could therefore 
promote retrofit in certain circumstances, such as moving into a new home 
(Maby and Owen, 2015).
Capital cost and split incentives
While retrofits result in long- term energy savings, whole house retrofits typically 
require long periods before the capital cost can be recovered in energy savings 
(Gouldson et al., 2015). Thus, many households lack access to up- front capital, 
with the benefits of the investment not being realised when moving house or in 
a landlord- tenant situation – termed ‘split incentives’ (Sorrell et al., 2004). 
While the up- front cost barrier has largely been the focus of recent policy initi-
atives in the UK, the economics of long- term financing is extremely sensitive to 
interest rates (Gouldson et al., 2015), particularly if energy bill neutrality4 is 
required (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Further, while households may value 
funding for wider non- energy measures, such as general repairs, the majority of 
policies fund EE measures alone (Borgeson et al., 2013). These four related chal-
lenges are shown in Figure 7.1.
 Typically, policy interventions in this area have targeted one or at most two 
of these issues. However, to overcome these ‘multi- headed challenges’ and 
deliver on the promise of residential retrofit, a systemic approach across multiple 
sectors and involving multiple government departments will be necessary (see 
the Conclusions and Policy Recommendations section). This chapter draws on 
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three emerging research themes: business models, financing and intermediaries. 
Building on these insights we then propose policy solutions to overcome the 
challenges for the widespread diffusion of whole house residential retrofit.
Overcoming the challenges for residential retrofit
In the following section we explore how best practice approaches to retrofit – 
business models, financing and intermediaries – can overcome many of the chal-
lenges that constrain uptake identified in the previous section.
Retrofit business models
A business model is defined as the nature of the products or services delivered to 
customers, the activities involved in delivering these and the means of captur-
ing revenue from these activities (Boons et al., 2013). Many radical innovations 
only became widespread once a complementary business model enabled their 
diffusion (Teece, 2010). Examples such as the MP3 player, low- cost air travel 
and smartphones owe their success to the effective pairing of the technology 
Low uptake 
of retrofit
Capital cost and
split incentives
Complexity,
disruption and
timing
Information, 
engagement 
and trust 
Uncertain 
benefits and 
quality
Figure 7.1 Key systemic challenges for driving retrofit uptake.
Source: the authors.
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with an appropriate business model and in many cases financing package. 
Emerging ‘service- based’ business models provide the useful end service rather 
than the technology or commodities themselves, shifting incentives for resource 
efficiency onto suppliers (Bocken et al., 2014). Consequently, energy service 
business models are promoted as a means of reducing energy demand (Labanca 
et al., 2014). Innovations such as distributed energy5 and whole house retrofit 
may therefore require novel, complementary business models before they are 
viable on a large scale (Hall and Roelich, 2016). Drawing on recent research at 
the CIED (Brown, 2018), we argue that despite significant policy action in this 
area, a major reason for the lack of uptake of whole house retrofit is the limita-
tions of the traditional business model.
 The dominant business model for residential retrofit (Figure 7.2) is character-
ised by a piecemeal offering; with a fragmented supply chain, a focus on single 
(rather than multiple, complementary) measures, and no guarantees on perform-
ance. This is typically marketed on estimated energy cost and carbon savings and 
involves measures and technologies installed by separate contractors. Customers 
procure the individual measures, energy audits and finance separately, with the 
result that multiple interfaces are required for a comprehensive residential retrofit. 
The offer of energy savings is based on modelled impacts of measures, and no per-
formance guarantees are provided. Therefore, any finance package is based on 
estimated rather than guaranteed savings. Such an approach has typified the 
delivery of the EE through UK policies such as ECO and the Green Deal.
 This approach introduces significant complexity for customers in managing 
multiple interfaces with sub- contractors, energy auditors and finance providers, 
also tending to result in major disruption for a whole house retrofit. Equally, the 
narrow emphasis on estimated cost savings, without performance or ongoing 
Customer
Energy auditor 
Installer type 1 Installer type 2
Finance provider 
Supply chain actor 
Retrofit measures
Customer interface
Finance repayments
Up-front payments
Figure 7.2 The incumbent ‘atomised market model’ for residential retrofit.
Source: Brown (2018), with permission (and without changes).
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maintenance guarantees, means uncertain benefits for the customer and provides 
limited trust on installation quality. Unsurprisingly, this approach has resulted in 
low demand for comprehensive residential retrofits.
 Recently, novel, integrated business models for residential retrofit have begun 
to emerge. These approaches emphasise a broader source of value for a whole 
house retrofit; focused upon aesthetics, increased property value, comfort, health 
and wellbeing alongside energy and carbon savings. Such approaches involve 
integrated and increasingly industrialised supply chains providing compre-
hensive whole house retrofits, through a single contractor or well- integrated 
network of sub- contractors. These approaches are characterised by a simplified 
customer interface with a single expert point of contact to coordinate the entire 
project. Some examples also offer integrated financing packages, and in some 
cases energy performance guarantees.
 The Energiesprong initiative originated in the Netherlands and has expanded 
into the UK (Energiesprong, 2017). Customers are offered a comprehensive 
residential retrofit, based upon net- zero energy consumption. Typically, an Ener-
giesprong retrofit involves the rapid delivery and installation of off- site manu-
factured, insulated wall facades, integrated with renewable heat systems and 
photovoltaic panels as well as ventilation and controls. The provider offers a 
30-year energy performance guarantee (based on set internal temperature) for 
annual net- zero energy consumption, with specified energy usage limits, along-
side an upstream financing package. An energy service contractor (ESCO) also 
takes on responsibility for the payment of the energy bill of the customer to 
provide ‘total energy management’. This represents a holistic energy services 
offering to the household, commonly termed a Managed Energy Services Agree-
ment (MESA) (Kim et al., 2012; Figure 7.3). This approach is currently being 
trialled in multi- family buildings and across large social housing estates.
Energy 
utility
Customer
ESCO
Energy auditor Installer type 2Installer type 1
Supply chain actor 
Retrofit measures
Customer interface
Energy savings performance
contract payments (ESPC)*
Energy Supply Contract 
(ESC)
*finance is provided directly 
to the ESCO
Finance provider
Figure 7.3 The Energiesprong Managed Energy Services Agreement (MESA).
Source: Brown (2018), with permission (and without changes).
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 Integrated business models such as the MESA have significant potential to 
drive demand for residential retrofit. By emphasising broader sources of value and 
including additional renovation measures as part of the offering, suppliers can 
attract customers by appealing to the wider benefits of improved aesthetics, 
increased property value, comfort, health and wellbeing alongside energy and 
carbon savings. Creating a simplified customer journey through an integrated 
supply chain, project co- ordination and a financing offer reduces complexity 
and minimises disruption for households. Further, the offer of energy performance 
guarantees provides certainty surrounding the ongoing performance benefits of the 
retrofit and the quality of the installation. While this may be the optimal solution, 
it is worth noting that integrated business models also face barriers and their 
uptake has been slow in the residential sector (Kangas et al., 2018).
 Business model innovation involves novel approaches and relationships for 
the delivery of products and services (Chesbrough, 2010). However, incumbent 
business models may be heavily embedded with existing industry practices, 
technological artefacts and regulatory regimes (Hannon, 2012). Therefore, 
adopting integrated energy service business models remains a challenge for an 
industry dominated by small- scale small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).
Retrofit finance
The up- front capital cost of retrofit measures and the split incentives faced by 
tenants and landlords remain a key challenge for the scaling up of compre-
hensive residential retrofits. Many UK households are also still in fuel poverty – 
defined as the necessity to spend more than 10 per cent of household income on 
energy bills (Sovacool, 2015).
 As noted above, the UK’s market- based SOs have funded significant loft and 
cavity wall insulation, low- energy lightbulbs and other low- cost measures 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). ECO, the latest evolution of the SO policies, was 
initially designed to fund more expensive retrofit measures, such as solid wall 
insulation. It has since been criticised for its focus on single measures (Brown, 
2018), dis- incentivising comprehensive installations, with no funding for com-
plementary work such as ventilation and damp prevention (Hansford, 2015). 
SO policies require a levy on all households’ energy bills, and thus increase the 
energy bills of households that do not benefit from programmes such as ECO 
(Rosenow et al., 2013). The ECO has now been redesigned to focus on the ‘fuel 
poor’. Although, having added approximately £50 a year to average household 
bills – a total of £1.3 billion annually (DECC, 2013), policies like ECO are 
arguably a poor tool for addressing fuel poverty (Rosenow et al., 2013).
 Meeting the UK’s retrofit targets will require an estimated £85.2 billion of 
net investment to 2035 (Rosenow et al., 2017). Achieving this level of invest-
ment through an SO like ECO could introduce politically unacceptable bill 
rises (Kern et al., 2017) and be particularly regressive for the fuel poor who do 
not adopt retrofit measures (Rosenow et al., 2013). Previous fuel poverty policies 
such as Warm Front did not raise wider energy bills as they were funded by 
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general taxation (Sovacool, 2015). A fuel poverty policy funded by general 
taxation is also more consistent with targeting the co- benefits of social welfare 
(Rosenow et al., 2013) and improved health and wellbeing (UKGBC, 2017).
 Alongside fuel poverty grants, there is a likely need for repayable retrofit 
financing for the ‘able- to-pay’ segment (Freehling and Stickles, 2016). The UK’s 
Green Deal policy involved a novel finance mechanism, intended to deliver 
approximately 2 million retrofit installations per year and leverage billions of 
pounds of private sector investment. The scheme was based on private sector 
lending to households, paid back through energy bills – known as on- bill-
repayment. However, the scheme achieved a fraction of its targets, and resulted 
in a significant loss to the UK taxpayer before its premature scrappage in 2015 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).
 A range of other retrofit finance mechanisms have been developed in the 
UK, wider EU and USA, including several that have been markedly more suc-
cessful than the Green Deal (EEFIG, 2015). Examples include: property assessed 
clean energy finance (PACE) in the USA, repaid through property taxes (Kim 
et al., 2012); low- cost public loans (such as the German KfW scheme) (Schröder 
et al., 2011); utility funded on- bill-financing (State and Local Energy Efficiency 
Action Network, 2014); retrofit mortgages (EEFIG, 2015); state- backed guaran-
tee funds (Borgeson et al., 2013); and energy service agreements (ESA) – where 
finance for measures is procured upstream by an ESCO as part of an energy per-
formance contract (Kim et al., 2012).
 Examples of successful retrofit financing programmes, including Germany’s 
KfW programme and California’s PACE scheme, share some common features. 
These schemes typically include: a cost of capital that is low enough not to deter 
households and enable deeper retrofit measures to remain cost- effective 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016); a simplified customer journey – with finance often 
arranged by the contractor or project manager (Brown, 2018), use of an existing 
repayment channel (such as property taxes), attaching the debt to the property 
not the householder (resolving the spilt incentive issue); and funding for broader 
sources of value, such as wider renovation work or essential home improvements, 
that are often more highly valued by households (Fawcett and Killip, 2017).
 By contrast the Green Deal involved a complex vetting and application 
process, that required a separate interface with a third- party provider, with no 
funding available for wider improvements. Introducing significant complexity 
that was likely to be offputting for most households. The Green Deal also had 
relatively high interest rates of 7–11 per cent (Marchand et al., 2015). Indeed, 
the total cost of capital amounted to at least 49 per cent of total Green Deal 
Plan costs over 15 years (UKGBC, 2014). Programmes such as the KfW scheme 
offer finance at extremely low or zero interest rates (>2 per cent) (Schröder 
et al., 2011). Such offers are likely to be more appealing to households (March-
and et al., 2015) and drastically improve the economics of whole house retrofits 
with longer payback periods (UKGBC, 2014).
 Several approaches exist to reduce the cost of capital for retrofit finance. 
Privately funded schemes such as PACE and retrofit mortgages are secured 
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against the property and can be securitised and sold to secondary markets – redu-
cing risk and transaction costs for investors (Borgeson et al., 2013). State actors 
may also assist in reducing the cost of capital, particularly where customers face 
difficulties or high costs in accessing finance. Policy options include interest sub-
sidies (Gouldson et al., 2015), state provision of subordinated (high risk) capital 
(State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network, 2014), investor guarantee 
funds (Borgeson et al., 2013) or the direct provision of low- cost loans, as has been 
the case in Germany’s KfW programme (Schröder et al., 2011).
 However, there are limits to what financing alone can achieve. In most cases 
financing is likely to be an enabler of retrofit projects rather than a driver of 
demand (Borgeson et al., 2014). Consequently, policymakers can introduce a 
range of incentives to promote demand for retrofit. These include fiscal or 
energy supplier incentives, such as variable property taxes (i.e. stamp duty or 
council tax), income tax rebates, VAT reductions or EE feed- in tariffs (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017; UKGBC, 2013). Some can be made fiscally neutral through 
penalising properties that do not meet a certain performance level (UKGBC, 
2013). Incentives are likely to be particularly effective when they are available 
at key junctures when broader renovation decisions are being made. Thus, 
approaches that target key trigger points such as when properties change hands, 
during extensive renovations or heating replacements, are likely to be most suc-
cessful (Maby and Owen, 2015).
Retrofit intermediaries
Intermediaries – that can be individuals, organisations or platforms – facilitate 
innovation processes (and broader transition processes) by educating, collecting 
and allocating financial and human resources, assessing new technologies and 
practices, creating partnerships, and influencing changes in regulations and rules 
(Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008). They may also shape how innovation occurs when 
it faces the user and negotiate on behalf of other actors (ibid.). Intermediaries 
may act as a single point of contact between households and retrofit contractors. 
In this section, we focus on how intermediaries can (1) stimulate, guide and 
manage different whole house retrofit projects, and (2) aid the creation of a 
market for new retrofit business models and financing solutions, supporting a 
transition towards a low- energy housing stock.
 To address the challenges of information, engagement and trust as well as the 
complexity of whole house retrofits, intermediary actors are needed both at 
project level (e.g. specific retrofits) and the broader market level. In the former, 
intermediaries interconnect different technological, human and financial solu-
tions. In the latter, they can have a crucial role in building trust and aggregating 
and disseminating clear and reliable information on retrofit techniques, sup-
pliers and contractors.
 A review of European case studies (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018) shows 
that two types of intermediaries are specifically important in driving the market 
for retrofit. First, innovation funders such as Innovate UK are important in 
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supporting successful piloting of complex architectural or systemic innovation 
(i.e. interconnecting innovative and standard solutions to deliver whole house 
retrofits). Second, social housing providers and local community actors are crucial in 
market creation and advancing retrofits in practice. Yet, the role of social 
housing providers has lately diminished through policies introducing rent caps 
and ‘right to buy’ schemes, as well as local authority budget cuts – leaving less 
resources for housing providers to carry out retrofits in their building stock. In 
addition, business networks, such as the Passive House Platform in Belgium 
(Mlecnik, 2013) are important in pooling together different types of companies 
and solutions to create new business models and promote retrofitting. In the 
UK, the Green Deal Pioneering Places also stimulated cooperatives to deliver 
retrofits. What still seems to be largely lacking in the UK are intermediaries that 
can effectively stimulate the market for whole house retrofitting by 
owner–occupiers and private landlords, at the community level.
 At the project level, intermediaries are needed to stimulate interest in whole 
house retrofits, share experiences among home owners, and provide necessary 
expertise during planning and implementation. Platforms, such as Eco Open 
Houses in the City of Brighton and Hove, organised in 2008 and between 
2010–2015, enabled people to see and visit sustainable homes. These cases 
demonstrate that such events have been extremely useful in providing informa-
tion, stimulating engagement and sharing knowledge on whole house retrofits, 
as well as providing details of trusted local tradespeople and installers. When 
planning and executing whole house retrofits, individual actors taking up inter-
mediary roles – for example, architects, building cooperatives or local authority 
officers taking actions beyond their usual roles – are valuable in helping house-
holds make choices over technologies and materials. Previous research has 
shown the importance of local authority energy managers, planners (Lovell, 
2008) and sustainability officers (Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018) as important 
intermediaries in project planning and implementation.
 Recent CIED research involved a case study of a three- bedroom terraced 
home built in 1860 in Southampton Street, Brighton. The house was part of a 
local project obtaining funding from the ‘Green Deal Pioneer Places’ Pro-
gramme (a national government- funded programme that sought to demonstrate 
the benefits of EE). The house has undergone an extensive retrofit, motivated 
by the owners’ interest in climate change and sustainable living, though the 
owners had no specific knowledge or interest to carry out a retrofit themselves. 
This was coordinated by the Green Building Partnership, which was formed ini-
tially to take part in the programme. The owners therefore did not have to 
acquire knowledge on the technical or policy aspects of the retrofit. The retrofit 
measures included external solid wall insulation, loft insulation, improved 
windows, new boiler and heating controls – involving multiple partners. While 
the Green Building Partnership led the process, from the perspective of the 
owner, there was no one key intermediary communicating between the broader 
scheme and the owners, leading to some confusion. Southampton Street later 
became part of local Eco Open Houses event, acting as an example to others.
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 Without these intermediary roles, projects may become much more compli-
cated. Intermediaries provide information on the retrofit options available for 
the building projects and help to create a plan that meets regulations. More 
support is, however, needed from dedicated intermediaries, to facilitate ‘one- 
stop-shops’ for retrofitting (Brown, 2018), through which households can access 
trustworthy advice on technological and financing options, as well as tradesmen, 
contractors and installers. In this way intermediaries are often the key actors in 
providing information for households on the options and benefits of undertaking 
comprehensive retrofits; engaging communities and supply chains to promote 
retrofit at a local level; and are also likely to be more trusted than actors with a 
financial stake in promoting certain services or products.
 Overall, some factors for successful intermediaries can be depicted. On a 
broader scale, most impact occurs over a longer timeframe. For example, the 
Centre on Alternative Technology established in the 1970s still influences the 
expectation and visions behind home retrofits. While the Eco Open Houses events 
have been popular in Brighton, they were not organised in 2016–2017, creating 
uncertainty about future knowledge exchange and example setting locally. 
Another important determinant in market formation is the positioning between 
ambitious sustainability aims and connections to business and supply chains.
 Innovative business models, such as the Energiesprong approach, owe much 
of their success to dedicated intermediaries, often initiated by government 
policy. Energiesprong was brought into being through a R50 m grant from the 
Dutch government, and the setting up of a market development team (Energie-
sprong, 2017). These market development teams brought together stakeholders 
including the construction industry, housing providers, policymakers and finan-
ciers to radically re- think the business model through which EE retrofit is 
delivered. While these approaches still face challenges, they could represent a 
template for how the UK could deliver on its ambitious retrofit targets.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In the ancient Greek myth, the Hydra was invulnerable only if it retained at 
least one head. Heracles, realising that he could not defeat the Hydra alone, 
worked with Iolaus, and through a combination of decapitating the beasts’ mul-
tiple heads and burning the stumps with a firebrand, stopped them growing 
back. The Hydra’s remaining immortal head was cut off with a golden sword 
given to Heracles by Athena. Heracles placed the head – still alive and writhing 
– under a great rock and shot it with an arrow dipped in the Hydra’s poisonous 
blood. Thus, his second task was complete.
 The previous sections outline how tackling the ‘multi- headed-challenges’ of 
whole house residential retrofit will require a similarly sophisticated and multifac-
eted approach. Promoting business model innovation, delivering a range of financ-
ing options and incentives along with the establishment of strategic intermediaries, 
at both local community and national levels, will require a wide- reaching and 
systemic policy strategy. This strategy should incorporate a mix of regulations, 
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financing and incentives along with the establishment of new institutions and the 
recognition of EE as a strategic infrastructure priority. Equally, different solutions 
will be required for socially rented, privately rented and owner–occupier sectors. 
This will require joined up action across multiple government departments includ-
ing but not limited to: Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government’s (MHCLG), the Treasury (HMT), Educa-
tion (DfE) and Health (DH), the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the National Infrastructure 
Commission (NIC). The following section provides an outline of the range of pol-
icies (Table 7.1) that could contribute to achieving the enormous potential for the 
comprehensive retrofit of residential buildings.
Standards and regulations
EE retrofits create economic benefits that are often several multiples of the 
initial investment (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). Cost- effective investments 
in residential EE to 2035 have a current net present value of £7.5 billion. 
With wider benefits such as gross domestic product (GDP) effects and health 
improvements that could be up to £47 billion (Rosenow et al., 2017). Thus, 
EE investments share the characteristics of other forms of infrastructure as 
identified in HM Treasury’s valuation guidance (Frontier Economics Ltd, 
2015). Therefore, we argue that EE should be re- framed as an infrastructure pri-
ority by the UK government and given the level of strategic support and 
status as other forms of infrastructure; such as road, rail and supply side 
energy infrastructure and be included within the remit of the NIC (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017).
 The UK Clean Growth Plan set an aspirational goal for all domestic 
buildings to achieve and EPC level C or higher by 2035. We support these 
aims, but argue the government could go further, mandating MEES for the 
owner–occupier sector in the 2020s. This could take the form of a gradual step 
change through to a minimum EPC level of C by 2035 at the point of sale, with 
potential for ever- tightening standards moving into the 2040s and beyond 
(Sustainable Energy Association, 2017).
 There remain concerns surrounding the standard and quality of many instal-
lations currently funded under ECO, particularly solid wall insulation, which is 
to be a key part of the UK’s targets (Hansford, 2015). Therefore, we support the 
findings of the recent Each Home Counts – ‘The Bonfield Review’, that the 
government should establish a new quality assurance standard such as a home 
Quality Mark (Bonfield, 2016). Such a policy should be designed not to intro-
duce a further regulatory and cost burden on SMEs and could build on existing 
standards of good practice along the lines of the Investor Confidence Project in 
the commercial sector (Investor Confidence Project, 2015).
 Taken together these three high- level regulatory policies would set the stra-
tegic direction for UK residential retrofit policy and would send market signals 
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for the development of integrated business models, novel financing solutions 
and market intermediaries. However, on their own, top- down regulations are 
unlikely to build a sufficient market for whole house retrofit.
Financial measures
Overcoming the up- front capital cost of EE retrofit remains a challenge for 
many households. Current fuel poverty schemes such as ECO are limited in size 
and have inherent design flaws (Rosenow et al., 2013). For those in fuel poverty 
we instead propose that these costs should largely be met through government 
grants in the form of a fuel poverty obligation paid for by general taxation. This 
would allow the government to better spread the costs of such a scheme, and if 
properly designed could reduce spending in areas such as health, social care and 
welfare (Rosenow et al., 2017).
 For the ‘able- to-pay’ segment a range of market- led financing mechanisms 
may eventually emerge, including mortgage- based approaches and other private 
sector offerings. Yet, we argue that the government should learn the lessons of 
the failed Green Deal and promote a new low- cost financing mechanism tied to the 
property, perhaps retaining the on- bill repayment channel. Successful financing 
schemes such as Germany’s KfW programme have used government funds to 
provide a low cost of capital, involved a simplified customer journey and funded 
broader sources of value such as wider renovation works, which are likely to be 
perceived as higher value by households (Schröder et al., 2011).
 Although providing sources of lending for EE measures is key to enabling ret-
rofit projects, it is unlikely that low- cost financing alone will be drive demand 
for retrofit (Borgeson et al., 2014). Therefore, government can introduce a range 
of fiscal incentives at key trigger points to promote uptake. These might include: 
variable VAT, stamp duty land tax, council tax, income tax rebates or an EE 
feed- in tariff for households who have undertaken measures – with increasing 
benefits for deeper retrofits (UKGBC, 2013). Such approaches will be most 
effective when they are targeted at key trigger points such as moving home or 
when undertaking major renovations (Maby and Owen, 2015).
New institutions and intermediaries
A key challenge for residential retrofit remains the paucity of information, 
engagement and trust within communities. Recent work at the UK Green 
Building Council (2017) has highlighted a new role for intermediaries to catalyse 
retrofit and regeneration activity in local areas. These actors would engage local 
communities on the benefits of retrofit and regeneration and be the key point of 
contact for: information, marketing, financing and project delivery, through 
dedicated project managers/coordinators – drawing on the pre- existing networks 
of diffuse intermediaries already operating in many communities (Martiskainen 
and Kivimaa, 2018). These intermediaries could be based on Community Social 
Enterprise or Local Authority Arm’s Length Management Organization 
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(ALMO) delivery models, and funded through a combination of local authority 
budgets, central government grants and community shares (UKGBC, 2017).
 Intermediaries also play a role in promoting business model innovation for 
the delivery of comprehensive residential retrofit. Examples such as the Dutch 
Energiesprong scheme (Brown, 2018) and the RE:FIT programme in London 
(Nolden et al., 2016) demonstrate how public bodies can promote business 
model innovation, through the creation of new market facing intermediaries and 
standardised procurement frameworks. These initiatives help reduce transaction 
costs and bring together stakeholders to foster learning, new funding approaches 
and supply chain integration.
 Achieving the promise of residential retrofit and tackling the ‘multi- headed-
challenges’ that stand in the way, will require a joined up and coordinated strategy 
– as outlined in this chapter. To deliver this vision, we argue that the UK govern-
ment should set up a National Retrofit Taskforce. This body would be responsible 
for the planning and delivery of the MEES targets through an overarching strategy, 
monitoring and verification process that brings together key stakeholders, includ-
ing, Government, Third sector, Industry and Consumer groups (Rosenow and 
Cowart, 2017). This new high- level intermediary would also be responsible for the 
management of a central Information Hub (to act as a collection point for best 
practice advice and guidance) and a Data Warehouse (to act as a store for property- 
level data and information) (Bonfield, 2016). Advising multiple government 
departments, this body could monitor progress towards the UK’s targets for the 
sector and propose polices to keep this progress on track.
 Climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge facing humanity in the 
twenty- first century. Buildings are perhaps the biggest single contributor to 
carbon emissions, with the existing residential buildings by far the largest com-
ponent (CCC, 2016). Such a Herculean challenge will require an equally Her-
culean effort. We argue that the considerable rewards are more than worth 
rising to this challenge, and that the proposals presented here could go a long 
way towards achieving this.
Notes
1 The CCC define the cost- effective path as comprising measures that cost less than the 
projected carbon price across their lifetimes together with measures that may cost 
more than the projected carbon price but are necessary in order to manage costs and 
risks of meeting the 2050 target (CCC 2013).
2 Those that result from heating, ventilation and cooling systems as well as and hot 
water. This term excludes emissions from electricity consumption.
3 Such as mould growth, poor air quality and interstitial condensation due to poor detail-
ing, and insufficient consideration of building physics, airtightness and ventilation.
4 Energy bill neutrality may include requirements that modelled savings are ‘cash- flow 
positive’ meaning that finance repayments are equal to, or result in, net energy cost 
savings (Borgeson et al., 2013).
5 Defined as electricity generation feeding into the local distribution network (operating 
from 132 kV down to 230 V), as opposed to the regional or national transmission grid 
(which operates from 400 kV and 275 kV).
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